Showing papers in "Foreign Affairs in 1973"

The oil crisis: this time the wolf is here

Abstract: It was a popular belief in the 1960s that the supply of oil was abundant. As late as 1970, it was believed that the U.S. could remain essentially self-sufficient in oil. Recognizing the dangers of dependence on oil from the Eastern Hemisphere, a Presidential Task Force recommended that imports from the Eastern Hemisphere be limited to 10% of total U.S. oil consumption, a level expected to be reached in the mid-1980s. These projections were spectacularly wrong. Imports from the Eastern Hemisphere amounted to 15% of consumption in 1972, and are expected to rise to 20% in 1973. The source of these errors were: (1) overestimates of domestic capacity, and (2) the decline of natural gas supplies and its impact on oil demand. Most of the world's proven oil reserves are in Arab hands. We must recognize that previous political threats on restriction of oil have been directed against the U.S. alone, not against our allies. By 1980, we will be even more dependent on oil from the Middle East. The present price agreements are defined only thorugh 1975. Production is leveling off in the Middle East. The only alternative to shortfall before 1980 will be Saudi Arabia, and its projected production seems improbably high. The U.S. has discussed a two-pronged approach to consumer cooperation: (1) development of new forms of energy, and (2) an international authority to avoid cutthroat competition in times of shortage. In the long run, the only satisfactory position for the U.S. must be alternative sources of energy. Effective mass-transit systems could do much to limit our present profligate use of energy in the form of oil.

Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out The Century

Abstract: The autumn of last year marked half the road from the beginning of the nuclear era to the year 2000. Mankind has been spared nuclear devastation since the annihilation of two Japanese cities by the only two nuclear weapons then existing. But the destructiveness of nuclear arsenals, now increased many thousandfold, has sunk into human consciousness like man’s knowledge of his mortality.

The Mutual-Hostage Relationship between America and Russia

Abstract: FOR nearly two decades the strategic nuclear armaments of the Soviet Union and the United States have been great enough for each to hold the other's civilian population as hostage against a devastating nuclear attack. Living with this situation has not been and will not be easy: it has become, quite simply, one of the major tensions of modern life. Yet the mutual hostage relationship has been given credit, and probably justly so, for the prevention of massive world wars. During the last few years, this relationship has been exposed to broader public scrutiny as a result of the SALT I negotiations and treaty, and a number of articles and statements have ap peared criticizing U.S. policy with regard to the situation.1 One critic, Donald Brennan, coined the acronym MAD, for Mutual Assured Destruction, to indicate his view of the policy underly ing SALT. While others have not employed quite as harsh terms, they still assert that the terms of the SALT I treaty prohibiting extensive anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployments do in fact signify a morally repugnant policy of leaving "mass slaughter" as the only option in case deterrence has failed in some way. The recently named head of the Arms Control and Disarma ment Agency, Fred Charles Ikl?, cites three "far-reaching dog mas" as implied by current U.S. policies:

U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus

Abstract: A MERICA was thrust into the world some 30 years ago. That A-\ jolting experience generated in America a degree of unity ** ^ concerning foreign affairs unusual for a democratic and pluralist society. Largely as a consequence of that shock, Amer ica's foreign policy came to enjoy for a quarter of a century the advantage of broad popular support and of a seeming sense of direction. Throughout much of that time, America's involvement in world affairs was characterized by an increasingly activist inter nationalism, by an idealistic optimism, and by a strong dose of populist Manichaeanism. The activist internationalism was in part a reaction to widely shared guilt feelings about America's earlier rejection of the League of Nations, and?as if to erase the past?America now became the most active promoter of interna tional undertakings. The idealistic optimism combined a strong faith in the eventual emergence of a world of united nations with an unprecedented degree of popular willingness to share Amer ica's bounty with others. The populist Manichaeanism reflected the propensity of the masses to demonize foreign affairs, a ten dency easily reinforced by the realities of Hitlerism and then of Stalinism. Both World War II and the subsequent cold war gave Amer ica's involvement in world affairs a clear focus. The objectives of foreign policy were relatively easy to define, and they could be imbued with high moral content. To be sure, periodic frustra tions in the conduct of the cold war prompted different Presi dents to define their policies and priorities in varying terms, but the essential character of America's involvement remained un changed. President Roosevelt focused public hopes on the "four freedoms," but the frustrations of Yalta?a case of unsuccessful Realpolitik at variance with the prevailing idealism?led not long afterward to President Truman's call for the containment of Stalinism and for the reconstruction of Europe. The frustra tions of the Korean War in turn led to President Eisenhower's "Crusade for Freedom," including even the goal of liberating Eastern Europe (and thus repudiating Yalta). U.S. passivity in

The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction and Fair Play

Abstract: THE multitude of articles, news reports and commentaries on the energy "crisis" in recent months have been chiefly concerned with four basic issues: (i) a growing (and by implication, a worrisome) oil "shortage" in the United States and the industrial world; (2) an intimate (and by implication, an unholy) alliance between the major oil companies and the Orga nization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) at the expense of the consuming public; (3) an increasing (and by implication, an undesirable) redistribution of oil revenues through higher oil prices in favor of producing countries, giving them significant (and by implication, excessive) controls over future oil supply and foreign exchange reserves; and (4) a need for concerted ac tion (and by implication, "drastic measures") on the part of the oil-short countries vis-?-vis the "oil cartel." An obsessive preoccupation with the superficial and adversary aspects of these issues has in turn given rise to some unfortunate misunderstandings regarding the real problems facing both oil producers and oil consumers in the next decades. The need for a more balanced assessment of these problems, and for a construc tive world view of the situation, has never been so compelling. II

Growth, Poverty and Inequalities

Abstract: The need to combine political changes with projects designed to foster economic growth and reduce poverty is discussed. The experience of the last two decades demonstrates that the distribution of income, assets, and influence over institutions determines the character of subsequent growth. The pattern of growth can only be changed if these factors are drastically altered, and such a drastic change will only come about through a government that derives its power from the dispossessed. Evidence indicates that a major political transformation would not adversely influence overall growth rates. The conclusion that the character of growth cannot be altered unless the political milieu is thoroughly transformed does not imply that there is no hope for change. For example, India has shown an ability to mobilize the dispossessed to initiate and police reforms. It is concluded that political change, rather than direct attacks upon poverty, is the key to redressing inequality.

Pressures on Apartheid

Abstract: IN South Africa today there exist pressures for change, superficial and po tentially far-reaching, complementary and contradictory, deriving from a variety of sources: economic, political, Black, White, foreign and domestic. The dynamics of the situation suggest an image of a series of cogs whose vary ing and opposing motions and alternate meshing and disengagement produce erratic and undirected movement. The task of assessing the significance and direction of change is an awk ward one. Intensifying and broadening international activity, evolving in ternal patterns and raised Black expectations provide a shifting background. Further, radically differing perceptions and evaluations of the meaning and pace of change are bound to make both analysis and communication difficult. Nonetheless, trends of some seeming significance for the contemporary de velopment of South African institutions are taking place in three principal areas: increasing criticism and protest by the Black leadership of the Bantu stans or native reserves; activity among urban Blacks, particularly in the Black labor movement; and wide-ranging efforts by outside groups, organiza tions and businesses to influence South African racial policy.

The Concert of Europe

Abstract: TEN years after President Kennedy stood at the Berlin Wall and proclaimed, "Ich bin ein Berliner," his sometime rival Richard Nixon is about to make his own Grand Tour of the Old World. The very notion of a Grand Tour calls up the Jamesian theme of an innocent abroad. One might ask whether President Nixon will discover, as did the Jamesian hero, often to his sorrow, that innocence and goodwill are not enough for such an undertaking; the ability to deal with subtleties and com plexities is the necessary virtue in order to apprehend the Euro pean experience. But then, President Nixon is not going alone, and, unlike his avowed model, Woodrow Wilson, he is unlikely to abandon his Colonel House after his disembarkation. On the contrary, he will most likely leave it to his European-born ad viser, Henry Kissinger, to guide him through the labyrinth of European diplomacy. Moreover, ten years after President Kennedy's visit, President Nixon will be confronted by a new set of perceptions that the Europeans (and by Europeans, I mean West Europeans) hold of America, and vice versa. The Europeans see America as Ray mond Vernon has described her, as a "rogue elephant in the forest" whose economic might is such that she can lash out, de spite the recent downturn in her monetary fortunes.1 But she is also a beast wounded in pride, after an Asian war which seemed to the European mind a reckless adventure. Alastair Buchan, now at Oxford, has written that "the United States has come, for the time being, to be regarded in Europe . . . less as the mainspring of civilization and more as the generator of crude power." Since perceptions are the forces which guide statesmen, our own self-image as a somewhat put-upon, rather benevolent creature, who did not seek an empire and who has emerged chastened and wiser after a debilitating war, may not coincide with what General de Gaulle?expressing what many Europeans often felt?characterized as a people animated by a will to power cloaked in idealism. But what of Europe? Surely our perceptions of Europe are