Showing papers in "Games and Economic Behavior in 2001"

TL;DR: This work considers algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest, and suggests a framework for studying such algorithms.

TL;DR: This work formalizes decentralized scheduling as a discrete resource allocation problem, and brings to bear some relevant economic concepts about the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, and the quality of equilibrium solutions.

TL;DR: This work analyzes the process of network formation in a dynamic framework, where self-interested individuals can form and sever links, to determine which network structures the formation process will converge to.

TL;DR: An extensive breakdown of the auction design space is presented that captures the essential similarities and differences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies.

TL;DR: A slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of G. E. Bolton and R. Zwick is presented, finding a significant change in behavior: Fair offers occur less often when equal splits are replaced by nearly equal splits.

TL;DR: In simple sequential games, this work investigates experimentally whether preferences over an outcome depend on what other possible outcomes of the situation under consideration are, i.e. whether choices are "menu dependent".

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework, where self-interested individuals can form and sever links, and determine which network structures the formation process will converge to.

TL;DR: In the modern literature on game theory there are several versions of what is known as Zermelo’s theorem, and it is shown that most of them bear only a partial relationship to what Zermela really did.

TL;DR: This paper revisits the minimum-effort coordination game with a continuum of Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria with a logit probabilistic choice function and finds that logit equilibrium efforts decrease with increases in effort costs and the number of players, even though these parameters do not affect the Nash Equilibria.

TL;DR: An axiom system is devised which is sound and complete with respect to the class of type spaces in the sense of Harsanyi (1967-68) and requires that degrees of belief be compatible for any two sets of assertions which are equivalent in a suitably defined natural sense.

TL;DR: It is shown that under four canonical incentive conditions the no-communication hypothesis can be rejected with and without literal meanings, which means communicative outcomes are less likely to evolve and, if they do, evolve more slowly without a commonly understood language.

TL;DR: A "jury theorem" is proved for the analysis of juries by modelling voting as a game of incomplete information: as the size of the jury increases, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule, except unanimity rule.

TL;DR: It is shown that, despite such strategic breach, leveled commitment increases the expected payoff to both contract parties and can enable deals that are impossible under full commitment.

TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that Modica and Rustichini's approach can be viewed as a special case of a general approach to unawareness considered by R. Fagin and J. Y. Halpern.

TL;DR: This paper presents a simple model in order to explain two phenomena concerning debate rules, and shows how these phenomena can change during and after a debate.

TL;DR: The model developed in Sarin and Vahid (1999, GEB) is used to explain behaviour in games with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium better than alternative models and is obtained further support for the simple dynamic model.

TL;DR: This paper experimentally tests the self-impression management model, which predicts that individuals act to show themselves in a positive light, even when they are the only observer of their own behavior, and predicts that the “other” type of dictator will avoid being greedy by taking more only as their choices are increasingly restricted.

TL;DR: The so-called CPR learning rule and the dynamic process it induces are formally stated and compared to other reinforcement rules as well as to fictitious play or the replicator dynamics.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote, and show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for friends may be postponed, and it may be advantageous to vote for enemies.

TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that the key difference between Aumann and Stalnaker lies in how they interpret this counterfactual, and a formal model is presented that lets us capture this difference.

TL;DR: It is shown that behavior which satisfies none of the standard consistency assumptions can be both invulnerable and maximally opportunist, and two conditions which, combined with maximal opportunism, imply the existence of a choice function rationalized by an ordering and satisfying the sure thing principle are presented.

TL;DR: It is found that, on average, responders have negative regard for proposers' earnings in all countries and proposers are expected payoff maximizers in countries where responders have low negative regard.

TL;DR: This paper showed that the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within the class of all posterior-implementable trading procedures and fails to do so among all interim incentive-compatible procedures in which losers do not pay.

TL;DR: A version of Rubinstein's Electronic Mail Game in which the noisy communications technology is voluntary and costly is examined, including the equilibrium in which only one message is sent as well as equilibria in which longer strings of messages are exchanged.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation structures and divisions of the payoffs are determined simultaneously, and analyze the cooperation structure and payoff divisions that result according to Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibrium, and coalition proof Nash equilibrium.

TL;DR: Two completely informed but possibly asymmetric bidders buy or sell identical “claims” in sequential auctions and subsequently receive monetary prizes that depend upon the final allocation of claims, which may be interpreted as the natural market structure.

TL;DR: If the stage games have positive spillovers and satisfy certain other conditions, then the limit points of the subgame perfect equilibria are precisely the approachable action profiles in monotone games.

TL;DR: The authors compare adaptive learning and fairness in an experiment that involves punishment and reward versions of the ultimatum game and draw conclusions concerning the abilities and limitations of both types of theories of fairness.

TL;DR: This work derives a set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by investigating equilibrium notions in game theory from the revealed preference approach.

TL;DR: The main message of this study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome.