Showing papers in "Europe-Asia Studies in 2001"

An Assessment of Outward Foreign Direct Investment from China's Transitional Economy

Abstract: (2001). An Assessment of Outward Foreign Direct Investment from China's Transitional Economy. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 8, pp. 1235-1254.

Ethnicity and Social Exclusion in Estonia and Latvia

Abstract: (2001). Ethnicity and Social Exclusion in Estonia and Latvia. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 7, pp. 1023-1049.

The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy

Abstract: (2001). The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 7-31.

Voting in a Floating Party System: The 1999 Duma Election

Abstract: (2001). Voting in a Floating Party System: The 1999 Duma Election. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 419-443.

Putin's Federal Reforms and their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia

Abstract: (2001). Putin's Federal Reforms and their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 719-743.

Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan

Abstract: SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR many scholars have pointed to the weakness of the political parties in the states of the former Soviet Union.' Unlike some of the countries of post-communist Eastern Europe (such as the Visegrad states, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as the Baltic States), where relatively stable patterns of partisan competition have emerged, in most of the states of the former Soviet Union, it has been argued, only 'pseudo parties' have arisen. These 'pseudo parties' are seen as largely shifting coalitions of individuals, unanchored in post-communist society and incapable of performing even the most basic functions of political parties.2 Indeed, from this 'pessimistic' point of view, parties in the former Soviet Union are scarcely more than transient organisations with little continuity from one election to another, lacking coherent ideological programmes and reliable social constituencies.3 Many have argued that decades of totalitarian rule (more extreme and of longer duration in the Soviet Union than in Eastern Europe or the Baltic States) pulverised what little there was of civil society, a legacy that continues to retard the development of political parties. As Bielasiak notes, the 'numerous weaknesses of political society impede the formation and consolidation of a structured party system capable of providing informed choices to the electorate'.4 Others have pointed to the incentives generated by political structures, particularly the existence of 'superpresidentialism', which have also retarded the development of political parties.5 Unfortunately, most of the existing literature that relates superpresidentialism to party development in the countries of the former Soviet Union has focused only on single case studies, without the benefit of comparative perspective.6 Because of this tendency it is difficult to assess truly whether or not 'superpresidentialism' has the often cited retarding effect on party development. On the other hand, macro-comparative approaches that lump together all of the former communist states run the risk of conflating the effects of the electoral system and presidentialism on party development, especially since most parliamentary systems in post-communist Europe employ some form of proportional representation.7 The key then is to select cases that vary in terms of the degree of superpresidentialism but where variations in the electoral system are controlled. Finally, most studies that have pointed to the weaknesses of political parties in the countries of the former Soviet Union have relied

The state of agrarian reform in the former Soviet Union

Abstract: (2001). The State of Agrarian Reform in the Former Soviet Union. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 885-901.

Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum

Abstract: (2001). Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 7, pp. 1077-1095.

Premature Deaths: Russia's Radical Economic Transition in Soviet Perspective

Abstract: THE 'WASHINGTON CONSENSUS', which for nearly a decade put the best face it could on Russia's mis-transition, is showing signs of crumbling.1 It is now acknowledged that the Russian Federation's post-communist depression was deep and painful, causing immense physical hardship and psychological stress. After reporting unem- ployment in the low single digits during the first half of the 1990s, it turns out that more than 17 million are seeking work or have left the labour force after years of discouragement.2 The time therefore has come for a dry-eyed assessment of whether acute privation during the 1990s caused a significant number of premature deaths. To mitigate the problem of ex post assumption fitting, detailed population projections prepared by the American Census Bureau in 1993 have been selected as the foundation for the null hypothesis that the physical hardships, social disruption and psychological distress associated with a 44% decline in Russia's GNP caused millions of premature deaths, in addition to any adverse impact they may have had on fertility. The exercise reveals that there were 3.4 million Russian premature deaths in 1990-98 plausibly attributable to the travails of post-communism.3 What went wrong? Why were policy makers so misguided? There are many possible explanations including bad advice from the Washington Consensus, but no full fledged mea culpas.4 This article tries to cut through the finger pointing by attributing Russia's latest bout of premature deaths to the penchant of post-tsarist political leaders like Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Gorbachev and El'tsin for rash measures rather than carefully prepared reforms supported by the 'rule of law'.5 There is no doubt that the Washington Consensus bears some responsibility for the victims of 'shock therapy'. Its nostrums influenced reformers in El'tsin's circle like Stanislav Shatalin, Grigorii Yavlinsky and Egor Gaidar, but key Western advisers like Anders Aslund and Jeffrey Sachs legitimately counter-claim that the Kremlin's reforms reflected the political agenda of the El'tsin administration, concerned more with destroying the vestiges of the Soviet state and building new institutions of cronyist power than establishing competitive free enterprise. It is in this sense that Russia's post-communist premature deaths are ascribed to the tradition of callous economic radicalism,6 rather than failed liberalisation. Russian leaders have repeatedly exhibited little self-restraint in eradicating their adversaries' economic institutions and must admit this vice if the cycle of premature deaths is to be broken.

Legislative Voting Behaviour in the Russian Duma: Understanding the Effect of Mandate

Abstract: (2001). Legislative Voting Behaviour in the Russian Duma: Understanding the Effect of Mandate. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 869-884.

Types of Identification among Russians in the 'Near Abroad'

Abstract: AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION a significant number of Russians, namely 25 million, happened to live in the near abroad, that is in one of the 14 non-Russian successor states.' These ethnic Russians, whose social status suddenly shifted from the position of a dominant nation in the Soviet era to that of a minority group residing in a nationalising state, have been the focus of attention of many scholars.2 These authors have coined various labels to categorise the Russians in the near abroad, such as Russian settlers or Russian diaspora. These labels, however, have clear drawbacks. The term 'Russian settler community', used by Melvin in his perceptive study Russians beyond Russia, suggests a prior movement from one country to another, while in fact Russians can be considered as indigenous in some regions, for instance eastern Ukraine.3 The label 'diaspora', used by Shlapentokh among others, implies that Russians in the near abroad have strong links with their Russian homeland, while in fact most of them lack a sense of homeland other than the USSR as a whole.4 The conglomerate identity category 'Russian-speaking population', used by Laitin, is not accurate either. Whereas the use of this label may serve as a simple means to generalise 'the other' from the titular perspective, the question remains whether different non-titular ethnic groups speaking the Russian language (e.g. Jews, Gypsies, Belarusians and Russians in Ukraine) consider themselves as one group. Moreover, the label 'Russian-speaking population' is ambiguous in those republics where a considerable number of titulars speak Russian as their first language, for instance in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (i.e. Russophone titulars). Although many researchers have focused on the position of ethnic Russians in the near abroad and on their differences across the republics, little attention has been given to the possible variety within Russian communities.5 Given the dynamic nature of identification among ethnic minorities in newly independent republics, we may assume nonetheless that various identification types can be distinguished among Russians living in the near abroad. In this article we attempt to distinguish the most salient types of identification among these Russians. It is important to find out whether most of them consider themselves primarily as Russians or whether many of them are more or less assimilated and whether they then identify as republican representatives or even as titulars. The question is whether dual ethnic identification is an option for Russians, and whether many Russians still identify as Soviet citizens. After having determined the most salient types of

'Black Cash' Tax Evasion in Russia: Its Forms, Incentives and Consequences at Firm Level

Abstract: This paper discusses Russia’s “black cash” economy. Using interviews and survey data, we examine the mechanics of several distinctly Russian tax evasion schemes and attempt a rough estimate of the scale and dynamics involved in tax evasion based on black cash. Entrepreneurs’ opinions are also used to get an idea of the incentives and costs of black cash tax evasion. We next describe the apparent economic consequences of black cash tax evasion and formulate general formal conditions for successful evasion at firm level. Finally, we recommend several policy measures to reduce the incentives to such behavior and discuss questions for future research. (JEL: D21, H26, O17)

HZDS: The Ideology, Organisation and Support Base of Slovakia's Most Successful Party

Abstract: IN ELECTORAL TERMS the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) has been Slovakia's most successful party since its formation in 1991. The clear winner of the June 1992 elections in the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia with 37.26% of the vote, HZDS's founder and leader and three time Slovak Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, led the final phase of negotiations with his Czech counterpart, Vaclav Klaus, that spelt the demise of the common state. Although a cluster of defections brought down independent Slovakia's first HZDS-led government in early 1994, the party won the largest share of the vote in the autumn 1994 elections (34.96%) and formed a coalition government with two smaller parties, which held power for the length of the four year electoral cycle. During the 1994-98 period Slovakia became the black sheep of Central Europe, excluded by both the European Union and NATO from their respective first wave applicant groups for eastern enlargement. Blame for both exclusions has been laid at the door of the HZDS-led governments. Despite its central role in Slovak politics since its formation in 1991, HZDS has received scant attention from scholars. What attention it has received has tended to

Revising Pandora's Gifts: Religious and National Identity in the Post-Soviet Societal Fabric

Abstract: In this article I will explore the validity of these assumptions as applied to the multifaceted cauldron of religious identities in post-communist societies, particularly in the former Soviet Union. The common vision is that the break-up of the communist system uncovered a 'Pandora's box' of old evil spirits competing with the good spirits of democratisation. Religious identities are part of this dubious legacy from the frustrating past, providing a temporary and inefficient substitute for real needs and, at the same time, a convenient means of manipulation by resource-hunting elite groups. (In this context the excessive exaltation of religion can be seen as the other side of its demonisation.) My purpose here is to try to replace these value judgements with a more balanced vision of the religious processes in this area. Disintegration and reintegration in post-Soviet Eurasia The post-Soviet religious resurgence of the 1990s is certainly part of a larger societal process of change that started as early as the 1960s. It was a period of ongoing social and cultural diversification and, at the same time, of a reactive hardening of the Soviet regime; it made the institutional framework increasingly at odds with the changing society. This 'pressure cooker' effect (Milanovic, 1994) finally took the form of an exponential collapse of institutional structures. The institutional catastrophe in turn produced an identity crisis-not just a gradually evolving one but a rapid and painful turning point. The overall identity crisis that developed during the course of this disintegration was essentially dominated by the energy of particularism; it was in fact a crisis of old collective values and symbols, a multiplication and split of identity frames, from cosmic communist and imperial supranational frames down to frames of ethnicity, social strata, locality, family, other immediate groups and the individual. Although the

Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan: a Consociational Approach

Abstract: What factors permit some ethnically and religiously segmented societies to avoid large-scale violence while others sink into protracted conflict? The collapse of the Soviet Union has given rise to a variety of plural societies, the principal common feature of which has been their rapid, and seemingly irrevocable, descent along a trajectory of ethnic conflict, political separatism, and socio-economic disintegration. Nowhere has this collapse had more tragic consequences than the Caucasus where, with rare exceptions, all administrative units have approximated this trajectory to varying degrees. This study focuses upon perhaps the most dramatic of those exceptions. The absence of protracted ethnic conflict in the Russian Republic of Dagestan stands in stark contrast to its neighbors in the region, and indeed to the Russian Federation considered as a whole. For whereas the latter has been mired in horrific ethnic conflict just across Dagestan’s border, in Chechnya, Dagestan has largely avoided such difficulties. This is especially remarkable in that, even by regional standards, Dagestan is distinguished by its extremes of ethnic diversity and economic deprivation. Indeed, Dagestan has been depicted (falsely, we will argue) as a miniature Soviet Union on the verge of disintegration. With more than thirty-four ethnolinguistic groups, Dagestan is by far the most ethnically heterogeneous of Russia’s republics. Apart from Chechnya, it is also the poorest. Since these conditions have been compounded by the rigors of social transition; by the collapse of a central authority that previously guaranteed order and subsidized most of the Dagestani economy; by an influx of refugees from the three bordering republics that have been mired in violent ethnic strife; by pressures of Islamic fundamentalism; by a virtual blockade during the first

Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism in Russia's Ethnic Republics

Abstract: (2001). Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism in Russia's Ethnic Republics. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 73-104.

Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse

Abstract: (2001). Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 821-839.

Property Without Rights: Dimensions of Russian Privatisation

Abstract: IMAGINE IF YOU WILL that Adam Smith had returned to Moscow in the spring of 1992. Would he then have lectured about how 'the butcher, the brewer and the baker' by acting in their own narrow self-interest would have brought about an optimal and collectively rational outcome? Or would he perhaps have picked up his old copy of Thomas Hobbes and started reading up on the need for a strong state? These questions go to the very heart of what Russia's attempted 'systemic change' was really about. If we rephrase Smith into modern Russian reality, we may ask whether, by undertaking sweeping deregulation and a massive scaling down of the state, the Russian reformers were right in assuming that 'the banker, the gangster and the corrupt bureaucrat' by acting in their narrow self-interest would bring about an optimal and collectively rational outcome? We all know the answer to that question, at least in terms of what did follow in the wake of instant liberalisation and 'the fastest privatisation in human history'.l But perhaps it is not equally obvious in what ways an outwardly well-intended reform programme could degenerate into something so vastly destructive. Phrasing the question more specifically, what was it that made Russian privatisation turn into what some have called the 'crime of the century' and others have branded as the 'greatest robbery in world history'? Given the massive support, financial as well as political, which was offered for the programme by broad circles in the Western democracies, this transformation of good intentions into poor outcomes becomes even more puzzling. Or should it really have been at all surprising? In the following it will be argued that the transformation of a rules-based programme of privatisation into what Russians have called 'prikhvatizatsiya' (asset grabbing) represented a path dependent institutional response to the drastic change in rules that was implied by the collapse of the Soviet order. Simply put, we may say that key actors in the process were locked into pursuing individually rational but collectively disastrous strategies. Thinking in terms of multiple equilibria, this most certainly could have been avoided, but it would have required a different political agenda-and a different policy response from the West. We shall begin our statement of the case by looking at some of the arguments that were advanced in favour of setting out to privatise, and at some of the very specific Russian complications that would add to the difficulties of the privatisers. It is primarily by highlighting the latter that we can see how the entire programme for

Czech Attitudes Towards the Roma: 'Expecting More of Havel's Country'?

Abstract: EVER-GROWING IS THE ISSUE OF RIGHTS FOR ROMA and their relations with majority nations throughout Central and Eastern Europe. If one group of people seems today to be consistently verbally derided, subjected to physical abuse, social marginalisation and even legal disenfranchisement in the post-communist space, it is them. While hardly unique, this situation nevertheless has become particularly evident in the Czech Republic. Few incidents in the fate of contemporary Europe's Roma have seized the international imagination-rightly or wrongly-as much as those that have occurred in the Czech Republic. These issues, which not only require careful examination but also some qualification of foreign media coverage, include the 'wall' built effectively segregating Roma from Czechs, a series of killings, a 'citizenship' law condemned internationally as intentionally denying Roma Czech citizenship, the departure of Roma from that country and their claim of asylum in several states, and the continued operation of an industrial pig farm on the site of a World War II concentration camp for Roma.' All these incidents should be striking in themselves and call for explanation and analysis, as well as in some cases clarification of how they have been presented in the West. They are perhaps all the more unusual because of a paradox: the ethos of liberalism and tolerance accorded to Czech society by many of its own citizens, intellectual and law makers, and especially by its admirers and supporters abroad. Indeed, the present author would be among these, and this article carries some concern for the prestige and reputation of the Czech Republic.2 The importance of this assessment is multidimensional. The Romani issue has captured international media attention, if perhaps in a simplified manner. Its ramifications are numerous, affecting the Czech Republic's relations with several

Off the Cuff Politics—Explaining Russia's Lack of a Ukraine Strategy

Abstract: THERE IS A BLATANT PARADOX in Russia's policy towards Ukraine. On the one hand, there are few discussions that bring out more consensus across the Russian political spectrum than discussions of Russian-Ukrainian relations. On the other hand, Russia was not at any time during the first 10 years of Ukrainian independence able to produce a co-ordinated political strategy for the conduct of relations with her southern neighbour. The recent appointment as ambassador to Ukraine of the political heavyweight and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin could be the first indication of a more coherent Russian Ukraine strategy based on a principle of economy first, but that is still too early to say. How can the 10-year lack of a political strategy be explained? In this article I will try to explain why Russia has not been able to bring into being any coherent strategy in its policy towards Ukraine. This is especially surprising since policy towards Ukraine, more than most other foreign policy issues, was centralised and taken care of by the president and his administration. I will seek my explanations for this lack of strategy on three levels: the cognitive level, the level of resources for influence, and the bureaucratic level. I will structure the article around three working hypotheses on why Russia has not been able to generate a consistent Ukraine policy. First, the Russian political establishment has not truly come to terms with the existence of an independent Ukraine. Second, except for oil and gas, Russia has realised that her resources for influencing Ukraine are limited. Third, peculiarities of the Russian system of foreign policy making-particularly in the Ukrainian case-made a coherent foreign policy difficult to achieve. The focus for this study is not what Russia has and has not achieved in her relations with Ukraine, but why policy towards the southern neighbour has been so haphazard. That is, I focus on output rather than outcome.

The dynamic impact on the Central-Eastern European economies of accession to the European Union: social capability and technology absorption.

Abstract: WHENEVER ECONOMISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO GAUGE the gains from economic integration they have come up with very modest figures. Estimates of the total impact, in terms of static trade effects, of the creation of the original Common Market are all in the region of 1%. Taking economies of scale and competition effects into account raises the estimate, but only to a still modest 3%. Ex ante assessments of the impact of the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme, making allowance for scale and competition effects, produced estimates of total impact in the range of 4-6% WHENEVER ECONOMISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO GAUGE the gains from economic integration they have come up with very modest figures. Estimates of the total impact, in terms of static trade effects, of the creation of the original Common Market are all in the region of 1%. Taking economies of scale and competition effects into account raises the estimate, but only to a still modest 3%. Ex ante assessments of the impact of the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme, making allowance for scale and competition effects, produced estimates of total impact in the range of 4-6% WHENEVER ECONOMISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO GAUGE the gains from economic integration they have come up with very modest figures. Estimates of the total impact, in terms of static trade effects, of the creation of the original Common Market are all in the region of 1%. Taking economies of scale and competition effects into account raises the estimate, but only to a still modest 3%. Ex ante assessments of the impact of the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme, making allowance for scale and competition effects, produced estimates of total impact in the range of 4-6% WHENEVER ECONOMISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO GAUGE the gains from economic integration they have come up with very modest figures. Estimates of the total impact, in terms of static trade effects, of the creation of the original Common Market are all in the region of 1%. Taking economies of scale and competition effects into account raises the estimate, but only to a still modest 3%. Ex ante assessments of the impact of the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme, making allowance for scale and competition effects, produced estimates of total impact in the range of 4-6% WHENEVER ECONOMISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO GAUGE the gains from economic integration they have come up with very modest figures. Estimates of the total impact, in terms of static trade effects, of the creation of the original Common Market are all in the region of 1%. Taking economies of scale and competition effects into account raises the estimate, but only to a still modest 3%. Ex ante assessments of the impact of the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme, making allowance for scale and competition effects, produced estimates of total impact in the range of 4-6% WHENEVER ECONOMISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO GAUGE the gains from economic integration they have come up with very modest figures. Estimates of the total impact, in terms of static trade effects, of the creation of the original Common Market are all in the region of 1%. Taking economies of scale and competition effects into account raises the estimate, but only to a still modest 3%. Ex ante assessments of the impact of the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme, making allowance for scale and competition effects, produced estimates of total impact in the range of 4-6% WHENEVER ECONOMISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO GAUGE the gains from economic integration they have come up with very modest figures. Estimates of the total impact, in terms of static trade effects, of the creation of the original Common Market are all in the region of 1%. Taking economies of scale and competition effects into account raises the estimate, but only to a still modest 3%. Ex ante assessments of the impact of the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme, making allowance for scale and competition effects, produced estimates of total impact in the range of 4-6% WHENEVER ECONOMISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO GAUGE the gains from economic integration they have come up with very modest figures. Estimates of the total impact, in terms of static trade effects, of the creation of the original Common Market are all in the region of 1%. Taking economies of scale and competition effects into account raises the estimate, but only to a still modest 3%. Ex ante assessments of the impact of the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme, making allowance for scale and competition effects, produced estimates of total impact in the range of 4-6% WHENEVER ECONOMISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO GAUGE the gains from economic integration they have come up with very modest figures. Estimates of the total impact, in terms of static trade effects, of the creation of the original Common Market are all in the region of 1%. Taking economies of scale and competition effects into account raises the estimate, but only to a still modest 3%. Ex ante assessments of the impact of the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme, making allowance for scale and competition effects, produced estimates of total impact in the range of 4-6% WHENEVER ECONOMISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO GAUGE the gains from economic integration they have come up with very modest figures. Estimates of the total impact, in terms of static trade effects, of the creation of the original Common Market are all in the region of 1%. Taking economies of scale and competition effects into account raises the estimate, but only to a still modest 3%. Ex ante assessments of the impact of the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme, making allowance for scale and competition effects, produced estimates of total impact in the range of 4-6%

Economists, Soviet Growth Slowdown and the Collapse

Abstract: (2001). Economists, Soviet Growth Slowdown and the Collapse. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 675-695.

The Russian Detour: Real Transition in a Virtual Economy?

Abstract: Illustrates the creation of a market economy by showing that no easy procedures automatically lead to that goal; the Russian forest sector is used as a model for all Russian industries. The major o ...

Stalin's Cabinet: the Politburo and Decision Making in the Post-war Years

Abstract: (2001). Stalin's Cabinet: The Politburo and Decision Making in the Post-war Years. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 291-312.

Russian agriculture and food processing: Vertical cooperation and spatial dynamics

Abstract: IF THERE IS ONE TRAIT that many Western-trained Russia watchers share, it is a 'breaking news' mentality: the Russian scene is viewed through a looking glass of upheavals and political personalities rather than long-term processes and their historical antecedents and roots. Examples of fleeting events that have recently captured imaginations include changes of the guard in the Kremlin,' elections, relationships between top Russian leaders and oligarchs, the drastic devaluation of the ruble, and so forth. The devaluation, in particular, has possessed economic analysts for a long time-which is justifiable but only in a carefully circumscribed context.2 We have repeatedly stressed that there is more continuity to developments in

Postwar Normalisation and its Limits in the USSR: the Case of Trade

Abstract: was an economy of crisis. R. W. Davies has documented the crisis that led to systemic reforms in 1932, and its continuation through 1935; Elena Osokina has drawn attention to the crop failure of 1936 and to the 'prewar' crisis of 1939-41; Mark Harrison has painted a desperate picture of Soviet resources during World War II; and V. F. Zima has published the first synthetic account of the 1946-47 famine.' Even the 1920s have appeared in a darker light since the opening of the archives; works are in progress on famine in 1924-25 and what appears to have been a large-scale famine in southern Ukraine in 1928.2 In the course of my own research on Soviet trade, I have kept a rough tally of starvation incidents; I believe that the only years between 1916 and 1949 in which no swath of the population starved were 1926, 1927 and-excluding prisoners and deportees-1938.3 This is a sorry record for the workers' paradise. It has led some scholars, including Osokina and Zima, to argue that a propensity to food crises was the distinguishing feature of Stalinism. Food crises had broad implications for retail trade in the era before World War II. As Osokina has shown in a series of pioneering works, the regime's response to such crises was to give priority to groups of consumers whose survival was most important to key industrial goals. This logic not only structured the centralised rationing system of the early 1930s but was behind a recurrent pattern of state intervention on behalf of the regime's most valuable consumers for nearly 15 years. Pointing to repeated incidents in which the open trade principles of the second half of the 1930s were violated for the sake of protecting the elite's privileged access to consumer goods, Osokina has argued that the abolition of rationing 'did not introduce fundamental changes into the system of supplying the population'.4 Accordingly, she portrays the reintroduction of rationing in 1939-40 as inevitable not because of such contingent factors as the Soviet war against Finland or preparations for total war, but rather because prioritising consumers was a core need of the Stalinist economy. The system 'claimed its own' when shortages, lengthy queues and a hierarchical rationing system returned to plague citizens' daily lives. Zima has made a similar point with regard to trade after World War II. Though elsewhere in his study he portrays 1948-49 as the end of the postwar famine, Zima opened a section on trade with the assertion that 'in 1948 people's everyday material situation did not significantly improve'.5 Even with respect to the early 1950s his portrait of trade is unremittingly negative: not enough affordable food in Moscow;

Compatriot Games: Explaining the 'Diaspora Linkage' in Russia's Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States

Abstract: (2001). Compatriot Games: Explaining the 'Diaspora Linkage' in Russia's Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 771-791.

For Victory? The Crises and Dilemmas of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation

Abstract: IT HAS LONG BECOME COMMON for analysts to predict the demise of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and its irrelevance as a political organisation. The CPRF in turn has repeatedly confounded such analyses. In 1993 Richard Sakwa came to the understandable conclusion that communist groups in Russia were 'part of an exhausted tradition nursed only by the old generation', just before the CPRF re-entered parliamentary politics in the Duma elections of December 1993.1 After the party's defeat in the presidential elections of 1996 and repeatedly throughout the period of the 6th Duma (1995-99), analysis focused on its future organisational and ideological viability. A common assumption was that the CPRF had reached a 'crossroads' by the summer of 1996, and thereafter might split, or turn itself into a non-communist organisation (either social democratic or nationalist), or both.2 Yet, having neither split nor renewed itself ideologically, the party actually achieved a better result on the party list vote in 1999 than in either parliamentary election before. Moreover, soon after this election, the party obtained the re-election of its candidate Gennadii Seleznev as parliamentary speaker, and a significant number of parliamentary committee chairmanships. So was there any real substance to such rumours of the CPRF's difficulties? What was the real significance of the communists' election performance? How did this influence the prospects of the party's evolution? This article seeks an explanation of the CPRF's long-term development up to 1999 by focusing on how an 'anti-system' communist party aims to achieve its ends in a pluralist system. The CPRF's ideology, culture, structure and much of its mass membership and electorate are anti-system in orientation. Yet the CPRF's elite made the transition to a within-system opposition within the parliament of 1995-99, and this was marked in the conduct and aftermath of the 1999 elections. The contradiction

The Economic Consequences of Slobodan Milo w evi

Abstract: MODERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT has been associated with profound structural changes. Agriculture became increasingly commercialised and therefore specialised, it increased in productivity and shifted towards livestock raising. It supported a rising standard of food consumption, while permitting an overall shift of resources towards secondary and tertiary activities. Industry expanded as a proportion of total output and, within the industrial sector, there was a shift from low value added processing of primary products and the manufacture of single-use consumer goods towards higher technology sectors, especially in the production of machines and metal manufactures, producer goods and consumer durables. Growth caused a disproportionate rise in productive capital stock, and a corresponding deepening of social infrastructure. Fast growing economies were associated with rising personal and corporate savings, supplemented by the net inflow of capital. Public authorities increased their participation in total output. They devoted a rising proportion of their own activity (excluding transfer payments) to the provision of social services to the population, particularly healthcare and education, while reducing the proportion devoted to internal and external security. Rising healthcare and education provisions were accompanied by improvement in the human capital stock, which in turn facilitated the assimilation and development of new technologies, which sustained economic advance. This general statement of the relationship between economic growth and structure loosely follows the template set up in the 1960s by Simon Kuznets.1 Economic structure in countries experiencing protracted secular decline should therefore undergo changes the reverse of those associated with growing economies, though this has not to my knowledge been tested. We would expect economic decline to be associated with a growing dependence on agriculture, especially for selfconsumption, a deterioration in agricultural practice, and a diminution in the physical capital stock in productive industry and in infrastructure. Industrial structure would shift away from metal goods and producers goods, and the quality of the industrial technology applied would deteriorate. Decline would also be associated with negative saving and net capital export. Within the sector of state provision, spending on state security would rise relatively, resulting in a sharp run-down of healthcare and education. This would threaten the quality of the human capital stock. Between 1978 and the fall of the Milosevic regime in 2000 Serbia-Montenegro (from 1992 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) experienced protracted secular

The Question of Legitimacy: Elites and Political Support in Russia

Abstract: institutions in politics, economy and goverance, while others survived more or less intact from the former regime. For the first time the elite could openly express critical attitudes towards institutions and their leaders, the main characteristic of the democratic process. The dilemma is that stable democracy also requires a certain level of support for institutions and their leadership. Acceptance of institutions by both the elite and the masses helps to prevent disruptive conflicts and instability. Stable institutions are a prerequisite for democracy and they acquire legitimacy only through support. Support may be 'diffuse' and related to the value of the institution as such, or it may take the form of more 'specific' support for the leaders of the institution in question. Most would agree that if democracy is to be stable, leaders and the masses must have a minimum level of confidence in institutions, and members of the elite must have a basic level of trust in each other and some interest in mass support. A change of regime away from authoritarian rule makes the question of legitimacy particularly crucial since 'democracy' presupposes backing for its main institutions. The purpose of this article is to find some evidence on how solid this foundation is in Russia among the elite and the mass.