Showing papers in "Harvard Business Review in 2002"

The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy

Abstract: When it comes to philanthropy, executives increasingly see themselves as caught between critics demanding ever higher levels of "corporate social responsibility" and investors applying pressure to maximize short-term profits. In response, many companies have sought to make their giving more strategic, but what passes for strategic philanthropy is almost never truly strategic, and often isn't particularly effective as philanthropy. Increasingly, philanthropy is used as a form of public relations or advertising, promoting a company's image through high-profile sponsorships. But there is a more truly strategic way to think about philanthropy. Corporations can use their charitable efforts to improve their competitive context--the quality of the business environment in the locations where they operate. Using philanthropy to enhance competitive context aligns social and economic goals and improves a company's long-term business prospects. Addressing context enables a company to not only give money but also leverage its capabilities and relationships in support of charitable causes. The produces social benefits far exceeding those provided by individual donors, foundations, or even governments. Taking this new direction requires fundamental changes in the way companies approach their contribution programs. For example, philanthropic investments can improve education and local quality of life in ways that will benefit the company. Such investments can also improve the company's competitiveness by contributing to expanding the local market and helping to reduce corruption in the local business environment. Adopting a context-focused approach goes against the grain of current philanthropic practice, and it requires a far more disciplined approach than is prevalent today. But it can make a company's philanthropic activities far more effective.

Why business models matter.

Abstract: "Business model" was one of the great buzz-words of the Internet boom. A company didn't need a strategy, a special competence, or even any customers--all it needed was a Web-based business model that promised wild profits in some distant, ill-defined future. Many people--investors, entrepreneurs, and executives alike--fell for the fantasy and got burned. And as the inevitable counterreaction played out, the concept of the business model fell out of fashion nearly as quickly as the .com appendage itself. That's a shame. As Joan Magretta explains, a good business model remains essential to every successful organization, whether it's a new venture or an established player. To help managers apply the concept successfully, she defines what a business model is and how it complements a smart competitive strategy. Business models are, at heart, stories that explain how enterprises work. Like a good story, a robust business model contains precisely delineated characters, plausible motivations, and a plot that turns on an insight about value. It answers certain questions: Who is the customer? How do we make money? What underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? Every viable organization is built on a sound business model, but a business model isn't a strategy, even though many people use the terms interchangeably. Business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they don't factor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. That's the job of strategy. Illustrated with examples from companies like American Express, EuroDisney, WalMart, and Dell Computer, this article clarifies the concepts of business models and strategy, which are fundamental to every company's performance.

Serving the world's poor, profitably.

Abstract: By stimulating commerce and development at the bottom of the economic pyramid, multi-nationals could radically improve the lives of billions of people and help create a more stable, less dangerous world. Achieving this goal does not require MNCs to spearhead global social-development initiatives for charitable purposes. They need only act in their own self-interest. How? The authors lay out the business case for entering the world's poorest markets. Fully 65% of the world's population earns less than $2,000 per year--that's 4 billion people. But despite the vastness of this market, it remains largely untapped. The reluctance to invest is easy to understand, but it is, by and large, based on outdated assumptions of the developing world. While individual incomes may be low, the aggregate buying power of poor communities is actually quite large, representing a substantial market in many countries for what some might consider luxury goods like satellite television and phone services. Prices, and margins, are often much higher in poor neighborhoods than in their middle-class counterparts. And new technologies are already steadily reducing the effects of corruption, illiteracy, inadequate infrastructure, and other such barriers. Because these markets are in the earliest stages of economic development, revenue growth for multi-nationals entering them can be extremely rapid. MNCs can also lower costs, not only through low-cost labor but by transferring operating efficiencies and innovations developed to serve their existing operations. Certainly, succeeding in such markets requires MNCs to think creatively. The biggest change, though, has to come from executives: Unless business leaders confront their own preconceptions--particularly about the value of high-volume, low-margin businesses--companies are unlikely to master the challenges or reap the rewards of these developing markets.

Customers As Innovators: A New Way to Create Value

Abstract: R&D has long been a costly and inexact process. Now some companies are trying a radically new approach, giving customers the tools to design and develop their own products.

How resilience works

Abstract: Why do some people bounce back from life's hardships while others despair? HBR senior editor Diane Coutu looks at the nature of individual and organizational resilience, issues that have gained special urgency in light of the recent terrorist attacks, war, and recession. In the business arena, resilience has found its way onto the list of qualities sought in employees. As one of Coutu's interviewees puts it, "More than education, more than experience, more than training, a person's level of resilience will determine who succeeds and who fails." Theories abound about what produces resilience, but three fundamental characteristics seem to set resilient people and companies apart from others. One or two of these qualities make it possible to bounce back from hardship, but true resilience requires all three. The first characteristic is the capacity to accept and face down reality. In looking hard at reality, we prepare ourselves to act in ways that allow us to endure and survive hardships: We train ourselves how to survive before we ever have to do so. Second, resilient people and organizations possess an ability to find meaning in some aspects of life. And values are just as important as meaning; value systems at resilient companies change very little over the long haul and are used as scaffolding in times of trouble. The third building block of resilience is the ability to improvise. Within an arena of personal capabilities or company rules, the ability to solve problems without the usual or obvious tools is a great strength.

The mismanagement of customer loyalty.

Abstract: Who wouldn't want loyal customers? Surely they should cost less to serve, they'd be willing to pay more than other customers, and they'd actively market your company by word of mouth, right? Maybe not. Careful study of the relationship between customer loyalty and profits plumbed from 16,000 customers in four companies' databases tells a different story. The authors found no evidence to support any of these claims. What they did find was that the link between customers and profitability was more complicated because customers fall into four groups, not two. Simply put: Not all loyal customers are profitable, and not all profitable customers are loyal. Traditional tools for segmenting customers do a poor job of identifying that latter group, causing companies to chase expensively after initially profitable customers who hold little promise of future profits. The authors suggest an alternative approach, based on well-established "event-history modeling" techniques, that more accurately predicts future buying probabilities. Armed with such a tool, marketers can correctly identify which customers belong in which category and market accordingly. The challenge in managing customers who are profitable but disloyal--the "butterflies"--is to milk them for as much as you can while they're buying from you. A softly-softly approach is more appropriate for the profitable customers who are likely to stay loyal--your "true friends." As for highly loyal but not very profitable customers--the "barnacles"--you need to find out if they have the potential to spend more than they currently do. And, of course, for the "strangers"--those who generate no loyalty and no profits--the answer is simple: Identify early and don't invest anything.

Avoid the four perils of CRM.

Abstract: Customer relationship management is one of the hottest management tools today. But more than half of all CRM initiatives fail to produce the anticipated results. Why? And what can companies do to reverse that negative trend? The authors--three senior Bain consultants--have spent the past ten years analyzing customer-loyalty initiatives, both successful and unsuccessful, at more than 200 companies in a wide range of industries. They've found that CRM backfires in part because executives don't understand what they are implementing, let alone how much it will cost or how long it will take. The authors' research unveiled four common pitfalls that managers stumble into when trying to implement CRM. Each pitfall is a consequence of a single flawed assumption--that CRM is software that will automatically manage customer relationships. It isn't. Rather, CRM is the creation of customer strategies and processes to build customer loyalty, which are then supported by the technology. This article looks at best practices in CRM at several companies, including the New York Times Company, Square D, GE Capital, Grand Expeditions, and BMC Software. It provides an intellectual framework for any company that wants to start a CRM program or turn around a failing one.

Turn customer input into innovation.

Abstract: It's difficult to find a company these days that doesn't strive to be customer-driven Too bad, then, that most companies go about the process of listening to customers all wrong--so wrong, in fact, that they undermine innovation and, ultimately, the bottom line What usually happens is this: Companies ask their customers what they want Customers offer solutions in the form of products or services Companies then deliver these tangibles, and customers just don't buy The reason is simple--customers aren't expert or informed enough to come up with solutions That's what your R&D team is for Rather, customers should be asked only for outcomes--what they want a new product or service to do for them The form the solutions take should be up to you, and you alone Using Cordis Corporation as an example, this article describes, in fine detail, a series of effective steps for capturing, analyzing, and utilizing customer input First come indepth interviews, in which a moderator works with customers to deconstruct a process or activity in order to unearth "desired outcomes" Addressing participants' comments one at a time, the moderator rephrases them to be both unambiguous and measurable Once the interviews are complete, researchers then compile a comprehensive list of outcomes that participants rank in order of importance and degree to which they are satisfied by existing products Finally, using a simple mathematical formula called the "opportunity calculation," researchers can learn the relative attractiveness of key opportunity areas These data can be used to uncover opportunities for product development, to properly segment markets, and to conduct competitive analysis

Creativity under the gun.

Abstract: If you're like most managers, you've worked with people who swear they do their most creative work under tight deadlines. You may use pressure as a management technique, believing it will spur people on to great leaps of insight. You may even manage yourself this way. If so, are you right? Not necessarily, these researchers say. There are instances where ingenuity flourishes under extreme time pressure--for instance, a NASA team within hours comes up with a primitive but effective fix for the failing air filtration system aboard Apollo 13. But when creativity is under the gun, it usually ends up getting killed, the authors say. They recently took a close look at how people experience time pressure, collecting and analyzing more than 9,000 daily diary entries from individuals who were working on projects that required high levels of creativity and measuring their ability to innovate under varying levels of time pressure. The authors describe common characteristics of time pressure and outline four working environments under which creativity may or may not flourish. High-pressure days that still yield creativity are full of focus and meaningful urgency--people feel like they are on a mission. High-pressure days that yield no creativity lack such focus--people feel like they are on a treadmill, forced to switch gears often. On low-pressure days that yield creativity, people feel like they are on an expedition--exploring ideas rather than just identifying problems. And on low-pressure days that yield no creative thinking, people work on autopilot--doing their jobs without engaging too deeply. Managers should avoid extreme time pressure when possible; after all, complex cognitive processing takes time. For when they can't, the authors suggest ways to mollify its effects.

Making sense of corporate venture capital.

Abstract: Large companies have long sensed the potential value of investing in external start-ups, but more often than not, they fail to get it right. Remember the dash to invest in new ventures in the late 1990s and the hasty retreat when the economy turned? This article presents a framework that will help a company decide whether it should invest in a particular start-up by first understanding what kind of benefit might be realized from the investment. The framework--illustrated with examples from Intel, Lucent, and others--explains why certain types of corporate VC investments proliferate only when financial returns are high, why other types persist in good times and in bad, and why still others make little sense in any phase of the business cycle. The framework describes four types of corporate VC investments, each defined by its primary goal--strategic and financial--and by the degree of operational linkage between the start-up and the investing company. Driving investments are characterized by a strong strategic rationale and tight operational links. Enabling investments are also made primarily for strategic reasons, but the operational links are loose. Emergent investments, which are characterized by tight operational links, have little current--but significant potential--strategic value. Passive investments, offering few potential strategic benefits and only loose operational links, are made primarily for financial reasons. Passive corporate VC investments dry up in a down economy, but enabling and driving investments usually have more staying power. That's because their potential returns are primarily strategic, not financial. In other words, they can foster business growth. Emergent investments may make sense even in a weak market because of their potential strategic value--that is, their ability to help companies identify and spark the growth of future businesses.

Open-market innovation.

Abstract: Companies in many industries are feeling immense pressure to improve their ability to innovate. Even in these tough economic times, executives have pushed innovation initiatives to the top of their priority lists, but they know that the best ideas aren't always coming out of their own R&D labs. That's why a growing number of companies are exploring the idea of open-market innovation--an approach that uses tools such as licensing, joint ventures, and strategic alliances to bring the benefits of free trade to the flow of new ideas. For instance, when faced with the unanticipated anthrax scare last fall, Pitney Bowes had nothing in its R&D pipeline to help its customers combat the deadly spores. So it sought help from outside innovators to come up with scanning and imaging technologies that could alert its customers to tainted letters and packages. And Dow Chemical and Cargill jointly produced a new form of plastic derived from plant starches--a breakthrough product that neither company could have created on its own. In this article, Bain consultants Darrell Rigby and Chris Zook describe the advantages and disadvantages of open-market innovation and the ways some companies are using it to gain competitive advantage. By importing ideas from the outside, the authors say, companies can collect more and better ideas from different kinds of experts. Creative types within a company will stick around longer if they know their ideas will eventually find a home--as internal R&D projects or as concepts licensed to outside buyers. Exporting ideas also gives companies a way to measure an innovation's real value. However, the authors warn against entering into open-market innovation without properly structuring deals: Xerox and TRW virtually gave away their innovations and had to stand by while other companies capitalized on them.

Why good accountants do bad audits.

Abstract: On July 30, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressing corporate accountability. A response to recent financial scandals, the law tightened federal controls over the accounting industry and imposed tough new criminal penalties for fraud. The president proclaimed, "The era of low standards and false profits is over." If only it were that easy. The authors don't think corruption is the main cause of bad audits. Rather, they claim, the problem is unconscious bias. Without knowing it, we all tend to discount facts that contradict the conclusions we want to reach, and we uncritically embrace evidence that supports our positions. Accountants might seem immune to such distortions because they work with seemingly hard numbers and clear-cut standards. But the corporate-auditing arena is particularly fertile ground for self-serving biases. Because of the often subjective nature of accounting and the close relationships between accounting firms and their corporate clients, even the most honest and meticulous of auditors can unintentionally massage the numbers in ways that mask a company's true financial status, thereby misleading investors, regulators, and even management. Solving this problem will require far more aggressive action than the U.S. government has taken thus far. What's needed are practices and regulations that recognize the existence of bias and moderate its effects. True auditor independence will entail fundamental changes to the way the accounting industry operates, including full divestiture of consulting and tax services, rotation of auditing firms, and fixed-term contracts that prohibit client companies from firing their auditors. Less tangibly, auditors must come to appreciate the profound impact of self-serving biases on their judgment.

The people who make organizations go--or stop.

Abstract: Managers invariably use their personal contacts when they need to, say, meet an impossible deadline or learn the truth about a new boss Increasingly, it's through these informal networks--not just through traditional organizational hierarchies--that information is found and work gets done But to many senior executives, informal networks are unobservable and ungovernable--and, therefore, not amenable to the tools of management As a result, executives tend to work around informal networks or, worse, try to ignore them When they do acknowledge the networks' existence, executives fall back on intuition--scarcely a dependable tool--to guide them in nurturing this social capital It doesn't have to be that way It is entirely possible to develop and manage informal networks systematically, say management experts Cross and Prusak Specifically, senior executives need to focus their attention on four key role-players in informal networks: Central connectors link most employees in an informal network with one another; they provide the critical information or expertise that the entire network draws on to get work done Boundary spanners connect an informal network with other parts of the company or with similar networks in other organizations Information brokers link different subgroups in an informal network; if they didn't, the network would splinter into smaller, less effective segments And finally, there are peripheral specialists, who anyone in an informal network can turn to for specialized expertise but who work apart from most people in the network The authors describe the four roles in detail, discuss the use of a well-established tool called social network analysis for determining who these role-players are in the network, and suggest ways that executives can transform ineffective informal networks into productive ones

What Makes Great Boards Great

Abstract: In the wake of meltdowns at WorldCom, Tyco, and Enron, enormous attention has been focused on the companies' boards. It seems inconceivable that business disasters of such magnitude could happen without gross or even criminal negligence on the part of board members. And yet a close examination of those boards reveals no broad pattern of incompetence or corruption. In fact, they followed most of the accepted standards for board operations: Members showed up for meetings; they had money invested in the company; audit committees, compensation committees, and codes of ethics were in place; the boards weren't too small or too big, nor were they dominated by insiders. In other words, they passed the tests that would normally be applied to determine whether a board of directors was likely to do a good job. And that's precisely what's so scary, according to corporate governance expert Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, who suggests that it's time for some new thinking about how corporate boards operate and are evaluated. He proposes thinking not only about how to structure the board's work but also about how to manage it as a social system. Good boards are, very simply, high-functioning work groups. They're distinguished by a climate of respect, trust, and candor among board members and between the board and management. Information is shared openly and on time; emergent political factions are quickly eliminated. Members feel free to challenge one another's assumptions and conclusions, and management encourages lively discussion of strategic issues. Directors feel a responsibility to contribute meaningfully to the board's performance. In addition, good boards assess their own performance, both collectively and individually.

Just-in-Time Delivery Comes to Knowledge Management

Abstract: Like all primary care physicians, Dr. Bob Goldszer must stay on top of approximately 10,000 different diseases and syndromes, 3,000 medications, 1,100 laboratory tests, and many of the 400,000 articles added each year to the biomedical literature. That's no easy task. And it is, quite literally, a matter of life and death. The Institute of Medicine's 1999 report, To Err Is Human, suggests that more than a million injuries, and 90,000 deaths are attributable to medical errors annually. Something like 5% of hospital patients have adverse reactions to drugs, another study reports, and of those, 43% are serious, life threatening, or fatal. Many knowledge workers have problems similar to Dr. Goldszer's (though they're usually less life threatening). No matter what the field, many people simply can't keep up with all they need to know. In the early years of knowledge management, companies established knowledge networks and communities of practice, built knowledge repositories, and attempted to motivate people to share knowledge. But each of these activities involved a great deal of additional labor for knowledge workers. A better approach, say the authors, is to bake specialized knowledge into the jobs of highly skilled workers. Partners HealthCare has started to embed knowledge into the technology that doctors use in their jobs so that consulting it is no longer a separate activity. Now when Dr. Goldszer orders medicine or a lab test, the order-entry system automatically checks his decision against a massive clinical database as well as the patient's own medical record. Knowledge workers in other fields could likewise benefit from a just-in-time knowledge-management system tailored to deliver the right supporting information for the job at hand.

Selling the brand inside.

Abstract: When you think of marketing, chances are your mind goes right to your customers--how can you persuade more people to buy whatever it is you sell? But there's another "market" that's equally important: your employees. Author Colin Mitchell argues that executives by and large ignore this critical internal audience when developing and executing branding campaigns. As a result, employees end up undermining the expectations set by the company's advertising--either because they don't understand what the ads have promised or because they don't believe in the brand and feel disengaged or, worse, hostile toward the company. Mitchell offers three principles for executing internal branding campaigns--techniques executives can use to make sure employees understand, embrace, and "live" the brand vision companies are selling to the public. First, he says, companies need to market to employees at times when the company is experiencing a fundamental challenge or change, times when employees are seeking direction and are relatively receptive to new initiatives. Second, companies must link their internal and external marketing campaigns; employees should hear the same messages that are being sent to the market-place. And third, internal branding campaigns should bring the brand alive for employees, creating an emotional connection to the company that transcends any one experience. Internal campaigns should introduce and explain the brand messages in new and attention-grabbing ways and then reinforce those messages by weaving them into the fabric of the company. It is a fact of business, writes Mitchell, that if employees do not care about or understand their company's brands, they will ultimately weaken their organizations. It's up to top executives, he says, to give them a reason to care.

Organizing for innovation: When is virtual virtuous?

Abstract: Outsourcing may make you more flexible. But it could also undermine your ability to innovate.

Leading in times of trauma.

Abstract: An employee is diagnosed with cancer or loses a family member unexpectedly. An earthquake destroys an entire section of a city, leaving hundreds dead, injured, or homeless. At time like these, managerial handbooks fail us. After all, leaders can't eliminate personal suffering, nor can they ask employees who are dealing with these crises to check their emotions at the door. But compassionate leadership can facilitate personal as well as organizational healing. Based on research the authors have conducted at the University of Michigan and the University of British Columbia's CompassionLab, this article describes what leaders can do to foster organizational compassion in times of trauma. They recount real-world examples, including a story of personal tragedy at Newsweek, natural disasters that affected Macy's and Malden Mills, and the events of September 11, 2001. During times of collective pain and confusion, compassionate leaders take some form of public action, however small, that is intended to ease people's pain and inspire others to act. By openly demonstrating their own humanity, executives can unleash a compassionate response throughout the whole company, increasing bonds among employees and attachments to the organization. The authors say compassionate leaders uniformly provide two things: a "context for meaning"--creating an environment in which people can freely express and discuss how they feel--and a "context for action"--creating an environment in which those who experience or witness pain can find ways to alleviate their own and others' suffering. A leader's competence in demonstrating and fostering compassion is vital, the authors conclude, to nourishing the very humanity that can make people--and organizations--great.

Make Your Values Mean Something

Abstract: Take a look at this list of corporate values: Communication. Respect. Integrity. Excellence. They sound pretty good, don't they? Maybe they even resemble your own company's values. If so, you should be nervous. These are the corporate values of Enron, as claimed in its 2000 annual report. And they're absolutely meaningless. Indeed, most values statements, says the author, are bland, toothless, or just plain dishonest. And far from being harmless, as some executives assume, they're often highly destructive. Empty values statements create cynical and dispirited employees and undermine managerial credibility. But coming up with strong values--and sticking to them--isn't easy. Organizations that want their values statements to really mean something should follow four imperatives. First, understand the different types of values: core, aspirational, permission-to-play, and accidental. Confusing them with one another can bewilder employees and make management seem out of touch. Second, be aggressively authentic. Too many companies view a values initiative in the same way they view a marketing launch: a onetime event measured by the initial attention it receives, not by its content. Third, own the process. Values initiatives are about imposing a set of fundamental, strategically sound beliefs on a broad group of people. That's why the best values efforts are driven by small teams. Finally, weave core values into everything. It's not enough to hang your values statement on the wall; it must be integrated into every employee-related process--hiring methods, performance management systems, even dismissal policies. Living by stated corporate values is difficult. But the benefits of doing so can be profound; so can the damage from adopting a hollow set of corporate values.

They're not employees, they're people.

Abstract: In this essay, business thinker Peter Drucker examines the changing dynamics of the workforce--in particular, the need for organizations to take just as much care and responsibility when managing temporary and contract workers as they do with their traditional employees. Two fast-growing trends are demanding that business leaders pay more attention to employee relations, Drucker says. First is the rise of the temporary, or contract, workers; 8 million to 10 million temp workers are placed each day worldwide. And they're not just filling in at reception desks. Today, there are temp suppliers for every kind of job, all the way up to CEO. Second, a growing number of businesses are outsourcing their employee relations to professional employee organizations (PEOs)--third-party groups that handle the ever mounting administrative tasks associated with managing a company's employees. (Managers can easily spend up to one-quarter of their time on employee-related rules, regulations, and paperwork.) Driving these trends, Drucker observes, is the shift from a dependency on manual labor to create wealth and jobs to a dependency on specialization and knowledge. Leaders are increasingly trying to keep up with the needs of many small groups of product or service experts within their companies. Temps and PEOs free up leaders to focus on the business rather than on HR files and paperwork. But if organizations outsource those functions, they need to be careful not to damage relationship with their people in the process, Drucker concludes. After all, developing talent is business's most important task--the sine qua non of competition in a knowledge economy.

Executive women and the myth of having it all.

Abstract: When it comes to having a high-powered career and a family, the painful truth is that women in the United States don't "have it all." At midlife, in fact, at least a third of the country's high-achieving women--a category that includes high wage earners across a variety of professions--do not have children. For many, this wasn't a conscious choice: Indeed, most yearn for motherhood. So finds economist Sylvia Ann Hewlett, who recently fielded a nationwide survey to explore the professional and private lives of highly educated and high-earning women. Other findings are similarly disturbing. Many of these women who are raising children have suffered insurmountable career setbacks. In addition, today's young women will likely experience even starker trade-offs. In general, Hewlett's data show that, for too many women, the demands of ambitious careers, the asymmetries of male-female relationships, and the difficulties of conceiving later in life undermine the possibility of combining high-level work with family. By contrast, Hewlett's research reveals that high-achieving men continue to "have it all." Of the men she surveyed, 79% report wanting children, and 75% have them. Indeed, the more successful the man, the more likely he is to have a spouse and children. The opposite holds true for women, particularly the highest-achieving women in Hewlett's survey: At age 40, 49% of these ultra-achievers are childless, while 19% of their male peers are. The facts and figures are bleak but, the author contends, could be liberating if they spur action. Hewlett urges lawmakers and corporations to establish policies that support working parents. But recognizing that changes won't happen overnight, she exhorts young women to be more deliberate about their career and family choices.

The virtue matrix. Calculating the return on corporate responsibility.

Abstract: Executives who want to make their organizations better corporate citizens face many obstacles: If they undertake costly initiatives that their rivals don't embrace, they risk eroding their company's competitive position. If they invite government oversight, they may be hampered by costly regulations. And if they adopt wage scales and working conditions that prevail in the wealthiest democracies, they may drive jobs to countries with less stringent standards. Such dilemmas call for clear, hard thinking. To aid in that undertaking, Roger Martin introduces the virtue matrix--a tool to help executives analyze corporate responsibility by viewing it as a product or service. The author uses real-life examples to explore the forms and degrees of corporate virtue. He cites Aaron Feuerstein, CEO of Malden Mills, a textile company whose plant was destroyed by fire in 1995. Rather than move operations to a lower-wage region, Feuerstein continued to pay his idled workforce and rebuilt the plant. Unlike the typical CEO of a publicly held corporation, who is accountable to hundreds or thousands of shareholders, Feuerstein was free to act so generously because he had only a few family members to answer to. But as Martin points out, corporations don't operate in a universe composed solely of shareholders. They can be subject to pressure from citizens, employees, and political authorities. The virtue matrix provides a way to assess these forces and how they interact. Martin uses it to examine why the public clamor for more responsible corporate conduct never seems to abate. Another issue the author confronts is anxiety over globalization. Finally, Martin applies the virtue matrix to two crucial questions: What are the barriers to increasing the supply of corporate virtue? And what can companies do to remove those barriers?

Three questions you need to ask about your brand.

Abstract: Traditionally, the people responsible for positioning brands have concentrated on the differences that set each brand apart from the competition. But emphasizing differences isn't enough to sustain a brand against competitors. Managers should also consider the frame of reference within which the brand works and the features the brand shares with other products. Asking three questions about your brand can help: HAVE WE ESTABLISHED A FRAME?: A frame of reference--for Coke, it might be as narrow as other colas or as broad as all thirst-quenching drinks--signals to consumers the goal they can expect to achieve by using a brand. Brand managers need to pay close attention to this issue, in some cases expanding their focus in order to preempt the competition. ARE WE LEVERAGING OUR POINTS OF PARITY?: Certain points of parity must be met if consumers are to perceive your product as a legitimate player within its frame of reference. For instance, consumers might not consider a bank truly a bank unless it offers checking and savings plans. ARE THE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE COMPELLING?: A distinguishing characteristic that consumers find both relevant and believable can become a strong, favorable, unique brand association, capable of distinguishing the brand from others in the same frame of reference. Frames of reference, points of parity, and points of difference are moving targets. Maytag isn't the only dependable brand of appliance, Tide isn't the only detergent with whitening power, and BMWs aren't the only cars on the road with superior handling. The key questions you need to ask about your brand may not change, but their context certainly will. The saviest brand positioners are also the most vigilant.

The very real dangers of executive coaching.

Abstract: A personal coach to help your most promising executives reach their potential--sounds good, doesn't it? But, according to Steven Berglas, executive coaches can make a bad situation worse. Because of their backgrounds and biases, they ignore psychological problems they don't understand. Companies need to consider psychotherapeutic intervention when the symptoms plaguing an executive are stubborn or severe. Executives with issues that require more than coaching come in many shapes and sizes. Consider Rob Bernstein, an executive vice president of sales at an automotive parts distributor. According to the CEO, Bernstein had just the right touch with clients but caused personnel problems inside the company. The last straw came when Bernstein publicly humiliated a mail clerk who had interrupted a meeting to ask someone to sign for a package. At that point, the CEO assigned Tom Davis to coach Bernstein. Davis, a former corporate lawyer, worked with Bernstein for four years. But Davis only exacerbated the problem by teaching Bernstein techniques for "handling" employees--methods that were condescending at best. While Bernstein appeared to be improving, he was in fact getting worse. Bernstein's real problems went undetected, and when his boss left the company, he was picked as the successor. Soon enough, Bernstein was again in trouble, suspected of embezzlement. This time, the CEO didn't call Davis; instead, he turned to the author, a trained psychotherapist, for help. Berglas soon realized that Bernstein had a serious narcissistic personality disorder and executive coaching could not help him. As that tale and others in the article teach us, executives to be coached should at the very least first receive a psychological evaluation. And company leaders should beware that executive coaches given free rein can end up wreaking personnel havoc.

Breaking out of the innovation box.

Abstract: In most companies, investments in innovation follow a boom-bust cycle. For a time, the cash flows. Then, as the economy sours or companies rethink their priorities, the taps go dry. But when research budgets are slashed, the strong projects are often abandoned along with the weak ones. Promising initiatives are cut off just when they are about to bear fruit. Expensive labs are closed; partnership agreements costing millions in legal fees are thrown away. When disruptive changes in the competitive landscape come, companies are caught flat-footed. Sustainable innovation requires a new approach: Instead of being largely isolated projects, innovation initiatives need to gain access to the insights and capabilities of other companies. To be protected from the ax of short-term cost reductions and the faddishness born of easy money, the initiatives must become part of the ongoing commerce that takes place among companies. But how can businesses traffic in such sensitive information without giving their competitors an advantage? The answer, the author contends, lies in a practice that's been common since the Middle Ages: the use of independent intermediaries to facilitate the exchange of sensitive information among companies without revealing the principals' identities or motives and without otherwise compromising their interests. Executive search firms, for example, allow job seekers to remain anonymous during the early stages of a search, and they protect businesses from disclosing their hiring plans to rivals. A network of innovation intermediaries would be in a unique position to visualize new opportunities synthesized from insights and technologies provided by several companies--ideas that might never occur to businesses working on their own.

Getting it right the second time.

Abstract: Once a business performs a complex activity well, the parent organization often wants to replicate that success. But doing that is surprisingly difficult, and businesses nearly always fail when they try to reproduce a best practice. The reason? People approaching best-practice replication are overly optimistic and overconfident. They try to perfect an operation that's running nearly flawlessly, or they try to piece together different practices to create the perfect hybrid. Getting it right the second time (and all the times after that) involves adjusting for overconfidence in your own abilities and imposing strict discipline on the process and the organization. The authors studied numerous business settings to find out how organizational routines were successfully reproduced, and they identified five steps for successful replication. First, make sure you've got something that can be copied and that's worth copying. Some processes don't lend themselves to duplication; others can be copied but maybe shouldn't be. Second, work from a single template. It provides proof success, performance measurements, a tactical approach, and a reference for when problems arise. Third, copy the example exactly, and fourth, make changes only after you achieve acceptable results. The people who developed the template have probably already encountered many of the problems you want to "fix," so it's best to create a working system before you introduce changes. Fifth, don't throw away the template. If your copy doesn't work, you can use the template to identify and solve problems. Best-practice replication, while less glamorous than pure innovation, contributes enormously to the bottom line of most companies. The article's examples--Banc One, Rank Xerox, Intel, Starbucks, and Re/Max Israel--prove that exact copying is a non-trivial, challenging accomplishment.

What's a business for?

Abstract: In the wake of the recent corporate scandals, it's time to reconsider the assumptions underlying American-style stock-market capitalism. That heady doctrine--in which the market is king, success is measured in terms of shareholder value, and profits are an end in themselves--enraptured America for a generation, spread to Britain during the 1980s, and recently began to gain acceptance in Continental Europe. But now, many wonder if the American model is corrupt. The American scandals are not just a matter of dubious personal ethics or of rogue companies fudging the odd billion. And the cure for the problems will not come solely from tougher regulations. We must also ask more fundamental questions: Whom and what is a business for? And are traditional ownership and governance structures suited to the knowledge economy? According to corporate law, a company's financiers are its owners, and employees are treated as property and recorded as costs. But while that may have been true in the early days of industry, it does not reflect today's reality. Now a company's assets are increasingly found in the employees who contribute their time and talents rather than in the stockholders who temporarily contribute their money. The language and measures of business must be reversed. In a knowledge economy, a good business is a community with a purpose, not a piece of property. If, like many European companies, a business considers itself a wealth-creating community consisting of members who have certain rights, those members will be more likely to treat one another as valued partners and take responsibility for telling the truth. Such a community can also help repair the image of business by insisting that its purpose is not just to make a profit but to make a profit in order to do something better.