Journal•ISSN: 1093-1082
Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines
Philosophy Documentation Center
About: Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines is an academic journal. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Critical thinking & Argument. It has an ISSN identifier of 1093-1082. Over the lifetime, 2455 publications have been published receiving 29887 citations. The journal is also known as: Inquiry : critical thinking across the disciplines..
Topics: Critical thinking, Argument, Action (philosophy), Rationality, Morality
Papers published on a yearly basis
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2,091 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the principles of diversity, complexity, autonomy, decentralization, symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness of ecology responsible policies, which are concerned only in part with pollution and resource depletion.
Abstract: Ecologically responsible policies are concerned only in part with pollution and resource depletion. There are deeper concerns which touch upon principles of diversity, complexity, autonomy, decentralization, symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness.
1,745 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that the Western tradition has tended to obscure the vital role of emotion in the construction of knowledge, by construing emotion as epistemologically subversive, and pointed out how the myth of dispassionate investigation has functioned historically to undermine the epistemic authority of women as well as other social groups associated with emotion.
Abstract: This paper argues that, by construing emotion as epistemologically subversive, the Western tradition has tended to obscure the vital role of emotion in the construction of knowledge. The paper begins with an account of emotion that stresses its active, voluntary, and socially constructed aspects, and indicates how emotion is involved in evaluation and observation. It then moves on to show how the myth of dispassionate investigation has functioned historically to undermine the epistemic authority of women as well as other social groups associated culturally with emotion. Finally, the paper sketches some ways in which the emotions of underclass groups, especially women, may contribute to the development of a critical social theory.
1,032 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory and proposes an outline of a theory of communicative competence that is based on the negations of three implicit assumptions, here called "monologism", "a priorism" and "elementarism".
Abstract: In this, the second of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory. ‘Linguistic competence’ for Chomsky means the mastery of an abstract system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus. The model by which communication is understood on this account contains three implicit assumptions, here called ‘monologism’, ‘a priorism’, and ‘elementarism’. The author offers an outline of a theory of communicative competence that is based on the negations of these assumptions. In opposing the first two assumptions he introduces distinctions, respectively, between semantic universals which process experiences and those that make such processing possible, and between semantic universals which precede all socialization and those that are linked to the conditions of potential socialization. Against elementarism, he argues that the semantic content of all possible natural languag...
660 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that the feeling of oppression in the new philosophy at Oxford is due to misunderstanding, and that the frequent attacks upon it are misdirected, and argued that it is worth trying to bring out their differences as fully as possible.
Abstract: That what we ordinarily say and mean may have a direct and deep control over what we can philosophically say and mean is an idea which many philosophers find oppressive. It might be argued that in part the oppression results from misunderstanding; that the new philosophy which proceeds from ordinary language is not that different from traditional methods of philosophising, and that the frequent attacks upon it are misdirected. But I shall not attempt to be conciliatory, both because I think the new philosophy at Oxford is critically different from traditional philosophy, and because I think it is worth trying to bring out their differences as fully as possible. There is, after all, something oppressive about a philosophy which seems to have uncanny information about our most personal philosophical assumptions (those, for example, about whether we can ever know for certain of the existence of the external world, or of other minds; and those we make about favourite distinctions between the descriptive and the normative’, or between matters of fact and matters of language) and which inveterately nags us about them. Particularly oppressive when that philosophy seems so often merely to nag and to try no special answers to the questions which possess us — unless it be to suggest that we sit quietly in a room. Eventually, I suppose, we will have to look at that sense of oppression itself: such feelings can come from a truth about ourselves which we are holding off.
490 citations