Dados-revista De Ciencias Sociais 

About: Dados-revista De Ciencias Sociais is an academic journal published by Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Politics & Democracy. It has an ISSN identifier of 0011-5258. It is also open access. Over the lifetime, 944 publications have been published receiving 12178 citations.

Presidential cabinets, electoral cycles, and coalition discipline in Brazil

Abstract: All presidential cabinets formed in Brazil between 1985 and 1998 included politicians from more than one party and could, in principle, be defined as coalit...

Proletariat Into a Class: The Process of Class Formation from Karl Kautsky's `The Class Struggle` to Recent Controversies

Abstract: a &dquo;clasi-mzitself&dquo; to a &dquo;class-for-.itself,&dquo; a formulation in which economic relations have the staffs of objective conditions and all other relations constitute realms of subjective actions. In place of this formulation we must think along the lines, also suggested by Marx, in which economic, political, and ideological conditions jointly structure the realm of struggles that have as their effect the organizations, dis~rg~ni~a.tiQ!!.1 or reorganization off classes Classes must thus be viewed as effects of struggles structured by objective conditions that are simultaneously economic, political, and ideological. Class analysis is a form of analysis that links social development to struggles among concrete historical actors. Such actors, collectivitiesin-struggle at a particular moment of history, are not determined uniquely by objective conditions, not even by the totality of economic, political, and ideological conditions. Precisely because class formation is an effect of struggles, outcomes of this process are at each moment of history to some extent indeterminate.

Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999

Abstract: This paper is about two related subjects: how to classify political regimes in general, and how Latin American regimes should be classified for the 1945-1999 period. We make five general claims about regime classification. First, regime classification should rest on sound concepts and definitions. Second, it should be based on explicit and sensible coding and aggregation rules. Third, it necessarily involves some subjective judgments. Fourth, the debate about dichotomous versus continuous measures of democracy creates a false dilemma. Neither democratic theory, nor coding requirements, nor the reality underlying democratic practice compel either a dichotomous or a continuous approach in all cases. Fifth, dichotomous measures of democracy fail to capture intermediate regime types, obscuring variation that is essential for studying political regimes. This general discussion provides the grounding for our trichotomous ordinal scale, which codes regimes as democratic, semi-democratic or authoritarian in nineteen Latin American countries from 1945 to 1999. Our trichotomous classification achieves greater differentiation than dichotomous classifications and yet avoids the need for massive information that a very fine grained measure would require.

Comportamento Estratégico em Presidencialismo de Coalizão: As Relações entre Executivo e Legislativo na Elaboração do Orçamento Brasileiro*

Abstract: In Brazil the executive has exclusive rights to initiate the annual budget. Legislators have the right to amend the bill; but only if those amendments are compatible with the multi-year budget plan elaborated by the executive as well as with the law on budgetary guidelines. Moreover, congress may not authorize expenditures that exceed the budgetary revenue. It is also the executive, who is entitled to determine which amendment will really be appropriated, as the appropriation is contingent on the availability of resources in the national treasury. This paper argues that those rules not only restrict congressional action, but also enable the president to preserve at low costs its coalition inside Congress. It shows strong evidence that the Brazilian President rewards those legislators who most vote for his interests by executing their individual amendments to the annual budget and, equally, punishes those who vote less by not executing their individual amendments.