Showing papers in "Harvard Business Review in 1998"

Clusters and the new economics of competition.

Abstract: Economic geography in an era of global competition poses a paradox. In theory, location should no longer be a source of competitive advantage. Open global markets, rapid transportation, and high-speed communications should allow any company to source any thing from any place at any time. But in practice, Michael Porter demonstrates, location remains central to competition. Today's economic map of the world is characterized by what Porter calls clusters: critical masses in one place of linked industries and institutions--from suppliers to universities to government agencies--that enjoy unusual competitive success in a particular field. The most famous example are found in Silicon Valley and Hollywood, but clusters dot the world's landscape. Porter explains how clusters affect competition in three broad ways: first, by increasing the productivity of companies based in the area; second, by driving the direction and pace of innovation; and third, by stimulating the formation of new businesses within the cluster. Geographic, cultural, and institutional proximity provides companies with special access, closer relationships, better information, powerful incentives, and other advantages that are difficult to tap from a distance. The more complex, knowledge-based, and dynamic the world economy becomes, the more this is true. Competitive advantage lies increasingly in local things--knowledge, relationships, and motivation--that distant rivals cannot replicate. Porter challenges the conventional wisdom about how companies should be configured, how institutions such as universities can contribute to competitive success, and how governments can promote economic development and prosperity.

Welcome to the Experience Economy

Abstract: First there was agriculture, then manufactured goods, and eventually services. Each change represented a step up in economic value--a way for producers to distinguish their products from increasingly undifferentiated competitive offerings. Now, as services are in their turn becoming commoditized, companies are looking for the next higher value in an economic offering. Leading-edge companies are finding that it lies in staging experiences. To reach this higher level of competition, companies will have to learn how to design, sell, and deliver experiences that customers will readily pay for. An experience occurs when a company uses services as the stage--and goods as props--for engaging individuals in a way that creates a memorable event. And while experiences have always been at the heart of the entertainment business, any company stages an experience when it engages customers in a personal, memorable way. The lessons of pioneering experience providers, including the Walt Disney Company, can help companies learn how to compete in the experience economy. The authors offer five design principles that drive the creation of memorable experiences. First, create a consistent theme, one that resonates throughout the entire experience. Second, layer the theme with positive cues--for example, easy-to-follow signs. Third, eliminate negative cues, those visual or aural messages that distract or contradict the theme. Fourth, offer memorabilia that commemorate the experience for the user. Finally, engage all five senses--through sights, sounds, and so on--to heighten the experience and thus make it more memorable.

Putting the enterprise into the enterprise system

Abstract: Enterprise systems present a new model of corporate computing. They allow companies to replace their existing information systems, which are often incompatible with one another, with a single, integrated system. By streamlining data flows throughout an organization, these commercial software packages, offered by vendors like SAP, promise dramatic gains in a company's efficiency and bottom line. It's no wonder that businesses are rushing to jump on the ES bandwagon. But while these systems offer tremendous rewards, the risks they carry are equally great. Not only are the systems expensive and difficult to implement, they can also tie the hands of managers. Unlike computer systems of the past, which were typically developed in-house with a company's specific requirements in mind, enterprise systems are off-the-shelf solutions. They impose their own logic on a company's strategy, culture, and organization, often forcing companies to change the way they do business. Managers would do well to heed the horror stories of failed implementations. FoxMeyer Drug, for example, claims that its system helped drive it into bankruptcy. Drawing on examples of both successful and unsuccessful ES projects, the author discusses the pros and cons of implementing an enterprise system, showing how a system can produce unintended and highly disruptive consequences. Because of an ES's profound business implications, he cautions against shifting responsibility for its adoption to technologists. Only a general manager will be able to mediate between the imperatives of the system and the imperatives of the business.

How to kill creativity.

Abstract: In today's knowledge economy, creativity is more important than ever But many companies unwittingly employ managerial practices that kill it How? By crushing their employees' intrinsic motivation--the strong internal desire to do something based on interests and passions Managers don't kill creativity on purpose Yet in the pursuit of productivity, efficiency, and control--all worthy business imperatives--they undermine creativity It doesn't have to be that way, says Teresa Amabile Business imperatives can comfortably coexist with creativity But managers will have to change their thinking first Specifically, managers will need to understand that creativity has three parts: expertise, the ability to think flexibly and imaginatively, and motivation Managers can influence the first two, but doing so is costly and slow It would be far more effective to increase employees' intrinsic motivation To that end, managers have five levers to pull: the amount of challenge they give employees, the degree of freedom they grant around process, the way they design work groups, the level of encouragement they give, and the nature of organizational support Take challenge as an example Intrinsic motivation is high when employees feel challenged but not overwhelmed by their work The task for managers, therefore, becomes matching people to the right assignments Consider also freedom Intrinsic motivation--and thus creativity--soars when managers let people decide how to achieve goals, not what goals to achieve Managers can make a difference when it comes to employee creativity The result can be truly innovative companies in which creativity doesn't just survive but actually thrives

Preventing the premature death of relationship marketing.

Abstract: Relationship marketing is in vogue. And why not? The new, increasingly efficient ways that companies have of understanding and responding to customers' needs and preferences seemingly allow them to build more meaningful connections with consumers than ever before. These connections promise to benefit the bottom line by reducing costs and increasing revenue. Unfortunately, a close look suggests that the relationships between companies and customers are troubled ones, at best. Companies may delight in learning more about their customers and in being able to provide features and services to please every possible palate. But customers delight in neither. In fact, customer satisfaction rates in the United States are at an all-time low, while complaints, boycotts, and other expressions of consumer discontent are on the rise. This mounting wave of unhappiness has yet to reach the bottom line. Sooner or later, however, corporate performance will suffer unless relationship marketing becomes what it is supposed to be--the epitome of customer orientation. Ironically, the very things that marketers are doing to build relationships with customers are often the things that are destroying those relationships. Relationship marketing is powerful in theory but troubled in practice. To prevent its premature death, marketers need to take the time to figure out how and why they are undermining their own best efforts, as well as how they can get things back on track.

A new mandate for human resources.

Abstract: Should we do away with HR? In recent years, a number of people who study and write about business--along with many who run businesses--have been debating that question. The debate arises out of serious and widespread doubts about HR's contribution to organizational performance. Dave Ulrich acknowledges that HR, as it is configured today in many companies, is indeed ineffective, incompetent, and costly. But he contends that it has never been more necessary. The solution, he believes, is to create an entirely new role for the field that focuses it not on traditional HR activities, such as staffing and compensation, but on business results that enrich the company's value to customers, investors, and employees. Ulrich elaborates on four broad tasks for HR that would allow it to help deliver organizational excellence. First, HR should become a partner in strategy execution. Second, it should become an expert in the way work is organized and executed. Third, it should become a champion for employees. And fourth, it should become an agent of continual change. Fulfilling this agenda would mean that every one of HR's activities would in some concrete way help a company better serve its customers or otherwise increase shareholder value. Can HR transform itself on its own? Certainly not--in fact, the primary responsibility for transforming the role of HR, Ulrich says, belongs to the CEO and to every line manager who works with the HR staff. Competitive success is a function of organizational excellence, and senior managers must hold HR accountable for delivering it.

Business marketing: understand what customers value.

Abstract: How do you define the value of your market offering? Can you measure it? Few suppliers in business markets are able to answer those questions, and yet the ability to pinpoint the value of a product or service for one's customers has never been more important. By creating and using what the authors call customer value models, suppliers are able to figure out exactly what their offerings are worth to customers. Field value assessments--the most commonly used method for building customer value models--call for suppliers to gather data about their customers firsthand whenever possible. Through these assessments, a supplier can build a value model for an individual customer or for a market segment, drawing on data gathered form several customers in that segment. Suppliers can use customer value models to create competitive advantage in several ways. First, they can capitalize on the inevitable variation in customers' requirements by providing flexible market offerings. Second, they can use value models to demonstrate how a new product or service they are offering will provide greater value. Third, they can use their knowledge of how their market offerings specifically deliver value to craft persuasive value propositions. And fourth, they can use value models to provide evidence to customers of their accomplishments. Doing business based on value delivered gives companies the means to get an equitable return for their efforts. Once suppliers truly understand value, they will be able to realize the benefits of measuring and monitoring it for their customers.

Strategy as a portfolio of real options.

Abstract: In financial terms, a business strategy is much more like a series of options than like a single projected cash flow. Executing a strategy almost always involves making a sequence of major decisions. Some actions are taken immediately while others are deliberately deferred so that managers can optimize their choices as circumstances evolve. While executives readily grasp the analogy between strategy and real options, until recently the mechanics of option pricing was so complex that few companies found it practical to use when formulating strategy. But advances in both computing power and our understanding of option pricing over the last 20 years now make it feasible to apply real-options thinking to strategic decision making. To analyze a strategy as a portfolio of related real options, this article exploits a framework presented by the author in "Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the Numbers" (HBR July-August 1998). That article explained how to get from discounted-cash-flow value to option value for a typical project; in other words, it was about reaching a number. This article extends that framework, exploring how, once you've worked out the numbers, you can use option pricing to improve decision making about the sequence and timing of a portfolio of strategic investments. Timothy Luehrman shows executives how to plot their strategies in two-dimensional "option space," giving them a way to "draw" a strategy in terms that are neither wholly strategic nor wholly financial, but some of both. Such pictures inject financial discipline and new insight into how a company's future opportunities can be actively cultivated and harvested.

Empowerment: the emperor's new clothes.

Abstract: Everyone talks about empowerment, but it's not working. CEOs subtly undermine empowerment. Employees are often unprepared or unwilling to assume the new responsibilities it entails. Even change professionals stifle it. When empowerment is used as the ultimate criteria of success in organizations, it covers up many of the deeper problems that they must overcome. To understand this apparent contradiction, the author explores two kinds of commitment: external and internal. External commitment--or contractual compliance--is what employees display when they have little control over their destinies and are accustomed to working under the command-and-control model. Internal commitment occurs when employees are committed to a particular project, person, or program for their own individual reasons or motivations. Internal commitment is very closely allied with empowerment. The problem with change programs designed to encourage empowerment is that they actually end up creating more external than internal commitment. One reason is that these programs are rife with inner contradictions and send out mixed messages like "do your own thing--the way we tell you." The result is that employees feel little responsibility for the change program, and people throughout the organization feel less empowered. What can be done? Companies would do well to recognize potential inconsistencies in their change programs; to understand that empowerment has its limits; to establish working conditions that encourage employees' internal commitment; and to realize that morale and even empowerment are penultimate criteria in organizations. The ultimate goal is performance.

How venture capital works.

Abstract: The popular mythology surrounding the U.S. venture-capital industry derives from a previous era. Venture capitalists who nurtured the computer industry in its infancy were legendary both for their risk taking and for their hands-on operating experience. But today things are different, and separating the myths from the realities is crucial to understanding this important piece of the U.S. economy. Today's venture capitalists are more like conservative bankers than the risk takers of days past. They have carved out a specialized niche in the capital markets, filling a void that other institutions cannot serve. They are the linch-pins in an efficient system for meeting the needs of institutional investors looking for high returns, of entrepreneurs seeking funding, and of investment bankers looking for companies to sell. Venture capitalists must earn a consistently superior return on investments in inherently risky businesses. The myth is that they do so by investing in good ideas and good plans. In reality, they invest in good industries--that is, industries that are more competitively forgiving than the market as a whole. And they structure their deals in a way that minimizes their risk and maximizes their returns. Although many entrepreneurs expect venture capitalists to provide them with sage guidance as well as capital, that expectation is unrealistic. Given a typical portfolio of ten companies and a 2,000-hour work year, a venture capital partner spends on average less than two hours per week on any given company. In addition to analyzing the current venture-capital system, the author offers practical advice to entrepreneurs thinking about venture funding.

Appraising boardroom performance.

Abstract: Rare is the company that does not periodically review the performance of its staff, business units, and suppliers. But rare, as well, is the company that does such a review of one of its most important contributors--its board of directors. Reviewing a board's performance is not an easy proposition: it has to be done by the members themselves, people who generally have many other responsibilities and whose time is always at a premium. But done properly, appraisals can help boards become more effective by clarifying individual and collective responsibilities. They can help improve the working relationship between a company's board and its senior management. They can help ensure a healthy balance of power between the board and the CEO. And, once in place, an appraisal process is difficult to dismantle, making it harder for a new CEO to dominate a board or avoid being held accountable for poor performance. Done properly is the key here, though. Done incorrectly, board appraisals can degenerate into self-serving evaluations or unpleasant, time-wasting exercises. Worse, they can evolve into rigid mechanical processes that discourage innovation. In fact, all of the approaches the authors observed in two years of research were incomplete. The authors have therefore drawn on the strengths of several different approaches to synthesize a best-practice process that is both rigorous and comprehensive.

The dawn of the e-lance economy.

Abstract: Will the large industrial corporation dominate the twenty-first century as it did the twentieth? Maybe not. Drawing on their research at MIT's Initiative on Inventing the Organizations of the 21st Century, Thomas Malone and Robert Laubacher postulate a world in which business is not controlled through a stable chain of management in a large, permanent company. Rather, it is carried out autonomously by independent contractors connected through personal computers and electronic networks. These electronically connected free-lancers-e-lancers-would join together into fluid and temporary networks to produce and sell goods and services. When the job is done--after a day, a month, a year--the network would dissolve and its members would again become independent agents. Far from being a wild hypothesis, the e-lance economy is, in many ways, already upon us. We see it in the rise of outsourcing and telecommuting, in the increasing importance within corporations of ad-hoc project teams, and in the evolution of the Internet. Most of the necessary building blocks of this type of business organization--efficient networks, data interchange standards, groupware, electronic currency, venture capital micromarkets--are either in place or under development. What is lagging behind is our imagination. But, the authors contend, it is important to consider sooner rather than later the profound implications of how such an e-lance economy might work. They examine the opportunities, and the problems, that may arise and anticipate how the role of managers may change fundamentally--or possibly even disappear altogether.

The hidden traps in decision making

Abstract: Bad decisions can often be traced back to the way the decisions were made--the alternatives were not clearly defined, the right information was not collected, the costs and benefits were not accurately weighted. But sometimes the fault lies not in the decision-making process but rather in the mind of the decision maker. The way the human brain works can sabotage the choices we make. John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, and Howard Raiffa examine eight psychological traps that are particularly likely to affect the way we make business decisions: The anchoring trap leads us to give disproportionate weight to the first information we receive. The statusquo trap biases us toward maintaining the current situation--even when better alternatives exist. The sunk-cost trap inclines us to perpetuate the mistakes of the past. The confirming-evidence trap leads us to seek out information supporting an existing predilection and to discount opposing information. The framing trap occurs when we misstate a problem, undermining the entire decision-making process. The overconfidence trap makes us overestimate the accuracy of our forecasts. The prudence trap leads us to be overcautious when we make estimates about uncertain events. And the recallability trap leads us to give undue weight to recent, dramatic events. The best way to avoid all the traps is awareness--forewarned is forearmed. But executives can also take other simple steps to protect themselves and their organizations from the various kinds of mental lapses. The authors show how to take action to ensure that important business decisions are sound and reliable.

Time pacing: competing in markets that won't stand still.

Abstract: Most companies change in reaction to events such as moves by the competition, shifts in technology, or new customer demands. In fairly stable markets, "event pacing" is an effective way to deal with change. But successful companies in rapidly changing, intensely competitive industries take a different approach. They change proactively, through regular deadlines. The authors call this strategy time pacing. Like a metronome, time pacing creates a rhythm to which managers can synchronize the speed and intensity of their efforts. For example, 3M dictates that 25% of its revenues every year will come from new products, Netscape introduces a new product about every six months, and Intel adds a new fabrication facility to its operations approximately every nine months. Time pacing creates a relentless sense of urgency around meeting deadlines and concentrates people on a common set of goals. Its predictability also provides people with a sense of control in otherwise chaotic markets. The authors show how companies such as Banc One, Cisco Systems, Dell Computer, Emerson Electric, Gillette, Intel, Netscape, Shiseido, and Sony implement the two essentials of time pacing. The first is managing transitions--the shift, for example, from one new-product-development project to the next. The second is setting the right rhythm for change. Companies that march to the rhythm of time pacing build momentum, and companies that effectively manage transitions sustain that momentum without missing important beats.

Making business sense of the Internet.

Abstract: For managers in large, well-established businesses, the Internet is a tough nut to crack. It is very simple to set up a Web presence and very difficult to create a Web-based business model. Established businesses that over decades have carefully built brands and physical distribution relationships risk damaging all they have created when they pursue commerce through the Net. Still, managers can't avoid the impact of electronic commerce on their businesses. They need to understand the opportunities available to them and recognize how their companies may be vulnerable if rivals seize those opportunities first. Broadly speaking, the Internet presents four distinct types of opportunities. First, it links companies directly to customers, suppliers, and other interested parties. Second, it lets companies bypass other players in an industry's value chain. Third, it is a tool for developing and delivering new products and services to new customers. Fourth, it will enable certain companies to dominate the electronic channel of an entire industry or segment, control access to customers, and set business rules. As he elaborates on these four points, the author gives established companies a systematic way to sort through the risks and rewards of doing business in cyberspace.

The power of virtual integration: an interview with Dell Computer's Michael Dell. Interview by Joan Magretta.

Abstract: Michael Dell started his computer company in 1984 with a simple business insight. He could bypass the dealer channel through which personal computers were then being sold and sell directly to customers, building products to order. Dell's direct model eliminated the dealer's markup and the risks associated with carrying large inventories of finished goods. In this interview, Michael Dell provides a detailed description of how his company is pushing that business model one step further, toward what he calls virtual integration. Dell is using technology and information to blur the traditional boundaries in the value chain between suppliers, manufacturers, and customers. The individual pieces of Dell's strategy--customer focus, supplier partnerships, mass customization, just-in-time manufacturing--may be all be familiar. But Michael Dell's business insight into how to combine them is highly innovative. Direct relationships with customers create valuable information, which in turn allows the company to coordinate its entire value chain back through manufacturing to product design. Dell describes how his company has come to achieve this tight coordination without the "drag effect" of ownership. Dell reaps the advantages of being vertically integrated without incurring the costs, all the while achieving the focus, agility, and speed of a virtual organization. As envisioned by Michael Dell, virtual integration may well become a new organizational model for the information age.

The discipline of innovation.

Abstract: Some innovations spring from a flash of genius. But as Peter Drucker points out in this HBR Classic, most result from a conscious, purposeful search for opportunities. For managers seeking innovation, engaging in disciplined work is more important than having an entrepreneurial personality. Writing originally in the May-June 1985 issue, Drucker describes the major sources of opportunities for innovation. Within a company or industry, opportunities can be found in unexpected occurrences, incongruities of various kinds, process needs, or changes in an industry or market. Outside a company, opportunities arise from demographic changes, changes in perception, or new knowledge. These seven sources overlap, and the potential for innovation may well lie in more than one area at a time. Innovations based on new knowledge, of course, tend to have the greatest effect on the marketplace. But it often takes decades before the ideas are translated into actual products, processes, or services. The other sources of innovation are easier and simpler to handle, yet they still require managers to look beyond established practices. Drucker emphasizes that in seeking opportunities, innovators need to look for simple, focused solutions to real problems. The greatest praise an innovation can receive is for people to say, "This is obvious!" Grandiose ideas designed to revolutionize an industry rarely work. Innovation, like any other endeavor, takes talent, ingenuity, and knowledge. But Drucker cautions that if diligence, persistence, and commitment are lacking, companies are unlikely to succeed at the business of innovation.

Versioning: the smart way to sell information

Abstract: Positioning and pricing strategies become all the more important when the marginal cost of your product is zero. phone book, a compact disc containing all the telephone listings for the New York area. Charging $10,000 a copy, the company sold the CDs to the FBI, the IRS, and other large commercial and governmental organizations. Sensing a great business opportunity, the Nynex executive in charge of the project, James Bryant, left to set up his own company. Pro CD. His goal was to produce an electronic directory covering the entire United States. The phone companies, fearing an attack on their lucrative yellow pages businesses, refused to license digital copies of their listings to Pro CD. But that didn't stop Bryant. He went to Beijing and hired Chinese workers-at $ 3.5 o a day-to type into computers every listing from every U.S. telephone book. The resulting database, containing more than 70 million phone numbers, was used to create a master disc, which in turn was used to create hundreds of thousands of copies. The CDs, which cost well under a dollar each to produce, sold for hundreds of dollars, yielding a tidy profit for Pro CD. But the CD-phone-book boom was short-lived. Attracted by the seemingly strong profit potential, competitors such as Digital Directory Assistance and American Business Information rushed to launch competing products containing essentially the same information. Because their products were indistinguishable, the companies were forced to compete on price alone. Not surprisingly, prices plunged. Soon, CD phone directories were selling for a few dollars in discount software bins. A high-priced, high-margin produet just months hefore, the CD phone book had become a cheap commodity. The rapid rise, and even more rapid fall, of CD telephone directories stands as a cautionary tale for the purveyors of information products, particularly those sold in digital form. It reveals that the so-called new economy is still subject to the old laws of economics. In a free market, once several companies have sunk the costs necessary to create an undiffer-entiated product, competitive forces will usually move the product's price toward its marginal cost-the cost of manufacturing an additional copy. And because the marginal cost of reproducing information tends to be very low, the price of an information product, if left to the marketplace, will tend to be low as well. What makes information products economically attractive-their low reproduction cost-also makes them economically dangerous. Many …

Covert leadership: notes on managing professionals. Knowledge workers respond to inspiration, not supervision.

Abstract: The orchestra conductor is a popular metaphor for managers today--up there on the podium in complete control. But that image may be misleading, says Henry Mintzberg, who recently spent a day with Bramwell Tovey, conductor of the Winnipeg Symphony Orchestra, in order to explore the metaphor. He found that Tovey does not operate like an absolute ruler but practices instead what Mintzberg calls covert leadership. Covert leadership means managing with a sense of nuances, constraints, and limitations. When a manager like Tovey guides an organization, he leads without seeming to, without his people being fully aware of all that he is doing. That's because in this world of professionals, a leader is not completely powerless--but neither does he have absolute control over others. As knowledge work grows in importance, the way an orchestra conductor really operates may serve as a good model for managers in a wide range of businesses. For example, Mintzberg found that Tovey does a lot more hands-on work than one might expect. More like a first-line supervisor than a hands-off executive, he takes direct and personal charge of what is getting done. In dealing with his musicians, his focus is on inspiring them, not empowering them. Like other professionals, the musicians don't need to be empowered--they're already secure in what they know and can do--but they do need to be infused with energy for the tasks at hand. This is the role of the covert leader: to act quietly and unobtrusively in order to exact not obedience but inspired performance.

Six dangerous myths about pay.

Abstract: Every day, executives make decisions about pay, and they do so in a landscape that's shifting. As more and more companies base less of their compensation on straight salary and look to other financial options, managers are bombarded with advice about the best approaches to take. Unfortunately, much of that advice is wrong. Indeed, much of the conventional wisdom and public discussion about pay today is misleading, incorrect, or both. The result is that business people are adopting wrongheaded notions about how to pay people and why. In particular, they are subscribing to six dangerous myths about pay. Myth #1: labor rates are the same as labor costs. Myth #2: cutting labor rates will lower labor costs. Myth #3: labor costs represent a large portion of a company's total costs. Myth #4: keeping labor costs low creates a potent and sustainable competitive edge. Myth #5: individual incentive pay improves performance. Myth #6: people work primarily for the money. The author explains why these myths are so pervasive, shows where they go wrong, and suggests how leaders might think more productively about compensation. With increasing frequency, the author says, he sees managers harming their organizations by buying into--and acting on--these myths. Those that do, he warns, are probably doomed to endless tinkering with pay that at the end of the day will accomplish little but cost a lot.

Creating corporate advantage.

Abstract: What differentiates truly great corporate strategies from the merely adequate? How can executives at the corporate level create tangible advantage for their businesses that makes the whole more than the sum of the parts? This article presents a comprehensive framework for value creation in the multibusiness company. It addresses the most fundamental questions of corporate strategy: What businesses should a company be in? How should it coordinate activities across businesses? What role should the corporate office play? How should the corporation measure and control performance? Through detailed case studies of Tyco International, Sharp, the Newell Company, and Saatchi and Saatchi, the authors demonstrate that the answers to all those questions are driven largely by the nature of a company's special resources--its assets, skills, and capabilities. These range along a continuum from the highly specialized at one end to the very general at the other. A corporation's location on the continuum constrains the set of businesses it should compete in and limits its choices about the design of its organization. Applying the framework, the authors point out the common mistakes that result from misaligned corporate strategies. Companies mistakenly enter businesses based on similarities in products rather than the resources that contribute to competitive advantage in each business. Instead of tailoring organizational structures and systems to the needs of a particular strategy, they create plain-vanilla corporate offices and infrastructures. The company examples demonstrate that one size does not fit all. One can find great corporate strategies all along the continuum.

Desperately seeking synergy.

Abstract: Corporate executives have strong biases in favor of synergy, and those biases can lead them into ill-advised attempts to force business units to cooperate--even when the ultimate benefits are unclear. But executives can separate the real opportunities from the mirages, say Michael Goold and Andrew Campbell. They simply need to take a more disciplined approach to synergy. These biases take four forms. First comes the synergy bias, which leads executives to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of synergy. Then comes the parenting bias, a belief that synergy will be captured only by cajoling or compelling business units to cooperate. The parenting bias is usually accompanied by the skills bias--the assumption that whatever know-how is required to achieve synergy will be available within the organization. Finally, executives fall victim to the upside bias, which causes them to concentrate so hard on the potential benefits of synergy that they overlook the possible downside risks. In combination, these four biases make synergy seem more attractive and more easily achievable than it truly is. As a result, corporate executives often launch initiatives that ultimately waste time and money and sometimes even severely damage their businesses. To avoid such failures, executives need to subject all synergy opportunities to a clear-eyed analysis that clarifies the benefits to be gained, examines the potential for corporate involvement, and takes into account the possible downsides. Such a disciplined approach will inevitably mean that fewer initiatives will be launched. But those that are pursued will be far more likely to deliver substantial gains.

Fast, global, and entrepreneurial: supply chain management, Hong Kong style. An interview with Victor Fung. Interview by Joan Magretta.

Abstract: Li & Fung, Hong Kong's largest export trading company, has been an innovator in supply chain management--a topic of increasing importance to many senior executives. In this interview, chairman Victor Fung explains both the philosophy behind supply chain management and the specific practices that Li & Fung has developed to reduce costs and lead times, allowing its customers to buy \"closer to the market.\" Li & Fung has been a pioneer in \"dispersed manufacturing.\" It performs the higher-value-added tasks such as design and quality control in Hong Kong, and outsources the lower-value-added tasks to the best possible locations around the world. The result is something new: a truly global product. To produce a garment, for example, the company might purchase yarn from Korea that will be woven and dyed in Taiwan, then shipped to Thailand for final assembly, where it will be matched with zippers from a Japanese company. For every order, the goal is to customize the value chain to meet the customer's specific needs. To be run effectively, Victor Fung maintains, trading companies have to be small and entrepreneurial. He describes the organizational approaches that keep the company that way despite its growing size and geographic scope: its organization around small, customer-focused units; its incentives and compensation structure; and its use of venture capital as a vehicle for business development. As Asia's economic crisis continues, chairman Fung sees a new model of companies emerging--companies that are, like Li & Fung, narrowly focused and professionally managed.

Strategic stories: how 3M is rewriting business planning.

Abstract: Virtually all business plans are written as a list of bullet points. Despite the skill or knowledge of their authors, these plans usually aren't anything more than lists of "good things to do." For example: Increase sales by 10%. Reduce distribution costs by 5%. Develop a synergistic vision for traditional products. Rarely do these lists reflect deep thought or inspire commitment. Worse, they don't specify critical relationships between the points, and they can't demonstrate how the goals will be achieved. 3M executive Gordon Shaw began looking for a more coherent and compelling way to present business plans. He found it in the form of strategic stories. Telling stories was already a habit of mind at 3M. Stories about the advent of Post-it Notes and the invention of masking tape help define 3M's identity. They're part of the way people at 3M explain themselves to their customers and to one another. Shaw and his coauthors examine how business plans can be transformed into strategic narratives. By painting a picture of the market, the competition, and the strategy needed to beat the competition, these narratives can fill in the spaces around the bullet points for those who will approve and those who will implement the strategy. When people can locate themselves in the story, their sense of commitment and involvement is enhanced. By conveying a powerful impression of the process of winning, narrative plans can mobilize an entire organization.

The Alternative Workplace: Changing Where and How People Work.

Abstract: Today many organizations, including AT&T and IBM, are pioneering the alternative workplace--the combination of nontraditional work practices, settings, and locations that is beginning to supplement traditional offices. This is not a fad. Although estimates vary widely, it is safe to say that some 30 million to 40 million people in the United States are now either telecommuters or home-based workers. What motivates managers to examine how people spend their time at the office and where else they might do their work? Among the potential benefits for companies are reduced costs, increased productivity, and an edge in vying for and keeping talented employees. They can also capture government incentives and avoid costly sanctions. But at the same time, alternative workplace programs are not for everyone. Indeed, such programs can be difficult to adopt, even for those organizations that seem to be most suited to them. Ingrained behaviors and practical hurdles are hard to overcome. And the challenges of managing both the cultural changes and systems improvements required by an alternative workplace initiative are substantial. How should senior managers think about alternative workplace programs? What are the criteria for determining whether the alternative workplace is right for a given organization? What are the most common pitfalls in implementing alternative workplace programs? The author provides the answers to these questions in his examination of this new frontier of where and how people work.

Even swaps: a rational method for making trade-offs.

Abstract: Making wise trade-offs is one of the most important and difficult challenges in decision making. Needless to say, the more alternative you're considering and the more objectives you're pursuing, the more trade-offs you'll need to make. The sheer volume of trade-offs, however, is not what makes decision making so hard. It's the fact that each objective has its own basis of comparison, from precise numbers (34% versus 38%) to relationships (high versus low) to descriptive terms (red versus blue). You're not just trading off apples and oranges; you're trading off apples and oranges and elephants. How do you make trade-offs when comparing widely disparate things? In the past, decision makers have relied mostly on instinct, common sense, and guesswork. They've lacked a clear, rational, and easy-to-use trade-off methodology. To help fill that gap, the authors have developed a system-which they call even swaps-that provides a practical way of making trade-offs among a range of objectives across a range of alternatives. The even-swap method will not make complex decisions easy; you'll still have to make hard choices about the values you set and the trades you make. What it does provide is a reliable mechanisms for making trades and a coherent framework in which to make them. By simplifying and codifying the mechanical elements of trade-offs, the even-swap method lets you focus all your mental energy on the most important work of decision making: deciding the real value to your company of different courses of action.

The right mind-set for managing information technology.

Abstract: Too many managers in the West are intimidated by the task of managing technology. They tiptoe around it, supposing that it needs special tools, special strategies, and a special mind-set. Well, it doesn't, the authors say. Technology should be managed-controlled, even--like any other competitive weapon in a manager's arsenal. The authors came to this conclusion in a surprising way. Having set out to compare Western and Japanese IT-management practices, they were startled to discover that Japanese companies rarely experience the IT problems so common in the United States and Europe. In fact, their senior executives didn't even recognize the problems that the authors described. When they dug deeper into 20 leading companies that the Japanese themselves consider exemplary IT users, they found that the Japanese see IT as just one competitive lever among many. Its purpose, very simply, is to help the organization achieve its operational goals. The authors recognize that their message is counterintuitive, to say the least. In visits to Japan, Western executives have found anything but a model to copy. But a closer look reveals that the prevailing wisdom is wrong. The authors found five principles of IT management in Japan that, they believe, are not only powerful but also universal. M. Bensaou and Michael Earl contrast these principles against the practices commonly found in Western companies. While acknowledging that Japan has its own weaknesses with technology, particularly in white-collar office settings, they nevertheless urge senior managers in the West to consider the solid foundation on which Japanese IT management rests.

Making the deal real: how GE Capital integrates acquisitions.

Abstract: Most companies view acquisitions and mergers as onetime events managed with heroic effort--anxiety-producing experiences that often result in lost jobs, restructured responsibilities, derailed careers, and diminished power. Little wonder, then, that most managers think about how to get them over with--not how to do them better. But even as the number of mergers and acquisitions rises in the United States, studies show the performance of the resulting companies falls below industry averages more often than not. To improve these statistics, executives need to view acquisition integration as a manageable process, not a unique event. One company that has done exactly that is GE Capital Services, which has assimilated more than 100 acquisitions in the past five years alone and, in the process, has developed a formal model for melding new acquisitions into the corporate fold. Drawing on their experiences working with the company to develop the model, consultants Ron Ashkenas and Suzanne Francis, together with GE Capital's Lawrence DeMonaco, offer four lessons from the company's successful run. First, begin the integration process before the deal is signed. Second, dedicate a full-time individual to managing the integration process. Third, implement any necessary restructuring sooner rather than later. And fourth, integrate not only the business operations but also the corporate cultures. These guidelines won't erase all of the discomfort that accompanies many mergers, but they can make the process more transparent and predictable for those involved.