scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question

Showing papers in "Humana.Mente in 2018"


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the role of positive emotions for cooperation in dialogical inquiry is discussed and evaluated, and positive emotions such as love and gratitude foster knowledge generation by providing an environment for posing questions and exploring aspects of a specific topic that a subject would not investigate outside of a group.
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to discuss and evaluate the role of positive emotions for cooperation in dialogical inquiry. I analyse dialogical interactions as vehicles for inquiry, and the role of positive emotions in knowledge gain is illustrated in terms of a case study taken from Socratic Dialogue, a contemporary method used in education for fostering group knowledge. I proceed as follows. After having illustrated the case study, I analyse it through the conceptual tools of distributed cognition and character-based virtue epistemology, focusing on the two functions that emotions seem to play in the process of knowledge-building. These functions are (1) motives for joint inquiry, and (2) building blocks of the affective environment where the inquiry takes place. Positive emotions such as love and gratitude foster knowledge generation by providing an environment for posing questions and exploring aspects of a specific topic that a subject would not investigate outside of a group. This analysis helps me defend the thesis for which positive emotions are beneficial for cooperation. Because cooperation is the process that leads a group to cognitive transformation, emotions that support cooperation are beneficial for group knowledge creation as well. I assume that the beneficial function that positive emotions play within dialogical inquiry is the one of enhancement of cooperation. A beneficial factor not only comprises positive emotions that facilitate and strengthen cooperation among the agents in their epistemic practices, but also consists of such emotions that nurture the epistemic agents, enhancing their responsibility to generate epistemic goods, as propositional knowledge or explanatory understanding, for example. Thus, the responsibility toward the epistemic practice disclose the ethical dimension of group inquiry.

12 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the pedagogic potential of re-interpreting the problematics of traditional academic writing for arts students through a neurodiversity framework was assessed through case studies of the two primary dynamics evidenced in literature, both of which are at play in the teaching of non-visual concepts to art and design students.
Abstract: In the UK, Art and Design Higher Education currently faces multiple challenges regarding its validity, efficacy and cultural value. These challenges are tractable against a complex historical background of successive governmental agendas aimed at both widening social participation and increasing professionalization/standardization. A specific problematic in this context is the teaching of 'critical', 'theoretical', or 'cultural' studies components on undergraduate degrees especially where written outputs are viewed as separate to visual work. The complexity of equitable and effective instruction is increased by the high proportion of neurodiverse, as opposed to neurotypical, learners engaging with this sector of education.In this paper, the pedagogic potential of re-interpreting the problematics of traditional academic writing for arts students through a neurodiversity framework will be assessed through case studies of the two primary dynamics evidenced in literature, both of which are at play in the teaching of non-visual concepts to art and design students. Adopting a neurodiverse framework, so I will argue, undermines the most pernicious aspects of neoliberal management routed through competitive differences, and empowers students to access truly emancipatory forms of learning.

8 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an ethical analysis of the possibility of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement and demonstrate that this type of moral enhancement sheds new light on the moral enhancement debate.
Abstract: Scientific progress in recent neurofeedback research may bring about a new type of moral neuroenhancement, namely, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement; however, this has yet to be examined thoroughly. This paper presents an ethical analysis of the possibility of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement and demonstrates that this type of moral enhancement sheds new light on the moral enhancement debate. First, I survey this debate and extract the typical structural flow of its arguments. Second, by applying structure to the case of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement, I examine the ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI) to show that this technique is unique and traditionalist, which makes it compatible with almost all our conservative notions, so that it, accordingly, can be seen as an ethically acceptable option. Third, by rejecting the premise in the moral enhancement debate that bio/neuro-enhancement has its unique ELSI that traditional methods would never create, I demonstrate that, by virtue of its traditional or conservative features, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be incorporated into the traditional moral education network. Finally, I conclude that, being a part of the traditional moral education network, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be a unique and ethically acceptable option of moral neuroenhancement.

8 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: This paper assess the theoretical foundations of cognitive science as a functional theory of the mind and conclude that cognitive-psychological approach to education suffers from an inherent blind spot regarding the actor's feelings and motivations.
Abstract: The idea to utilise cognitive neuroscientific research for educational purposes is known as Mind-Brain Education or Educational Neuroscience. Despite some calls for an uncritical endorsement of such an agenda, a growing number of educational scholars argue that it must remain impossible to translate neurological descriptions into mental or educationally relevant descriptions. This paper takes these well-established arguments further by not only focusing upon these different levels of description but going beyond this issue to assess the theoretical foundations of cognitive science as a functional theory of the mind. With relevance to education it is argued that because of its functional character a cognitive-psychological approach to education suffers from an inherent blind spot regarding the actor’s feelings and motivations. The paper concludes with the claim that, because of this experiential poverty, any cognitive neuroscientific approach must face severe limitations when utilised for educational purposes.

7 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue for an apparently obvious, but relatively underexplored view of the classical hylomorphic concept of form (morphe), not just as the information that characterizes the organization of human body, but also as the intrinsic final reason why, through a specific type of bodily (brain) structure, the human being develops his/her natural inclinations and behaves according to them.
Abstract: The contemporary philosophy of mind and neuroethics are two of the liveliest fields of interdisciplinary reflection which deal with the everlasting topic: what/who we essentially are. One of the many questions that can be tackled in order to go deep in this knowledge is: why man is naturally inclined towards specific tiers for survival which constitute his/her teleological project of flourishing? Two different, but complementary, answers are brought to light in this work. The author argues for an apparently obvious, but relatively underexplored view of the classical hylomorphic concept of form (morphe), not just as the information that characterizes the organization of human body, but also as the intrinsic final reason why, through a specific type of bodily (brain) structure, the human being develops his/her natural inclinations and behaves according to them. The author advances the argument in terms of an upward comparison between the threefold levels of Thomas Aquinas’ natural human inclinations according to Summa Theologiae I-II, question 94, article 2, and the pioneering structural and functional “Triune Brain” model developed from 1949 to 1952 by Paul MacLean. The hylomorphic view sketched is profoundly different from a purely materialistic conception of teleological processes of human behavior, and it is a plausible explanation that motivates and invites further considerations and research.

3 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss a specific aspect of Husserl's phenomenology, i.e., the notion of synthesis of identification, and the role it plays in the arguments set forward in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation during the discussion of the constitution of the other, hence of the monadological inter-subjectivity.
Abstract: This paper aims at discussing a quite specific aspect of Husserl’s phenomenology, i.e., the notion of synthesis of identification, and the role it plays in the arguments set forward in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation during the discussion of the constitution of the other, hence of the monadological inter-subjectivity. The case will be made for considering the very heart of the Meditation to be what we will refer to as Husserl’s “transcendental argument”, consisting in the claim that there can be only one inter-subjectivity, hence, the “world” being the correlate of the transcendental monadological inter-subjectivity, only one real and actual world. This will also give us the opportunity to critically approach a series of views lately held by some leading figures of the “continental” and “analytic” tradition, which, as the first part of the essay will show, pursue views directly opposed to Husserl’s.

2 citations


Journal Article
Jacob Rump1
TL;DR: Husserlian phenomenology as discussed by the authors is based on a teleology of determination by means of the lawfulness of nature that leaves no room for the freedom of self-determination, for reason, or for experience.
Abstract: Both Millikan’s brand of naturalistic analytic philosophy and Husserlian phenomenology have held on to teleological notions, despite their being out of favor in mainstream Western philosophy for most of the twentieth century. Both traditions have recognized the need for teleology in order to adequately account for intentionality, the need to adequately account for intentionality in order to adequately account for meaning, and the need for an adequate theory of meaning in order to precisely and consistently describe the world and life. The stark differences between their accounts of these fundamental concepts stem from radically different conceptions of the world, the natural and life. I argue that Millikan’s teleosemantic approach relies on a teleology of determination by means of the lawfulness of nature that leaves no room for the freedom of self-determination, for reason, or for experience—for the reality of lived human life. In contrast to Millikan’s account, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology situates teleology as a function of reason and first-personal experience, part of an extended account of intentionality and meaning according to which the full range of our making sense of the world is conceived as a rational activity that is itself a part of that world, and not an unnatural activity to be separated from it. While Husserl’s account of these issues is indeed symptomatic of what Millikan calls “meaning rationalism,” I argue that it is immune to the sorts of problems she claims will plague any such account, since these problems arise only against the background of a set of presuppositions about intentionality (representationalism, the “mythiness” of all givens) that Husserl does not share. Husserl’s position can itself be understood to be within the bounds of a suitably liberal conception of naturalism, and interpreting him in this way it has the added benefit—contra Millikan—of not divorcing teleology from reason, the latter construed as our first-personal striving to make sense of the world as we experience it—of life.

2 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the way in which Husserl's transcendental idealism reverses the thesis stemming from the naturalistic worldview, according to which the existence of humanity in the universe is a contingent fact.
Abstract: This article explores the way in which Husserl’s transcendental idealism reverses the thesis stemming from the naturalistic worldview, according to which the existence of humanity in the universe is a contingent fact. It will appear that the resulting teleological account of the world history does not interfere with the traditional explanations provided by the empirical sciences and that it is a consequence of the teleology inbuilt in the correlation between transcendental subjectivity and the world. The conclusion is reached by analyzing some of Husserl’s text concerning the transcendental role of embodiment and normality.

2 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors use the comparison between human beings and intelligent machines to shed light on the concept of teleology, and conclude that a specific finalism, understood in a noncriterial sense, is what qualifies the human being and differentiates the latter from smart robots.
Abstract: In this paper, I use the comparison between human beings and intelligent machines to shed light on the concept of teleology. What characterizes human beings and distinguishes them from a robot capable of achieving complex objectives? In the first place, by stipulating that what characterizes human beings are mental states, I consider the mark of the mental. A smart robot probably has no consciousness but we might have reason for doubt while interacting with it. And a smart robot shows intentionality. I focus on the type of naturalized intentionality that is at stake here. Then I go back to the traditional idea of teleology, and to the scientific criticism of it, through the question of the kind of purposes that artificial intelligence (AI) may set itself. Husserl's basic idea of teleology therefore serves to have an authoritative term of comparison and to introduce the intuitive difference between human beings and intelligent machines based on the homo pictor thought experiment proposed by Jonas. My conclusion is that a specific finalism, understood in a non-criterial sense, is what qualifies the human being and differentiates the latter (for now) from smart robots.

2 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the nature of emotions by considering what appear to be two differing, perhaps even conflicting, approaches to affectivity: an evolutionary functional account, on the one hand, and a phenomenological view on the other, arguing for the centrality of the notion of function in both approaches, articulating key differences between them, and attempting to understand how such differences can be overcome.
Abstract: This paper explores the nature of emotions by considering what appear to be two differing, perhaps even conflicting, approaches to affectivity—an evolutionary functional account, on the one hand, and a phenomenological view, on the other. The paper argues for the centrality of the notion of function in both approaches, articulates key differences between them, and attempts to understand how such differences can be overcome.

1 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue for the relevance of innate conceptual repertoires and briefly address the question whether such repertoires should matter to transhumanist debates, arguing that the answers eventually given to this puzzle will inevitably challenge received views on education, especially the kind of education appropriate for such future minds.
Abstract: This paper programmatically posits, argues for the relevance of, and briefly addresses the question whether innate conceptual repertoires, if admitted as plausible, should matter to transhumanist debates. The latter should turn their attention to analyzing the radically enhanced cognitive capacities with which such future human beings will be endowed. The answers eventually given to this puzzle will inevitably challenge received views on education, especially the kind of education appropriate for such future minds.

Journal Article
TL;DR: It is suggested that perhaps the simplest and most effective way to foster learning via promoting imitation is through letting learners of various ages co-exist.
Abstract: Observational learning is ubiquitous We very often observe and pick up information about how others behave and subsequently replicate similar behaviours in one way or another Focusing on observational learning, I investigate human imitation, the mechanisms that underpin it as well as the processes that complement it, in order to assess its contribution to learning and education Furthermore, I construe emotion as a scaffold for observational learning and bring together evidence about its influence on selective attention Finally, I flesh out possible ways in which the insights about the role of imitation in learning could help design a more effective and equally rewarding learning environment Specifically, I suggest that perhaps the simplest and most effective way to foster learning via promoting imitation is through letting learners of various ages co-exist The benefits of learning in a mixed-age group are assessed

Journal Article
TL;DR: In the last century, most philosophers of science have tried to expunge teleological explanations from the fields of epistemology as discussed by the authors, and they took for granted that the Darwinian concepts of natural selection and evolution effectively dispense us with any presence of goal-directedness in nature.
Abstract: During the last century, most philosophers of science have tried to expunge teleological explanations from the fields of epistemology. They took for granted that the Darwinian concepts of natural selection and evolution effectively dispense us with any presence of goal-directedness in nature: based on an anti-metaphysical attitude, they hold purposes and goals to be of religious and spiritual nature, thereby obstacles to any effective comprehension of biological processes. Accordingly, teleological categories have been abandoned in many ways in favor of mechanical causes and non-teleological processes: since Darwin demonstrated that no teleology is required in order to explain the natural world, causal explanations became the only tools to investigate natural processes (see Bedau 1991, for a compelling reflection on teleological categories and on their relations with the natural world).