Showing papers in "Games and Economic Behavior in 2006"

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a formal theory of reciprocity, which takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention.

TL;DR: It is shown that the allocation problem among submodular valuations is NP-hard, and an efficient greedy 2-approximation algorithm is presented that generalizes to the case of limited complementarities.

TL;DR: The experimental results strongly support the basic insight of the theory, namely, that less information is transmitted when preferences of the sender and the receiver diverge, and the average payoffs are very close to those predicted by the most informative equilibrium.

TL;DR: It is found that in a society with many groups, where it is cheaper to connect within groups as compared to across groups, strategic play by individuals leads to a network architecture in which there is a core group which is entirely internally connected while all the other groups are entirely externally linked and hence completely fragmented.

TL;DR: This article found that both price and the extent to which the recipient's contribution is below the group mean are significant determinants of the quantity of punishment demanded, and that punishment is mainly directed at free riders even when it costs nothing to the punisher.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed an auction model in which very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and showed that late bidding in a fixed deadline auction can occur at equilibrium in auctions both with private values and with uncertain, dependent values.

TL;DR: It is shown that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games that possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE.

TL;DR: The standard Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP) is relaxed and it is shown that a potent theory of individual choice (with and without risk) can be founded on this weaker axiom when it is coupled with some other standard postulates.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the first versus second-mover advantage in differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs and show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead over its rival has a first mover advantage.

TL;DR: A general class of adaptive processes in games is developed, which significantly generalises weakened fictitious play and can be considered as a first step towards explaining how players might learn to play Nash equilibrium strategies without having any knowledge of the game, or even that they are playing a game.

TL;DR: An experiment examining a simple clearinghouse model that generates price dispersion finds that an increase in the fraction of informed consumers leads to more competitive pricing for all consumers, and that when more firms enter the market, prices to informed consumers become more competitive while prices to captive customers become less competitive.

TL;DR: It is shown that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised, and almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist.

TL;DR: Axiomatizations of two classes of interaction indices, namely probabilistic interaction indices and cardinal-probabilistic intervention indices, generalizing Probabilistic values and semivalues, respectively are first proposed.

TL;DR: If the value cumulative distribution functions are log-concave at the highest lower extremity of their supports of the first-price auction in the asymmetric indepent private values model, then the model is said to be asymmetric.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks and study the relationship between pairwise stability and other concepts such as the largest pairwise consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise stable set.

TL;DR: This experiment reports the results of an individual choice experiment designed to test the Nash equilibrium predictions of the first-price sealed-bid auction, and applies impulse balance theory and long run predictions of individual bidding behavior.

TL;DR: This paper first shows that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and then shows that, with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters' utilities, a Nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory.

TL;DR: It is found that shorter-lasting relationships have an immediate negative impact on both behaviors in the relationships that immediately follow, while longer- lasting relationships have the opposite effect.

TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that concavity calibration has no general implication for expected utility theory and has problematic implications for all decision theories that involve concave transformations (utility or value functions) of positive money payoffs, which makes loss aversion irrelevant to the argument.

TL;DR: Two strategy-proof mechanisms where one of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium are reported, and clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play are found.

TL;DR: It is concluded that the all-pay auction yields significantly higher revenue than both the risk- neutral Bayesian equilibrium and the winner- pay auction.

TL;DR: In this paper, the results from an experimental beauty-contest game where subjects could endogenously choose their preferred way of decision-making were reported, and about 60% of them preferred to decide in a team, and teams won the game significantly more often than individuals did.

TL;DR: A model where costs are incurred for routing traffic, as well as for a lack of network connectivity, is presented, which focuses on directed links and the link stability equilibrium concept, and characterize connected link stable equilibria.

TL;DR: In this paper, a necessary and sufficient condition for inefficiency is that a simple network is embedded in the network, and several alternative characterizations of networks in which inefficiencies may occur.

TL;DR: This paper studies coalition formation, payoff division and expected payoffs in a “divide the dollar by majority rule” game with random proposers by reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium.

TL;DR: It is shown that an ascending price auction for multiple units of a homogeneous object proposed by Ausubel raises prices for packages until they reach those nonlinear and non-anonymous market clearing prices at which bidders get their marginal products.

TL;DR: It is shown that the model introduced by economists introducing beliefs as arguments in decision makers' vNM utility function has several shortcomings in this regard, as long as Bayesian updating is retained.

TL;DR: It is found that long-run equilibrium selection depends on a trade-off between efficiency and risk dominance due to the presence of scale effects arising from network externalities.

TL;DR: In this paper, evolutionary considerations determine which aspects of the environment are likely to be monitored by the players and hence appear as part of the framing information, and how players can exploit framing information to identify focal equilibrium.

TL;DR: It is shown that a discrete-time, stochastic process in which players move towards better replies - the better-reply dynamics - converges globally to a Nash equilibrium if actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements for all players around each Nash equilibrium that is asymptotically stable under a deterministic, adjusted best- reply dynamics.