Showing papers in "Consciousness and Cognition in 2002"
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TL;DR: In three experiments, it is shown that people often do have a representation of some aspects of the pre-change scene even when they fail to report the change, and they appear to "discover" this memory and can explicitly report details of a changed object in response to probing questions.
147 citations
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TL;DR: Three experiments are described which explore whether these stimuli have a unique capacity to capture and extend the limits of attention under conditions in which this has been deemed highly unlikely.
146 citations
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TL;DR: Two experiments are described in which it is found that many reported decision times were before the onset of the Lateralized Readiness Potential, which measures hand-specific movement preparation, consistent with the conclusion that the LRP always started after the conscious decision to move.
142 citations
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TL;DR: Support is shown for an explanation of the picture superiority effect that involves an interaction of encoding and retrieval processes.
122 citations
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TL;DR: It is proposed that the mechanism underlying awareness of how the authors' own intentions lead to actions can also be used to represent the intentions that underlie the actions of others.
104 citations
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TL;DR: It is suggested that the authors' conscious sensation evolves over time, during the period from 80 to 500 ms after a stimulus, until the sensation is stably localized in space.
101 citations
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TL;DR: It is argued that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable and the way is clear to explain qualitative consciousness by appeal to a model such as the higher-order-thought hypothesis.
84 citations
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TL;DR: The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with colleagues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences have met with a lot of praise and criticism as mentioned in this paper, and the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and experiential (mental) timing.
78 citations
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TL;DR: It is found that emotions are almost always evoked by dream characters and that they are often used as a basis for identifying them and the suggestion that these limbic areas have minimal input from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the dreaming brain is consistent.
74 citations
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TL;DR: The original data reported by Benjamin Libet and colleagues are reinterpreted, taking into account the facilitation which is experimentally demonstrated in the first of their series of articles.
73 citations
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TL;DR: The criticisms and alternative proposals by Trevena and Miller, Pockett, and Gomes are analyzed and found to be largely unwarranted.
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TL;DR: The results suggest that the processing of nonconsciously registered information is flexible because it is susceptible to the changing intentions of a person, yet these processes are apparently restricted, as non conscious information cannot be used as easily for purposes not corresponding to the currently active intentions as better visible information.
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TL;DR: Evidence is reviewed that this otherwise puzzling body of phenomenology is generated by an empirical strategy of perception in which the color an observer sees is entirely determined by the probability distribution of the possible sources of the stimulus.
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TL;DR: Patients learned to control low-frequency components of their EEG: the so-called slow cortical potentials (SCPs), and their ability to perceive the SCPs was related to the ability to control them; this perception was not mediated by peripheral variables such as changes in muscle tonus and cannot be reduced to simple vigilance monitoring.
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TL;DR: It is hypothesized that suppression of the early gamma response to T2, accompanying the P3 related to T1, causes the attentional blink.
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TL;DR: This work tests whether CBB is caused by a misestimation of the perceptual experience associated with visual changes and shows that it persists even when the pre- and postchange views are separated by long delays, and concludes that it is a robust phenomenon that cannot be accounted for by failure to understand the specific perceptual experienceassociated with a change.
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TL;DR: The experiential paradigm of offers the possibility of improved designs and methods for investigating neural mechanisms underlying pain and consciousness by integratingexperiential-phenomenological methods with those of neuroscience.
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TL;DR: The results strongly suggest that participants have little conscious awareness of their preparedness and challenge commonly accepted assumptions concerning the role of consciousness in cognitive control.
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TL;DR: For instance, this paper found that participants tend to report events as happening approximately 70 ms later than they actually happened, and that their subjective timing task was indeed biased such that participants' tendency was indeed bias.
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TL;DR: This commentary evaluates the claim made by Keenan et al. that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity, self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere and presents two views that challenge this rationale.
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TL;DR: It is shown that the flash-lag effect would compensate for the bias caused by sensory delay processing the clock information that would alter Trevena and Miller's conclusions regarding the timing of the lateralized readiness potential.
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TL;DR: Findings provide support for the hypothesis that cholinergic activity is an important neural correlate if consciousness and suggest a mechanism of DOC in DLB involving alterations in the nicotinic receptor, composed of predominantly alpha4 and beta2 subunits.
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TL;DR: Benjamin Libet’s experiments focus on the timing of two types of conscious mental occur-rence, both of which appear to conflict with the commonsense picture of how mental func-tioning interacts with bodily occurrences.
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TL;DR: The temporal granularity of consciousness may be far less fine than the real-time information processing mechanisms that underlie the authors' sensitivity to small temporal differences.
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TL;DR: Two lexical decision experiments that employ masked priming illustrate one way in which awareness (or lack thereof) affects the dynamics of visual word recognition.
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TL;DR: Further testing has been possible with subject DB, who was a blindsight patient tested intensively over a period of 10 years and who was the subject of the book, and a new feature was discovered, namely that he describes conscious after-images of a wide range of inducing stimuli of which he is unconscious.
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TL;DR: This selective review examines a recent set of behavioral and event-related potentials, studies conducted in patients with visual and auditory unilateral neglect or extinction, with the aim of establishing what aspects of initial processing are impaired in these patients.
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TL;DR: Libet's (2000) arguments in defense of his interpretation of his experimental results are insufficient and the claims of my critical review (Gomes, 1998) do not suffer with his new statements.
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TL;DR: A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller is given, and Libet's method of timing intentions is thoroughly criticized.
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TL;DR: It is argued that even though Libet's own data are weak, there are good arguments for a backward referral mechanism to help the subject make sense out of the tangled chaos of asynchronous information associated with experienced events.