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Showing papers in "Cornell Law Review in 1993"




Journal Article
TL;DR: The authors conducted interviews with jurors who served in South Carolina capital cases and found that the burden of proof in capital cases can arise in any death penalty state, regardless of the number of jurors serving in the case.
Abstract: A fatal mistake. A defendant is sentenced to die because the jury was misinformed about the law. The justice system should be designed to prevent such a tragic error. Yet our interviews with jurors who served in South Carolina capital cases indicate that this nightmare is a reality. Although our data are limited to South Carolina, the question whether jurors are adequately instructed in capital cases is of national concern. For example, the issue whether jurors should be more fully informed about the alternative to a death sentence has arisen in other states.' And the question whether jurors understand the burdens of proof in capital cases can arise in any death penalty state. 2 As with many death penalty issues, it is tempting to view the question of juror instructions solely as a question for resolution by the Supreme Court as a matter of federal constitutional law. This narrow

69 citations












Journal Article
TL;DR: The authors make a broader argument about the relevance of legal realism to the social contract tradition in political theory and make a contribution to the theoretical and historical literature about Lon Fuller, a figure who is of interest both for his own sake and because of his "iconic" role in legal thought over the last fifty years.
Abstract: This Article is a contribution to the theoretical and historical literature about Lon Fuller, a figure who is of interest both for his own sake and because of his "iconic" role in the history of legal thought over the last fifty years. At the same time, the Article aspires to make a broader argument about the relevance of legal realism to the social contract tradition in political theory. My argument begins with the discovery of an apparent conflict between the "public" and the "private" jurisprudence of contract in Fuller's work. Describing contracts in private law, Fuller gave an account that owed a great deal to legal realism, particularly in the way that it attacked formalistic criteria for enforceability. Where the classicists stressed form and consideration as theoretical a prioris, Fuller subjected those ideas to functional scrutiny, decried the undervaluation of the reliance principle, and found reasons for enforceability in relative and contingent community norms. Fuller accepts that Section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts may require the judge to step in post hoc and create enforceable bargains where necessary "to prevent injustice"; he portrays the formal requirements of contract as being in dialectical, productive tension with their functional goals; and he denies that the rules of contract law are somehow immanent within the very definition of a contract.








Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a survey of the state of the art in the area of law review publishing, including the following papers: 619.78 Cornell Law Review 619 (1993)
Abstract: 78 Cornell Law Review 619 (1993)



Journal Article
TL;DR: The authors examines two distinct notions of responsibility and how they shape different ways people think about injustice, and examines how this conflict of paradigms manifests itself in tort doctrine and employs them to illuminate current conflicts in political discourse and tort law.
Abstract: Disagreements over responsibility for human suffering frequently stern from disparate understandings of what it means to be responsible. In such disputes, parties often talk past one another. They do not simply disagree; rather, they fail to communicate meaningfully. This essay examines two distinct notions of responsibility and how they shape different ways people think about injustice. This essay attempts to clarify these distinct understandings of responsibility and employ them to illuminate current conflicts in political discourse and tort law. Part I examines in detail the paradigms of awareness and participation. Part II offers examples of how the disparity between the paradigms often leads to miscommunication in contemporary disagreements about moral responsibility for various forms of human suffering. Part III considers how this conflict of paradigms manifests itself in tort doctrine.