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Showing papers in "Connections: The Quarterly Journal in 2012"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: ADL's Experience API (xAPI) can now provide an option for mobile devices to support traditional online training scenarios as well as new types of informal learning opportunities, and gives learners, instructional developers, and instructors the opportunity to track and access data that far exceeds the current capabilities afforded by the SCORM.
Abstract: IntroductionThe Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) Initiative's Sharable Content Object Reference Model (SCORM®) has been a staple of online learning standards since 2001. The SCORM specification was created by ADL to address interoperability challenges that existed prior to the wide adoption of touchscreen mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. A new interoperability standard is needed to support training opportunities on mobile devices. ADL's Experience API (xAPI) can now provide an option for mobile devices to support traditional online training scenarios as well as new types of informal learning opportunities.1 However, a mobile SCORM capability involves more than simply ensuring technical compatibility with a new technology. It has new implications for instructional design as well as the potential to improve the overall learning experience.Mobile learning is now a ubiquitous educational technology, one that introduces both exciting capabilities and complexity into the learning design process. However, there are very few guidelines for developing mobile learning. As a growing number of mobile innovations become available in the learning space, education and training technology thought leaders are now interested in how to effectively design programs for a variety of mobile learning scenarios. ADL is currently leading a project that will develop an instructional design framework along with guidelines and best practices to better support mobile learning design.Mobile LearningADL believes that mobile learning should be viewed as a way to augment the learner through the use of ubiquitous technology and information, anytime and anywhere. Unlike other learning technologies, mobile learning is unique in that it can accommodate both formal and informal learning, in collaborative or individual learning modes. Many of the existing definitions of mobile learning in the education and training community are too learner-centric or too device-centric. However, ADL believes that both the learner and the device should be taken into consideration in order to provide a more flexible perspective on mobile learning. ADL currently describes mobile learning as "Leveraging ubiquitous mobile technology for the adoption or augmentation of knowledge, behaviors, or skills through education, training, or performance support while the mobility of the learner may be independent of time, location, and space."2 While mobile learning is not appropriate in all instances, we believe that it should be considered as a potential tool for any organization's learning and training support infrastructure.Overview of the xAPIWhile the SCORM was successful in meeting the high-level requirements to solve the challenges within Web-based training systems, it was created prior to the widespread use of other learning environments and platforms such as mobile devices, intelligent tutoring systems, virtual worlds, games, and other social networking tools that augment the performance of today's learner beyond formal training situations. Further, SCORM content was designed to be accessed and tracked via a learning management system (LMS). Mobile learning provides new opportunities to capture more than just a learner's assessment score or course completion status. Learners, as well as education and training practitioners, expect new types of learning data to be captured and used within the aforementioned learning environments, in order to provide a personalized learning experience. They expect to learn informally and collaboratively, and to be able to use social networks as part of the learning experience. Users expect that their learning experiences will earn them credit, regardless of whether the learning activities are browser-based or not; thus there is a new requirement to free learners from being tied to an LMS. The xAPI gives learners, instructional developers, and instructors the opportunity to track and access data that far exceeds the current capabilities afforded by the SCORM. …

17 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The introduction of mobile technologies into education and training is particularly challenging because many organizations have not yet completed the initial adoption of conventional ADL solutions, so the question for security and defense organizations is whether they have to reiterate the process and create new educational resources and programs if they want to introduce scalable mobile learning solutions.
Abstract: IntroductionOver the last decade, mobile information technologies have become a ubiquitous part of daily life. Mobile learning research has been going on for less than ten years, given that the smartphone revolution only started in 2006.1 As such, this field is among the newest research areas in educational technology. Given the overwhelming success of smart mobile devices on the global scale, this technology appears to be well suited to extending the reach and continuity of educational programs.Mobile technologies have become increasingly relevant for education and training in security and defense organizations not only because of the market success of mobile phones and other portable devices but also because many mobile technologies have become part of the standard infrastructure in these organizations. Mobile technologies are part of the information networks that characterize the professional environments of soldiers, policemen, fire fighters, and other security workers. An example of such a networked infrastructure in the defense sector is the "Gladius" System that integrates infantry and vehicle-based weapon systems in the German military.2 Further development towards "network-enabled" combat systems is currently in process.3 These examples illustrate that the scope of technological change represented by the mobile revolution goes far beyond the availability and use of mobile phones.Education and training in security and defense organizations are challenged by mobile technologies and the new relevance of mobility from four perspectives:* Technological* Socio-technological* Professional complexity* Organizational.This essay emphasizes the organizational perspective. Many organizations have already made substantial investments in learning management systems (LMSs) for advanced distributed learning (ADL) infrastructure and in developing appropriate educational material. Significant investments have also been made in the training of instructors and authors to make good use of the available ADL solutions; indeed, many organizations have a rich pool of educational resources available in the SCORM format.4 The introduction of mobile technologies into education and training is particularly challenging because many organizations have not yet completed the initial adoption of conventional ADL solutions. This raises the question for security and defense organizations of whether they have to reiterate the process and create new educational resources and programs if they want to introduce scalable mobile learning solutions.Mobile Learning and SCORMThe sharable content object reference model (SCORM) is the most prominent interoperability standard for educational material that can be used for Web-based training. Originally developed by the ADL Co-labs in the United States, it has emerged as the industry standard for exchanging Web-based training material. SCORM introduced interoperability standards for educational material that made the solution independent from the underlying delivery platform. SCORM is one of the core elements for sustaining investments into the development of educational material. The "reference model" has been widely adopted for packaging and exchanging educational material between so-called "run-time" environments and "learning management systems." SCORM specifies three aspects of ADL solutions:* Content packaging, exchange, and delivery* Content arrangement and sequencing* Interactive content and data persistency.The central elements of SCORM are "content objects." The terminology of SCORM refers to content objects as "sharable content objects," or in shorthand, "SCOs." SCOs are those educational resources that can be shared across ADL courses, compared to non-reusable contents, such as submissions to discussion forums or student presentations, which cannot be shared across courses. SCOs can be text documents, videos, audio files, interactive multi-media, as well as tests and assessments. …

11 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The concept of "strategic communication" has been widely used in the field of security and national defense as mentioned in this paper, with the goal of maintaining or pursuing political and strategic objectives, with the objective of achieving credibility and thus freedom of action.
Abstract: (ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)IntroductionMost recent military actions have provided stark examples of the increasing power of communications in the public and governmental arena regarding the role that direct actors play in disputes characterized as "conflicts of interests." These examples have also shown how communications can directly influence perceptions within the international system and among those who enjoy "freedom of action," who are always pursued by an arsenal of immediate media technology. However, in a conflict of interests, nation-states act along political lines and use the tools of the "fields of action" (internal, external, economic, and defense) to execute their national strategies, with the objective of maintaining or pursuing political and strategic objectives. But how can we defend ourselves against communications, or use them to benefit our political-strategic interests?After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, three capabilities concerning communication began to develop within the George W. Bush Administration in the U.S.: "Information Operations and Psychological Operations" (IO and PSYOPS); "Public Affairs" (PA); and "Defense Support to Public Diplomacy" (DSPD). This was done by dedicating integrated communications technologies for use in pursuing specific tactics, operations, and other elements of the national strategy in this so-called "war of perceptions," with the objective of achieving credibility and thus freedom of action. In that moment the concept of "strategic communication" started to appear in the vocabulary of many people linked to security and national defense issues.Between 2002 and 2004, after many reports, studies, and drafts of the definition of strategic communication in the area of defense, the concept migrated to other areas such as business, public relations, and social communication, generating dissonance within the concept. Meanwhile, another concept, called "strategic communications" (the only difference being the "s") was bom, causing even more confusion.This article intends to offer an interdisciplinary approach to strategy and mass communication in the field of security and national defense and to define, by means of hermeneutical, qualitative, and quantitative research techniques, the definitions, missions and lineaments of strategic communication. It will create a model proposal for "Strategic Communication for Security and National Defense," with the objective of tracing the guidelines of this vital tool for pursuing and maintaining permanent national objectives, including peacekeeping. We will begin with a look at this concept, its evolution and attempts of definitions in recent years.The Evolution of the Definition of Strategic CommunicationThe Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication in the year 2004 defined strategic communication as follows:Strategic communication is a vital component of U.S. national security. It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with a strength of purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security. Presidential leadership and the bipartisan political will of Congress are essential. Collaboration between government and the private sector on an unprecedented scale is imperative. ... Moreover, strategic communication efforts must reinforce key themes and messages and constantly be measured against defined objectives. As a result, adjustments must be made and those responsible for implementation held accountable.1This shows that strategic communication "efforts" are a vital component of U.S. national security.Moreover, in 2005 the Director of Strategic Communications and Information at the National Security Council (NSC), Jeff Jones, pointed out the importance of strategic communication by saying: "There is little evidence of cooperation, coordination, or even more, the appreciation of the impact of strategic communication. …

7 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the question of "What should soldiers do, besides fighting and preparing to fight?" What tasks are (and are not) appropriate for soldiers to carry out in a domestic context? And are there better and cheaper-solutions?
Abstract: IntroductionTwo decades after the end of the Cold War, does Europe need armies? What should soldiers do, besides fighting and preparing to fight? What tasks are (and are not) appropriate for soldiers to carry out in a domestic context? Is territorial defense still a valid mission for European armed forces? And are there better-and cheaper-solutions?These questions have become increasingly difficult to answer in the current strategic and budgetary environment. Armies are expensive, and the threat environment for most European countries has evolved significantly over the past two decades. As a consequence, taxpayers may look askance at defense expenditures, wondering why it is still necessary to pay so much for a capability that no longer seems necessary and might even be redundant. Those defense expenditures also represent tempting targets for politicians anxious to cut budgets in times of austerity.This study is intended to help examine these issues, with a view towards trying to provide answers to the questions of what armies (and, by extension, navies and air forces) can do, should do, must do-and, equally important, should not do-particularly in a domestic context. With the tremendous pressures on governments to save money, these questions are likely to become even more salient in the near future.For armies are convenient targets, and relatively easy to cut. In most European countries, defense expenditures are discretionary, unlike entitlement programs. Their constituencies-though often powerful, particularly in the defense industry-are small, and military forces, particularly contemporary professionalized forces, lack significant popular support. Absent a sense of external threat, militaries are often unappreciated. These professional armies, as is the case in most European countries, are generally small and have little lobbying power and few friends in high places. They are vulnerable. But they are also available, for what often seems to be whatever task comes up.Thus, "Let the army do it" is a phrase often heard in many countries when a task- such as the recovery from an earthquake-exceeds the abilities of local and regional, and often even national, authorities. Military forces are often seen, justifiably or not, as sitting in their bases, waiting for something to do. And since engaging the military in a civil security task is often viewed as free of both cost and risk, the temptation on the part of political leaders to "let the army do it" is great indeed. And it must be said that, for many tasks, it is appropriate to "let the army do it" - but not for all tasks at all times.This trend toward having military forces perform ever more and varied functions distinct from their traditional tasks associated with territorial defense is present in every state with an army. Indeed, some countries, such as China and Egypt, have armies that are vertically and horizontally integrated into the economy, often running major business enterprises. But armies are often asked to perform more mundane tasks, such as trash collection and firefighting, often to the detriment of their readiness to carry out their primary function. For while there are benefits to the engagement of military forces in civil support tasks, there are also opportunity costs. Soldiers engaged in these tasks cannot often be rapidly redeployed. They cannot be in two places at one time, and often would require a significant amount of time to extricate themselves from a particularly challenging civil support task in order to carry out another one. Moreover, soldiers, particularly contemporary professional soldiers, are expensive, particularly when compared to conscript soldiers.Military forces have traditionally played broad-indeed, quite expansive-roles in support of European governments, particularly when viewed from the U.S. perspective, which is characterized by legal and cultural restraints on the domestic deployment of military personnel. …

7 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Asymmetric warfare takes its name from the pitting of a weaker opponent against a stronger one, and from the use of war-fighting techniques that are vastly different from traditional military tactics as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: IntroductionAsymmetric warfare takes its name from the pitting of a weaker opponent against a stronger one, and from the use of war-fighting techniques that are vastly different from traditional military tactics It is the use of these untraditional methods that enables the weaker side stand up to its stronger adversary1 The radical difference of asymmetric warfare from what is now mostly referred to as conventional warfare lies both in the ethical aspect of the conflict and in the types of actions that typically take place, as well as in the instruments brought to bear and the strategies usedThe ethical aspect that characterizes asymmetric warfare is the disregard of any of the ethical standards governing warfare that prevail among most developed nations, replacing it with an ethic founded on religious and/or political fanaticism, disregard for human life, and the justification of every means of struggle that supports the desired end The goals of the struggle never appear to be negotiable, and the general psychological condition of those engaged in such warfare can be summed up as "victory or death"The concrete acts involved in asymmetric warfare serve to educate the younger generations in religious and/or nationalistic fanaticism up to and including martyrdom, with frequent recourse to suicide bombings, generalized bombing, armed attacks, targeted murders, kidnappings (even of persons unrelated to the conflict, for ransom), and the intimidation of populations The tools used cover an extremely wide range: from traditional weaponry to explosives and chemical weapons to all the means of psychological warfare, propaganda, and indoctrination offered by the information and communications technologies of the Internet society, to the so-called shadow economy The general strategy of a weaker adversary in an asymmetric campaign is to extend the war to the territory of the stronger side (typically an industrialized country) These states, in a centuries-long evolution, had succeeded in shifting such conflicts away from their cities and countryside to the boundaries of their world and beyondThe Practice of Asymmetric WarfareThat this form of conflict can be legitimately included in the 'war' category seems to be demonstrated by statistical data: between January 1990 and March 2012, worldwide terrorist attacks caused 8,254 deaths and 12,576 wounded, with an increase in losses between the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century of 560 percent2 All this carnage took place during a period that historians and political scientists have considered a period of peace for the industrialized countries (if exceptions are made for the out-of-area small wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) A useful comparison in this regard is that in the Second Gulf War in Iraq, the coalition's human losses were a total of 4,836 deaths - that is, just slightly over half of those produced by twenty years of asymmetric conflict involving non-state actorsIt should also be pointed out that asymmetric conflict does not consist solely of the clash between fundamentalist Islam, represented by AI Qaeda, and the industrialized countries - "Jews, crusaders, and their apostate puppet regimes in the Islamic world," in typical Islamist parlance - as one can at times be led to think due to its strong public impact Many other movements, both national and international, now adopt this form of struggle, as testified by the impressive list assembled by Gabriel Weimann:* From the Middle East, Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement), the Lebanese Hezbollah (Party of God), the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Fatah Tanzim, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Kahane Lives movement, the People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI-Mujahedin-e Khalq), the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), and the Turkish-based Popular Democratic Liberation Front Party (DHKP/C) and Great East Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C) …

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors measure the level of foreign policy cohesion within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) by analyzing the voting records of the ten member and observer states in the United Nations General Assembly.
Abstract: Having celebrated its tenth anniversary in 201 1, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can be said to have risen rapidly to a position of prominence in the world of regional organizations. Part of the reason for this is found in the successful political marketing of the organization, a process which has seen the member states openly promote their ambition to develop a strong Asian bloc based on both wider and deeper cooperation. As was made clear by the 2001 Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO, this ambition includes the development within the organization of a culture of "close cooperation on the most important international and regional problems." lA high level of agreement on aims and modalities among the members of the group - a precondition for close foreign policy cooperation - will indicate that they may more readily form a united policy front and thus find it easier to have an impact on their surrounding environment. Conversely, a low level of agreement will indicate that they will find it relatively difficult to stand together shoulder-to-shoulder and to achieve the ambitions outlined in the Declaration.Assessing SCO CohesionWhat follows is an assessment of the actual level of foreign policy cohesion within the membership circle. This includes most importantly the six current full members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (the founders in 1996 of the Shanghai Five, the predecessor of the SCO), and Uzbekistan, which joined the SCO at the founding meeting in 200 1.2 To this group I add the original four observer states - Mongolia (which joined in 2004) as well as India, Iran, and Pakistan (all of which joined in 2005) - as these are the most likely candidates for future full membership.3I measure the level of foreign policy cohesion within the SCO by analyzing the voting records of the ten member and observer states in the United Nations General Assembly. The voting record of each state is seen as a proxy for its foreign policy behavior. These types of studies date back to the 1950s, making this a well-tried and oft-used methodology which can help provide us with quantifiable information as we speculate about the possible changes in the foreign policy of a single state or in the relationship between two or more states.4The ToolboxThe data set used in this analysis is the voting records of the SCO member and observer states, all of which are freely available on the United Nations website.5 In order to present a fuller picture of the development of foreign policy in these respective states I expand the temporal basis by using data from General Assembly Sessions 47 through 65, beginning in September 1992 and ending in July 2011. This means that I include data reaching back before the establishment of the SCO and even the Shanghai Five. Within this time span, I extracted data from every second session, giving me data from a total of ten different sessions.The data collection methodology was based on three basic principles.6 First, I only used votes on resolutions passed (thereby excluding resolutions that were rejected as well as parts of resolutions). Second, from this data set I included only roll call (recorded) votes. These two principles combined result in a pool of more than 700 recorded votes. These votes form the basis for the following analysis. The third and final principle is to treat absenteeism as abstention. On each of the more than 700 votes, the SCO member or observer states had the choice of voting "Yes" or "No," or abstaining. A fourth option, however, is to simply choose to be absent - that is, not take part in the voting altogether.Faced with the challenge of absenteeism, some researchers simply throw out all cases with less than full participation by all the objects of analysis.7 However, as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all had high levels of absenteeism in several sessions, this clearly would not work in this study. …

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The phenomena that fall under the rubric of "Web 2.0" have radically changed the characteristics of the objects of security as well as the problems facing security - starting from Twitter revolutions, going through the protests of "the indignant," and culminating in the key role of social media as tools of "soft power."
Abstract: Information can often provide a key power resource, and more people have access to more information than ever before. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power.3Joseph S. Nye, Jr.Power always depends on context.2 The year 2011 has made Joseph Nye's statement starkly visible concerning all actors in the realm of security policy. The Arab Spring uprisings (still ongoing in Syria) and the protests that have erupted in nations around the world of ineffective government policies regarding the global financial and economic crisis have categorically proven that political stability (security) cannot be considered and achieved only in the context of traditional institutions and norms of representative democracy, or through inspiring fear and beliefs in a closed society. These events have demonstrated new forms and scales of political activity, and have called for competent political participation. What unites them, in spite of their widespread geography, is that they were organized and conducted with the help of new communications technologies.The current context of security policy is the communications society. The phenomena that fall under the rubric of "Web 2.0" have radically changed the characteristics of the objects of security (individuals, society, state), as well as the problems facing security - starting from Twitter revolutions, going through the protests of "the indignant," and culminating in the key role of social media as tools of "soft power." This article is an attempt to assess and analyze the parameters of these changes as challenges and new opportunities for security systems in a communications society.The Communications SocietyUntil recently, we used to define the world that we live in as an "information society." But if we carefully analyze the trends of the past decade, we could argue that this statement does not reflect well enough the specifics of the present anymore. Although the quantity of accessible information continuously increases, today it is more appropriate to say that we are witnessing a revolution that provides new alternative instruments for communication. These communication technologies focus not on increasing the volume of accessible information, but on developing various innovative and effective forms of mass communication from central points to large numbers of people, and also on creating new modes of information exchange between individual actors. The phenomenon of "communication" is moving toward obtaining the status of the main explanatory principle in many of the social sciences.The evolution of the Internet at the beginning of the twenty-first century saw the development of a variety of technologies that combined to create what is known as Web 2.0. This stage in the Internet's evolution is characterized by social networks, social media, and user-generated content - by the granting of creative agency to individual users, not just traditional media outlets. A vital feature is the use of the Internet not only as a "communication medium" but also as a "platform."3 These platforms can be created and improved upon both by designers and users. One of the most significant outcomes of Web 2.0 is the creation of social ("new") media as a new means for online mass information, where every Internet user - even those without any special programming abilities - can take part in the process of creating, storing, and disseminating socially important information, addressed to a wide audience.4The widespread dissemination of these "new media" has turned them simply into "the media" for a large number of people. The following are considered the "traditional" media: printed material (newspapers, magazines, etc.), radio, television, cinema and video programs, and digital editions (so-called Web 1 .0) of newspapers, information, and news feeds. Although no official "scientific" definition exists yet, the notion of "new media" characterizes Internet-based (Web 2. …

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a theoretical framework based on several published works whose content deals with history teaching as a key mechanism of justice in transitional societies, and the question arises of whether the teaching of history could help transitional societies become more democratic, and whether it can contribute to the development of empathy for, or even social cohesion among, former enemies in societies in which some groups were marginalized or were deprived of certain rights.
Abstract: IntroductionThe theoretical framework of this article is based on several published works whose content deals with history teaching as a key mechanism of justice in transitional societies.1 Then, it draws from the work of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe and their project "Clio in the Balkans" and the Joint History Textbook Project. In addition, there are materials from interviews with Macedonian and Albanian history teachers, experts, and government representatives selected from the participants in the Macedonian project presented at a United States Institute of Peace conference in Washington, D.C. in November 2005.Unite or Divide?In societies recovering from violent conflict, questions of how to deal with the past are sensitive, especially when they involve memories of widespread victimization, death, and destruction. It is very often the case that, in the wake of violence, political leaders and others seem to prefer social amnesia to the study of their society's recent history, as they try to "move forward" and promote stability.Therefore, the question arises of whether the teaching of history could help transitional societies become more democratic, and whether it can contribute to the development of empathy for, or even social cohesion among, former enemies in societies in which some groups were marginalized or were deprived of certain rights. Going further, can history teaching reinforce other transitional justice processes, such as truth telling and legal accountability for crimes that had been committed in the past? Finally, can teaching history promote belief in the rule of law, resistance to a culture of impunity, and greater trust in public institutions, including schools themselves?The United States Institute of Peace conference convened on this topic in Washington, D.C. in November 2005 raised the issue of the content of post-conflict history education, which raised additional concerns about developing and adopting new history curricula. The issues to be considered include:* Who decides what version(s) of history will be taught?* What impact do those choices have on promoting stable, cohesive, and tolerant societies?* What is the relationship between the (re)writing of history by academic historians and the development of secondary-school history textbooks?* What impact do transitional justice processes have on the development of new secondary-school history textbooks and the way history is actually taught in schools?One particularly problematic issue for post-conflict school systems in divided, multiethnic, and multilingual societies is determining which languages will be used to instruct schoolchildren. Although it is important for children in a multilingual country to learn the language (and, by extension, the culture) of other main groups of citizens in addition to their own mother tongue, having too many official languages in the schools can promote semi-literacy, poor performance, high repetition, and high dropout rates (as is seen in many African countries). At the same time, the rising importance of English as a lingua franca in the global marketplace is increasingly influencing language policies. Ethnic segregation or integration of schools also is an important structural aspect of education. When different ethnic groups are educated separately within the national education system, and especially when one ethnic (or gender) group receives more educational resources than another, such arrangements can convey important overt or hidden messages to students. Cole and Barsalou's report says that some educational systems (such as Macedonia's) permit the use of different history texts in ethnically segregated classrooms. In this case, history instruction in Macedonia is the same for Albanians and Slavs - but only in the sense that each group separately learns a remarkably similar history of victimization by the other, and each claims the same distinctions, such as a longer presence in the region. …

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined and analyzed the proposal for Smart Defense with a view to assessing its value in helping NATO surmount the fiscal challenges it faces, and concluded about the ability of the Smart Defense proposal to help NATO overcome the current fiscal challenges.
Abstract: IntroductionSince 2008, the world has experienced a severe economic crisis, one that has led to many austerity measures, including deep cuts in defense spending in many countries. As NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has argued, maintaining a capable and effective NATO Alliance in this era of financial crisis presents a real and pressing challenge for NATO.1 In response to these challenges, at the Munich Security Conference in February 2011 Rasmussen launched a proposal for "Smart Defense." This proposal aims to examine how "NATO can help nations to build greater security with fewer resources." It emphasizes the need to "spend better" by prioritizing, specializing, and seeking multinational solutions.2This article will examine and analyze the proposal for Smart Defense with a view to assessing its value in helping NATO surmount the fiscal challenges it faces. The first section will provide a brief overview of the current fiscal environment within NATO member states, including key member states' current and planned defense spending cuts and how these cuts will impact burden sharing within NATO. The next section will briefly describe the Secretary-General's Smart Defense proposal, and will explore each pillar of the concept. The third section will examine the key challenges and strengths of the proposal. Finally, conclusions will be drawn about the ability of the Smart Defense proposal to help NATO overcome the current fiscal challenges.NATO Burden Sharing and the Fiscal EnvironmentBurden sharing within NATO occurs through a variety of direct and indirect contributions to the costs of the Alliance.3 The main way member states contribute to the Alliance is through the participation of their national armed forces in NATO, including in operations, and in efforts to ensure that national forces are interoperable with other NATO members.4 At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO member states made a commitment to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense in order to ensure that each member state was able to maintain a capable and effective defense force that was interoperable with other NATO forces.5Constrained fiscal environments within member states have a significant impact on NATO, as this may lead member states to reduce their defense budgets and contributions to NATO. Presently, there are two key challenges for NATO stemming from the current fiscal environment: declining defense budgets in many states, which will likely lead to capability shortfalls; and the increasing gap between European and U.S. contributions to NATO resources. Each trend is discussed below and is followed by a review of the likely impacts on NATO.Declining Defense BudgetsWhile declining defense budgets have been a trend for some time now in Europe, the financial crisis in 2008 accelerated this trend. In 2011, for example, eighteen NATO member states spent less on defense than in 20 10.6 Indeed, in the last two years, Europe's defense spending has gone down by roughly USD 45 billion, which is around the size of Germany's entire annual defense budget.7 The United States also faces huge spending cuts with a USD 487 billion reduction to the US Defense budget over the next ten years.8 In addition, in 201 1 only three of NATO's twenty-eight members met the target of dedicating 2 percent of GDP to defense spending.9 As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recognized, the "fiscal, political, and demographic realities make [achieving the 2 percent of GDP target] unlikely to happen anytime soon." 10 Added to this are the concerns that these "cuts have been carried out with little or no coordination with other member states of the Alliance."11An Increasing Gap between U.S. and European ContributionsSince the beginning of NATO, there have been concerns about the equality of the Alliance's burden-sharing arrangements, particularly between contributions made by the United States and those from its European allies. …

5 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Supporting Crisis Simulations with the ARLearn Toolkit for Mobile Serious Games.
Abstract: Ternier, S., Gonsalves, A., Tabuenca, B., De Vries, F., & Specht, M. (2013, August). Supporting Crisis Simulations with the ARLearn Toolkit for Mobile Serious Games. The Quarterly Journal, 12(1), 19–29. Retrieved from https://pfpconsortium.org/publication-article/supporting-crisis-simulations-arlearn-toolkit-mobile-serious-games

5 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the decision to support the BMD program from the perspective of the Polish government, focusing in particular on the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program proposed and eventually implemented by the Obama Administration in 2009.
Abstract: IntroductionThe government of Poland has addressed a number of difficult national security issues since the nation regained its independence from Soviet control in 1989. Longstanding border disputes with neighboring countries and the perceived disparate treatment of Polish minorities in these countries are just two examples of the many external security challenges Poland faced head-on after its emergence from the Warsaw Pact. Poland's leadership has also addressed a number of internal security problems, such as the modernization of its Cold War-era military and the transfer of control of the armed forces from the Polish General Staff to civilian authorities within its Ministry of Defense.Notwithstanding these daunting security challenges, Poland's decision to support elements of a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program on its sovereign soil has arguably posed the most complex national security dilemma for Polish leaders in this most recent chapter of its long national history. This essay will examine the decision to support the BMD program from the perspective of the Polish government, focusing in particular on the BMD program proposed and eventually implemented by the Obama Administration in 2009. After providing a historical summary of the United States' BMD program as it applies to Poland, the article will examine the domestic context within Poland, and how this context influenced the actions of government officials charged with evaluating the BMD program.The essay will then review Poland's national interests in accepting a BMD program on its soil, and will discuss how Polish officials negotiated with the Obama Administration to gain concessions in support of these national interests. Finally, the essay will examine how the decision to support the BMD program affected Poland's long-term relationships with neighboring countries within the European Union (EU) and, most importantly, Russia. By allying with the United States and, to a certain extent, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on BMD, Poland put itself in the middle of a highly contentious international dispute. Given the security guarantees, military modernization, and potential economic aid that resulted from this eventual support, however, the decision by the Polish government will likely prove to be a beneficial one, as Poland continues to rapidly emerge from the shadows of the Warsaw Pact.The Roots of the BMD Program in PolandFollowing several years of discussions with the Polish government, President George W. Bush proposed a European BMD program in early 2007. The program, similar to installations in Alaska and California that focus on ballistic missile threats from North Korea, called for the deployment of ten silo-based interceptor missiles in Poland to target ballistic missile attacks originating from Iran.1 The system, it was believed, would optimize ballistic missile defensive coverage for the United States, as well protect U.S. allies and U.S. personnel stationed in Europe.2The Polish government, then under the leadership of President Lech Kaczynski and Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski, was eager to implement the BMD program without any U.S. concessions. The twin brothers believed the mere presence of U.S. troops on Polish soil not only markedly increased the country's defenses against foreign aggression, but also improved its relationship with what they saw as an important future ally in the United States.3 Because of these benefits, President Kaczynski and Prime Minister Kaczynski did not connect their support of the agreement to U.S. concessions on foreign aid or foreign military sales.4In October 2007, parliamentary elections split control of the Polish government, which resulted in the replacement of Jaroslaw Kaczynski as prime minister. The new prime minister, Donald Tusk, was more cautious on the proposed BMD project, and he made it clear that his government would carefully weigh the costs and benefits of the BMD program and bargain more actively on behalf of Poland's national interests. …

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TL;DR: NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a forum for partners to individually tailor their relationships with NATO, agree on common activities, and implement them at a level and pace that is acceptable to each government as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: A new security environment dramatically different from that which defined NATO's mission at its inception poses different challenges for collective action. Newly emerging global threats such as terrorism, cyber attacks, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction confront both existing Alliance members and its global partners. NATO must also consider the nature of partnership itself, and the role NATO might play in building its partners' capacity to address global threats, participate in coalition operations, and enhance defense reform.These themes - security and partnerships - were key to the NATO Lisbon Summit (held in November 2010) and the newly crafted NATO Strategic Concept. According to the recommendations of the Group of Experts on NATO's new strategic concept, "For NATO 2020, the twin imperative is assured security for all its members and dynamic engagement beyond the treaty area to minimize threats."1 Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates identified building partner capacity as a critical element in promoting and sustaining security. In an article in the May- June 2010 issue oi Foreign Affairs, Secretary Gates wrote, "[There] has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or human capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term."2One way in which the United States, its NATO Allies, and Partnership for Peace (PfP) Partners are cooperating to enhance security through building defense institutions and developing human capital is in the context of professional military and civilian defense education. Many believe that education - changing mindsets and restructuring the approach to military teaching and research - and not military hardware offers the best opportunity for success.What follows is an exploration of those innovative initiatives that NATO - both collectively and as individual members and Partner nations - is taking to support PfP members in building Partner capacity in the area of education. The central point is that these initiatives are important: from building reliable partners, to deterring conflict in Europe and Eurasia (specifically the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus), to strengthening Partner nations from within. I will demonstrate a link between the complex security issues facing the Alliance and the role of education and training in transforming individuals, military academic institutions, and societies. Education and training transformation is a high-priority mission that will need to be sustained for decades in order to contribute to more reasoned decisions, better leadership, and ultimately a region at peace. This sustainment is critical - and will be highlighted as essential for the programs' success.NATO's Partnership for PeaceNATO launched the Partnership for Peace in 1994 as a means of promoting reforms, increasing stability, and enhancing security relationships both between and among Partner countries and NATO.3 PfP provides a forum for Partners to individually tailor their relationships with NATO, agree on common activities, and implement them at a level and pace that is acceptable to each government. In this way, the Partners "self-differentiate" their levels of cooperation with the Alliance.4 Although several non-aligned, developed states joined PfP (e.g., Austria and Switzerland), the majority of the new PfP countries were former Communist states from the Warsaw Pact or the former Soviet Union. Thus, NATO viewed new avenues for cooperation as an important aspect of changing mindsets, such as encouraging support for democracy, as well as enhancing security through increased military interoperability.Since PfP was established, twelve former members have joined the Alliance.5 NATO enlargement has replaced the traditional orientation toward containment of the Soviet Union and Russia as the Alliance's principal policy direction. …

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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors highlight the impact and positive changes that gender mainstreaming has made in the process of modernizing law enforcement institutions and to present a toolkit for those administrations who are ready to employ a gender-mainstreaming program or for those who are in the nascent stages of implementation.
Abstract: IntroductionThe way we distinguish between men and women is generally based on biological sex differences. An approach to the issue based on gender (rather than sex) examines how societies relate to biological diversity. Societies around the world have developed a variety of models based on different understandings and expectations for male and female roles within society. Worldwide, the roles of women and men - that is, gender - are defined by historical, cultural, and religious factors.Gender inequality is still prevalent in today's world. According to the United Nations report World's Women 2010, statistical research has shown that "progress in ensuring the equal status of women and men has been made in many areas, including school enrollment, health, and economic participation. At the same time, it makes clear that much more needs to be done, in particular to close the gender gap."1 Societies continue to place limitations on individuals' access to work as well as the ability to enjoy certain rights based on their gender. In the twenty-first century, this is a subject of utmost importance that cannot be ignored.The "gender mainstreaming" model has proven to be an effective tool in reversing the negative trajectory of gender inequality. Unfortunately, the gender mainstreaming concept is often misunderstood or misinterpreted, met with skepticism, or flatly rejected. Despite numerous publications and much academic research, there remains a pervasive need to talk about gender mainstreaming and to examine this issue in greater detail as it pertains to specific fields.This article will focus on one particular dimension of this issue, gender mainstreaming in the field of law enforcement. As a senior law enforcement practitioner, I firmly believe that no modern state administration system can be effective without a gender mainstreaming strategy and action plan.The Significance of Gender MainstreamingThe objective of this article is to highlight the impact and positive changes that gender mainstreaming has made in the process of modernizing law enforcement institutions and to present a toolkit for those administrations who are ready to employ a gender mainstreaming program or for those who are in the nascent stages of implementation. Numerous studies have shown that gender equality in the realms of law enforcement and security directly contributes to comprehensive security. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted on 31 October 2000, "reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressed the importance of their equal participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, particularly in decision-making."2As for the direct relationship between law enforcement reform and gender, the authors of the Toolkit on Police Reform and Gender summarize the situation thus:Security threats and crimes are committed against all sections of society; however, police organizations throughout the world continue to be predominantly male with poor representation from certain groups. Policing has traditionally been regarded as 'men's work' because it is associated with crime, danger, and coercion. Recruitment processes ... sometimes eliminate female candidates or men that do not have 'correct' masculine attitudes. However, by having a more representative police service - one that reflects the ethnic, religious, geographic, sex, tribal, and language makeup of the community - the credibility, trust and therefore the legitimacy of the service, will grow in the eyes of the public. Increasing the number of female personnel can have concrete operational benefits.3The most remarkable benefits of gender mainstreaming are:* An improved security situation* Increased public support of law enforcement activities* Increased transparency* The possibility to develop specific capabilities* Decreased discrimination and increased acceptance of social diversity* The strengthening of societal acceptance of female role models. …

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TL;DR: This article proposes to briefly examine four developments that have brought new requirements for military education, and then to think further about what these new requirements mean for military educators.
Abstract: IntroductionThe last few decades have seen many new features introduced into the world of warfare, with an evident impact on those who go into harm's way on our behalf. In this article, I propose to briefly examine four developments that have brought new requirements for military education, and then to think further about what these new requirements mean for military educators. The essay will conclude with a real-life example, by sketching how this wave of change translates into military education reform in the Republic of Armenia.The four "new" elements selected for consideration here are:1. A new world of conflict and warfare, for which we must educate our students2. A new world of education, featuring lifelong learning, e-learning, and learnercentered education3. New networks of learning, including such examples as the European Higher Education Area, NATO's Defense Institution Building initiative, and the Partnership for Peace Consortium4. Military education reform in emerging democracies, encompassing new institutions, new curricula, and new attitudes.This list is far from complete, and the discussion offered in a brief format such as this can only be superficial at best, but they provide intriguing indicators of how military education - that fascinating bazaar where the military world and the educational world intersect - is addressing the challenges of a military education curriculum that continues to expand and that has embraced some unexpected domains. Who would have predicted fifty years ago that diversity and gender would become features of professional military education? Such topics find themselves in the curriculum in part because they reflect modern human rights sensitivities and in part because they have operational utility.Continuing Change in a Persistent CultureThe profession of arms may be in some ways one of the most stable and enduring professions on the face of the earth. Military culture and military traditions are shared across national boundaries and across generations. But the business of the profession of arms is highly fluid, and constantly changing. While military traditions and values persist, each new mission brings new doctrines, new tactics, new lessons, and new thinking. The daily reports of suicide bombers, pilotless drone attacks, and cyber warfare viruses all remind us of the new complexity of the old business of warfare. Less visible than combat operations, the work of generating, managing, and sustaining armed forces has become more complicated as well. Governments demand greater financial accountability. Weapons acquisition, logistics, and financial oversight all demand modern business skills. Whole-of-government initiatives and the comprehensive approach are a growing part of the operational fabric, calling for a whole new set of knowledge and skills.The business of assembling and sustaining a modern and sophisticated armed force falls to a large extent on the military trainer and the military educator, which means that trainers and educators have a responsibility to understand the impact of new developments in the world of defense on military teaching. This involves more than selecting the most important new concepts and absorbing them into the military curriculum. The very nature of the curriculum is changing, as many of the new demands upon it require a more thorough, more systematic, and indeed a more academic approach. As a result, we find within the traditional training paradigm an increasing component of what has become known as "professional military education."1The first question to be asked is, How do we define the modern military education curriculum? The most obvious concern is technical. Officers and soldiers will need new technical skills to operate new capabilities. A more important challenge is how to use new weapons and techniques that have both tactical and strategic applications. The most potent example is perhaps the armed pilotless drone, a weapon that can do the bidding of a company commander in the field, or respond to the direct instructions of a head of state. …

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TL;DR: Serdyukov's "New Look" as mentioned in this paper is the most recent attempt to reform the Russian military, which is based on the so-called "near-foreign" principle.
Abstract: Introduction"Russia Has Lost its Army." This headline of an editorial published on the global defense and military portal DefenceTalk in October 2003 gives proof of the perception of the Russian military leadership at the beginning of the twenty-first century.1 The developments after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to multiple efforts to reform the Russian armed forces. In the early 1990s, former Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev initiated a number of military reforms, but met heavy resistance within the Russian officer corps (still strongly influenced by the Soviet era) who were trying to preserve their system and positions.2 Most of the additional reform efforts of the last twenty years - which were mostly limited to downsizing manpower and equipment, without addressing the larger military system and organizational structure - failed to achieve the goal of a restructured modern Russian military. This led the Russian military journalist Alexander Goltz to publish a book in 2004 titled The Army of Russia: 11 Lost Years, in which he concludes that between 1993 and 2004 the military reforms that were carried out in Russia had no meaningful results.3 In response to the lack of progress in armed forces reform, the newly appointed civilian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov introduced the so-called "New Look" on 23 February 2008. Will the "New Look" reforms lead to the "reappearance of the Red Star," the symbol of the former Soviet Army? What are the possible implications of such a resurgence for NATO? To understand the imperatives behind Serdyukov' s "New Look," it is necessary to understand Russia's national interests, as every government will calculate their military reforms based on their perceived national interests, as well as on identified threats and risks.Key Aspects of Russian Foreign PolicySince the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's national interests have remained basically unchanged, with one exception. The importance of economic prosperity with respect to oil, natural gas, and other extractive resources has risen considerably, as this wealth is perceived as the foundation of any Russian attempt to tackle existing and future domestic challenges, as well as a way back to gaining dominance in Russia's socalled "near abroad."4 Russia's traditional national interests, which are stated in the July 2008 Foreign Policy Concept and the 2009 National Security Strategy, include bolstering demographic health and security as well as maintaining security on its borders and within the near abroad. Additionally, Russia wants to ensure that it remains the primary actor in the region, especially in Central Asia.5 The more recently published "New Military Doctrine" of February 2010 refers to the importance of the "near abroad" and underlines Russian concerns about NATO encroachment in this region. To ensure its regional dominance and to protect Russian interests, the Russian armed forces "might be used operationally outside Russia" unilaterally, according to this doctrine.6 Russia seems also to be more willing to deploy their forces within the arrangements of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.7 Russia's national interests and their translation into the New Military Doctrine as well as the ongoing focus on the "near abroad" have to be considered when analyzing any efforts to reform Russia's military.After the "Collapse of the Red Army": Russian Forces at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century"Not since 1941 has the Russian military stood as perilously close to ruin as it does now," stated Dr. Alexei Arbatov, the Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee in the Duma in 1998.8 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Russian armed forces - which inherited the larger part of the Soviet Red Army in terms of soldiers and equipment - still struggled with a heritage that relied heavily on the mentality of the Soviet era and with the legacy of outdated equipment. The first review of Russia's military doctrine, carried out in 1993, was largely unsuccessful in organizing the Russian forces and in changing the old Soviet military mentality; Russian forces were spread out all over the expansive area of the former Soviet Union, with a lack of general strategy and organization. …

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TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an overview of the state-of-the-art technologies used in the development of these systems. But they do not discuss the impact of these technologies on the quality of the resulting products.
Abstract: Резюме: Интервенция в Афганистане, которая продлилась более десяти лет, не принесла того, на что больше всего надеялись – безопасность для афганского народа и стабилизацию всего региона. Эти процессы ежедневно сталкиваются с вызовами, порожденными сложностью социальных структур Афганистана: его культурой, ценностями, образом жизни, племенными связями, политикой, сетями повстанцев и его историей. Детальное исследование примеров структур, связанных с культурой и политикой, может дать нам общий взгляд на их сложность и на глубоко переплетенные взаимоотношения между разными акторами, причастными к афганскому конфликту. В этом свете мы сможем показать повторяющиеся недостатки либерального способа установления мира в конкретном случае с Афганистаном. Эти примеры также демонстрируют отличия в ценностях между афганским и западным обществом по отношению к равенству полов, в культурных и политических восприятиях. Возможности разрешения конфликтов на основе традиционных структур—таких, как местные сообщества, племенные или религиозные структуры, или системы традиционных ценностей,—предлагают новые сценарии для исследования реальных стратегий и также их возможного применения. Верификация представлений об афганской реальности на месте и подготовка к операциям по восстановлению мира могут эффективно улучшить формулировку целей и реализацию действий международного сообщества, и соответственно, улучшить достигаемые результаты. В стране, которая в прошлом всегда успевала отбросить иностранных оккупантов и которая не склонна к принятию диктата извне, шансы на успех нашей миссии могут возрасти, если мы сможем принять то, что либеральные ценности, возможно, не являются универсально применимыми. Прислушиваясь напрямую к голосу афганцев, вовлекая их в процесс восстановления, учитывая реалии афганской жизни в контексте афганских ценностей, – все это дает возможность создать успешную стратегию для восстановления Афганистана.

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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the nature of asymmetric conflict, its nature as seen by the participants, their relations with the other actors present in the theatre of operations, their assessment of how the soldiers to be sent on a given mission were selected and prepared, and the particular experiences gained in the theater.
Abstract: IntroductionThe completion of a cross-national research study on a sizeable sample of military personnel who had participated in asymmetric warfare operations has resulted in a variety and breadth of survey material that is deserving of further examination.1 Additional study of the data gathered in this research is particularly important in order to recon struct the environment of this type of warfare, with special regard to the human impact of such conflicts on the participants.2This closer look is possible because of the way in which the research was conducted, by means of in-depth, semi-structured interviews, which gave the interviewees a chance to go beyond the topics strictly pertaining to the interview's structure and to talk more expansively about their lived experiences, emotions, and backgrounds. The richness of this data will be rendered in this essay through direct quotation of the interviewees' responses, preserving their vivacity and, at times, simplicity, and limiting the comments of the article's author to a minimum.The essay deals with four aspects of asymmetric conflict: its nature as seen by the participating soldiers, their relations with the other actors present in the theatre of operations, their assessment of how the soldiers to be sent on a given mission were selected and prepared, and the particular experiences gained in the theatre.The Nature of Asymmetric ConflictThe first topic that is examined here is the nature itself of asymmetric conflict, as it appears in the testimonies of the protagonists, in its dual aspect of war-fighting on the one hand and civil action on the other. In many instances, this latter aspect of the work took on the de facto nature of civil replacement; soldiers were asked to carry out tasks and functions that in that particular territory at that particular moment were not being performed by the civilian authorities who were normally responsible for them. It is well known and amply discussed in the literature on this subject (see footnote 1) that one of the chief (and contradictory) characteristics of asymmetric warfare is precisely the mingling of these two aspects and their constant intersection. This characteristic also poses one of the greatest difficulties to the service personnel involved - that is, the necessity of being able to pass at any moment from the role of the social worker to that of the combatant, and back again.We have gathered abundant data on both of these aspects. Indeed, if we consider, by way of example, the current conflict (now in its eleventh year) in Afghanistan, I believe that there can be no doubt with regard to its characterization as a war. This statement is borne out by the number of dead and wounded, the use of war munitions (quantitatively and qualitatively), the type of means deployed, and the combat situations that have occurred. And, as a war, it is a particularly insidious one, due to the mingling of the insurgents with the civilian population and their use of guerrilla techniques and terrorism. These qualities of the Afghanistan conflict are amply recorded in the experiences of the soldiers participating in the ISAF coalition. And the same applies to combat experiences in other theatres that have received less media coverage but that have been equally characterized by episodes of asymmetric warfare, such as Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, etc.Participants experienced the asymmetric conflict environment as a true war theatre and this fact is reported by numerous testimonies, such as:I was involved in a big fire fight on June 11, 2009 and appreciated how my mates reacted to the fire. I was in command of an armored craft ("Lince"): my machine gunner was wounded on his arm, but he remained at his post. The craft behind me was heavily hit (two casualties) and a pickup truck carrying Afghan soldiers was blown up by an IED: I talked with them few minutes before, and was hit particularly hard by their death (Italian NCO, deployed in Afghanistan). …

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TL;DR: The Mobile Learning Environment (MoLE) Project is discussed, a unique and ambitious effort sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense's Coalition Warfare Program in partnership with over twenty nations, which explored the usefulness and effectiveness of using mobile technologies as a tool to support training activities in medical stability operations.
Abstract: IntroductionThis research paper discusses the Mobile Learning Environment (MoLE) Project, a unique and ambitious effort sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense's Coalition Warfare Program (CWP) in partnership with over twenty nations. The mobile learning project explored the usefulness and effectiveness of using mobile technologies as a tool to support training activities in medical stability operations. This article discusses the importance of employing global research ethics and social responsibility practices in the testing and evaluating of science and technology projects. It provides an understanding of research ethics requirements and looks at how the technical challenges were applied within a global framework. Finally, it showcases an integrated application of a mobile capability in accordance with a myriad of research ethics guidelines and concludes with the accomplishment of evaluating this global capability.Research DesignScience and technology (S&T) research has played a significant role in developing new technologies that benefit both society and the defense sector. There are many positive impacts that have resulted from such research, and the benefits have revolutionized our way of life. However, this is not always the case across all fields, and there are numerous examples of ethical misconduct in social and behavioral sciences and humanities research. Some researchers in these disciplines at times assert that regulations for the protection of human research subjects do not apply to their work in the same way that they apply to scientific or medical research. However, a close reading of most regulations regarding the involvement of human beings as research subjects will find references that state otherwise.1 Ethical conduct is an essential element in all scientific research, and is necessary to foster collaboration, cooperation, and trust. It is imperative that research be socially responsible in order to make advancements in scientific knowledge that both protect and benefit the public.2Research has been defined as a process of systematic investigation that includes research development and testing and evaluation activities that are designed to develop or contribute to generalized knowledge.3 A human subject is defined as an individual who is or becomes a participant in research, either as a recipient of an article being tested or as a control. With such a broad definition, researchers should ensure that all moral and social dimensions are considered when a research project involves any interactions with humans. During the development stage, the project should incorporate a "gate-keeping" mechanism into the planning activities that demonstrates an endorsement of ethical practices, solid research methodologies, and applicable professional standards. For cooperative research, the project's planning activities need to adhere to each of the institution or country's research ethics requirements to ensure that the project takes the moral and social dimensions into account.4 Therefore, when conducting research, three components are required in the research design:* The Human Research Protection Program, which ensures that the researchers promote the integrity of the research and safeguard against any misconduct* A Data Collection Plan, which will ensure that there is a clear understanding of the research objectives and develops trust in the data collection process* The Data Analysis and Interpretation Process, which builds ownership across the research project and provides safeguards against any misconduct or impropriety that might reflect on the researchers or organizations involved.5Human Research ProtectionHuman subject research is research that involves a living individual about whom an investigator obtains data through interaction. This interaction may include, but is not limited to, any type of communication-such as surveys, emails, Internet, phone interviews, face-to-face conversations, etc. …

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TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on representative examples of cultural and political structures and their role in the war in Afghanistan and demonstrate the repeated shortcomings of liberal peace building in the case of Afghanistan.
Abstract: :An intervention in Afghanistan that has lasted longer than a decade has not brought about what was most hoped for: security for the Afghan people and stabilization of the entire region. These processes are challenged every day by the complexity of Afghanistan's social structures: its culture, values, way of life, tribal networks, politics, insurgent networks, and its history. A closer examination of examples of cultural and political structures can provide us with a perspective on this complexity, and on the deeply intertwined relationships among various actors engaged in the Afghan conflict. In this light, we can demonstrate the repeated shortcomings of liberal peace building in the case of Afghanistan.These examples also manifest the differences in values, attitudes toward gender, and cultural and political perceptions between Afghan and Western societies. The possibilities of conflict resolution, and its foundation in traditional structures-such as local communities, tribal or religious structures, or traditional value sets-offer scenarios for feasible strategies to be explored and possibly implemented.Acknowledgement of the Afghan reality on the ground and preparation for peace building missions can effectively improve the goals of efforts pursued and carried out by the international community, with a corresponding improvement in results. In a country that has managed to repel foreign invasions in the past, and tends not to accept dictates from the outside, our chances of success in our mission can be increased if we can admit that liberal values might not apply universally. By listening to Afghan voices directly and ensuring their involvement in the process of reconstruction, our respect for the realities of Afghan life, in the context of their values, creates the possibility to set up a successful strategy for Afghanistan's recovery.IntroductionAfghanistan has been experiencing military and humanitarian intervention for more than ten years. "The right war" - as U.S. President Barack Obama has described this effort - carries several distinctive characteristics. It is also considered by some researchers to be a "war on Islam." This statement has been strongly denied by the Obama Administration, which took a decisive step in December 2009 to end this conflict by declaring a significant "detour" and changing its official language, bringing few new wrinkles to the process: the beginning of negotiations with the Taliban and the announced intention to withdraw all U.S. combat troops by 2014. Some others invoke this conflict's similarity to the Vietnam War. Both critics and supporters of this war agree that, under current conditions, Afghanistan will not be able to sustain itself.Despite the lessons of history, the international community became involved in a conflict from which an exit would be hard to envisage and in which success would be difficult to define, let alone to achieve. One of the key elements contributing to this status is the problematic nature of the goal of building a Western-style state structure in the context of a tribal society wracked by ongoing conflict. Strong calls for the prioritization of liberal values - peace, democracy, equality, and economic modernization - are omnipresent in reports and political speeches related to Western missions in Afghanistan. The shortcomings of these missions mostly relate to civilian casualties and missteps that deeply affect the cultural and religious sensitivities of the Afghan people.Afghanistan's social structure is dominated by multiple layers made up of ethnic, tribal, clan, family, or qawm entities.2 My primary intention - to analyze these multiple structures (political, cultural, tribal, economic, regional, military, religious, etc.) - would have been too complex to tackle, and indeed would be the work of a lifetime. Therefore, the main focus of this article will be on representative examples of cultural and political structures and their role. …

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TL;DR: The role of the major players in the Arctic; the territorial disputes between the Arctic countries; sovereign rights over natural resources; and disputes over new transportation routes are analyzed in this article. But the focus of this paper is on the Russian side.
Abstract: IntroductionFor centuries, the Arctic was a "sacred place" for humanity. This frozen void was a magnet for adventurers and explorers, for everybody who wanted to challenge both themselves and nature. In nineteenth century, the "top of the world" became a field of competition for major European and North American nations. During this race, the main prize was the North Pole. Which state would be the first to claim it? Even at the climax of the era of colonial conquest, no nation was ready to declare the Arctic entirely for itself. The twentieth century brought new developments to the Arctic. Two World Wars went almost unnoticed in the extreme North. But during the Cold War, the Arctic became a new battleground. For two superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union - the route through the Arctic provided the shortest course for nuclear-armed intercontinental missiles and planes loaded with thermonuclear bombs bound for targets in one nation or the other. The thick ice cap provided additional protection for the nuclear submarines trying to edge ever closer to enemy territory. After the end of Cold War and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the attention given to the Arctic waned. With the beginning of the twenty-first century, new challenges arose in the Arctic. Climate change, a global race for natural resources, new transportation routes, and old territorial disputes created not only new threats to security, but also opportunities for cooperation between the Arctic countries.The purpose of this article is to examine the problems that have arisen in the Arctic in the post-Cold War era. This essay will analyze the role of the major players in the Arctic; the territorial disputes between the Arctic countries; sovereign rights over natural resources; and disputes over new transportation routes. It is particularly important to examine Russia's military build-up and its more assertive foreign policy in the Arctic region.There are two main reasons why the Arctic has increasingly come to take a place at the center of global politics. The first reason is climate change. The process of global warming is a byproduct of human activities, yet up to this point the global community has failed to establish common rules to reduce the use of fossil fuels and reduce carbon emissions in order to reduce the effects of climate change. Melting of year-round sea ice in the Arctic has opened completely new sea routes, and the reduction in size of the polar ice cap in the Arctic has uncovered natural resources that were hidden for millennia. The second reason is the rise of Russia. Even before the war with Georgia in 2008, Russia had been demonstrating that it was coming to rely more on "hard power" than on the primacy of international law. By stepping up its nationalistic rhetoric and increasingly acting unilaterally, Russia's political and military leadership is trying to reassess and create a vision for a "New Russia."The Major PlayersThere are five "Arctic Rim" countries: the United States, Canada, Denmark (through its possession of Greenland), Norway, and Russia. In addition, there are three more nations with territory bordering or above the Arctic Circle: Iceland, Sweden, and Finland. By extension, the European Union (EU) is a major stakeholder in all Arctic disputes (given Denmark, Sweden, and Finland's status as EU members). These eight countries are members of the Arctic Council. This high-level forum was established in 1996 to increase cooperation between the Arctic countries. There are six working groups that administer a range of projects - from regulations on shipping in the "High North" to assessments of the impact of climate change. The Arctic Council works by consensus, and has no regulatory mandate nor any enforcement mechanism.1 Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Great Britain hold the status of permanent observers. China, Japan, South Korea, and Italy all hold ad hoc observer status. …

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TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored some alternatives that may enhance the capabilities of strategic communication as a viable instrument of warfare, and they also pointed out that non-Muslim states are at a greater disadvantage, even if they do have constitutional protections of religion for all citizens, including Muslims.
Abstract: IntroductionNation-states (particularly non-Muslim states) will face daunting challenges in the struggle against terrorists who use Islam as a justification for their actions. This form of terrorism is multidimensional and global, and it is likely that this struggle will span several generations. While Muslim states are also victims of terrorism, non-Muslim states are at a greater disadvantage, even if they do have constitutional protections of religion for all citizens, including Muslims. In this continuing struggle, non-Muslim states must persuasively communicate with the Islamic world about their aims and what they hope to achieve in the war against terror. Considering the scope of the violence that has already been perpetrated by these kinds of terrorists, countries engaged in this struggle will have to be extraordinarily vigilant to protect their interests, and in some cases, their allies. In contrast to this, terrorist organizations will continue to use their networks to counteract those governments that they are against and portray them negatively. Despite the threats posed by terror groups and the challenges to conducting military operations against irregular actors such as terrorists, non-Muslim states must prevail in their mission.1This article explores some alternatives that may enhance the capabilities of strategic communication as a viable instrument of warfare.2Terrorists' Communication Strategy: Their Center of GravityAfter almost ten years in the global war on terror, non-Muslim states will have to enhance awareness among Muslims in the Islamic World of their objectives. Eliminating these terrorists is difficult, if not impossible, because of the financial and moral support they receive from some segments of Muslim communities throughout the world. In essence, this support comes through their manipulative exhortation that the war against terror - a war directed at very specific actors - is a war against all of Islam.Their communication strategy is clearly effective. They are achieving their objectives through their ability to gain financial and other support from Muslim communities. It is likely this will continue to pose major challenges for non-Muslim countries' policy makers. One tactic that might considerably weaken terrorists' capabilities is to use their communication strategy, which focuses on Islam - the center of gravity for their power - to undermine the religious link to their communities. This approach is within non-Muslim countries' capacity, and thus it should be considered as nations outside of the Muslim community continue to seek ways to increase the effectiveness of their messages to the Islamic World.No group has the sole authority to speak for its entire religion, and Islam is no exception. Given that over 23 percent of the world's population is Muslim, it is impossible that any one group would be able to articulate a message that would be accepted by all Muslims around the globe.3 Nonetheless, Islamist terrorists continue to include Islamic references, themes, and traditions as justifications for their actions. Knowledge of Islam may gain one a certain degree of legitimate authority, but purposeful misinterpretation of the Quran and other holy texts is without doubt un-Islamic. It is obvious that those who misuse Islam's religious principles are not seeking spirituality, but rather seeking their own power and gain. The slant that terrorists put on Islam in order to achieve their ends does matter, especially when it goes against most Muslims' sensitivities about their religious beliefs and meaningful interpretations of the Quran. What really matters is to point out such groups' inaccurate usage of Islamic themes and their purposeful denigration of Islam. For instance, if a group were to inaccurately communicate religious themes for its benefit, then anyone would have the right to question the basis for such interpretations and the hatred they promote. …

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TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that a new approach to the decision about whether to resort to force could give the U.S. the opportunity to revitalize its global leadership.
Abstract: IntroductionThe United States developed as a country imbued with the belief that it held a somehow unique and unifying vocation that was best formulated in the key phrase of nineteenthcentury westward expansion "Manifest Destiny," which held that the U.S. had a divinely ordained fate to expand across the North American continent, and ultimately to redeem the Old World. While the twentieth century saw this ideology take concrete form in a nation that eventually achieved the status of a unique superpower, the first decade of the twenty-first century has often been suggested to reflect a relative decline in the United States' global standing. Assuming that this decline is unavoidable would be to participate in a form of fatalism, allowing neither the chance for the United States' core strengths to demonstrate the contrary, nor the possibility that geopolitical events may at some point potentially keep other countries from rising.If, during the last Bush Administration, the United States frequently resorted to the use of hard power as a quick answer to certain issues, under Barack Obama's presidency, some events have suggested a change in the way the U.S. resorts to hard power, eventually "re-casting the way America should approach the world." !Indeed, numerous cases have indicated that the U.S. is currently more moderate than could have been expected, based on the previous eight years. For example, President Obama announced in 2010 the plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan by 2014. Simultaneously, and especially in 2011, the White House exerted unusual pressure on Israel with respect to the latter' s potential action against Iran.2 Parallel to that, events in Libya during the fall of the Gaddafi regime did not reflect an unquestioning willingness to resort to force; indeed, haste seems to be the last word to use to describe the White House's approach to intervention in Syria as well. Concretely, more emphasis has been placed on diplomacy and low-profile actions, such as frequent use of armed drones, targeted elimination, and negotiation (although some of these actions have received significant media attention). Surrounding this unusual stance, a desire to clarify relations with Islam has also emerged. Manifested in President Obama's 2009 speech in Cairo, this more temperate approach has perhaps helped mitigate some resentment against U.S. military interventionism throughout the Muslim world.Obama, who was believed - at least from a European perspective - to be a much more peaceful president than his predecessor, has remained above all a Commander-inChief, seeing himself as elected and inclined to act to protect U.S. interests.3 He seems to view the option to use military force - as reflected in the 2010 National Security Strategy - through the lens of attempting to rebalance the use of force, to render the decision somehow surprising, and less predictable than in the past.4 All in all, the United States has seemed to adopt a new approach to the use of force, one combining reflective moderation and the judicious use of military assets.Given this framework, the thesis of this article is that a new approach to the decision about whether to resort to force could give the U.S. the opportunity to revitalize its global leadership. This revitalization springs from three advantages that such an approach offers. First, moderation will mitigate the resentment triggered by previous excessive U.S. military interventionism. Second, withdrawal from the open-ended wars that are part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will allow energy to be refocused on the Obama Administration's other core priorities (economy, education). Third, a flexible and adaptive military culture will help deter or address current and upcoming threats. These foundations will assist the revitalization of U.S. leadership around the world. Consequently, this essay will analyze Obama' s doctrine by reviewing some main events reflecting his "unspoken" foreign policy doctrine, before advocating for a more flexible military capability that will participate in returning the United States to a position of political and moral leadership, if used wisely. …

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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors assess the interests and political will of each Central Asian state to provide their own security, and that of the region in dealing with Afghanistan, and compare these interests with each state's individual and collective capacity to fulfill them, considering a variety of characteristics related to leadership, economic strength, security and armed forces capacity, and national foreign policy dynamics, along with other factors that may inhibit future regional cooperation efforts.
Abstract: IntroductionThe regional security of Central Asia hinges on the level of stability within Afghanistan and its foreign relations with its neighbors.1 Afghanistan is not only pivotal in the maintenance of regional security, but is also crucial to the region's economic and political development. As Ashraf Ghani, chairman of the Afghan transition commission, stated, "The region needs to make a choice, a stable Afghanistan ... is absolutely essential."2 However, there is looming doubt as to the ability of Afghan forces to be able to defend the state against domestic and external insurgent movements and to sustain the progress in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency that the U.S.-backed, NATOled International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan has established under UN mandates since the United States initiated military action against the Taliban in 2001. The year 2014 is the deadline that has been set for ISAF troops to withdraw from the war-tom country and hand over the responsibility for ensuring security in the nation to the Afghan Security Forces. Currently the U.S. and NATO forces are transitioning from a mission of combat to one of support.3 The participants of the "Bonn+10" conference4 identified 2011 as the dividing point "From Transition to the Transformation Decade," during which the burden on the international community to assist Afghanistan in maintaining peace and continuing to develop its governmental reforms should gradually diminish.5 Several important questions require informed and insightful responses: During this "Transformation decade," what will the security picture in Afghanistan look like? Who will supplant the U.S. forces and complement the Afghan security forces to establish the necessary stability in Afghanistan to allow further economic and political development in the country and the region?This article evaluates what kind of role the Central Asian states will play in Afghanistan after U.S. and NATO/ ISAF forces complete their withdrawal in 2014. Through a survey of regional media and analysis from renowned security agency assessments of these countries, I assess the interests and political will of each Central Asian state to provide their own security, and that of the region in dealing with Afghanistan. I also describe and compare regional trade and security cooperation efforts with relation to Afghanistan and to threats external to each respective state. These interests are then compared with each state's individual and collective capacity to fulfill them, considering a variety of characteristics related to leadership, economic strength, security and armed forces capacity, and national foreign policy dynamics, along with other factors that may inhibit future regional cooperation efforts. Finally, comparative analysis of these traits is displayed in a matrix format, which assists in determining future engagement approaches with Afghanistan on the part of each Central Asian state.As a result of this research, I argue that the low levels of security force capacities, both historical and projected, of the Central Asian countries, their diverse levels of political will and corresponding goals regarding security operations in Afghanistan, and the lack of effective cooperation among the Central Asian states on a variety of related security issues will lead to their inability to cooperate in a comprehensive unified effort to establish stability in Afghanistan. Therefore, collectively, Central Asia will play only a minor role in continuing the U.S./ISAF security and stability operations in Afghanistan after 2014, directly affecting the regional security of Central Asia at large. Instead, the countries will continue as they have been doing, strategically creating a buffer zone of protection against any negative spillover effects resulting from any conflicts that may arise in Afghanistan. These conflicts include incursions from terrorist organizations, drug trafficking, and other organized crime. …

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TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the challenges of transnational security challenges, such as the proliferation of weapons to organized crime, including the trafficking of human beings, the security implications of migration, and challenges of information and cyber security.
Abstract: Those contributing to international peace and stability act in an ever-changing, increasingly complex and inter-connected global environment. The international security landscape has changed considerably during the last twenty years, with important power shifts in international affairs, an acceleration of globalization dynamics, the spread of modern information technologies, and a diversification of powerful actors in world politics. In addition, a multitude of transnational security challenges - ranging from the proliferation of weapons to organized crime, including the trafficking of human beings, the security implications of migration, and the challenges of information and cyber security - are on the agenda.Global governance, which is understood here as cooperative arrangements between various international actors - states, international and regional organizations, as well as actors from the private sector and civil society communities - to manage global processes under conditions of globalization and in the absence of a world government, is still weak when it comes to adapting to these developments. Significant deficits in global governance with respect to issues of peace and international security exist today, and will most likely continue to exist in the future. A key consequence is the continuous presence of insecurity and disorder. In such situations of uncertainty, there is a need for leadership and close cooperation among partners. Education will be crucial in enabling the armed forces to fulfill their role in this environment. Thus, leadership skills, political awareness, and versatility will all be important elements of defense education.The global governance deficit requires us to better understand and deal with the changes in the international security landscape, including changing patterns of armed conflict and other forms of violence, the increasing threat to our financial and economic security, and the development and spread of new technologies. All these factors determine our security and defense thinking.The Changing Security LandscapeThe international system has witnessed dramatic changes during the last twenty years, shifts that have an impact on national, regional and international security policies. The period of the Cold War was a stable but potentially apocalyptic period of nuclear superpower competition. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States remained the sole superpower, dominating the international system and promoting liberalism worldwide. During the post-Cold War era, international and regional organizations were empowered, becoming influential actors in international affairs. The United Nations has assumed a greater importance on the world stage, and NATO and the EU have also enlarged their scope of activities to include crisis management and stabilization missions. They also changed the political and strategic map of Europe by expanding eastwards to include the former members of the Warsaw Pact and some former republics of the Soviet Union.The beginning of the new millennium was then marked by the attacks of 1 1 September 2001 and the onset of the global war against terrorism. In the following years, asymmetrical warfare and the return to the use of force and interventionism have shaped international security policies. At the same time, the world has also seen the slow but steady rise of new powerful state actors, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (collectively referred to as the BRIC countries) and a redistribution of global power from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China, especially, has gained considerable power, developing into the world's second-biggest economy after the United States.In addition to these "tectonic" developments, today's security landscape is very much influenced by two recent "game changers": the global economic and financial crisis of 2008, and the set of national movements in North Africa and the Middle East subsumed under the banner of the "Arab Spring" or "Arab Awakening. …

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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors conducted a study to determine the characteristics of distance education, characteristics of students participating in distance education and how the quality of online distance education is being assessed, and how Education monitors distance education in its stewardship of federal student aid funds.
Abstract: HighlightsWhy GAO Did This StudyAs the largest provider of financial aid in higher education, with about $134 billion in Title IV funds provided to students in fiscal year 2010, the Department of Education (Education) has a considerable interest in distance education. Distance education- that is, offering courses by the Internet, video, or other forms outside the classroom- has been a growing force in postsecondary education and there are questions about quality and adequate oversight. GAO was asked to determine (1) the characteristics of distance education today, (2) the characteristics of students participating in distance education, (3) how the quality of distance education is being assessed, and (4) how Education monitors distance education in its stewardship of federal student aid funds. GAO reviewed federal laws and regulations, analyzed Education data and documents, and interviewed Education officials and industry experts. GAO also interviewed officials from accrediting and state agencies, as well as 20 schools - which were selected based on a variety of factors to represent diverse perspectives.What GAO RecommendsTo improve its oversight and monitoring of federal student aid funds, Education should develop a plan on how it could best use the new distance education data NCES is collecting and provide input to NCES on future data collections. Education agreed with the recommendation.Main FindingsWhile distance education can use a variety of technologies, it has grown most rapidly online with the use of the Internet. Online distance education is currently being offered in various ways to students living on campus, away from a campus, and across state lines. School offerings in online learning range from individual classes to complete degree programs. Courses and degree programs may be a mix of face-to-face and online instruction - "hybrid" or "blended" instruction. Online asynchronous instruction- whereby students participate on their own schedule-is most common because it pro1 vides students with more convenience and flexibility, according to school officials. In the 2009-2010 academic year, almost half of postsecondary schools offered distance education opportunities to their students. Public 2- and 4-year schools were most likely to offer distance education, followed closely by private for-profit 4-year schools.Students in distance education enroll mostly in public schools, and they represent a diverse population. While they tend to be older and female, and have family and work obligations, they also include students of all races, current and former members of the military, and those with disabilities. According to the most current Education data (2007-2008), students enrolled in distance education studied a range of subjects, such as business and health.Accrediting agencies and schools assess the academic quality of distance education in several ways, but accreditors reported some oversight challenges. Federal law and regulations do not require accrediting agencies to have separate standards for reviewing distance education. As such, accreditors GAO spoke with have not adopted separate review standards, although they differed in the practices they used to examine schools offering distance education. Officials at two accreditors GAO spoke with cited some challenges with assessing quality, including keeping pace with the number of new online programs. School officials GAO interviewed reported using a range of design principles and student performance assessments to hold distance education to the same standards as face-to-face education. Some schools reported using specialized staff to translate face-to-face courses to the online environment, as well as standards developed by distance education experts to design their distance education courses. Schools also reported collecting outcome data, including data on student learning, to improve their courses.Education has increased its monitoring of distance education but lacks sufficient data to inform its oversight activities. …

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TL;DR: In the early 1990s, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a clearing-house as "a central agency for the collection, classification, and distribution, especially of information; [a] channel for distributing information or assistance" as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: IntroductionIn the immediate aftermath of the Cold War period in the 1990s, NATO was highly engaged with the armed forces of a number of states of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe-based Warsaw Pact. The intent of this engagement was to assist their militaries in the process of Western-style transformation as part of their national preparation for interoperability and potential integration with NATO. One of the major supporting components for this NATO process was the development of regionally focused "clearing-houses."The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a clearing-house as "a central agency for the collection, classification, and distribution, especially of information;.... [a] channel for distributing information or assistance." In the case of NATO, these regional clearinghouses were to serve an integration function for the NATO member states to provide specific support for the transformation of militaries in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries. The NATO member states would participate in these periodic meetings to identify the required assistance needs on the part of the non-member target states that were not being filled (gaps that existed in the support process), and to determine which member nations would be willing to support efforts to meet those needs through the execution of various programs and individual events.After heads of state and government created the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, they developed a number of tools to assist partners, including the perpetuation of the original clearing-house concept. A clearing-house had been in existence at NATO headquarters up to the late 1990s, when NATO realized the difficulty of meeting partner requirements with offers from Allied nations when the partner states participated in the same meeting, sometimes in the same room. Several Allies made a decision to reinvent the clearing-house tool by taking a regional approach after NATO disestablished the clearing-house in Brussels. The first regional clearing-house was established in support of the three Baltic nations: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This was followed in the first decade of the twenty-first century by regional clearing-houses designated for Southeastern Europe (Balkan countries) and the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, later joined by the Republic of Moldova). In addition, one clearing house exists solely to provide support to Ukraine. Over time, these regional clearing-houses have become critical security cooperation management tools for the Alliance in its effort to support the transformation of the armed forces in partner nations.The Creation of the First Functional Clearing-HouseUntil the mid-2000s, NATO support to partner states had primarily focused on the guidelines of the 1999 Training and Education Enhancement Program (TEEP), which was intended to promote interoperability "in the field." NATO defense reform efforts gained added momentum with the creation of the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB) at the 2004 Istanbul Summit. The PAP-DIB Action Plan outlines the specific goals that NATO and partner states want to achieve in the area of defense institution building. One of the functional subject areas in which NATO provided support since the mid-2000s, via the International Staff, was that of defense education. Defense education support was designed to address interoperability "of minds" - a set of common references, doctrines, and approaches to problem solving that would allow officers from different backgrounds to understand each other. NATO support for defense education is defined in the EAPC document, "Implementing the PAP-DIB: The Education & Training for Defense Reform Initiative - Guidelines for Development."1 It has been reconfirmed by the Berlin decisions on partnerships and discussions at the 2012 Chicago Summit that identified the need for the further development of partner capacity through defense education. …

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TL;DR: The Baltic Defence College (BDC) as discussed by the authors offers a year-long course for colonels and higher-level civilians with a half-year course for civilian members of the defense and foreign ministries.
Abstract: IntroductionEducation is something that touches every single member of the military profession, and is important for the civilians who work with the military as well. Military education is something with which everyone in the military has some direct experience. After all, one could not get to top military positions today without attending staff college courses, and often war college-level courses, taught in military institutions. Higher military education - the focus of this article - is the education that takes place at the rank of major and above and includes the joint staff college courses as well as courses at the strategic level designed for colonels and generals.National armed forces and military education institutions create mission statements defining the institutional and individual goals of each course in higher military education. The aims of the higher military education institutions in the West are generally similar, with mission statements that reflect the need to develop officers who are critical thinkers and problem solvers, who will be prepared for higher command and to serve effectively in national and multinational staff positions. But while the goals are clear, the process of achieving those goals is usually not as explicitly laid out. As a practitioner, having spent the last twenty-two years as an academic involved in higher-level military education, I have to focus on the process. From this experience I will lay out some principles that are essential to meet the goals of educating officers to meet tough challenges. While most of the principles set out here are basic to all higher military education institutions, there are a few principles that apply specifically to multinational institutions.There are a few truly multinational institutions in the Western nations, and it is likely that in the future there will be more. This reflects the realities of modern operations. In the future, operations such as Libya and Afghanistan that involve multinational staffs and do not necessarily have a single lead nation will likely be the norm. Educating midrank and senior officers to operate in a multinational environment is already essential.Multinational military education is the central focus of the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, which is a unique institution in that it is equally owned and operated by three nations: Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. Because each of the Baltic countries alone did not have the resources to offer a top-tier higher military education for its officers, in 1999 the three Baltic States decided to pool their resources and expertise and create a single staff college that would provide higher courses for officers and selected civilians. The result is a comprehensive institution that offers a year-long joint staff course to officers not only from the Baltic States, but also from NATO, EU, and partner nations. In addition, the Baltic Defence College (where the author of this article is Dean) runs a half-year course for colonels and higher-level civilians as well as a half-year course for civilian members of the defense and foreign ministries. Based on the experience of the Baltic Defence College, this article will lay out some of the key principles that guide our planning and development.The insights presented here are not simply those of an American, or European, or an American who works for Europeans. They are the insights of a military educator who works in a highly multinational environment. There is one thing that a long period of working in a completely multinational environment will teach you - that the fundamentals of the military profession transcend nation and culture. Still, there are some aspects of education that apply especially to multinational environments, and I will discuss these later in this article.While all professional officers attend staff college and higher military education courses sometime in their career (usually several times in their career), they only understand military education through their experience as a student and, as students, they were primarily focused on the task at hand, which was to do well in their courses and graduate. …

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TL;DR: In 2008, the National Defense University of Kazakhstan (KAZ NDU) and the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes (PfPC) agreed on a three-year program of cooperation as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: IntroductionIn 2008, the National Defense University of Kazakhstan (KAZ NDU) and the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes (PfPC) agreed on a three-year program of cooperation. The intent of the program was PfPC support for KAZ NDU' s attainment of international standards for both curriculum and teaching methodology. The program that was created was known as a DEEP - a Defense Education Enhancement Program. DEEP initiatives have a unique ability to provide support to Partner defense education institutions in the areas of curriculum and faculty development. For curriculum development, this could include the creation or refinement of courses or individual lessons, as well as support for the curriculum development of an entire new defense education institution. Faculty development could include pedagogy support in the areas of classroom teaching and evaluation techniques. The PfPC program in support of Kazakhstan is now in its fifth year, and will continue for several more.How it BeganIn the late winter of 2007, the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan (MoD) made a request to the United States Embassy to undertake an assessment of the KAZ NDU. This request was in accordance with Partnership Action Plan-Defense Institution Building (PAPDIB) objectives of the NATO-Kazakhstan Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), agreed between Kazakhstan and NATO in January 2006. In response to the request, and as a component of the Defense Education Enhancement Program, this peer review was conducted by the PfPC, taking place at the direction of the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (OSD) and in coordination with NATO with the intent of understanding the current composition of the defense education process conducted by the KAZ NDU. The broad areas to be examined included institutional purpose, organization, academic programs and curriculum, academic evaluation, student make-up, faculty qualifications, library resources, and Internet connectivity. A six-person team conducted the review from 10-13 December 2007. The team was composed of academic experts on subject matter directly related to the needs of the specific host educational institution. The source for the needs was found in the specific requests made by the institution and in the country's NATO-related IPAP. The team consisted of:* Dr. Alan G. Stolberg, U.S. Army War College* Dr. Jack Treddenick (Canadian), George C. Marshall Center* Colonel George Teague, U.S. Army War College* Colonel Cynthia Coates, U.S. Joint Staff J7* Lieutenant Colonel Paul Riley, George C. Marshall Center* Mr. Alexander Vinnikov, NATO International Staff.The KAZ NDU head (director), General-Major Shoinbaev and his staff were extremely transparent and open. They exhibited a spirit of cooperation and the desire to learn from us (with "us" to be defined as "the West" writ large). Their long-term intent is to balance the Russian and Chinese influence on Kazakhstan's military education curriculum.The KAZ NDU is the only higher defense education institution in the country. It is designed as a two-year residential program that results in the attainment of a Master's degree in one of three fields: Military Art, Military History, or Armaments Technology and Logistics. Using Western defense education systems as an analogy, the KAZ NDU curriculum primarily represents a spectrum of education and training that encompasses advanced course (captains), intermediate level education (Staff College; majors), and senior service college (War College; lieutenant colonels and colonels) level instruction.The curriculum is situated more between the Staff College and War College levels. The student body has approximately sixty students per class, and is drawn from all parts of the government's security sector. The student body consists of captains through lieutenant colonels (0-3 through 0-5). Each class is typically made up of about 53 percent of students from the Ministry of Defense, with the remainder coming from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guards, Ministry of Emergency Situations (or the Russian EMERCON equivalent), the Presidential Guard, and a number of foreign students. …

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TL;DR: The National Transitional Council (NTC) and its interim government have prioritized security sector and judicial reform from the very beginning in order to provide a smooth transition in post-conflict Libya.
Abstract: IntroductionThe fall of Muammar al-Qadhafi in October 2011 marked the end of the Libyan uprising, led to the close of NATO's intervention "Operation Unified Protector" (OUP), and ushered in a delicate political transformation which failed to come to a quick and decisive end with the first round of elections held in early July 2012. To assess some major pitfalls of the current transitional process, this article will propose an analysis of two main challenges the new Libyan authorities will face, the proper handling of which will determine the nature and stability of the future state. The first challenge is the political transition from an autocratic regime via revolutionary credentials to democratic legitimacy. The second involves the construction and governance of an entirely reshaped security sector, both in the military and civilian realms, transcending their previous roles in the Jamahiriyya either as Praetorian Guard or as state-sponsored bullies.1Libyan politics are not immune to the major novelty introduced by the Arab Spring. Political representation transformed into a reflection of forces on the ground: what used to be called in derogatory terms the "Arab Street" - as opposed to the will of the dictator, or alleged Western interests - morphed into public opinion, which was now suddenly relevant in elections. Yet the first free national elections in Libya produced a mixed picture without clear majorities, partially due to the complicated electoral system, which was split into party lists and individual candidates. Furthermore, as could also be witnessed in local elections that took place in Misrata and Benghazi, political Islam as such seems not to be favored by the Libyan people. This means the search for charismatic, authoritative political leadership during the transition phase will most likely continue. However, achieving stability cannot be attained by a successful political transition alone. Rivalries between numerous and relatively autonomous kata 'ib (militias) could degenerate into open confrontation.2 If those rebel commanders, who have suddenly transformed into politicians, lose in the elections where they sought to acquire democratic credentials (and in the process to transcend their previous revolutionary achievements as militia leaders), such a scenario becomes more likely.The National Transitional Council (NTC) and its interim government have prioritized security sector and judicial reform from the very beginning in order to provide for a smooth transition in post-conflict Libya. However, in the current climate justice seems mainly to be understood to consist in indicting former regime officials (such as Qadhafi's son Saif al-Islam or the former Prime Minister Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi), rather than in terms of conducting reforms of the justice system. Simultaneously, assassinations are not uncommon. Jumma al-Jawzi, the judge who ordered the arrest of Abdelfattah Younes (commander of the National Liberation Army since his early defection, assassinated in July 2011) was killed in June this year.3 Several candidates running in the recent elections or former Qadhafl-era office bearers have been victims of politically motivated murder or assassination attempts as well.Despite the NTC s rhetoric about national reconciliation, security sector reform (SSR) is making slow progress in an environment that is prone to the settling of old intertribal disputes. These tribal rivalries, which had been used by Qadhafi as a reliable mechanism to consolidate his power, are now free-floating in the absence of a central authority. Practically, mediation efforts for the implementation of fragile cease-fires tend to be undertaken by shuyukh (tribal leaders), elders and notables from influential families. The army claimed on several occasions to have dispatched contingents to intervene in tribal clashes, such as confrontations in southwestern Sebha or southeastern Kufra. The reality looks quite different. …

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Azerbaijan's Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) with NATO as mentioned in this paper was designed for a junior officer's professional military development with the goal of building an independent Azerbaijani capacity for language training.
Abstract: Azerbaijan confronts a unique set of challenges and opportunities as it conducts a foreign policy aimed at alienating none of its neighbors while also modernizing its society and armed forces. While never applying for NATO membership, Azerbaijan still desires all the resources NATO makes available to its aspirants and other members of the Partnership for Peace. Thus, she faces the dilemma of determining in which strategic direction she will eventually lean, while in the process not actually leaning too far.On the one hand, this secular Muslim nation is an ideal candidate for modernizing its military by bringing it up to NATO standards. Located on the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan prides itself on being able to conduct friendly foreign relations with its neighbors, while also projecting an image of regional strength and preparedness. Its capital, Baku, is obviously flush with oil revenues, as evidenced by its well-groomed public spaces, magnificent architectural showcases, and high-fashion stores matched in few other European capitals. Its youth walk the boulevards of Baku wearing Western styles and listening to European popular music. However, it also maintains its local culture and traditions, which have only fitfully welcomed Western ideas. Outside of its main cities, Azerbaijani society has eased somewhat reluctantly into the twenty-first century. Both Russia to its north and Iran to its south send subtle messages that Europeanization is neither a correct nor realistic model. Adding to this friction is the pressing reality that Azerbaijan continues to be embroiled in a "frozen conflict" with Armenia over the status of NagornoKarabakh. The push and pull of these forces makes this decision over determining a "strategic direction" difficult. This article contends that the creation and development of a defense education program aimed at assisting the Azerbaijani Armed Forces to develop along the lines of a Western (NATO) model is a powerful force in persuading Azerbaijan to look westward.Remodeling Defense EducationThe Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense decided to improve its system of professional military education in 2008 with the help of NATO, particularly when it was clear that all its neighbors in the Caucasus were arriving at the same conclusion. Through its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), Baku showed interest in a number of defense educational fields including NCO training, specialized officer's training, and an extensive overhaul of all senior officer military education conducted at the Military College of the Armed Forces (MCAF) in Baku. Thus began Azerbaijan's Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) with NATO in 2009.The first element of the program, non-commissioned officers' (NCO) training, was provided by representatives from Allied Command Transformation (ACT), Allied Command Operations (ACO), Lithuania and the United States. Several team visits resulted in the creation of plan for the development and implementation of a holistic upgrade of the role and position of the Azerbaijani NCO corps. The NATO team focused on building courses on NCO professional careers and NCO instructors.Specialized Officer's Training, the second element of the program, began with a review of the courses offered at the Azerbaijani Education and Training Center by NATO representatives from the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and the United States. These courses are principally technical and tactical in nature, and are designed for a junior officer's professional military development. Both of the above elements are supported by the Partner Language Testing Center Europe (PLTCE) with the goal of building an independent Azerbaijani capacity for language training. Using language training structure assessments, NATO's Bureau for International Language Coordination (BILC) has been able to provide language training programs and tailored assistance with an eye toward building an independent Azerbaijani language training capacity. …