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Showing papers in "Harvard Business Review in 1999"


Journal Article•
TL;DR: The authors warn that knowledge management should not be isolated in a functional department like HR or IT, and emphasize that the benefits are greatest when a CEO and other general managers actively choose one of the approaches as a primary strategy.
Abstract: The rise of the computer and the increasing importance of intellectual assets have compelled executives to examine the knowledge underlying their businesses and how it is used. Because knowledge management as a conscious practice is so young, however, executives have lacked models to use as guides. To help fill that gap, the authors recently studied knowledge management practices at management consulting firms, health care providers, and computer manufacturers. They found two very different knowledge management strategies in place. In companies that sell relatively standardized products that fill common needs, knowledge is carefully codified and stored in databases, where it can be accessed and used--over and over again--by anyone in the organization. The authors call this the codification strategy. In companies that provide highly customized solutions to unique problems, knowledge is shared mainly through person-to-person contacts; the chief purpose of computers is to help people communicate. They call this the personalization strategy. A company's choice of knowledge management strategy is not arbitrary--it must be driven by the company's competitive strategy. Emphasizing the wrong approach or trying to pursue both can quickly undermine a business. The authors warn that knowledge management should not be isolated in a functional department like HR or IT. They emphasize that the benefits are greatest--to both the company and its customers--when a CEO and other general managers actively choose one of the approaches as a primary strategy.

4,558 citations




Journal Article•
TL;DR: This tool kit will help you determine what type of program your company can implement now, what you need to do to position your company for a large-scale initiative, and how to set priorities.
Abstract: One-to-one marketing, also known as relationship marketing, promises to increase the value of your customer base by establishing a learning relationship with each customer. The customer tells you of some need, and you customize your product or service to meet it. Every interaction and modification improves your ability to fit your product to the particular customer. Eventually, even if a competitor offers the same type of service, your customer won't be able to enjoy the same level of convenience without taking the time to teach your competitor the lessons your company has already learned. Although the theory behind one-to-one marketing is simple, implementation is complex. Too many companies have jumped on the one-to-one band-wagon without proper preparation--mistakenly understanding it as an excuse to badger customers with excessive telemarketing and direct mail campaigns. The authors offer practical advice for implementing a one-to-one marketing program correctly. They describe four key steps: identifying your customers, differentiating among them, interacting with them, and customizing your product or service to meet each customer's needs. And they provide activities and exercises, to be administered to employees and customers, that will help you identify your company's readiness to launch a one-to-one initiative. Although some managers dismiss the possibility of one-to-one marketing as an unattainable goal, even a modest program can produce substantial benefits. This tool kit will help you determine what type of program your company can implement now, what you need to do to position your company for a large-scale initiative, and how to set priorities.

639 citations


Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the author shows how some companies are moving beyond corporate social responsibility to corporate social innovation, and illustrates how this paradigm has produced innovations that have both business and community payoffs.
Abstract: Corporations are continually looking for new sources of innovation. Today several leading companies are beginning to find inspiration in an unexpected place: the social sector. That includes public schools, welfare-to-work programs, and the inner city. Indeed, a new paradigm for innovation is emerging: a partnership between private enterprise and public interest that produces profitable and sustainable change for both sides. In this article, the author shows how some companies are moving beyond corporate social responsibility to corporate social innovation. Traditionally, companies viewed the social sector as a dumping ground for their spare cash, obsolete equipment, and tired executives. But that mind-set hardly created lasting change. Now companies are viewing community needs as opportunities to develop ideas and demonstrate business technologies; find and serve new markets; and solve long-standing business problems. They focus on inventing sophisticated solutions through a hands-on approach. This is not charity; it is R & D, a strategic business investment. The author concedes that it isn't easy to make the new paradigm work. But she has found that successful private-public partnerships share six characteristics: a clear business agenda, strong partners committed to change, investment by both parties, rootedness in the user community, links to other organizations, and a commitment to sustain and replicate the results. Drawing on examples of successful companies such as IBM and Bell Atlantic, the author illustrates how this paradigm has produced innovations that have both business and community payoffs.

609 citations


Journal Article•
TL;DR: The lead user process as discussed by the authors is based on the fact that many commercially important products are initially thought of and even prototyped by "lead users" -companies, organizations, or individuals that are well ahead of market trends.
Abstract: Most senior managers want their product development teams to create break-throughs--new products that will allow their companies to grow rapidly and maintain high margins. But more often they get incremental improvements to existing products. That's partly because companies must compete in the short term. Searching for breakthroughs is expensive and time consuming; line extensions can help the bottom line immediately. In addition, developers simply don't know how to achieve breakthroughs, and there is usually no system in place to guide them. By the mid-1990s, the lack of such a system was a problem even for an innovative company like 3M. Then a project team in 3M's Medical-Surgical Markets Division became acquainted with a method for developing breakthrough products: the lead user process. The process is based on the fact that many commercially important products are initially thought of and even prototyped by "lead users"--companies, organizations, or individuals that are well ahead of market trends. Their needs are so far beyond those of the average user that lead users create innovations on their own that may later contribute to commercially attractive breakthroughs. The lead user process transforms the job of inventing breakthroughs into a systematic task of identifying lead users and learning from them. The authors explain the process and how the 3M project team successfully navigated through it. In the end, the team proposed three major new product lines and a change in the division's strategy that has led to the development of breakthrough products. And now several more divisions are using the process to break away from incrementalism.

539 citations


Journal Article•
Hagel J rd1, Singer M•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that traditional businesses will unbundle and then rebundle into large infrastructure and customer-relationship businesses and small, nimble product innovation companies, and executives in many industries will be forced to ask the most basic question about their companies: What business are we really in?
Abstract: No matter how monolithic they may seem, most companies are really engaged in three kinds of businesses. One business attracts customers. Another develops products. The third oversees operations. Although organizationally intertwined, these businesses have conflicting characteristics. It takes a big investment to find and develop a relationship with a customer, so profitability hinges on achieving economies of scope. But speed, not scope, drives the economics of product innovation. And the high fixed costs of capital-intensive infrastructure businesses require economies of scale. Scope, speed, and scale can't be optimized simultaneously, so trade-offs have to be made when the three businesses are bundled into one corporation. Historically, they have been bundled because the interaction costs--the friction--incurred by separating them were too high. But we are on the verge of a worldwide reduction in interaction costs, the authors contend, as electronic networks drive down the costs of communicating and of exchanging data. Activities that companies have always believed were central to their businesses will suddenly be offered by new, specialized competitors that won't have to make trade-offs. Ultimately, the authors predict, traditional businesses will unbundle and then rebundle into large infrastructure and customer-relationship businesses and small, nimble product innovation companies. And executives in many industries will be forced to ask the most basic question about their companies: What business are we really in? Their answer will determine their fate in an increasingly frictionless economy.

516 citations



Journal Article•
TL;DR: In recent years, forward-thinking companies like IBM, Texas Instruments, and Duke Power have begun to make the leap from process redesign to process management, emerging as true process enterprises--businesses whose management structures are in harmony, rather than at war, with their core processes.
Abstract: Many companies have succeeded in reengineering their core processes, combining related activities from different departments and cutting out ones that don't add value. Few, though, have aligned their organizations with their processes. The result is a form of cognitive dissonance as the new, integrated processes pull people in one direction and the old, fragmented management structures pull them in another. That's not the way it has to be. In recent years, forward-thinking companies like IBM, Texas Instruments, and Duke Power have begun to make the leap from process redesign to process management. They've appointed some of their best managers to be process owners, giving them real authority over work and budgets. They've shifted the focus of their measurement and compensation systems from unit goals to process goals. They've changed the way they assign and train employees, emphasizing whole processes rather than narrow tasks. They've thought carefully about the strategic trade-offs between adopting uniform processes and allowing different units to do things their own way. And they've made subtle but fundamental cultural changes, stressing teamwork and customers over turf and hierarchy. These companies are emerging from all those changes as true process enterprises--businesses whose management structures are in harmony, rather than at war, with their core processes. And their organizations are becoming much more flexible, adaptive, and responsive as a result.

484 citations


Journal Article•
TL;DR: Natural capitalism will sub-sume traditional industrialism, just as industrialism sub-sumed agrarianism, and the companies that are furthest down the road will have the competitive edge, the authors argue.
Abstract: No one would run a business without accounting for its capital outlays. Yet most companies overlook one major capital component--the value of the earth's ecosystem services. It is a staggering omission; recent calculations place the value of the earth's total ecosystem services--water storage, atmosphere regulation, climate control, and so on--at $33 trillion a year. Not accounting for those costs has led to waste on a grand scale. But now a few farsighted companies are finding powerful business opportunities in conserving resources on a similarly grand scale. They are embarking on a journey toward "natural capitalism," a journey that comprises four major shifts in business practices. The first stage involves dramatically increasing the productivity of natural resources, stretching them as much as 100 times further than they do today. In the second stage, companies adopt closed-loop production systems that yield no waste or toxicity. The third stage requires a fundamental change of business model--from one of selling products to one of delivering services. For example, a manufacturer would sell lighting services rather than lightbulbs, thus benefitting the seller and customer for developing extremely efficient, durable lightbulbs. The last stage involves reinvesting in natural capital to restore, sustain, and expand the planet's ecosystem. Because natural capitalism is both necessary and profitable, it will sub-sume traditional industrialism, the authors argue, just as industrialism sub-sumed agrarianism. And the companies that are furthest down the road will have the competitive edge.

473 citations


Journal Article•
TL;DR: A blueprint for change is laid out, challenging foundation leaders to spearhead the evolution of philanthropy from private acts of conscience into a professional field and a framework for thinking systematically about how foundations create value is presented.
Abstract: During the past two decades, the number of charitable foundations in the United States has doubled while the value of their assets has increased more than 1,100%. As new wealth continues to pour into foundations, the authors take a timely look at the field and conclude that radical change is needed. First, they explain why. Compared with direct giving, foundations are strongly favored through tax preferences whose value increases in rising stock markets. As a nation, then, we make a substantial investment in foundation philanthropy that goes well beyond the original gifts of private donors. We should therefore expect foundations to achieve a social impact disproportionate to their spending. If foundations serve merely as passive conduits for giving, then they not only fall far short of their potential but also fail to meet an important societal obligation. Drawing on Porter's work on competition and strategy, the authors then present a framework for thinking systematically about how foundations create value and how the various approaches to value creation can be deployed within the context of an overarching strategy. Although many foundations talk about "strategic" giving, much current practice is at odds with strategy. Among the common problems, foundations scatter their funding too broadly, they overlook the value-creating potential of longer and closer working relationships with grantees, and they pay insufficient attention to the ultimate results of the work they fund. This article lays out a blueprint for change, challenging foundation leaders to spearhead the evolution of philanthropy from private acts of conscience into a professional field.

Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the second generation of e-commerce will be shaped more by strategy than by experimentation, and that the key players will shift their attention from claiming territory to defending or capturing it.
Abstract: In its first generation, electronic commerce has been a landgrab. Space on the Internet was claimed by whoever got there first with enough resources to create a credible business. It took speed, a willingness to experiment, and a lot of cybersavvy. Companies that had performed brilliantly in traditional settings seemed hopelessly flat-footed on the Web. And despite their astronomical valuations, the new e-commerce stars have appeared to be just as confused. Many have yet to make a profit, and no one has any idea when they will. Now, the authors contend, we are entering the second generation of e-commerce, and it will be shaped more by strategy than by experimentation. The key players--branded-goods suppliers, physical retailers, electronic retailers, and pure navigators--will shift their attention from claiming territory to defending or capturing it. They will be forced to focus on strategies to achieve competitive advantage. Success will go to the businesses that get closest to consumers, the ones that help customers navigate their way through the Web. Indeed, the authors argue, navigation is the battlefield on which competitive advantage will be won or lost. There are three dimensions of navigation: Reach is about access and connection. Affiliation is about whose interests the business represents. And richness is the depth of the information that a business gives to or collects about its customers. Navigators and e-retailers have the natural advantage in reach and affiliation, while traditional product suppliers and retailers have the edge in richness. The authors offer practical advice to each player on competing in the second generation of e-commerce.

Journal Article•
W C Kim1, Renée Mauborgne•
TL;DR: The authors have studied how innovative companies break free from the competitive pack by staking out fundamentally new market space by creating products or services for which there are no direct competitors.
Abstract: Most companies focus on matching and beating their rivals. As a result, their strategies tend to take on similar dimensions. What ensues is head-to-head competition based largely on incremental improvements in cost, quality, or both. The authors have studied how innovative companies break free from the competitive pack by staking out fundamentally new market space--that is, by creating products or services for which there are no direct competitors. This path to value innovation requires a different competitive mind-set and a systematic way of looking for opportunities. Instead of looking within the conventional boundaries that define how an industry competes, managers can look methodically across them. By so doing, they can find unoccupied territory that represents real value innovation. Rather than looking at competitors within their own industry, for example, managers can ask why customers make the trade-off between substitute products or services. Home Depot, for example, looked across the substitutes serving home improvement needs. Intuit looked across the substitutes available to individuals managing their personal finances. In both cases, powerful insights were derived from looking at familiar data from a new perspective. Similar insights can be gleaned by looking across strategic groups within an industry; across buyer groups; across complementary product and service offerings; across the functional-emotional orientation of an industry; and even across time. To help readers explore new market space systematically, the authors developed a tool, the value curve, that can be used to represent visually a range of value propositions.

Journal Article•
TL;DR: How patching works is illustrated and some common stumbling blocks are pointed out: modular business units, fine-grained and complete unit-level metrics, and companywide compensation parity.
Abstract: In turbulent markets, businesses and opportunities are constantly falling out of alignment. New technologies and emerging markets create fresh opportunities. Converging markets produce more. And of course, some markets fade. In this landscape of continuous flux, it's more important to build corporate-level strategic processes that enable dynamic repositioning than it is to build any particular defensible position. That's why smart corporate strategists use patching, a process of mapping and remapping business units to create a shifting mix of highly focused, tightly aligned businesses that can respond to changing market opportunities. Patching is not just another name for reorganizing; patchers have a distinctive mindset. Traditional managers see structure as stable; patching managers believe structure is inherently temporary. Traditional managers set corporate strategy first, but patching managers keep the organization focused on the right set of business opportunities and let strategy emerge from individual businesses. Although the focus of patching is flexibility, the process itself follows a pattern. Patching changes are usually small in scale and made frequently. Patching should be done quickly; the emphasis is on getting the patch about right and fixing problems later. Patches should have a test drive before they're formalized but then be tightly scripted after they've been announced. And patching won't work without the right infrastructure: modular business units, fine-grained and complete unit-level metrics, and companywide compensation parity. The authors illustrate how patching works and point out some common stumbling blocks.

Journal Article•
TL;DR: By better understanding the relationship between their company's assets and the industry they operate in, executives from emerging markets can gain a clearer picture of the options they really have when multinationals come to stay, say the authors.
Abstract: The arrival of a multinational corporation often looks like a death sentence to local companies in an emerging market. After all, how can they compete in the face of the vast financial and technological resources, the seasoned management, and the powerful brands of, say, a Compaq or a Johnson & Johnson? But local companies often have more options than they might think, say the authors. Those options vary, depending on the strength of globalization pressures in an industry and the nature of a company's competitive assets. In the worst case, when globalization pressures are strong and a company has no competitive assets that it can transfer to other countries, it needs to retreat to a locally oriented link within the value chain. But if globalization pressures are weak, the company may be able to defend its market share by leveraging the advantages it enjoys in its home market. Many companies in emerging markets have assets that can work well in other countries. Those that operate in industries where the pressures to globalize are weak may be able to extend their success to a limited number of other markets that are similar to their home base. And those operating in global markets may be able to contend head-on with multinational rivals. By better understanding the relationship between their company's assets and the industry they operate in, executives from emerging markets can gain a clearer picture of the options they really have when multinationals come to stay.

Journal Article•
Forest L. Reinhardt1•
TL;DR: Five approaches will enable companies with the right industry structure, competitive position, and managerial skills to reconcile their responsibility to shareholders with the pressure to be faithful stewards of the earth's resources and bring the environment down to earth.
Abstract: The debate on business and the environment has typically been framed in simple yes-or-no terms: "Does it pay to be green?" But the environment, like other business issues, requires a more complex approach--one that demands more than such all-or-nothing thinking. Managers need to ask instead, "Under what circumstances do particular kinds of environmental investments deliver returns to shareholders?" This article presents five approaches that managers can take to identify those circumstances and integrate the environment into their business thinking. These approaches will enable companies with the right industry structure, competitive position, and managerial skills to reconcile their responsibility to shareholders with the pressure to be faithful stewards of the earth's resources. Some companies can distance themselves from competitors by differentiating their products and commanding higher prices for them. Others may be able to "manage" their competitors by imposing a set of private regulations or by helping to shape the rules written by government officials. Still others may be able to cut costs and help the environment simultaneously. Almost all can learn to improve their management of risk and thus reduce the outlays associated with accidents, lawsuits, and boycotts. And some companies may even be able to make systemic changes that will redefine competition in their markets. All five approaches can help managers bring the environment down to earth. And that means bringing the environment back into the fold of business problems and determining when it really pays to be green.

Journal Article•
TL;DR: In 1998, Silicon Valley companies produced 41 IPOs, which by January 1999 had a combined market capitalization of $27 billion--that works out to $54,000 in new wealth creation per worker in a single year, which is half that amount last year.
Abstract: In 1998, Silicon Valley companies produced 41 IPOs, which by January 1999 had a combined market capitalization of $27 billion--that works out to $54,000 in new wealth creation per worker in a single year. Multiply the number of employees in your company by $54,000. Did your business create that much new wealth last year? Half that amount? It's not a group of geniuses generating such riches. It's a business model. In Silicon Valley, ideas, capital, and talent circulate freely, gathering into whatever combinations are most likely to generate innovation and wealth. Unlike most traditional companies, which spend their energy in resource allocation--a system designed to avoid failure--the Valley operates through resource attraction--a system that nurtures innovation. In a traditional company, people with innovative ideas must go hat in hand to the guardians of the old ideas for funding and for staff. But in Silicon Valley, a slew of venture capitalists vie to attract the best new ideas, infusing relatively small amounts of capital into a portfolio of ventures. And talent is free to go to the companies offering the most exhilarating work and the greatest potential rewards. It should actually be easier for large, traditional companies to set up similar markets for capital, ideas, and talent internally. After all, big companies often already have extensive capital, marketing, and distribution resources, and a first crack at the talent in their own ranks. And some of them are doing it. The choice is yours--you can do your best to make sure you never put a dollar of capital at risk, or you can tap into the kind of wealth that's being created every day in Silicon Valley.


Journal Article•
TL;DR: High-tech acquisitions need a new orientation around people, not products, the authors argue, because most managers have a shortsighted view of strategic acquisitions.
Abstract: Eager to stay ahead of fast-changing markets, more and more high-tech companies are going outside for competitive advantage. Last year in the United States alone, there were 5,000 high-tech acquisitions, but many of them yielded disappointing results. The reason, the authors contend, is that most managers have a shortsighted view of strategic acquisitions--they focus on the specific products or market share. That focus might make sense in some industries, where those assets can confer substantial advantages, but in high tech, full-fledged technological capabilities--tied to skilled people--are the key to long-term success. Instead of simply following the "buzz," successful acquires systematically assess their own capability needs. They create product road maps to identify holes in their product line. While the business group determines if it can do the work in-house, the business development office scouts for opportunities to buy it. Once business development locates a candidate, it conducts an expanded due diligence, which goes beyond strategic, financial, and legal checks. Successful acquires are focused on long-term capabilities, so they make sure that the target's products reflect a real expertise. They also look to see if key people would be comfortable in the new environment and if they have incentives to stay on board. The final stage of a successful acquisition focuses on retaining the new people--making sure their transition goes smoothly and their energies stay focused. Acquisitions can cause great uncertainty, and skilled people can always go elsewhere. In short, the authors argue, high-tech acquisitions need a new orientation around people, not products.

Journal Article•
Donald L. Sull1•
TL;DR: The author draws on examples of pairs of industry leaders, like Goodyear and Firestone, whose fates diverged when they were forced to respond to dramatic changes in the tire industry to offer practical advice for avoiding active inertia.
Abstract: One of the most common business phenomena is also one of the most perplexing: when successful companies face big changes, they often fail to respond effectively. Many assume that the problem is paralysis, but the real problem, according to Donald Sull, is active inertia--an organization's tendency to persist in established patterns of behavior. Most leading businesses owe their prosperity to a fresh competitive formula--a distinctive combination of strategies, relationships, processes, and values that sets them apart from the crowd. But when changes occur in a company's markets, the formula that brought success instead brings failure. Stuck in the modes of thinking and working that have been successful in the past, market leaders simply accelerate all their tried-and-true activities. In attempting to dig themselves out of a hole, they just deepen it. In particular, four things happen: strategic frames become blinders; processes harden into routines; relationships become shackles; and values turn into dogmas. To illustrate his point, the author draws on examples of pairs of industry leaders, like Goodyear and Firestone, whose fates diverged when they were forced to respond to dramatic changes in the tire industry. In addition to diagnosing the problem, Sull offers practical advice for avoiding active inertia. Rather than rushing to ask, "What should we do?" managers should pause to ask, "What hinders us?" That question focuses attention on the proper things: the strategic frames, processes, relationships, and values that can subvert action by channeling it in the wrong direction.

Journal Article•
Robert Simons1•
TL;DR: The risk exposure calculator is a new tool that will help managers determine exactly where and how much internal risk is mounting in their companies.
Abstract: In boom times, it is easy for managers to forget about risk. And not just financial risk, but organizational and operational risk as well. Now there's the risk exposure calculator, a new tool that will help managers determine exactly where and how much internal risk is mounting in their companies. The risk calculator is divided into three parts: The first set of "keys" alerts managers to the pressures that come from growth. Now that the company has taken off, are employees feeling increased pressure to perform? Is the company's infrastructure becoming overloaded? And are more new employees coming on board as the company rushes to fill positions? If the answer is yes to any one of those questions, then risk may be rising to dangerous levels. The second set of keys on the calculator highlights pressures that arise from corporate culture. Are too many rewards being given for entrepreneurial risk taking? Are executives becoming so resistant to bad news that no one feels comfortable alerting them to problems? And is the company's level of internal competition so high that employees see promotion as a zero-sum game? The final set of pressures, the author says, revolves around information management. When calculating these pressures, managers should ask themselves, what was the company's complexity, volume, and velocity of information a year ago? Have they risen? By how much? How much of the time am I doing the work that a computer system should be doing? High pressure on many or all of these points should set off alarm bells for managers. To control risk, managers have four levers of control at their disposal that will show them where they need to make organizational adjustments.

Journal Article•
TL;DR: William Ryan describes how government outsourcing and a new business mind-set have changed the landscape of social services and asks whether nonprofits can adapt without compromising the qualities that distinguish them from for-profit organizations.
Abstract: For most of this century, society's caring functions have been the work of government and charities But social services in the United States are in a period of transition Today the US government no longer considers nonprofits to be entitled--or even best qualified--to provide social services Profit-seeking companies like Lockheed Martin are now winning contracts for such services William Ryan describes how government outsourcing and a new business mind-set have changed the landscape of social services The change raises fundamental questions about the mission and future of nonprofits Ryan attributes the growth of for-profits in the social service industry to four factors: size, capital, mobility, and responsiveness While those attributes give for-profits an advantage in acquiring new contracts, nonprofits have not yet lost their foothold Ryan cites examples of organizations like the YWCA and Abraxas to demonstrate various ways that nonprofits are responding--from subcontracting to partnership to outright conversion to for-profit status By playing in the new marketplace, nonprofits will be forced to reconfigure their operations and organizations in ways that could compromise their missions Because nonprofits now find themselves sharing territory with for-profits, sometimes as collaborators and sometimes as competitors, the distinctions between these organizations will continue to blur The point, Ryan argues, is not whether nonprofits can survive opposition from for-profits Many have already adjusted to the new competitive environment The real issue is whether nonprofits can adapt without compromising the qualities that distinguish them from for-profit organizations

Journal Article•
TL;DR: Before stampeding blindly toward global branding, companies need to think through the systems they have in place, according to David Aaker and Erich Joachimsthaler, who offer four prescriptions for companies seeking to achieve global brand leadership.
Abstract: As more and more companies begin to see the world as their market, brand builders look with envy upon those businesses that appear to have created global brands--brands whose positioning, advertising strategy, personality, look, and feel are in most respects the same from one country to another Attracted by such high-profile examples of success, these companies want to globalize their own brands But that's a risky path to follow, according to David Aaker and Erich Joachimsthaler Why? Because creating strong global brands takes global brand leadership It can't be done simply by edict from on high Specifically, companies must use organizational structures, processes, and cultures to allocate brand-building resources globally, to create global synergies, and to develop a global brand strategy that coordinates and leverages country brand strategies Aaker and Joachimsthaler offer four prescriptions for companies seeking to achieve global brand leadership First, companies must stimulate the sharing of insights and best practices across countries--a system in which "it won't work here" attitudes can be overcome Second, companies should support a common global brand-planning process, one that is consistent across markets and products Third, they should assign global managerial responsibility for brands in order to create cross-country synergies and to fight local bias And fourth, they need to execute brilliant brand-building strategies Before stampeding blindly toward global branding, companies need to think through the systems they have in place Otherwise, any success they achieve is likely to be random--and that's a fail-safe recipe for mediocrity

Journal Article•
TL;DR: The author proposes steps to close the gap between existing compensation practices and those needed to promote higher levels of achievement at all levels of the corporation and suggests how certain indicators of value can be used to measure the contribution of frontline managers and employees.
Abstract: As the stock market began its ascent in the mid-1990s, executive pay--always the subject of heated debate--mounted along with it That's because among the largest US companies, stock options now account for more than half of total CEO compensation and about 30% of senior operating managers' pay One problem became particularly clear during the bull market's astonishing run: even below-average performers reap huge gains from stock options when the market is rising rapidly The author proposes steps to close the gap between existing compensation practices and those needed to promote higher levels of achievement at all levels of the corporation For top managers, he recommends replacing conventional stock options with options that are tied to a market or peer index Below-average performers would not be rewarded under such plans; superior performers could, depending on the way plans were structured, receive even more He notes that managers at the business unit level should not be judged on the company's stock price--over which they have little control--and advocates an approach that accurately measures the value added by each unit Finally, he suggests how certain indicators of value can be used to measure the contribution of frontline managers and employees The concept of pay for performance has gained wide acceptance, but the link between incentive pay and superior performance is still too weak Reforms must be adopted at all levels of the organization Shareholders will applaud changes in pay schemes that motivate companies to deliver more value

Journal Article•
Edward M. Hallowell1•
TL;DR: The author relates stories of business-people who have dealt firsthand with the misunderstandings caused by an overreliance on technology and suggests that the strategic use of the human moment adds color to the authors' lives and helps us build confidence and trust at work.
Abstract: In the last decade or so, technological changes--mainly voice mail and e-mail--have made a lot of face-to-face interaction unnecessary. Face-to-face contact has also fallen victim to "virtuality"--many people work at home or are otherwise off-site. Indeed, most people today can't imagine life without such technology and the freedom it grants. But Edward Hallowell, a noted psychiatrist who has been treating patients with anxiety disorders--many of them business executives--for more than 20 years, warns that we are in danger of losing what he calls the human moment: an authentic psychological encounter that can happen only when two people share the same physical space. And, he believes, we may be about to discover the destructive power of its absence. The author relates stories of business-people who have dealt firsthand with the misunderstandings caused by an overreliance on technology. An e-mail message is misconstrued. Someone forwards a voice-mail message to the wrong people. A person takes offense because he was not included on a certain circulation list. Was it an accident? Often the consequences of such misunderstandings, taken individually, are minor. Over time, however, they take a larger toll--both on individuals and on the organizations they work for. The problem, however, is not insoluble. The author cites examples of people who have worked successfully to restore face-to-face contact in their organizations. The bottom line is that the strategic use of the human moment adds color to our lives and helps us build confidence and trust at work. We ignore it at our peril.

Journal Article•
TL;DR: The organigraph is a map that offers an overview of the company's functions and the ways that people organize themselves at work, and can help managers see untapped competitive opportunities.
Abstract: Walk into any organization and you will get a snapshot of the company in action--people and products moving every which way. But ask for a picture of the company and you will be given the org chart, with its orderly little boxes showing just the names and titles of managers. Now there's a more revealing way to depict the people and operations within an organization--an approach called the organigraph. The organigraph is not a chart. It's a map that offers an overview of the company's functions and the ways that people organize themselves at work. Perhaps most important, an organigraph can help managers see untapped competitive opportunities. Drawing on the organigraphs they created for about a dozen companies, authors Mintzberg and Van der Heyden illustrate just how valuable a tool the organigraph is. For instance, one they created for Electrocomponents, a British distributor of electrical and mechanical items, led managers to a better understanding of the company's real expertise--business-to-business relationships. As a result of that insight, the company wisely decided to expand in Asia and to increase its Internet business. As one manager says, "It allowed the company to see all sorts of new possibilities." With traditional hierarchies vanishing and newfangled--and often quite complex--organizational forms taking their place, people are struggling to understand how their companies work. What parts connect to one another? How should processes and people come together? Whose ideas have to flow where? With their flexibility and realism, organigraphs give managers a new way to answer those questions.

Journal Article•
TL;DR: The authors provide a framework for measuring the performance of software in a company's IT portfolio and discuss how to identify domain characteristics and software risks and suggest ways to reduce the variability of software domains.
Abstract: Software applications are now a mission-critical source of competitive advantage for most companies. They are also a source of great risk, as the Y2K bug has made clear. Yet many line managers still haven't confronted software issues--partly because they aren't sure how best to define the quality of the applications in their IT infrastructures. Some companies such as Wal-Mart and the Gap have successfully integrated the software in their networks, but most have accumulated an unwidely number of incompatible applications--all designed to perform the same tasks. The authors provide a framework for measuring the performance of software in a company's IT portfolio. Quality traditionally has been measured according to a product's ability to meet certain specifications; other views of quality have emerged that measure a product's adaptability to customers' needs and a product's ability to encourage innovation. To judge software quality properly, argue the authors, managers must measure applications against all three approaches. Understanding the domain of a software application is an important part of that process. The domain is the body of knowledge about a user's needs and expectations for a product. Software domains change frequently based on how a consumer chooses to use, for example, Microsoft Word or a spreadsheet application. The domain can also be influenced by general changes in technology, such as the development of a new software platform. Thus, applications can't be judged only according to whether they conform to specifications. The authors discuss how to identify domain characteristics and software risks and suggest ways to reduce the variability of software domains.


Journal Article•
TL;DR: If returns to shareholders from acquisitions are no better in the next ten years than they've been in the past 30, the authors warn, it will be because companies have failed to create systematic corporate governance processes that put their simple lessons into practice.
Abstract: Despite 30 years of evidence demonstrating that most acquisitions don't create value for the acquiring company, executives continue to make more deals, and bigger deals, every year. There are plenty of reasons why value isn't created, but many times it's simply because the acquiring company paid too much. It's not, however, that acquirers pay too high a price in an absolute sense. Rather, they pay more than the acquisition is worth to them. What is that optimum price? The authors present a systematic way to arrive at it, involving several distinct concepts of value. In today's market, the purchase price of an acquisition will nearly always be higher than the intrinsic value of the company--the price of its stock before any acquisition intentions are announced. The key is to determine how much of that difference is "synergy value"--the value that will result from improvements made when the companies are combined. This value will accrue to the acquirer's shareholders rather than to the target's shareholders. The more synergy value a particular acquisition can generate, the higher the maximum price an acquirer is justified in paying. Just as important as correctly calculating the synergy value is having the discipline to walk away from a deal when the numbers don't add up. If returns to shareholders from acquisitions are no better in the next ten years than they've been in the past 30, the authors warn, it will be because companies have failed to create systematic corporate governance processes that put their simple lessons into practice.

Journal Article•
TL;DR: The role of toxic handlers is introduced, explaining what they do and why, and offering practical advice for managers and organizations about how to support toxic handlers--before a crisis strikes.
Abstract: You've watched them comfort colleagues, defuse tense situations, and take the heat from tough bosses. You've seen them step in to ease the pain during layoffs and change programs. Who are they? The authors call them toxic handlers--managers who voluntarily shoulder the sandness, frustration, bitterness, and anger of others so that high-quality work continues to get done. Toxic handlers are not new. They are probably as old as organizations themselves. But there has never been a systematic study of the role they play in business. In this article, the authors introduce the role of toxic handlers, explaining what they do and why. Managing the pain of others is hard work. Toxic handlers save organizations from self-destructing, but they often pay a high price--emotionally, professionally, and sometimes physically. Some toxic handlers experience burnout; others suffer far worse consequences, such as ulcers and heart attacks. The authors contend that these unsung corporate heroes have strategic importance in today's business environment. Effective pain management can--and does--contribute to the bottom line. No company can afford to let talented employees burn out. Nor can it afford to have a reputation as an unhappy place to work. The authors offer practical advice for managers and organizations about how to support toxic handlers--before a crisis strikes. The role of toxic handler needs to be given the attention it deserves for everyone's benefit, because the health of employees is a key element in the long-term competitiveness of companies and of society.