Showing papers in "Games and Economic Behavior in 2016"

TL;DR: This work shows that even in simple environments with ample feedback and repetition, agents fail to reach non-truthtelling equilibria, and offers another way forward: implementing truth-telling as an ordinal Bayes–Nash equilibrium rather than as a dominant strategy equilibrium, showing that this weaker solution concept can allow for more efficient mechanisms in theory and in practice.

TL;DR: It is shown that a certain class of such preferences, that combine self-interest with morality of a Kantian flavor, are evolutionarily stable, and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are Evolutionarily unstable.

TL;DR: A generalized CH (GCH) model is proposed that nests a variant of the LK model, called LM, that captures behaviors better than CH and LK in fifty-five n×m games from four datasets.

TL;DR: It is shown that heterogeneity in attitudes towards loss aversion leads to higher failure probability of the resource at the equilibrium, and greater competition, vis-a-vis the number of players, increases the failure probability at the Nash equilibrium.

TL;DR: The role of re-election concerns in incumbent parties' incentives to shape the information that reaches voters is studied to show that if the IP supports the majority candidate, then it strategically designs this experiment to increase disagreement and, hence, the candidate's victory probability.

TL;DR: Surprisingly, uninformed voting is common even in the voluntary mode!

TL;DR: It is posited that focal points induce mutual expectations of bargainer social preferences that, when combined with the Nash bargaining solution, imply the comparative statics concerning the settlements observed.

TL;DR: This study provides evidence on how cooperation rates vary across payoff parameters in the Prisoner's Dilemma, using four one-shot games that differ only in the payoffs from mutual cooperation.

TL;DR: This paper describes an experiment designed to test which, if any, stochastic adjustment dynamic most accurately captures the behaviour of a large population, in which actions are strategic complements and two homogeneous groups have differing preferences over equilibria.

TL;DR: Three incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms are studied, which have three versions, depending on whether preferences over sure alternatives are extended to preferences over lotteries by the stochastic dominance, downward lexicographic, or upward Lexicographic extension.

TL;DR: New experimental data is reported on a simple common value auction to investigate the extent to which bidding can be explained by logit QRE, in combination with different models about bidder beliefs: cursed equilibrium, level-k, and cognitive hierarchy.

TL;DR: This work considers the complexity of finding a Correlated Equilibrium in an n-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries for players' utilities at pure strategy profiles and shows that both randomization and approximation are necessary.

TL;DR: It is shown that for a broad class of payoff functional dynamics, payoff monotonicity a la Oechssler and Riedel (2002) is equivalent to aggregatemonotonicity in the sense of Samuelson and Zhang (1992).

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogeneous objects to agents in the house allocation problem, where each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible.

TL;DR: Analytical results are provided which show that the proposed mechanism has a general ability to satisfy diversity objectives, as opposed to some currently proposed mechanisms, which may yield segregated assignments.

TL;DR: This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated attack games under both public and private information, and demonstrates that the main experimental results are robust predictions of limited depth of reasoning models.

TL;DR: The results suggest that attempts to change behavior by subjecting individuals to norms can lead to biased information acquisition instead of compliance, and the source of 'moral wiggle room' is not belief manipulation, but the coarseness of normative prescriptions under conditions of uncertainty.

TL;DR: A simple analytical model of image scoring is used to show that in the general image scoring model the introduction of implementation errors has just the opposite effect as in the binary scoring model: it may stabilize instead of destabilize cooperation.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate how the intensity of price competition and the level of customer information about past expert behavior influence experts' incentives to defraud their customers when experts can build up reputation.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a simple communication game where the receiver is perfectly informed about his material benefit from lying to the receiver, and the receiver knows only the ex-ante distribution of the sender's material incentives.

TL;DR: In any given equilibrium, decreasing the own-project bias of one agent improves the precision of communication by both agents, and sequential communication and simple delegation are shown to be essentially outcome-equivalent to simultaneous communication.

TL;DR: It is proved that a QRE of this game exists and characterized the unique solution to the proposer's problem, and it is shown that this model explains behavior better than the model with perfect best response.

TL;DR: It is found that subjects do not truncate their preferences more often when truncation is profitable, but they do, however, truncates their preferences less often when it is dangerous – that is, when there is a risk of “over-truncating” and remaining unmatched.

TL;DR: A model in which high and low income voters must decide between continuing with a status quo policy or switching to a different policy, which is more redistributive, finds an equilibrium in which the vast majority of them cast their ballots in favor of re-electing the less redistributives status quo.

TL;DR: This paper uses quantal response equilibrium as a homotopy method for equilibrium selection, and shows that the risk dominant equilibrium need not be selected for 2×2 bimatrix coordination games.

TL;DR: In this article, the problem of re-matching students to take advantage of these empty seats in a context where there are priorities to respect was studied. But the problem was not addressed in this paper.

TL;DR: It is shown that the set of all minimal nomination rules for prize winners is a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality with runners-up and consists of exactly one nomination rule.

TL;DR: This model of competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, each group's performance equals the best effort of its members, and the group with the best performance wins the contest shows members of the smaller group use the more aggressive strategy, but, depending on the nature of uncertainty, either team may be more likely to win.

TL;DR: In this paper, a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation and externality-robust implementation of the second-price auction, and the authors show that both dimensions of robustness are equally important.

TL;DR: In this paper, the impact of various combinations of the following motives on trustworthiness was investigated: unconditional other-regarding preferences, vulnerability-responsiveness, deal-response, and gift-response.