Showing papers in "Harvard Business Review in 1992"

Competing on capabilities: the new rules of corporate strategy.

Abstract: In the 1980s, companies discovered time as a new source of competitive advantage. In the 1990s, they will discover that time is only one piece of a more far-reaching transformation in the logic of competition. Using examples from Wal-Mart and other highly successful companies, Stalk, Evans, and Shulman of the Boston Consulting Group provide managers with a guide to the new world of "capabilities-based competition." In today's dynamic business environment, strategy too must become dynamic. Competition is a "war of movement" in which success depends on anticipation of market trends and quick response to changing customer needs. In such an environment, the essence of strategy is not the structure of a company's products and markets but the dynamics of its behavior. To succeed, a company must weave its key business processes into hard-to-imitate strategic capabilities that distinguish it from its competitors in the eyes of customers. A capability is a set of business processes strategically understood--for example, Wal-Mart's expertise in inventory replenishment, Honda's skill at dealer management, or Banc One's ability to "out-local the national banks and out-national the local banks." Such capabilities are collective and cross-functional--a small part of many people's jobs, not a large part of a few. Finally, competing on capabilities requires strategic investments in support systems that span traditional SBUs and functions and go far beyond what traditional cost-benefit metrics can justify. A CEO's success in building and managing a company's capabilities will be the chief test of management skill in the 1990s. The prize: companies that combine scale and flexibility to outperform the competition.

Capital disadvantage: America's failing capital investment system.

Abstract: The U.S. system of allocating investment capital is failing, putting American companies at a serious disadvantage and threatening the long-term growth of the nation's economy. The problem, says Michael Porter, goes beyond the usual formulation of the issue: accusations of "short-termism" by U.S. managers, ineffective corporate governance by directors, or a high cost of capital. The problem involves the external capital allocation system by which capital is provided to companies, as well as the system by which companies allocate capital internally. America's system is marked by fluid capital and a financial focus. Other countries--notably Japan and Germany--have systems with dedicated capital and a focus on corporate position. In global competition, where investment increasingly determines a company's capacity to upgrade and innovate, the U.S. system does not measure up. These conclusions come out of a two-year research project sponsored by the Harvard Business School and the Council on Competitiveness. Porter recommends five far-reaching reforms to make the U.S. system superior to Japan's and Germany's: 1. Improve the present macroeconomic environment. 2. Expand true ownership throughout the system so that directors, managers, employees, and even customers and suppliers hold positions as owners. 3. Align the goals of capital providers, corporations, directors, managers, employees, customers, suppliers, and society. 4. Improve the information used in decision making. 5. Foster more productive modes of interaction and influence among capital providers, corporations, and business units.

Creating project plans to focus product development.

Abstract: The long-term competitiveness of most manufacturers depends on their product development capabilities. Yet few companies approach the development process systematically or strategically. They end up with an unruly collection of projects that do not match long-term business objectives and that consume far more development resources than are available. Instead of working on important projects, development engineers spend their time fighting fires. Their productivity sinks, and products are invariably late to market. To attack development malaise and reinvigorate the process, companies should put together an "aggregate project plan." The plan helps managers restructure the development process so they no longer think in terms of individual projects but in terms of the "set" of projects. It is the set, not individual projects, that shapes the creation of a successful product line. The aggregate project plan also helps managers allocate resources, sequence projects, and build critical development capabilities. A central element of the aggregate project plan is the project map. The map categorizes projects into five types: breakthrough, platform, derivative, research and development, and partnerships. Each project type has its own unique characteristics and requires a different amount of development time. Companies should have projects in all categories to ensure a robust development process.

The new society of organizations.

Abstract: Managers in every organization from the largest publicly owned company to the smallest not-for-profit face the same unsettling imperative: to build change into their organization's very structure. On the one hand, this means being prepared to abandon everything that the organization does. On the other, it means constantly creating the new. Unless this process of abandonment and creation goes on without ceasing, the organization will very soon find itself obsolescent--losing performance and with it the ability to attract and hold the people on whom its performance depends. What drives this imperative is the nature of the organization itself. Every organization exists to put knowledge to work, but knowledge changes fast, with today's certainties becoming tomorrow's absurdities. That is why any knowledgeable individual must likewise acquire new knowledge every several years or also become obsolete. Familiar as the term "organization" is, we have only begun to reckon with the implications of living in a world in which the fundamental unit of society is--and must be--destabilizing. That is why questions of social responsibility now arise so often and from so many quarters. We need new ways to understand the relationship between organizations and their employees, who may in fact be unpaid volunteers, independent professionals whose organization is a network, or knowledgeable specialists who can--and often do--move on at any moment. For more than 600 years, no society has had as many competing centers of power as the one in which we now live. Drucker explains why change is--and must be--the only constant in an organization's life and explores the consequences for managers, individuals, and society overall.

Bootstrap finance: the art of start-ups.

Abstract: Entrepreneurship is more popular than ever: courses are full, policymakers emphasize new ventures, managers yearn to go off on their own. Would-be founders often misplace their energies, however. Believing in a "big money" model of entrepreneurship, they spend a lot of time trying to attract investors instead of using wits and hustle to get their ideas off the ground. A study of 100 of the 1989 Inc. "500" list of fastest growing U.S. start-ups attests to the value of bootstrapping. In fact, what it takes to start a business often conflicts with what venture capitalists require. Investors prefer solid plans, well-defined markets, and track records. Entrepreneurs are heavy on energy and enthusiasm but may be short on credentials. They thrive in rapidly changing environments where uncertain prospects may scare off established companies. Rolling with the punches is often more important than formal plans. Striving to adhere to investors' criteria can diminish the flexibility--the try-it, fix-it approach--an entrepreneur needs to make a new venture work. Seven principles are basic for successful start-ups: get operational fast; look for quick break-even, cash-generating projects; offer high-value products or services that can sustain direct personal selling; don't try to hire the crack team; keep growth in check; focus on cash; and cultivate banks early. Growth and change are the start-up's natural environment. But change is also the reward for success: just as ventures grow, their founders usually have to take a fresh look at everything again: roles, organization, even the very policies that got the business up and running.

Successful change programs begin with results.

Abstract: Most corporate improvement programs have a negligible impact on operational and financial performance because management focuses on the activities, not the results. By initiating activities-centered programs, such as seven-step problem solving, statistical process control, and total quality management training, managers falsely assume that one day results will materialize. But because there is no explicit connection between action and outcome, improvements seldom do materialize. The authors argue for an alternative approach: results-driven improvement programs that focus on achieving specific, measurable operational improvements within a few months. While both activity-centered and results-driven programs aim to strengthen fundamental corporate competitiveness, the approaches differ dramatically. Activity-centered programs rely on broad-based policies and are more concerned with time-consuming preparations than with measurable gains. Results-driven programs, on the other hand, rely on an incremental approach to change, building on what works and discarding what doesn't. As a result, successes come quickly, and managers build their skills and gain the support of their employees for future changes. Because results-driven improvements require minimal investment, there is no excuse for postponing action. Indeed, there is always an abundance of underexploited capability and dissipated resources within the organization that management can tap into to get the program off the ground. The authors give a few pointers for how to get started: translate the long-term vision into doable but ambitious short-term goals; periodically review strategy, learning from both successes and failures; and institutionalize the changes that work and get rid of the rest.

The new boundaries of the "boundaryless" company.

Abstract: In an economy founded on innovation and change, one of the premier challenges of management is to design more flexible organizations. For many executives, a single metaphor has come to embody this managerial challenge and to capture the kind of organization they want to create: the "corporation without boundaries." According to Larry Hirschhorn and Thomas Gilmore of the Wharton Center for Applied Research, managers are right to break down the boundaries that make organizations rigid and unresponsive. But they are wrong if they think that doing so eliminates the need for boundaries altogether. Once the traditional boundaries of hierarchy, function, and geography disappear, a new set of boundaries becomes important. These new boundaries are more psychological than organizational. They aren't drawn on a company's organizational chart but in the minds of its managers and employees. And instead of being reflected in a company's structure, they must be "enacted" over and over again in a manager's relationships with bosses, subordinates, and peers. In this article, Hirschhorn and Gilmore provide a guide to the boundaries that matter in the "boundaryless" company. They explain how these new boundaries are essential for both managers and employees in coping with the demands of flexible work. They describe the typical mistakes that managers make in their boundary relationships. And they show how executives can become effective boundary managers by paying attention to a source of data they have often overlooked in the past: their own gut feelings about work and the people with whom they do it.

Beyond takeovers: politics comes to corporate control.

Abstract: In the 1990s, politics will replace takeovers as the defining tool for corporate governance challenges, and a marketplace of ideas will replace the frenzied activity that once dominated the financial marketplace in the 1980s. In the transaction-driven market of the past, corporate raiders used junk bonds and other financial tools to take control of their targets. In the new marketplace of ideas, debate will replace debt as active shareholders press specific operating policies for their target corporations in a new politicized market for corporate control. John Pound, associate professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, reports that investors are already using shadow management committees, independent director slates, and outside experts to influence management policy. Pound cites Carl Icahn's battle for control of USX as an example of the emerging trend. What began as a hostile takeover ended with a negotiated solution in which many constituencies ultimately played a role in the restructuring of the company. This political approach to governance gives management a chance to embrace a bargain that is in its long-term interest. By promoting politically based tactics, managers can generate political capital with their major investors. Managers in companies as diverse as Avon and Lockheed now meet regularly with investors, seeking their input on both financial and strategic decisions. In the new politicized market for corporate control, striking a bargain with long-term investors is ultimately in the best interest of the corporation.

Balancing corporate power: a new Federalist paper.

Abstract: In an effort to govern their increasingly complex organizations, chief executives in some of today's largest corporations are turning to one of the world's oldest political philosophies-federalism. Given that organizations are seen more and more as minisocieties, the prospect of applying political principles to management makes a great deal of sense. Federalism is particularly appropriate because it offers a well-recognized system for dealing with paradoxes of power and control: the need to make things big by keeping them small; to encourage autonomy but within bounds; and to combine variety and shared purpose, individuality and partnership, local and global. As London Business School professor Charles Handy explains it, federalism responds to these paradoxes by balancing power among those in the center of the organization, those in the centers of expertise, and those in the center of the action--the operating businesses. The centers of federal organizations meet regularly, but they do not need to live together. Doing so would concentrate too much power in one place, whereas federalism gets its strength and energy from spreading responsibility across many decision points. Guided by five principles, federalism avoids the risks of autocracy and the overcontrol of a central bureaucracy. It ensures a measure of democracy and creates a "dispersed center" that is more a network than a place. That's why Asea Brown Boveri CEO Percy Barnevik calls his sprawling "multi-domestic" enterprise of 1,100 separate companies and 210,000 employees a federation. It succeeds because the independent bits, be they individuals, clusters, or business units, know they are part of the greater whole.

Managing price, gaining profit.

Abstract: The fastest and most effective way for a company to realize maximum profit is to get its pricing right. The right price can boost profit faster than increasing volume will; the wrong price can shrink it just as quickly. Yet many otherwise tough-minded managers miss out on significant profits because they shy away from pricing decisions for fear that they will alienate their customers. Worse, if management isn't controlling its pricing policies, there's a good chance that the company's clients are manipulating them to their own advantage. McKinsey & Company's Michael Marn and Robert Rosiello show managers how to gain control of the pricing puzzle and capture untapped profit potential by using two basic concepts: the pocket price waterfall and the pocket price band. The pocket price waterfall reveals how price erodes between a company's invoice figure and the actual amount paid by the customer--the transaction price. It tracks the volume purchase discounts, early payment bonuses, and frequent customer incentives that squeeze a company's profits. The pocket price band plots the range of pocket prices over which any given unit volume of a single product sells. Wide price bands are commonplace: some manufacturers' transaction prices for a given product range 60%; one fastener supplier's price band ranged up to 500%. Managers who study their pocket price waterfalls and bands can identify unnecessary discounting at the transaction level, low-performance accounts, and misplaced marketing efforts. The problems, once identified, are typically easy and inexpensive to remedy.

British privatization--taking capitalism to the people.

Abstract: From 1983 to 1986, John Moore served in the Thatcher government in Britain, launching that country's privatization program. In "British Privatization--Taking Capitalism to the People, " he describes the thinking behind privatization, the objections raised against it, and the actual measures taken to implement it. With privatization, corporate performance has improved and the government has been able to focus on regulation, not ownership. But in the end, says Moore, the greatest success of British privatization was that it transformed the public's attitude toward ownership and economic responsibility.

Is management still a science

Abstract: New technologies are transforming products, markets, and entire industries. Yet the more science and technology reshape the essence of business, the less useful the concept of management itself as a science seems to be. On reflection, this paradox is not so surprising. The traditional scientific approach to management promised to provide managers with the capacity to analyze, predict, and control the behavior of the complex organizations they led. But the world most managers currently inhabit often appears to be unpredictable, uncertain, and even uncontrollable. In the face of this more volatile business environment, the old-style mechanisms of "scientific management" seem positively counterproductive. And science itself appears less and less relevant to the practical concerns of managers. In this article, science journalist David Freedman argues that the problem lies less in the shortcomings of a scientific approach to management than in managers' understanding of science. What most managers think of as scientific management is based on a conception of science that few current scientists would defend. What's more, just as managers have become more preoccupied with the volatility of the business environment, scientists have also become preoccupied with the inherent volatility--the "chaos" and "complexity"--of nature. They are developing new rules for complex behavior in physical systems that have intriguing parallels to the kind of organizational behaviors companies are trying to encourage. In fact, science, long esteemed by business as a source of technological innovation, may ultimately prove of greatest value to managers as a source of something else: useful ways of looking at the world.

Women as a business imperative.

Abstract: In 1989, Felice N. Schwartz's HBR article "Management Women and the New Facts of Life" generated a huge debate over the rules established by corporations in their handling of women executives. Now in "Women as a Business Imperative," Schwartz follows up with practical insights about the costs companies incur in passing over qualified businesswomen. In the form of a memo to a fictional CEO, Schwartz describes how the atmosphere within most companies is corrosive to women and must change. Preconceptions harbored by male senior managers about women are so deeply ingrained that many men are not even aware of them. Yet senior managers must help women advance. Those companies that accept their responsibility to make radical change--both in women's treatment and in family support--can improve their bottom lines enormously. Treating women as a business imperative is the equivalent of creating a unique RD (2) allowing flexibility for women and men who need it; (3) providing training that takes advantage of women's leadership potential; and (4) eliminating the corrosive atmosphere and the barriers that exist for women in the workplace.

Are you a strategist or just a manager

Abstract: Perhaps the greatest strategist of all time was not a business executive but a general. Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the Prussian and German general staffs from 1858 to 1888, issued "directives" to his officers rather than specific commands. These guidelines for autonomous decision making encouraged Moltke's subordinates to show individual initiative. In this article, Hans Hinterhuber and Wolfgang Popp translate Moltke's example into business terms. According to Moltke, strategy is applied common sense and cannot be taught. The authors suggest that good entrepreneurs and managers--along with generals--are born with the qualities that make them successful. But even if managers have the potential to be good strategists, they must develop and hone their natural talents. And CEOs and top management can help by identifying and promoting such talents in their employees. Hinterhuber and Popp have created a questionnaire that helps measure strategic management competence. Managers and entrepreneurs take this test themselves, answering ten questions such as, "Do I have an entrepreneurial vision?", "Do I have a corporate philosophy?", and "Do I have competitive advantages?" Using the questionnaire, company management can evaluate managers being considered for a promotion. At the same time, those who take the test can use it to determine their own performance as strategists. Strategic managers provide subordinates with general guidelines, just as Helmuth von Moltke issued directives to his officers. And outstanding entrepreneurs create a corporate culture in which their vision, philosophy, and business strategies are implemented by employees who think independently.

CFOs and strategists: forging a common framework.

Abstract: Companies have become increasingly polarized into two divergent camps: those who consider shareholder value the key to managing the company and those who put their faith in gaining competitive advantage. Indeed, that age-old debate between investing for the long term and showing outstanding short-term results is back - only this time the camps are flying banners with the new buzzwords of corporate America: competitive advantage and shareholder value. In this article, Alfred Rappaport attempts to settle the debate once and for all, arguing forcefully that establishing competitive advantage and creating shareholder value both stem from a common economic framework. In fact, long-term productivity is the hinge from which both sustainable competitive advantage and consistent results for the shareholder hang. But many managers refuse to accept this theory and cling to the mistaken belief that the market does not actually value the long-term productivity of their company but judges it only by its short-term performance. They then jump to a second mistaken conclusion: assuming they must depart from the shareholder-value model to improve their competitive position. Rappaport attacks these mistaken beliefs, showing that the stock market does value the long-term productivity of a company and that it is not necessary to depart from the shareholder-value model to improve a company's competitive position. Maximum returns for current shareholders will materialize only when managers maximize long-term shareholder value and deliver interim results that attest credibly to sustainable competitive advantage.

The CEO as organizational architect: an interview with Xerox's Paul Allaire. Interview by Robert Howard.

Abstract: As chairman and CEO of the Xerox Corporation, Paul Allaire leads a company that is a microcosm of the changes transforming American business. With the introduction of the first plain-paper copier in 1959, Xerox invented a new industry and launched itself on a decade of spectacular growth. But easy growth led Xerox to neglect the fundamentals of its core business, leaving the company vulnerable to low-cost Japanese competition. Starting in the mid-1980s, Xerox embarked on a long-term effort to regain its dominant position in world copier markets and to create a new platform for future growth. Thanks to the company's Leadership through Quality program, Xerox became the first major U.S. company to win back market share from the Japanese. Allaire describes his efforts to take Xerox's corporate transformation to a new level. Since becoming CEO in 1990, he has repositioned Xerox as "the document company" at the intersection of the worlds of paper-based and electronic information. And he has guided the company through a fundamental redesign of what he calls the "organizational architecture" of Xerox's document processing business. Few CEOs have approached the process of organizational redesign as systematically and methodically as Allaire has. He has created a new corporate structure that balances independent business divisions with integrated R&D and customer operations organizations. He has redefined managerial roles and responsibilities, changed the way managers are selected and compensated, and renewed the company's senior management ranks. And he has articulated the new values and behaviors Xerox managers will need to thrive in a more competitive and fast-changing business environment.

The "barbarians" in the boardroom.

Abstract: According to conventional wisdom, the corporate raiders and buyout specialists who flourished in the 1980s were the antithesis of good management. Their goals of realizing quick profits from the acquisition of major companies--frequently through rapid cost-cutting and the breakup of conglomerates--made them the bane of old-school corporate leaders. Long-term management, it seemed, was being sacrificed on the altar of short-term profits. With the abatement of takeovers in recent times, top corporate managers have hailed a return to business-as-usual. But the takeover artists have not, in fact, retreated. Instead, these corporate acquirers, many of whom own large stakes in major industrial companies, are assuming board seats and switching their emphasis to overseeing the companies they control--with an eye toward the long term. In this new role, the takeover experts are not plunderers, nor are they creating quick profit at the expense of companies' long-term health; rather, they are defying expectations and, in a number of important respects, successfully implementing the agenda of the gurus of good management. Setting the pace in this new arena is the most powerful takeover group of the 1980s, the leveraged buyout firm of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company. KKR's partners hold board seats at nine different companies with $1 billion a year or more in sales.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

High-performance marketing: an interview with Nike's Phil Knight. Interview by Geraldine E. Willigan.

Abstract: Nike's advertising slogans--"Bo Knows," "Just Do It," and "There Is No Finish Line"--have moved beyond advertising into popular expression. Its athletic footwear and clothing have become a piece of Americana. Its brand name is as well known around the world as IBM and Coke. Behind the slogans and the flashy TV commercials is the vision of its founder, chairman, and CEO, Phil Knight. Since forming the company in 1962, Knight has taken Nike from a small-time distributor of Japanese track shoes to the top of the athletic shoe and apparel market. But not without a stumble. Along the way, Knight discovered that technological innovation alone could not continue to drive growth. When sales stagnated in the mid-1980s, Knight and Nike learned several hard lessons on how to build brands and understand consumers, and they transformed their technology company into a marketing company whose product is its most important marketing tool. "Ultimately," says Knight, "we wanted Nike to be the world's best sports and fitness company. Once you say that, you have a focus. You don't end up making wing tips or sponsoring the next Rolling Stones world tour." To keep the company growing, Nike began splitting its brands into sub-brands. In tennis, Nike divided its shoes into Challenge Court--for younger, more active players--and Supreme Court--for older, more mature players. That approach brought the company to a broader range of consumers while preserving the customer base. And to create an emotional tie with the consumer, Nike started advertising on TV. "Sports is at the heart of American culture," Knight says. "You can't explain much in 60 seconds, but when you show Michael Jordan, you don't have to. It's that simple."

The vision trap.

Abstract: At Mentor Graphics Corporation, Gerry Langeler was the executive responsible for vision, and vision, he discovered, has the power to weaken a strong company. Mentor helped to invent design-automation electronics in the early 1980s, and by the end of the decade, it dominated the industry. In its early days, fighting to survive, Mentor's motto was Build Something People Will Buy. Then when clear competition emerged in the form of Daisy Systems, a startup that initially outsold Mentor, the watchword became Beat Daisy. Both "visions" were pragmatic and immediate. They gave Mentor a sense of purpose as it developed its products and gathered momentum. Once Daisy was beaten, however, company vision began to self-inflate. As Mentor grew more and more successful, Langeler formulated vision statements that were more and more ambitious, grand, and inspirational. The company traded its gritty determination to survive for a dream of future glory. The once explicit call for effective action became a fervid cry for abstract perfection. The first step was Six Boxes, a transitional vision that combined goals for success in six business areas with grandiose plans to compete with IBM at the level of billion-dollar revenues. From there, vision stepped up to the 10X Imperative, a quality-improvement program that focused on arbitrary goals and measures that were, in fact, beyond the company's control. The last escalation came when Mentor Graphics decided to Change the Way the World Designs. The company had stopped making product and was making poetry. Finally, in 1991, after six years of increasing self-infatuation, Mentor hit a wall of decreasing indicators. Langeler, who had long since begun to doubt the value of abstract visions, reinstated Build Something People Will Buy. And Mentor was back to basics, a sense of purpose back to its workplace.

The myth of Japan's low-cost capital.

Abstract: The low rate at which U.S. companies are investing in manufacturing and the resulting decline in America's competitive position has been a topic of grave concern for more than a decade. During that time, critics have offered many excuses for this shortsighted investment behavior. Yet one excuse has steadily gained adherents and is becoming something of an article of faith--that is, that capital in the United States is more expensive than in other countries, particularly Japan. It is both a popular and appealing argument. Yet authors W. Carl Kester and Timothy A. Luehrman, professors at the Harvard Business School, warn that this argument is not only false but also dangerous. They assert that the empirical evidence does not support the claim that the U.S. manufacturing sector has persistently faced significantly higher average capital costs than the Japanese manufacturing sector. The authors argue that differences in capital costs have been isolated and temporary, not broad and persistent. To prove their point, Kester and Luehrman critically dissect both the common wisdom and the academic studies on the topic. They conclude that in the new global economy, all companies--Japanese, American, European, and others--must compete for the same capital. Some will succeed in obtaining it on temporarily favorable terms, not because they are Japanese but because they are efficiently organized and governed. But as long as an alleged international cost-of-capital gap is their excuse, U.S. managers run the risk of retaliating counterproductively against U.S. trading partners or doing nothing at all inside corporations. In short, managers should stop complaining about how much capital costs and worry more about how to manage it after it's been raised.

The reluctant entrepreneur.

Abstract: Unlike a lot of corporate executives, Ken Veit never longed to be his own boss. But after 30 years on the fast track, he lost his high-powered job at one of the world's largest insurance companies and was forced to take an entrepreneurial leap of faith. In 1989, Veit signed a franchise agreement to own and operate a Cartoon Corner store in a mall in Scottsdale, Arizona. Cartoon Corner was based on the Disney store idea, but it carried hundreds of products featuring cartoon characters from every movie studio. Most important, Cartoon Corner offered extensive training and an elaborate management support system for its franchisees. The company planned to franchise 100 stores over the next few years, then go public. If all went well, its young executives claimed, the Cartoon Corner chain would build a market valuation of up to $100 million by the mid-1990s. In addition, the mall, which was in the planning stages when Veit signed on, was supposed to become a new kind of entertainment mall, with seven movie theaters, a space-flight simulator, and a shark-filled aquarium. It had all sounded too good to be true--and it was. Despite Veit's careful forecasting, he suffered a series of unexpected catastrophes. The mall failed to keep its promises. The franchisor lost its venture capital. The Gulf War dried up retail traffic. But it was too late to back out. Veit went forward on his own, truly alone for the first time in his life. When the mall and his store finally opened in May 1991, they did so in the midst of a recession. Despite the inspirational stories of other former executives, Veit has learned that the life of an entrepreneur is not all it's cracked up to be. As he notes, "I began with well-above-average experience, a proven concept, and excellent capitalization, yet in my case, personal bankruptcy remains a distinct possibility."

Building corporate character. Interview by Nan Stone.

Abstract: Stride Rite is a good company by any definition: Keds, Sperry Top-Siders, and Stride Rite children's shoes are consumer favorites for their fit, quality, and comfort. Wall Street analysts praise the company's outstanding financial performance. Innovative programs such as the first corporate child-care center and public service scholarships support Stride Rite's reputation as one of the most responsible employers and corporate citizens in the United States. Behind Stride Rite's good performance are the building blocks of corporate character: a legacy of quality and service and a leader committed to keeping that legacy lively. When Stride Rite shipped its first children's shoes in 1919, they came with the company's commitment "to produce an honest quality product in an honest way and deliver it as promised." For Arnold Hiatt, that commitment has been the driving force behind the company's evolution from manufacturing into marketing and product development as well as the guiding principle in its relations with consumers, dealers, suppliers, and employees. But Stride Rite's corporate character is also a reflection of Hiatt himself. In his early 20s, Hiatt fled a management training program "designed to make carnivores" out of its new employees and bought Blue Star Shoes, a small manufacturing company that had gone into Chapter 11. Through experience and "stumbling around," he built Blue Star's sales to $5 million-and got a practical education in management, markets, and human nature that has proved equally useful in running Stride Rite.

From the classroom to the corner office.

Abstract: Going from Catholic nun and teacher to president and CEO of a $5.7 billion bank is a monumental leap. But Rosemarie Greco found that teaching school is not so different from managing a business. For many years, two insights have guided her transformation and climb up the corporate ladder: that both women and men have the ability to shape their professional destinies, and that there is unlimited power in the fusion of organizational vision and individual fulfillment. Hired in 1968 by Fidelity Bank in Philadelphia as a secretary, Greco was determined that every day on the job she would learn something new about banking. She took careful notes and stored them in a three-ring binder that soon became the bank's official training manual. This led to a promotion to the training department of human resources, putting Greco on a career path she had never envisioned. Along the way, Greco met obstacles, such as a boss who put his own name on her new ideas--a boss whom Greco later fired after she was promoted above him. She helped revise Fidelity's salary-grading system when the bank faced a sex discrimination class-action suit. At the same time, slotting employees into the newly created job grades opened Greco's eyes to the fact that the work of men was valued much more highly than that of women at the bank. When Greco was promoted to director of human resources--and later as CEO--she worked to change that discriminatory corporate culture until Fidelity Bank became one of the top organizations in the country for women to work in.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

U.S. industrial policy: inevitable and ineffective.

Abstract: In the realm of political economy, much of the 1980s in the United States was spent debating the pros and cons of industrial policy According to Kevin P Phillips, the debate is now over Regardless of who wins the 1992 presidential election, the United States will have some kind of industrial policy--but not the one it needs In "US Industrial Policy: Inevitable and Ineffective," Phillips details the economic and political forces that are propelling the US toward industrial policy--and the forces that will keep the policy from being effective