Ethical Perspectives 

About: Ethical Perspectives is an academic journal. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Politics & Nursing ethics. It has an ISSN identifier of 1370-0049. Over the lifetime, 342 publications have been published receiving 2469 citations.

Justice as a larger loyalty

Abstract: All of us would expect help if, pursued by the police, we asked our family to hide us Most of us would extend such help even when we know our child or our parent to be guilty of a sordid crime Many of us would be willing to perjure ourselves in order to supply such a child or parent with a false alibi But if an innocent person is wrongly convicted as a result of our perjury, most of us will be torn by a conflict between loyalty and justice Such a conflict will be felt, however, only to the extent to which we can identify with the innocent person whom we have harmed If the person is a neighbor, the conflict will probably be intense If a stranger, especially one of a different race, class, or nation, it may be considerably weaker There has to be some sense in which he or she is “one of us,” before we start to be tormented by the question of whether or not we did the right thing when we committed perjury So it may be equally appropriate to describe us as torn between conflicting loyalties – loyalty to our family and to a group large enough to include the victim of our perjury – rather than between loyalty and justice Our loyalty to such larger groups will, however, weaken, or even vanish altogether, when things get really tough

Historical Emissions and free riding.

Abstract: Should the current members of a community compensate the victims of their ancestor’s emissions of greenhouse gases? I argue that the previous generation of polluters may not have been morally responsible for the harms they caused. I also accept the view that the polluters’ descendants cannot be morally responsible for their ancestor’s harmful emissions. However, I show that, while granting this, a suitably defined notion of moral free-riding may still account for the moral obligation of the polluters’ descendants to compensate the current victims of their ancestors’ actions. A concept of trans- generational free-riding is defined. Objections to the idea of using free-riding as part of a theory of justice are rejected. Two different views of moral free-riding are contrasted, with consequences for the amount of compensation to be exigible from the polluters’ descendants. Some final considerations are devoted to the possible relevance of this free-riding-based view for other issues of historical injustice.

Dealing with uncertainty

Abstract: In C.S. Lewis's science fiction parable Perelandra was a planet which had no solid ground. At all times the floating landscape was continually swirling and moving, chasms would appear where a minute before there had been safe standing. The rational beings who lived there hopped nimbly on to another little island when the one on which they stood disappeared under their feet. They were used to it and took it for granted that nothing was certain. The visitor from our planet had to learn a completely new way of existence. But where did he get his idea of certainty in a fixed environment? It is more plausible that uncertainty is normal and the whole idea of certainty an illusion. Today gives an opportunity to reflect on how people deal with skepticism, doubt and uncertainty. The questions apply to a current debate in the UK on risk. Opinion polls constantly reveal that the public lacks trust in government, and particularly it does not trust the government to reveal the information needed to assess important risks. From which the risk analysts conclude that the government should grant access to information more freely and encourage enquiry. They believe that openness would foster a better understanding on the part of the public which at present does not know what to believe. More information would create certainty, more certainty and the public would trust its spokesmen, unreasonable fears would be calmed. This is the advice of an expert enquiry. Certainty is not a mood, or a feeling, it is an institution: this is my thesis. Certainty is only possible because doubt is blocked institutionally: most individual decisions about risk are taken under pressure from institutions. If we recognize more uncertainty now, it will be because of things that have happened to the institutional underpinning of our beliefs. And that is what we ought to be studying. In my student days the hottest controversies in anthropology were about why `other people' — that is people not living in advanced capitalist society — had certainty about their absurd beliefs. When trying to explain their misfortunes, why did they neglect the physical and scientific evidence, and draw instead on their beliefs in spirits, magic, and taboos? How could they be so obstinate in error? Anthropologists spent their energies on defending the allegedly irrational beliefs of other people, and I shall continue the tradition.

Some thoughts about caring

Abstract: Dans leur discussion concernant la nature de l'action humaine et egalement dans leurs enquetes sur la structure du raisonnement pratique, les philosophes s'appuient sur un repertoire conceptuel. L'item le plus frequent de ce repertoire est constitue par la notion de desir. L'A. pense qu'il est necessaire d'enrichir cette notion. Dans certains cas, il est particulierement approprie de penser ce qui nous guide en termes d'assistance, de compassion ou plus simplement d'amour. Pour terminer, l'A. s'arrete sur quelques points de la pensee de Hobbes au sujet du bonheur et du pouvoir