Taylor & Francis
About: Democratization is an academic journal published by Taylor & Francis. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Democracy & Democratization. It has an ISSN identifier of 1351-0347. Over the lifetime, 1694 publications have been published receiving 42101 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
TL;DR: In the literature on democratization, the mainstream of theoretical and empirical consolidology uses the dichotomy autocracy versus democracy as mentioned in this paper, where autocracy is defined as "electoral democ...
Abstract: In the literature on democratization the mainstream of theoretical and empirical consolidology uses the dichotomy autocracy versus democracy. Democracy is generally conceived of as ‘electoral democ...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the longevity of autocracies by referring to three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation.
Abstract: Why do some autocracies remain stable while others collapse? This article presents a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the longevity of autocracies by referring to three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation. These three causal factors are derived by distilling and synthesizing the main arguments of classic and more recent research efforts. Particular emphasis is paid to re-incorporate legitimation in the explanation of stable autocracies. The article conceptionalizes the three pillars and discusses methods of concrete measurement. It then moves on to explain the stabilization process. How do these pillars develop their stabilizing effect? It is argued that reinforcement processes take place both within and between the pillars. They take the form of exogenous reinforcement, self-reinforcement, and reciprocal reinforcement. To illustrate the inner logic of these processes, I draw on empirical examples. I also state what we would need to observe empirically and how we can...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors distinguish between forms of specific relationship (clientelism), of material exchange (corruption), of violent exertion of influence (putsch threat), of civil resistance (civil disobedience) and of legal practice (custom law), and discuss their relevance to democracy.
Abstract: Informal institutions have grown in relevance for the analysis of new ‘third wave’ democracies. The research strategy receives its impetus from the debate on neo‐institutionalism theory, which offers a productive perspective for structuring the field of analysis. This article explains the distinguishing factors between formal and informal institutions. It addresses five basic types of informal institutions, examines the ways in which they function and discusses their relevance in terms of democracy theory. Each type is characterized by the way in which it enacts its respective means of political influence. The study distinguishes between forms of specific relationship (clientelism), of material exchange (corruption), of violent exertion of influence (putsch threat), of civil resistance (civil disobedience) and of legal practice (custom law), and discusses their relevance to democracy. The central argument maintains that a differentiated study of informal institutions is crucial to addressing this question...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the politics of elections in authoritarian regimes, focusing on Jordan, and examine voter behavior in elections and how candidates participate in elections in an authoritarian regime and how state elites manage electoral competition.
Abstract: This study examines the politics of elections in authoritarian regimes, focusing on Jordan. Specifically, it considers (1) what is the role of elections in authoritarian regimes? (2) How can we understand voter behaviour in authoritarian elections? (3) How and why do candidates participate in elections? (4) How do state elites manage electoral competition? The fundamental contention is that elections under authoritarianism are an important arena for competition, but one over patronage, not policy. This has profound effects on electoral politics. Voters generally cast their ballots for those who can, and will, deliver goods; that is, they vote for candidates who maintain good relations with ruling elites, and with whom the voters have personal ties. Elites are similarly more likely to run in elections if they do not oppose the regime. The result is a pro-regime bias in parliaments, even in the absence of regime manipulation. Consequently, in contrast to conventional wisdom, elections are neither pre-determ...
TL;DR: A third wave of autocratization is manifestukuyama and others declared liberal democracy's eternal dominance, less than 30 years after Fukuyama et al..
Abstract: Less than 30 years after Fukuyama and others declared liberal democracy’s eternal dominance, a third wave of autocratization is manifest. Gradual declines of democratic regime attributes characteri...