Showing papers in "Games and Economic Behavior in 2018"

TL;DR: This paper found that individuals underreact to increasing the informativeness of a signal, thus undervalue high-quality information, and that they disproportionately prefer information that may yield certainty, mainly due to non-standard belief updating.

TL;DR: In a many-to-one matching model, it is shown that the set of envy-free matchings is a lattice and a Tarski operator on this lattice, which can be interpreted as modeling vacancy chains, has theset of stable matchings as its fixed points.

TL;DR: The findings indicate that increasing inequality does not per se lead to more money burning, but if subjects can tweak the income-generating process in their favor, money burning is substantially higher.

TL;DR: The impact of gossip accuracy on trust and trustworthiness in a population playing decentralized, two-player trust games suggests that even inaccurate gossip induces a degree of reputational concern in gossip targets and some willingness among gossip recipients to discriminate between partners on the basis of the gossip they received.

TL;DR: The extent to which communication can serve as a collusion device in one-shot first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions is studied, finding that communication alone leads to statistically significant but limited price drops.

TL;DR: Results under non-payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms, suggest that non-best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias.

TL;DR: In this article, a principal-agent model with reference-dependent utility was developed to investigate the effect of non-monetary incentives on workers' performance in the presence of goal setting.

TL;DR: When robots report their preferences truthfully and are program to draw their strategies from the distribution of empirical human strategies, it is found that the increase in scale increases human ex-post best responses under both mechanisms.

TL;DR: This work identifies a general condition on domains of preferences which ensures that every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity has the tops-only property.

TL;DR: It is proved that if a stochastic rule has an obviously strategy-proof (OSP) implementation, then it has such an implementation through a randomized round table mechanism, where the administrator randomly selects a game form in which the agents take turns making public announcements about their private information.

TL;DR: It is shown that strict maximal lotteries are PC-efficient and ST-strategyproof, and it is proved the incompatibility of PC-efficiency and PC-str strategyproofness for anonymous and neutral SDSs.

TL;DR: In this paper, a Bayesian Peer Influence (BPI) heuristic is proposed to compute how individuals update beliefs in a network, and the authors analyze the evolution of beliefs and show that consensus in society might change dynamically, and that beliefs might become polarised.

TL;DR: This experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure, and is largely consistent with a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking based on the iterated elimination of obviously dominated strategies.

TL;DR: An experiment investigating the effect of social identity on hiring decisions and whether the identity of the co-decisionmaker matters in joint decisions finds substantial discrimination occurs in both individual and joint decision-making situations.

TL;DR: It is found here that risk-taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments, and it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is su‐ciently low, as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling, it can cause greater inequality of wealth.

TL;DR: It is shown that the problem of computing a revenue-optimal pricing can be solved in polynomial time for distributions of support size 2, and its decision version is NP-complete for distributionsof support size 3.

TL;DR: A simple proof of Blackwell's theorem on the ranking of information structures is given, which extends naturally to environments where information arrives over time (leading to the notion of adapted garbling) and environment where information is diffused among multiple players.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors report data from a novel laboratory study of economic decisions under repeat temptations, where subjects are repeatedly offered an option with instantaneous benefit that also entails a substantial reduction to overall earnings.

TL;DR: The strength of the techniques are demonstrated by exhibiting a lower bound of 2 − 1 m for the scheduling problem with m unrelated machines and several notions of non-utilitarian fairness (Max-Min fairness, Min-Max fairness, and envy minimization) are discussed and used to prove lower bounds for these notions.

TL;DR: It is shown that smooth calibration yields uncoupled finite-memory dynamics in n-person games—“smooth calibrated learning”—in which the players play approximate Nash equilibria in almost all periods (by contrast, calibrated learning, which uses regular calibration, yields only that the time averages of play are approximate correlated equilibrio).

TL;DR: In this paper, the role of loss-aversion in affecting the long-run equilibria of stochastic evolutionary dynamics was investigated, and a generalized concept, generalized loss-dominance, was proposed.

TL;DR: It is shown that PSPEs form a semilattice, with a unique and natural Bottom Equilibrium, showing the existence of pure subgame-perfect equilibria (PSPE).

TL;DR: Assessment of the causal effects of an exogenously administered change in beliefs in beliefs about the level of human capital and the ability to learn on the motivation to learn finds that confidence in the able to learn raises incentives, while confidence inthe level ofhuman capital lowers incentives.

TL;DR: Motivated by Adam Smith's proposition that beneficence—like that of non- equilibrium play in the ultimatum game—cannot be extorted by force, this work offers the responder the opportunity to opt out of the game for a mere $1 payoff.

TL;DR: It is shown theoretically and experimentally that uncertainty about the number ofPlayers in a Volunteer's Dilemma increases cooperation compared to a situation with a certain number of players.

TL;DR: This work analyzes a T-period, bilateral matching economy without monetary transfers, and proposes an ordering of the set of dynamically stable matchings ensuring this set forms a lattice, investigating the robustness of dynamicallystable matchings with respect to the market's time horizon.

TL;DR: The Shapley distance is introduced, which, for a fixed monotone transferable-utility game, measures the distance of an arbitrary pay profile to the Shapley pay profile, and is shown to be additively decomposable into the violations of the classical Shapley axioms.

TL;DR: This work investigates the presence of the ratchet effect using two different methods for evaluating worker productivity, and finds strong evidence that workers restrict output when productivity is evaluated individually and little evidence of output restriction when it is evaluated at the group-level.

TL;DR: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem is provided, based on four steps, that extensive-form rationalizability can be characterized by the iterated application of a special reduction operator, the strong belief reduction operator that satisfies a mild version of monotonicity.

TL;DR: Several characterizations of q-responsive choice functions are provided, based on classical axioms of matching theory and revealed preference theory, of how these functions behave in the context of classical matching theory.