scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question

Showing papers in "Foreign Affairs in 1972"


Journal Article•DOI•

290 citations


Journal Article•DOI•

97 citations


Journal Article•
TL;DR: The final collapse of the Alliance for Progress was announced by Argentina as discussed by the authors, which was based on the assumption of cold-war confrontation, the Alliance was designed ten years ago to stop Castro's influence and win friends in Latin America.
Abstract: THE winds of economic nationalism are blowing strong in Latin America. This is evident in the nationalist and pro gressive r?gime in Peru, the rise and fall of the leftist gov ernment in Bolivia, the changes of policy in conservative coun tries like Colombia and Argentina and the spectacular election of a socialist government in Chile. There are also the numerous acts of nationalization in various countries, most of which have gone largely unnoticed, while others like the nationalization of petroleum in Peru and Bolivia, natural gas in Venezuela, alumi num in Guyana and copper in Chile have reached the headlines. Furthermore, there are restrictive foreign investment statutes unanimously endorsed by the Andean Pact nations, the limita tions of various kinds imposed on foreign subsidiaries even in countries, like Mexico, otherwise favorable to foreign invest ment, the unaccustomed incisiveness of the Latin American pro test against President Nixon's New Economic Policy voiced in the meetings of the Special Co-ordination Commission of Latin America, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States and the World Bank-In ternational Monetary Fund Annual Conference, as well as the formal withdrawal of Argentina from the Inter-American Com mittee of the Alliance for Progress. This last act, which does not come from a socialist Allende or a nationalist General Velasco Alvarado but from the conserva tive General Lanusse, marks the final collapse of the Alliance for Progress. Based on the assumption of cold-war confrontation, the Alliance was designed ten years ago to stop Castro's influence and win friends in Latin America. Now both the Alliance and the cold war are over, and there have been neither communist nor capitalist victors. The politico-ideological confrontation has been replaced to a large extent by an economic confrontation between the national interests of Latin America and those of the United States. The recent burst of nationalism is in fact a reac tion to long-term and increasingly intolerable dependence on foreigners. The development strategy of industrialization as a

67 citations


Journal Article•DOI•

55 citations


Journal Article•DOI•

45 citations


Journal Article•DOI•

29 citations


Journal Article•DOI•

22 citations


Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: In the case of the war in Vietnam, it was clear that stalemate was the most likely outcome and neither the Americans nor the Vietnamese communists had good odds for a traditional military victory in Vietnam.
Abstract: AS Henry Kissinger has written, public support is "the acid u\ test of a foreign policy." For a President to be successful A? ^in maintaining his nation's security he needs to believe, and others need to believe, that he has solid support at home. It was President Johnson's judgment that if the United States permitted the fall of Vietnam to communism, American politics would turn ugly and inward and the world would be a less safe place in which to live. Later, President Nixon would declare : "The right way out of Vietnam is crucial to our changing role in the world, and the peace in the world." In order to gain support for these judg ments and the objectives in Vietnam which flowed from them, our Presidents have had to weave together the steel-of-war strategy with the strands of domestic politics. Neither the Americans nor the Vietnamese communists had good odds for a traditional military victory in Vietnam. Given the mutual will to continue the war and self-imposed American restraint in the use of force, stalemate was the most likely out come.

17 citations


Journal Article•DOI•

16 citations


Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: In his first speech to the United Nations, the leader of Peking's delegation to the General Assembly, Chiao Kuan-hua, stated on behalf of his government: "I once again solemnly declare that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons." And he continued : "If the United States and the Soviet Union really and truly want to disarm themselves, they should commit themselves not to be a first-use country as mentioned in this paper... This is not something difficult to do." Chiao's remarks, and their prominence
Abstract: IN his first speech to the General Assembly, the leader of Peking's delegation to the United Nations, Chiao Kuan-hua, stated on behalf of his government: "I once again solemnly declare that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons." And he continued : "If the United States and the Soviet Union really and truly want dis armament, they should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is not something difficult to do." Chiao's remarks, and their prominence in the first official state ment by a representative of the People's Republic of China before the United Nations, came as no surprise : the declaration that China would not be the first to use nuclear weapons has been a staple of Peking's foreign policy, constantly reiterated, ever since the first Chinese nuclear explosion in October 1964. From a Chinese point of view, such assurances made eminent good sense. In their first years, the few Chinese nuclear weapons and their manufacturing facilities offered a tempting target for a preemptive enemy. Indeed, it was more than once rumored first that the United States and then that the Soviet Union was plan ning such an attack. Even today a first strike could very largely eliminate China's nuclear capabilities. In so far as a solemn dec laration foreswearing first use tends to make it morally more difficult for others to use nuclear weapons against China, the P.R.C. continues to be well served by it. Moreover, it is also self-evident that, given the marked disparities between the Chi nese nuclear force as it will be for the rest of the 1970s and the forces possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union, first use by China against either "nuclear superpower" (a term the Chinese use only derogatorily) would be suicidal. Now that Peking is at last represented at the United Nations, it is likely that the theme of no first use of nuclear weapons will be heard with increased frequency and from increasing numbers of voices among the non-nuclear powers, fearful as they are that some day, in some perhaps unforeseeable circumstance, nuclear weapons might be used against them. The United States and the Soviet Union will undoubtedly be under more pressure to declare

14 citations


Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: The model of the balance of power which moderated, if not the aspirations at least the accomplishments, of rulers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as discussed by the authors restrained violence (without curtailing wars) and provided enough flexibility to ensure a century of global peace after the Congress of Vienna.
Abstract: ^fa m ^ HE end of the bipolar postwar world" has been ac I knowledged by the latest presidential State of the ^ World message Although it is elliptic in describing the new design for a lasting and stable "structure of peace," there is little doubt that the blueprint for the future is inspired by the past It is the model of the balance of power which moderated, if not the aspirations at least the accomplishments, of rulers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries It restrained violence (without curtailing wars) It provided enough flexibility to ensure a century of global peace after the Congress of Vienna, despite drastic changes in the relative strengths and fortunes of the main actors

Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: The problem of finding alternative sources of military advice for the United States military has been discussed in this article. But the problem is not limited to the military, but also to other groups and individuals who can provide advice, but their access to information is limited.
Abstract: ALL Presidents are dependent on the permanent bureau /-\ cracies of government inherited from their predecessors. A President must have the information and analysis of options which the bureaucracies provide in order to anticipate problems and make educated choices. He must, in most cases, also have the cooperation of the bureaucracies to turn his deci sions into governmental action. A bureaucracy can effectively defuse a presidential decision by refusing to support it with in fluential members of Congress or to implement it faithfully. The President's dependence on the bureaucracy and his lim ited freedom to man uvre are acute in all areas. The military, however, poses a unique set of problems for him. These arise in part from the limitations upon the President when he is seeking military advice. When the National Security Council or other presidential sessions are convened to discuss high-level foreign and national security matters, the President has a great deal of influence on the selection of all those who will attend, except the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who must be chosen from a small group of senior career military officers. Compare also the President's ability to appoint noncareer people to subcabinet and ambassadorial posts with the limitations on his range of selection for appointments to senior military positions or over seas military commands. One dilemma for the President is finding alternative sources of military advice. The military, for example, has a virtual mo nopoly on providing information to the President about the readiness and capabilities of U.S. or even allied forces. Other groups and individuals can provide advice on many "military" questions, but their access to information is limited. The Presi dent may call for judgments from his Secretary of Defense, but the Secretary's analysis must rely on the basic factual material and field evaluations provided by the military. Judgments about the likely effectiveness of American combat operations are also the exclusive province of the military. In assessing the potential effects of a diplomatic move, the President can turn not only to career Foreign Service Officers, but also to businessmen, academics and intelligence specialists in other


Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify the principal phases of the cold war, view ing it as a process of conflict and competition, and delineate phases of time in which the competi tive process was dominated by a discernible pattern of relations, either on the basis of a relatively crystallized strategy and/or through more assertive behavior.
Abstract: THE dates May 22, 1947, and May 22, 1972, span exactly 25 years On May 22, 1947, President Truman signed a congressional bill committing the United States to support Greece and Turkey against Soviet designs, and the United States thereby assumed overtly the direct leadership of the West in the containment of Soviet influence Twenty-five years later to the day, another American President landed in Moscow, declaring to the Soviet leaders that "we meet at a moment when we can make peaceful cooperation a reality" Viewing the past 25 years of the cold war as a political process, this study seeks to evaluate the conduct of the two competitors and to draw some implications from the experience of a quarter? century's rivalry for the future of US-Soviet relations Its pur pose is thus neither to seek the causes of the cold war nor to assign moral or historical responsibility for it To accomplish the above, two preliminary steps must be taken The first is to identify the principal phases of the cold war, view ing it as a process of conflict and competition The purpose of the periodization is to delineate phases of time in which the competi tive process was dominated by a discernible pattern of relations; in its simplest form, this involves identifying phases in which one or the other side seemed to hold the political initiative, either on the basis of a relatively crystallized strategy and/or through more assertive behavior Second, it is necessary to focus on several dynamic components at work in the competitive process, the interaction of which shaped the relative performance of the two powers Reference will be made within the several phases of the competition to the relative international standing of the two rivals, to their relative economic power, to their relative military power, and to the relative clarity and purposefulness of national policy, including the degree of domestic support for that policy Finally, it must be acknowledged that this writer sees the cold war as more the product of lengthy and probably ineluc table historical forces and less as the result of human error and

Journal Article•

Journal Article•DOI•

Journal Article•DOI•

Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: In this paper, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, in an effort to establish a working relationship with the United States, offered to come to Washington to talk in person with President Roosevelt.
Abstract: ONE of the great "if s" and harsh ironies of history hangs on the fact that in January 1945, four and a half years before they achieved national power in China, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, in an effort to establish a working relationship with the United States, offered to come to Washington to talk in person with President Roosevelt. What became of the offer has been a mystery until, with the declassification of new material, we now know for the first time that the United States made no re




Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: Nixon as mentioned in this paper argued that the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended period of peace is when there has been a pentagonal balance of power, which produced two periods of about 40 years of peace between the battles of Waterloo and the Marne and hardly existed after that.
Abstract: IN the issue of Time of January 3, 1972, President Nixon is quoted as follows: "We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended period of peace is when there has been balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance." It is a curious statement if taken at its face value. In the first place, it is historically untrue?a pentagonal balance of power produced two periods each of about 40 years of peace between the battles of Waterloo and the Marne and hardly existed after ward ; in "the history of the world" the periods of deepest peace have been those of partial or universal empire. In addition, it negates a long-standing American declaratory position against a multiple power balance, symbolized by President Wilson's famous description of it at the Guildhall in 1918 as "a thing in which the balance was determined by the sword which was thrown in on one side or the other . . . the unstable equilibrium of competitive interests . . . maintained by jealous watchfulness and an antagonism of interests." It abrogates at least a decade or more in which it was the con ventional wisdom in Washington that the United States should be "infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competi tor." And finally, it assumes that, as in the eighteenth century, the five powers concerned have broadly the same range of resources at their disposal. This simply is not true today. The Soviet Union and the United States possess a degree of strategic, military and economic resources which the other three partners do not. West ern Europe, the United States and Japan are advanced techno logical powers of a kind which the Soviet Union and China would like to be but are not. Western Europe has still only the characteristics of a supermarket and it will take it many years to acquire those of a single actor in world politics. Japan is not

Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: The reaction to the 1969 White Paper on Foreign Policy has some resemblance to the events at Magnetic Hill as mentioned in this paper, where cars only seem to be coasting uphill, but they are actually going down.
Abstract: EACH year, at a place called "Magnetic Hill," visitors to Canada by the thousands park their cars at the bottom, place the gearshift in neutral, and sit in delighted astonish ment as they glide gradually but inexorably up the hill. The whole exercise is an optical illusion, of course. The cars only seem to be coasting uphill ; they are actually going down. The tourists know this, but they come anyway. It's not the feat that is the attraction; it's the illusion. The hue and cry that arose within Canada following the in troduction in 1969 of the government's White Paper on Foreign Policy bears some resemblance to the events at Magnetic Hill. The criticism was directed less at the paper's views of what Canada could and should do in the world than at the illusion



Journal Article•DOI•


Journal Article•DOI•