Homeland Security Affairs 

About: Homeland Security Affairs is an academic journal. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Homeland security & Terrorism. It has an ISSN identifier of 1558-643X. Over the lifetime, 189 publications have been published receiving 2475 citations.

Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and Future Research

Abstract: IntroductionThe greatest security threat facing the United States is not from formal states, but from terrorist organizations that attack informally, using terror at any time and place, with the goal of undermining confidence in U.S. institutions and the American way of life. No longer a structured battle that can be fought with military power, the war against terrorism will be won with superior knowledge.Due to the changing nature of homeland security issues, a new type of intelligence is needed by homeland security: social network analysis (SNA). The basis of social network analysis (also known as network science or network sociology) is that individual nodes (which, depending on the type of network, can be people, events, etc.) are connected by complex yet understandable relationships that form networks. 1 These networks are ubiquitous, with an underlying order and simple laws. Networks form the structural basis of many natural events, organizations, and social processes.Terrorist organizations are well-suited to study using social network analysis, as they consist of networks of individuals that span countries, continents, and economic status, and form around specific ideology. Terrorist organizations are different from hierarchical, state-sponsored appointments in characteristics such as leadership and organizational structure. Social network analysis can provide important information on the unique characteristics of terrorist organizations, ranging from issues of network recruitment, network evolution, and the diffusion of radical ideas. Specifically, social network analysis can be used to understand terrorist networks, inform U.S. homeland security policy, and form the basis of a more effective counter-measure to net war.Social Network AnalysisThe origin of contemporary social network analysis can be traced back to the work of Stanley Milgram. 2 In his famous 1967 experiment, Milgram conducted a test to understand how people are connected to others by asking random people to forward a package to any of their acquaintances who they thought might be able to reach the specific target individual. 3 In his research, Milgram found that most people were connected by six acquaintances. This research led to the famous phrase "six degrees of separation," which is still widely used in popular culture.Another important step in the development of social network analysis was the work of Mark Granovetter on network structures. In his widely-cited 1973 article "The Strength of Weak Ties," Granovetter argues that "weak ties" - your relationships with acquaintances - are more important than "strong ties" - your relationships with family and close friends - when trying to find employment. 4 Granovetter's article and subsequent research extended this argument by positing that more disperse, non-redundant, open networks have greater access to information and power than smaller, denser, and more interconnected networks because they supply more diversity of knowledge and information.D.J. Watts' small world hypothesis builds upon both Milgram's "six degrees of separation" concept and Granovetter's "weak ties" argument by stating that most networks in the natural and man-made world are highly clustered yet far-reaching. 5 These networks have a "clustered" center, where most nodes are neighbors, tightly interconnected. In addition, each has weak ties that can connect it to any node in the network in a few short connections. For example, if a node represents a person, a person's friendship network is generally tightly connected, with common friends, similar backgrounds, and overlaps. However, despite this "clustered" inner core, as shown with Milgram's "six degrees of separation," a person can reach a stranger in the world through only a few small steps/connections. Watts' small world argument has been extended by numerous researchers to help understand the structure and behavior of various networks, including the spread of AIDS, the collapse of financial markets, and the spread of information. …

Using Public Network Infrastructures for UAV Remote Sensing in Civilian Security Operations

Abstract: IntroductionAs a result of advances in communication, computation, sensor and energy storage technologies, as well as carbon fiber-reinforced plastic materials, micro unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are available at affordable prices. On this basis many new application areas, such as the in-depth reconnaissance and surveillance of major incidents, will be possible. Uncontrolled emissions of liquid or gaseous contaminants in cases of volcanic eruptions, large fires, industrial incidents, or terrorist attacks can be analyzed by utilizing UAV (Figure 1). Hence, the use of cognitive Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for distributing mobile sensors in incident areas is in general a significant value added for remote sensing, reconnaissance, surveillance, and communication purposes.1Figure 1: Deployment Scenario: Chemical Plume Detection with an Autonomous Micro UAV Mesh Network.In the near future police departments, fire brigades and other homeland security organizations will have access to medium- and small-size UAV and will integrate them in their work flow. The use of non-military frequencies and civil communication technologies gains in importance for purposes of safety and security missions, since the frequency pool is limited and nearly exhausted. In particular, regionally organized public authorities and small rescue organizations like fire brigades often have insufficient access to frequencies and expensive communication equipment. Thus, using civil mobile communication systems is often the only effective workaround for homeland security organizations.This is also one of the major issues for wireless communication in the area of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Besides flight regulation, wireless communication is an important aspect of UAS as telemetry information (navigation, control, guidance) and sensor data usually have to be transmitted to a mission control center (MCC) in nearly real-time. Today, there is no viable alternative for this type of transmission besides using civil mobile communication networks. Unfortunately, there is no foreseeable solution in terms of frequency assignment for UAS. For efficient sensor coverage of large industrial and incident areas, fast and flexible strategies for collecting sensor data through an autonomous, reliably connected UAV need to be developed. In this article we focus on the civilian concepts of operations (CONOPS) for UAV, in particular for small-scale UAV. Viable concepts on the system level for leveraging public wireless communication networks for UAV-based cognitive remote sensing are presented with respect to both existing constraints and user requirements.The article is structured as follows: we first present the current state of the art and related research activities in the area of UAS communication. Civilian concepts of operations (CONOPS) for purposes of homeland security are discussed in the next section. Subsequent sections address the requirements, concepts and solutions for Air-to-Air (A2A), Air-to-Ground (A2G), and UAS-backend communication. On this basis we then show a methodology for agent-based UAV-mobility for areas with insufficient communication. The article ends suggestions for future research.Related Work and ProjectsSeveral research investigations have been done in the area of UAS. However, UAS communication aspects mostly address proprietary communication systems and usually do not consider public wireless infrastructures since these systems have been mostly deployed by military organizations in the past. Hence, we identify a demand for more in-depth contributions for UAS communication by means of public wireless networks.Tiwari and others have studied the placement planning problem of an airborne network.2 They offer a toolbox to optimize the ground coverage while maintaining a certain degree of reliability and connectivity. By introducing practical scenarios for deployment, the interaction between communication design and mobility planning is shown. …

Building Resilient Communities: A Preliminary Framework for Assessment

Abstract: THE PROBLEMGovernments, non-governmental orga­nizations, and community leaders in many countries face a daunting task: the design and implementation of policies, programs, and systems that help local communities cope with a panoply of threats ranging from terrorist attacks to natu­ral disasters. In highly developed societies, this task is often compounded by associated problems such as aged, overburdened, and complex critical infrastructure systems; 1 the catastrophic potential of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats; and the increasing interconnectivity of many global systems of transportation and communication.The idea of building resilience to natural and man-made disasters is now a dominant strategic theme and operational goal in the current U.S. national security policy discourse. 2 Yet, even with unlimited resources, it is highly unlikely that a community can prevent or protect itself from all the possible dangers it may face. In the United States for example, complex distribution systems are now the primary mechanism for supplying populations with food and water. Gasoline-powered vehicles remain the dominant mode of transportation. Individuals and organizations build their everyday activities around complex systems over which they have little control, such as electricity, computerized systems, and communication networks supported by distant satellites. Each of these modern conveniences allows com­munities to function more efficiently. Yet few people maintain a stockpile of food and water or possess alternative modes of transportation, power generation, or com­munication in the event of an emergency.Meanwhile, governments, communities, and individuals have never been so devas­tatingly unprepared to cope with disturbances to infrastructure, vital resources, or public goods and services. Part of the problem is that the efficiencies inherent within these complex systems of modern life reduce resilience through a loss in redundancy and diversity. Another aspect is that few systems are designed with resilience as a specification. The ability of these systems to bounce back after a disaster will have a direct impact on the ability of a community to respond and recover. It is thus important to consider all the resources that a community must count on when assessing resilience.Researchers in varied and distinct disciplines have struggled with the concept of resilience in their respective fields for decades. 3 Scholars and practitioners continue to wrestle with this concept in hope of developing useful prescriptive homeland security policy guidance, 4 and community-level assessment tools. 5 While there is still much to debate about how to draft precise definitions of resilience and its attributes, and how to operationalize and apply resilience concepts within each discipline, overlap in the research of each discipline is significant enough to be instructive as to what makes systems resilient.The recent focus on resilience marks a shift from resistance strategies focused solely on the anticipation of risk and the mitigation of vulnerability to more inclusive strategies that integrate both resistance (prevent, protect) and resilience (respond, recover) in the face of disasters. In the past, some scholars have maintained that anticipation strategies should be used to focus on known problems, while those geared towards resilience are better suited for the unknown. It is important to point out that individually, both aspects have shortfalls. Just as planning based on anticipated threats can lead to resource investments to counter hazards that never materialize, planning from the broader resilience standpoint may call for the short-term diversion of resources in an effort to ensure long-term sustainability. 6Compounding the challenge is the difficulty in developing a flexible planning process that responds to changing conditions. …

Social Capital: Dealing with Community Emergencies

Abstract: Recent events in the United States have generated considerable discussion about dealing with emergencies. Such discussion has produced congressional investigations and governmental reorganization while blaming victims for their own ineptness. Much of that discussion misses the point. Every community shows evidence of past problem solving and many of those problems were considered emergencies. Everywhere, people solve their problems within their own social and cultural context. Cities that experienced traumatic damage in World War II - London, Hamburg, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Tokyo - are still vibrant communities. 1 San Francisco recently celebrated the 100th anniversary of the 1906 earthquake. Some celebrated the city's continuity but others predicted a dangerous future. We easily recall the disasters but forget the continuity and creativity of these communities.When new threats appear, they are usually seen as more deadly and more disorganizing than those that have come before. On the other hand, we often miss the effectiveness of individual communities in addressing these threats. In 1995, when the federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed by domestic terrorists, the city was home to a population of 450,000 and had fifteen hospitals. Within ninety seconds after the blast, emergency medical services had seven ambulances and two supervisory vehicles en route to the scene. The final report indicated that by 9:45 a.m., there were more medical personnel, drivers and people wanting to help than the site could handle. By 10:30 a.m. there were 442 people treated at various emergency rooms, eighty-three hospitalized and 243 treated by private physicians; all live victims, with perhaps two exceptions, had been removed from the damaged building. This effort - centering on a bomb-destroyed building - involved 167 deaths and 675 non-fatal injuries. The unanticipated emergency response from the community dealt with the immediate injuries in a little more than an hour. 2Of course, the central symbol of international terrorism in the United States was the collapse of the World Trade Towers in New York and the perhaps 3,000 deaths that resulted from the collapse. Often overlooked, however, is the fact that at the time of impact there were an estimated 17,400 occupants in those buildings and eighty-seven percent of them evacuated successfully. Most of the deaths were on the floors or above the floors where the planes hit. It is now determined that ninety-nine percent of those below the impact floors successfully evacuated. 3 This successful evacuation was not accomplished by conventional search and rescue groups; it was the result of people on site helping others and themselves to take protective action to get out of the towers and to a safe location. While the loss of property and life occurring on 9/11 is frequently recalled, the protective actions of the other "victims" in the building are often overlooked.Much of the contemporary discussion about emergency planning assumes that community members "panic" and that strong authority is necessary. The vocabulary of "command and control" suggests chaos rather than citizen adaptability and creativity. Such assumptions can be questioned by the research evidence accumulated in recent years. 4 While we calculate damage to physical and human capital, we usually ignore the social capital available within communities to deal with emergencies. Social capital is our most significant resource in responding to damage caused by natural and other hazards, such as terrorism.Different Kinds of CapitalInsight into the ways in which communities respond to emergencies can be found by looking at the types of capital used to construct the human community. Most obvious is physical capital. We have tools and materials to build houses and streets, string wires or go wireless, build 110-story towers and create the material environment we experience every day. …

Lessons We Don't Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them

Abstract: On February 23, 2006, in a press conference to release the White House report on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Frances Townsend said "[The president] demanded that we find out the lessons, that we learn them and that we fix the problems, that we take every action to make sure America is safer, stronger and better prepared" The lessons Townsend called out in her briefing concerned planning, resource management, evacuation, situational awareness, communications, and coordination No one in the emergency response community was surprised We know these are the problem areas We knew they would be before Katrina ever hit the Gulf coast Why? Because we identify the same lessons again and again, incident after incidentIn fact, responders can readily predict the problems that will arise in a major incident and too often their predictions are borne out in practice Even a casual observer can spot problems that recur: communications systems fail, command and control structures are fractured, resources are slow to be deployed A quick perusal of the reports published after the major incidents of the past decade quickly shows this to be true Consider the following:Hurricane Katrina, 2005 In terms of the management of the Federal response, our architecture of command and control mechanisms as well as our existing structure of plans did not serve us well Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear, and often overlapping, roles and responsibilities that were exposed as flawed during this disasterThis lack of coordination at the Federal headquarters-level reflected confusing organizational structures in the fieldFurthermore, the JFO [Joint Field Office] staff and other deployed Federal personnel often lacked a working knowledge of NIMS [the National Incident Management System] or even a basic understanding of ICS [Incident Command System] principles- From The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 2006: 52September 11 attack, 2001 It is a fair inference, given the differing situations in New York City and Northern Virginia, that the problems in command, control, and communications that occurred at both sites will likely recur in any emergency of similar scale The task looking forward is to enable first responders to respond in a coordinated manner with the greatest possible awareness of the situationEmergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS)When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command Both are proven frameworks for emergency response- From The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 315, 397Oklahoma City bombing, 1995 The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) were weakened early in the event due to the immediate response of numerous local, state and federal agencies, three separate locations of the Incident Command Post (ICP), within the first few hours, and the deployment of many Mobile Command Posts (MCPs), representing support agencies- From the After Action Report: Alfred P Murrah Federal Building Bombing, 2003: 3Hurricane Andrew, 1992 The Committee heard substantial testimony that the post-disaster response and recovery to Hurricane Andrew suffered from several problems, including: inadequate communication between levels of government concerning specific needs; lack of full awareness of supply inventories and agency capabilities; failure to have a single person in charge with a clear chain of command; and inability to cut through bureaucratic red tape- From the Governor's Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee Final Report, 1993: 60As these statements reveal, we repeatedly confront command and control issues in large incidents …