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Showing papers in "Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines in 2001"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors extend and update Heidegger's critique, documenting the increasing instrumentalization, professionalization, vocationalization, corporatization, and technologization of the modern university, the dissolution of its unifying and guiding ideals, and the growing hyper-specialization and ruinous fragmentation of its departments.
Abstract: Heidegger presciently diagnosed the current crisis in higher education. Contemporary theorists like Bill Readings extend and update Heidegger's critique, documenting the increasing instrumentalization, professionalization, vocationalization, corporatization, and technologization of the modern university, the dissolution of its unifying and guiding ideals, and, consequently, the growing hyper-specialization and ruinous fragmentation of its departments. Unlike Heidegger, however, these critics do not recognize such disturbing trends as interlocking symptoms of an underlying ontological problem and so they provide no positive vision for the future of higher education. By understanding our educational crisis 'ontohistorically', Heidegger is able to develop an alternative, ontological conception of education which he hopes will help bring about a renaissance of the university. In a provocative reading of Plato's famous 'allegory of the cave', Heidegger excavates and appropriates the original Western educationa...

126 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that an account of the first-person subjectivity is crucial to Heidegger's account of intelligibility (world) and so of the intentionality, or 'aboutness' of our acts and thoughts, that rests upon it.
Abstract: It is often held that, in contrast to Husserl, Heidegger's account of intentionality makes no essential reference to the first-person stance. This paper argues, on the contrary, that an account of the first-person, or 'subjectivity', is crucial to Heidegger's account of intelligibility (world) and so of the intentionality, or 'aboutness' of our acts and thoughts, that rests upon it. It first offers an argument as to why the account of intelligibility in Division I of Being and Time , based on a form of third-person self-awareness, provides a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for intentionality. It then shows that Heidegger provides a further necessary condition in his analysis of the collapse of the one-self in Division II. This condition is 'conscience', which is both a genuine first-person mode of self-awareness and, it is argued, the origin of reason as that which distinguishes factic 'grounds' from normative 'justifications'.

52 citations




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an interpretation of the structure of Dasein's Being compatible with both (1) and (2) was proposed, thus resolving the Dreyfus-Olafson debate.
Abstract: In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger claims that (1) das Manis an 'existential' i.e. a necessary feature of Dasein's Being; and (2) Dasein need not always exist in the mode of the Man-self, but can also be eigentlich, which I translate as 'self-owningly'. These apparently contradictory statements have prompted a debate between Hubert Dreyfus, who recommends abandoning (2), and Frederick Olafson, who favors jettisoning (1). I offer an interpretation of the structure of Dasein's Being compatible with both (1) and (2), thus resolving the Dreyfus-Olafson debate. Central to this resolution is the distinction between das Manand the Man-self. Das Manis one of three existential 'horizons', or fields of possibilities; the other two horizons are the world and death. At any time, Dasein encounters entities in one of two basic modes: either by 'expressly seizing' possibilities of the horizon, or by occluding these possibilities. These modes are 'existentiell', i.e. features of Dasein's Being that are possible, but not essenti...

23 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the evolution of the land ethic re-presented by J. Baird Callicott over the last two decades under pressure from the charge of misanthropy and eco-fascism is analyzed.
Abstract: This article analyzes the evolution of the land ethic re-presented by J. Baird Callicott over the last two decades under pressure from the charge of misanthropy and ecofascism. It also traces the development of Callicott?s own ethical system, and examines its most current phase both in itself and in relation to his other theoretical commitments, including his particular version of moral monism, and his communitarian critique of egalitarianism. It concludes that Callicott?s communitarianism is by itself insufficient to fund an adequate environmental ethic, and that for the sake of self-consistency he should either discard his moral monism or else further revise his ethical system.

19 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that what is called the extended space of reasons is ultimately social; that representation, the aboutness of thought, serves expressive roles in a socially articulated space of reason-giving.
Abstract: Adorno's conception of conceptually articulated experience can be defended and made fruitful for a critical philosophy after the so-called linguistic turn. The aim is both to answer the criticisms raised by Jurgen Habermas and others that Adorno's philosophy remains bound by the premises of a subject-centred philosophy, and to criticize social-pragmatism from the vantage-point of Adorno's philosophy of language. It is shown that Adorno is committed to a picture of experience very much in line with the recent views of John McDowell, which extends the space of reasons beyond the space of concepts. Further, it is shown that non-inferential justification can be combined with an expressivist picture of judgment. Finally, it is argued that what is called the extended space of reasons is ultimately social; that representation, the aboutness of thought, serves expressive roles in a socially articulated space of reason-giving. The advantage of Adorno's position vis-a-vis a one-sided social-pragmatism consists in h...

19 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The claim is that some collective entities can be thought of as part of the moral realm by virtue of their status as objects of moral concern as mentioned in this paper, and that such entities can have moral importance even if they lack the intrinsic moral importance attaching to human beings.
Abstract: The claim is that some collective entities can be thought of as part of the moral realm by virtue of their status as objects of moral concern Collectivities are defined in terms of irreducibly corporate action and distinctive conditions of persisting identity Their lack of sentience does not preclude moral concern, and their raison d'etremay render moral concern for them appropriate Recent attempts by Pettit, McMahon, and Broome to limit the moral realm to individuals are considered They are rebutted on the grounds that they rest heavily on pre-existing moral intuitions; they ascribe a stronger thesis than is necessary to the sponsors of the moral significance of non-individuals; and they wrongly assume that what has value for individuals must have value becauseit has value for individuals Collectivities can have moral importance even if they lack the intrinsicmoral importance attaching to human beings, and substantial consequences follow from that fact In particular, routine appeals to the distinct

16 citations




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The cover of Objectivity and Insight as discussed by the authors depicts an overturned Tazza, an elaborate silver platter on a long pedestal, with a Römer, a wineglass on a thick knobled stem, standing, half-emptied.
Abstract: A somber still life adorns the jacket of Mark Sacks’s new book, Objectivity and Insight. This may not be a case of a book written for its cover, but the painting serves as an apt counterpoint for Sacks’s discussion – at once re ecting the movement of his argument and raising some of the questions that must be posed concerning his position. The painting – by the seventeenth-century Dutch master, Pieter Claesz – presents the aftermath of a meal. Food and solitary diner have departed, leaving behind a collection of plates and a goblet, oyster shells, a knife, and a forgotten olive. The focus of the composition is an overturned Tazza – an elaborate silver platter on a long pedestal. A Römer, a hefty wineglass on a thick knobled stem, remains standing, half-emptied. For Sacks, we live in the aftermath of an overturned conception of objectivity; the question is whether we must settle for life in a half-emptied Römer.





Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that although utterances have unintended meanings, those cannot be considered apart from their intended meanings in the work and that intention distinguishes artworks from natural phenomena.
Abstract: A Gricean preamble concludes that though utterances have unintended meanings, those cannot be considered apart from their intended meanings. Intention distinguishes artworks from natural phenomena. To allocate an artwork to a genre, to accept its normal authorial boundaries and that its content is not random but chosen, is to concede intention's centrality. Wimsatt and Beardsley were right that meaning is public. But they think 'intention' is 'private' or 'unavailable'. However, it too is public, in the work. Fictions are utterances of a curious kind. They may mimic, but are not meant to be taken for, veridical reports. Neither are they 'pseudo-statements' (Richards) nor 'pretended illocutionary acts' (Searle). Their logical form is actually this: 'I [author] invite you [reader] to imagine that S [content].' This prescribes no response, nor claims to describe the 'real' world, even though it may elicit a response appropriate to real-life events. One reason for imagining fictional situations may be to stre...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argues that Dreyfus's reading of Heidegger's Being and Time is rooted in Cartesianism and hermeneutics of suspicion, and argues that these theses contribute to the view that there are two conflicting accounts of inauthenticity that threaten the coherence of the notion of authenticity.
Abstract: This essay critically engages Dreyfus's widely read interpretation of Heidegger's Being and Time . It argues that Dreyfus's reading is rooted in two primary claims or interpretative principles. The first - the Cartesianism thesis - indicates that Heidegger's objective in Being and Time is to overturn Cartesianism. The second - the hermeneutics of suspicion thesis - claims that Division II is supposed to suspect and throw into question the results of the Division I analysis. These theses contribute to the view that there are two conflicting accounts of inauthenticity that threaten the coherence of Heidegger's notion of authenticity. This view concerning authenticity is mistaken, as are the two theses that support it. The first thesis is incorrect because Heidegger's explicit aim is to investigate the question of the meaning of being not to overturn Cartesianism. The second is incorrect because the analyses of Division I describe the structures of everyday human existence in preparation for a closer examina...


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the heritage phenomenologique de Husserl dans le domaine de la theologie, de la sociologie, of la philosophie de l'esprit et des sciences cognitives.
Abstract: Etude de l'heritage phenomenologique de Husserl dans le domaine de la theologie, de la sociologie, de la philosophie de l'esprit et des sciences cognitives. Examinant la reorientation husserlienne de la philosophie dans le sens d'une analyse des structures de la conscience, l'A. montre que la continuation du projet de Husserl par Heidegger, Sartre et Levinas temoigne du dynamisme interdisciplinaire de la phenomenologie.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The notion of unique qualia is not opposed to the idea that some of the characterizations of qualia have to be qualified as mentioned in this paper, but it is the folk-philosophical, academic, notions of theoreticity and conceptuality that have been modified.
Abstract: If we are to preserve qualia, one possibility is to take the current academic, philosophical, and theoretical notion less seriously and current natural science and some pre-theoretical intuitions about qualia more seriously. Dennett (1997) is instrumental in showing how ideas of the intrinsicalness and privacy of qualia are misguided and those of ineffability and immediacy misinterpreted. However, by combining ideas of non-mechanicalness used in contemporary natural science with the pre-theoretical idea that qualia are special because they are unique, we get a notion of qualia that is acceptable to naturalistic philosophy. The notion of unique qualia is not opposed to the idea that some of the characterizations of qualia have to be qualified. It is the folk-philosophical, academic, notions of theoreticity and conceptuality that have to be modified.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is often taken to be intuitively obvious that if one is in a given conscious state, then one knows that one is also in that state as mentioned in this paper, and the Cartesian view that one can explain all conscious states in terms of higher-order awareness of mental states.
Abstract: It is often taken to be intuitively obvious that if one is in a given conscious state, then one knows that one is in that state. This alleged obvious truth lies at the heart of two very different philosophical doctrines ? the Cartesian doctrine that one has incorrigible knowledge about one?s own conscious states (which still has its defenders today), and the view that one can explain all conscious states in terms of higher-order awareness of mental states. The present paper begins with a description of the real-life case of Simon Browne, a man who believed he had no conscious states whatsoever, although all external evidence overwhelmingly suggests that he had. This case ? as well as other cases of what can be called ?being in denial? ? gives reason to reject both the alleged intuitively obvious truth and the two philosophical doctrines which attempt to exploit it. Having abandoned these doctrines, it remains to give an account of Browne?s condition, which picks out both why it is possible and why it is s...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a defence of the non-cognitivist approach to the interpretation of moral judgments as disguised imperatives corresponding to social rules is presented. But it does not address the body of criticism that faced R. M. Hare, and that currently faces moral anti-realists, on two levels, by providing a full semantic analysis of evaluative judgments and by arguing that antirealism is compatible with moral aspiration.
Abstract: This essay offers a defence of the non-cognitivist approach to the interpretation of moral judgments as disguised imperatives corresponding to social rules. It addresses the body of criticism that faced R. M. Hare, and that currently faces moral anti-realists, on two levels, by providing a full semantic analysis of evaluative judgments and by arguing that anti-realism is compatible with moral aspiration despite the non-existence of obligations as the externalist imagines them. A moral judgment consists of separate descriptive and prescriptive components and is to be understood as a declarative statement prefaced by an 'ideality operator'. Moral beliefs are genuinely representational, but their truth conditions can only be stated with reference to imaginary ideal worlds. Moral judgments are neither confirmed nor verified, but alternative moral positions are preferentially endorsed and adopted by individual agents on the basis of their perceived all-things-considered optimality. High aspiration moralities a...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that the value of freedom overall is not reducible to specific freedoms, and that conditions of action can be determined as constraints only within the context of their impact on freedom overall.
Abstract: Ian Carter argues against what he calls the ?specific freedom thesis?, which claims that in asking whether our society or any individual is free, all we need or can intelligibly concern ourselves with is their freedom to do this or that specific thing. Carter claims that issues of overall freedom are politically and morally important and that, in valuing freedom as such, liberals should be committed to a measure of freedom overall. This paper argues against Carter?s further claim that rejection of the specific freedom thesis requires rejection of morally based determinations of degrees of overall freedom. Using a concept of freedom as a capacity to pursue one?s interests, it is argued that the value of freedom overall is not reducible to the value of specific freedoms, and that conditions of action can be determined as constraints only within the context of their impact on freedom overall. Taking the case of coercive proposals, it is argued that we must evaluate the morality of the circumstances in which ...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that practical reasoning consists to a large extent in the capacity to articulate, specify, and evaluate implicit assumptions about what is and what is not normal.
Abstract: Philip Pettit's ethocentric account of rule-following is elaborated and defended in this paper as basically a story about the capacity to reason organized around largely implicit assumptions about what is and what is not normal. It is argued that this account can be insightfully used to elucidate the practical reasoning of agents confronted with the normative indeterminacy that seems to be characteristic of radically new situations. It is shown that practical reasoning consists to a large extent in the capacity to articulate, specify, and evaluate implicit assumptions about what is and what is not normal. One corollary of this account of practical reason is investigated in some detail: the predominant role of intrapersonaldivergence of habits in reasoning about an apparent normative indeterminacy and the related, merely criteriological role of convergence with respect to determining the right rules to follow.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that postmodernist philosophers are like mill-and-stampers: they work like mills and like stamps: throw down your seed-corn to them and they will know how to grind it small and reduce it to white dust.
Abstract: To the extent they have adopted a cafeteria-style approach to Nietzsche's trademark conceptions, kneading and molding his words into chimerical constructs, postmodernist philosophers inevitably remind us of Zarathustra's description of 'scholars': 'They work like mills and like stamps: throw down your seed-corn to them and they will know how to grind it small and reduce it to white dust' ( TSZ , II, 16). If so, how much significance might we attribute to any postmodernist's 'findings' of any textual nuances in Nietzsche's relativism and stylistic multiplicity - nuances which at one moment appear intimately to apply and at the next to be hopelessly impertinent to whatever point that postmodernist is straining to make? The answer ought to be clear: By maintaining that there exist no intrinsically privileged vantage platforms vis-a-vis any text whatever, postmodernists in effect subvert their own analyses, and thus leave every work they consider unaffected. In that sense, we should be on target to advance th...