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Showing papers in "International Affairs in 2014"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examines the rise in militarized approaches towards conservation, as part of a new 'war for biodiversity' and examines how the new war for biodiversity is justified and promoted by referring to wider debates about intervention in a post-Cold War era; notably that the international community has a responsibility towards wildlife, especially endangered species, and that military forms of intervention may be required to save them.
Abstract: This article examines the rise in militarized approaches towards conservation, as part of a new ‘war for biodiversity’. This is a defining moment in the international politics of conservation and needs further examination. The claims that rhinos and elephants are under threat from highly organized criminal gangs of poachers shapes and determines conservation practice on the ground. Indeed, a central focus of the 2014 London Declaration on the Illegal Wildlife Trade is the strengthening of law enforcement, and recent policy statements by the US government and the Clinton Global Initiative also draw the link between poaching, global security and the need for greater levels of enforcement. Such statements and initiatives contribute substantially to the growing sense of a war for biodiversity. This article offers a critique of that argument, essentially by asking how we define poachers, and if militarized approaches mean conservationists are becoming more willing to engage in coercive, repressive policies that are ultimately counterproductive. Further, this article examines how the new war for biodiversity is justified and promoted by referring to wider debates about intervention in a post-Cold War era; notably that the international community has a responsibility towards wildlife, especially endangered species, and that military forms of intervention may be required to save them.

253 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Roy Allison1
TL;DR: The Russian military interventions in Ukraine, which have led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and to the entrenchment of separatist enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, directly challenge the post-Cold War European state system as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The Russian military interventions in Ukraine, which have led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and to the entrenchment of separatist enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, directly challenge the post-Cold War European state system. Russia has consistently denied any wrongdoing or illegal military involvement and has presented its policies as a reaction to the repression of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. This article argues that it is important to examine and contest unfounded Russian legal and political claims used by Moscow to justify its interventions. The article proceeds to assess in detail three different explanations of the Russian operations in Ukraine: geopolitical competition and structural power (including the strategic benefits of seizing Crimea); identity and ideational factors; and the search for domestic political consolidation in Russia. These have all played a role, although the role of identity appears the least convincing in explaining the timing and scope of Russian encroachments on Ukrainian territorial integrity and the disruption of Ukrainian statehood.

197 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these four modes of capitalist governance, and probes the main contours of inter-capitalist competition, and concludes that the political differences between democratic and authoritarian capitalists override their shared interests or be mediated by them.
Abstract: The two-centuries-old hegemony of the West is coming to an end. The ‘revolutions of modernity’ that fuelled the rise of the West are now accessible to all states. As a consequence, the power gap that developed during the nineteenth century and which served as the foundation for a core–periphery international order is closing. The result is a shift from a world of ‘centred globalism’ to one of ‘decentred globalism’. At the same time, as power is becoming more diffuse, the degree of ideological difference among the leading powers is shrinking. Indeed, because all Great Powers in the contemporary world are in some form capitalist, the ideological bandwidth of the emerging international order is narrower than it has been for a century. The question is whether this relative ideological homogeneity will generate geo-economic or geopolitical competition among the four main modes of capitalist governance: liberal democratic, social democratic, competitive authoritarian and state bureaucratic. This article assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these four modes of capitalist governance, and probes the main contours of inter-capitalist competition. Will the political differences between democratic and authoritarian capitalists override their shared interests or be mediated by them? Will there be conflicting capitalisms as there were in the early part of the twentieth century? Or will the contemporary world see the development of some kind of concert of capitalist powers? A world of politically differentiated capitalisms is likely to be with us for some time. As such, a central task facing policy-makers is to ensure that geo-economic competition takes place without generating geopolitical conflict.

84 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the nature and scale of the threat posed by the Islamic State, and assesses three possible areas of further policy engagement that they UK may, or may have to, follow.
Abstract: The fall of Mosul in June of 2014 was followed in July by the establishment of a self-proclaimed Caliphate by the Islamic State of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Since then, the Islamic State has continued to expand its operations, persistently pushing into Sunni-dominated parts of Iraq and Syria, nearly defeating the Kurds of Iraq, and moving against the Kurds of Syria, in Kobani, as well as army units of the Syrian state. By doing so, it has maintained an astonishingly high tempo of operations and has shown itself capable, agile and resilient. It has also proved itself to be adept at utilizing social media outlets, and in pursuing brutal tactics against civilians and prisoners that have been aimed at shocking adversaries�potential or actual�and observers both in the region and beyond. The rise of the Islamic State poses a challenge not only to the security of Iraq and Syria, but to the state system of the Middle East. Western powers have been drawn into a conflict in a limited fashion�through air strikes and advising ground forces; the UK, while engaging slightly later than other countries against the Islamic State, has followed this pattern, though targeting Islamic State forces solely in Iraq. This article considers the nature and scale of the threat posed by the Islamic State, and assesses three possible areas of further policy engagement that they UK may, or may have to, follow.

66 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
John Borrie1
TL;DR: The authors examines how and why cluster munitions became widely reframed as unacceptable weapons, and the nature and significance of functional similarities with contemporary efforts of civil society activists to instigate humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons and promote the logic of a ban treaty in view of its norm-setting value among states.
Abstract: The achievement of past international treaties prohibiting anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions showed that unpropitious political situations for dealing with the effects of problematic weapons could be transformed into concrete, legally binding actions through humanitarian-inspired initiatives. Although there is now renewed concern about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, some policy makers dispute the relevance of these past processes. This article examines how and why cluster munitions became widely reframed as unacceptable weapons, and the nature and significance of functional similarities with contemporary efforts of civil society activists to instigate humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons and promote the logic of a ban treaty in view of its norm-setting value among states. In the case of cluster munitions, the weapon in question was signified as unacceptable in moral and humanitarian law terms because of its pattern of harm to civilians with reference to demonstrable evidence of the consequences of use. Ideational reframing was instigated by civil society actors, and introduced doubts into the minds of some policy-makers about weapons they had previously considered as unproblematic. This is relevant to the current discourse on managing and eliminating nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which there is dissonance between the rhetoric of those states claiming to be responsible humanitarian powers and their continued dependence on nuclear weapons despite questions about the utility or acceptability of these arms.

63 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Rob White1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the political, economic and ecological context within which environmental insecurity emerges and feeds back into a fortress mentality, which is linked to decades of neo-liberal policy and practice that have embedded an individualizing and competitive selfinterest that, collectively, is overriding prudent and precautionary policy construction around climate change and environmental degradation.
Abstract: This article explores the political, economic and ecological context within which environmental insecurity emerges and feeds back into a fortress mentality. Shortages of food, water and energy sources are the trigger for nefarious activities involving organized criminal networks, transnational corporations and governments at varying political levels. The consequences of such activities contribute to even more ruthless exploitation of rapidly vanishing natural resources, as well as the further diminishment of air, soil and water quality. These developments, in turn, exacerbate the competitive scramble by individuals, groups and nations for what is left. The accompanying insecurities and vulnerabilities ensure elite and popular support for self-interested ‘security’. Accordingly, the ‘fortress’ is being constructed and reconstructed at individual, local, national and regional levels—as both an attitude of mind and a material reality. Fundamentally, the basis for this fortress mentality is linked to decades of neo-liberal policy and practice that have embedded an individualizing and competitive self-interest that, collectively, is overriding prudent and precautionary policy construction around climate change and environmental degradation. The net result is that security is being built on a platform of state, corporate and organized group wrongdoing and injustice, in many instances with the implied and/or overt consent of relevant publics. Yet, as long as the fortification continues apace, it will contribute to and further exacerbate varying levels of insecurity for all.

42 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A more powerful China under the seemingly confident leadership of President Xi Jinping has committed to a more activist global policy as mentioned in this paper, which has influenced Beijing's policy towards UN peacekeeping operations, with a long-awaited decision to add combat forces to the engineering troops and police and medical units that have been features of its past contribution.
Abstract: A more powerful China under the seemingly confident leadership of President Xi Jinping has committed to a more activist global policy. In particular, this commitment has influenced Beijing's policy towards UN peacekeeping operations, with a long-awaited decision to add combat forces to the engineering troops and police and medical units that have been features of its past contribution. In addition, Beijing has doubled the size of its contribution to the UN peace operations budget. This article explains why the UN is a key venue for China to demonstrate its �responsible Great Power� status and expressed willingness to provide global public goods. The main explanatory factors relate to the UN's institutional design, which accords special status to China even as it represents a global order that promotes the sovereign equality of states. Moreover, there are complementarities between dominant Chinese beliefs and interests, and those contained within the UN system. Especially important in this latter regard are the links that China has tried to establish between peacebuilding and development assistance with the aim of strengthening the capacity of states. China projects development support as a contribution both to humanitarian need and to the harmonization of conflict-ridden societies. The Chinese leadership has also spoken of its willingness to contribute to peacemaking through stepping up its efforts at mediation. However, such a move will require much deeper commitment than China has demonstrated in the past and runs the risk of taking China into controversial areas of policy it has hitherto worked to avoid.

41 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors explored the underlying fault-lines between the United Nations and the AU by examining interactions between the UN and AU since the latter's launch in 2002, but focusing on the Mali case.
Abstract: The United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) have collaborated in building a viable African Peace and Security Architecture and have worked together in a number of armed conflicts over the past decade. Examples include the peace operations in Burundi and Somalia, and the hybrid peace operation in Sudan's Darfur region which is perhaps the most prominent illustration of this collaboration. Although the UN Security Council authorized the intervention in Libya, which was approved by leading regional organizations (the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Gulf Cooperation Council), it was opposed initially by the AU although the three African states in the Security Council voted for it. Relations cooled as a result and have grown colder still as the UN snubbed the AU and its initial efforts to engage in post-conflict stabilization in Mali. While the AU sought to prove itself as a capable security provider and partner on the continent with its operation AFISMA, France's Operation Serval and the UN's peace operation for Mali, MINUSMA, bypassed the African Union. This article explores the underlying fault-lines between the two organizations by examining interactions between the UN and AU since the latter's launch in 2002, but focusing on the Mali case. The fault-lines emerging from the analysis are different capabilities, risk-averse vs risk-assuming approaches to casualties, diverging geopolitics and leadership rivalry.

40 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that a primary problem has been the lack of consideration of how identity, strategy and action interrelate in foreign policy, and propose six ideal-type role orientations that the UK might fulfil in world politics, namely: isolate, influential (rule of law state), regional partner, thought leader, opportunist power and great power.
Abstract: In recent commentaries on British foreign policy, the New Labour and coalition governments have been criticized for lacking strategic thinking. Academics describe a �strategy gap� and note that old ideas about Britain's role in the world, such as Churchill's 1948 reference to �three circles�, continue to be recycled. Parliamentarians bemoan the �uncritical acceptance of these assumptions� that has led to �a waning of our interests in, and ability to make, National Strategy�. This article argues that a primary problem has been the lack of consideration of how identity, strategy and action interrelate in foreign policy. Using the insights of role theory, the article seeks to address this by outlining six ideal-type role orientations that the UK might fulfil in world politics, namely: isolate, influential (rule of law state), regional partner, thought leader, opportunist�interventionist power and Great Power. By considering how variations in a state's disposition towards the external environment translate into different policy directions, the article aims both to highlight the range of roles available to policy-makers and to emphasize that policy often involves making a choice between them. Failure to recognize this has resulted in role conflicts and policy confusion. In setting out a variety of different role orientations, the author offers a route to introducing a genuine strategic sensibility to policy-making, one that links identity with policy goals and outcomes.

36 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors explored the evolution and transformation of foreign affairs think-tanks in North America and Europe since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and highlighted, by relying on specific foreign and defence policy issues, the extent to which a handful of thinktanks have been able to become important fixtures in the policymaking community.
Abstract: The rise of think-tanks in the United States, in Europe and around the world has generated considerable scholarly attention in recent years. Much of this interest has been fuelled by the widespread belief that these institutions have come to play an increasingly influential role in shaping both public opinion and the domestic and foreign policy preferences and choices of high-level decision-makers. This perception was reinforced when several think-tanks with close ties to the administrations of President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair advocated a far more muscular posture towards Iraq in the months and years following the events of 9/1ya. As think-tanks on both sides of the Atlantic continue their efforts to become more entrenched in the policy-making process, scholars are beginning to pay closer attention to how these institutions, established ostensibly to engage in policy research, have become even more adept at political advocacy. Not surprisingly, as think-tanks have devoted more resources to affecting policy change, speculation about how much or little influence they wield has become more intense. The purpose of this article is to explore the evolution and transformation of foreign affairs think-tanks in North America and Europe since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and to highlight, by relying on specific foreign and defence policy issues, the extent to which a handful of think-tanks have been able to become important fixtures in the policy-making community.

34 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Harman et al. as discussed by the authors presented a pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: HARMAN, S. and WILLIAMS, D. (2014), International development in transition.
Abstract: This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: HARMAN, S. and WILLIAMS, D. (2014), International development in transition. International Affairs, 90: 925–941. doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12148, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12148

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The rhino-poaching crisis in South Africa raises questions about whether it should be tackled through judicial processes or by the application of hard-power methods as mentioned in this paper, and the poaching of wildlife has traditionally been met with a harsh response to send a clear message of punitive deterrence while the contemporary threat posed by poaching intersects with, and is complicated by, wider concerns such as border security and immigration.
Abstract: The rhino-poaching crisis in South Africa raises questions about whether it should be tackled through judicial processes or by the application of hard-power methods The poaching of wildlife has traditionally been met with a harsh response to send a clear message of punitive deterrence While the reaction of the South African authorities has been no different, the contemporary threat posed by poaching intersects with, and is complicated by, wider concerns such as border security and immigration In many respects, this has led to what can be termed the �rhinofication� of South African security South Africa has a long political tradition that relies on force rather than dialogue, negotiation and reform Yet, the hard-power response to protect the rhino and other large fauna, though necessary at one level, often runs up against the economic frustrations and temptations of a large, predominantly black, under-class, which for generations has been excluded from wildlife management and conservation by white �exceptionalism� Poachers are thus transformed through their counter-cultural actions into what Eric Hobsbawm termed �social bandits� While this social chasm lies at the heart of the �rhino wars�, it is clear that in practical terms the lack of a political/poaching settlement in the form of a racially inclusive conservation strategy almost certainly guarantees their continuation

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper argued that long-term changes in British attitudes to the use of force, coupled with the experience of recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, have also coloured the way in which the First World War is portrayed.
Abstract: The image of the First World War soldier as a cowed victim, caught in the grip of a meaningless, industrialized war, is one that has become entrenched in the British popular imagination. It was not, however, the image that dominated public discussion of the soldier between 1914 and 1918. This article seeks to examine how the portrayal of the soldier changed during and after the First World War and proposes that the victimized soldier motif has been reinforced today by the coalescence of three trends. The first is the growth of the family history industry that encourages an individualized and empathetic approach to the First World War. The second trend is concerned with an increasing public interest in psychological reactions to war. Since the Vietnam War, there has been a growing expectation that soldiers will be psychologically damaged by wartime experience. This has influenced the public perception of the First World War soldier, affecting, in particular, the discussion surrounding those executed for military crimes during the conflict. Finally, the article argues that long-term changes in British attitudes to the use of force, coupled with the experience of recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, have also coloured the way in which the First World War is portrayed. A range of interest groups have cast the contemporary British soldier as a victim in recent years and the article argues that the explicit linking of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with the First World War has reinforced this victim image for each conflict.

Journal ArticleDOI
Nick Ritchie1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors build on current research by developing three images of nuclear disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): surface devaluing, deep devaluing and delegitimizing.
Abstract: Expectations of significant progress towards a nuclear weapons-free world continue to shape global nuclear politics. Progress towards nuclear disarmament will require diminishing the value of nuclear weapons to the point where it becomes politically, strategically and socially acceptable for nuclear-armed states to relinquish permanently their nuclear arsenals. Key to this are the concepts and processes of �devaluing� and �delegitimizing� nuclear weapons that have steadily coalesced in global nuclear discourse since the mid-1990s. This article builds on current research by developing three images of nuclear disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): �surface� devaluing, �deep� devaluing, and delegitimizing nuclear weapons. The first represents codification by the nuclear-weapon states of the transformation of the Cold War environment through reductions in the size and role of nuclear arsenals that leaves the logic of nuclear deterrence and nuclear prestige largely unchanged. Deep devaluing is framed as a reconceptualization of the political, strategic and military logics that underpin nuclear-weapons policies and practices. Delegitimizing represents a more radical normative project to transform collective meanings assigned to nuclear weapons. The analysis examines conceptions of devaluing nuclear weapons from the perspective of non-nuclear weapon states and the relationship between devaluing nuclear weapons and the idea of a spectrum of nuclear deterrence. It concludes by highlighting the tension between surface and deep devaluing, the emergence of a delegitimizing agenda, and the political implications for the current NPT review cycle set to culminate in the next quinquennial Review Conference in 2015.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the case of Syria, Turkey and Iran responded to the growing ethno-sectarianization of the civil war by taking steps to conciliate the largely autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as well as one another as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Recent trends in the Syrian civil war have caused important shifts in alignment among neighbouring states. The conflict has exhibited a sharp turn towards ethno-sectarian violence, fighting among rival factions of the opposition and loss of central command over peripheral districts. In conjunction with the rise of the radical Islamist movement called the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, these developments precipitated a raging, multisided battle that spread across Syria's northeastern provinces, and sparked renewed sectarian conflict inside Turkey and Iraq. Turkey and Iran responded to the growing ethno-sectarianization of the civil war by taking steps to conciliate the largely autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as well as one another. Rapprochement with the KRG alienated Turkey and Iran from Iraq, prompting Iraqi officials to step up military operations along the Syrian frontier. These moves set the stage for large-scale intervention in Iraq by ISIL, which further weakened Iraq's positon in regional affairs. The resulting reconfiguration of relations accompanied a marked increase in belligerence by non-state actors, most notably the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which buttressed Turkey's newfound ties to the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iran.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine US President Barack Obama's foreign policy rhetoric on Syria, specifically in relation to the threat of chemical weapons and the prohibitionary taboo surrounding their use.
Abstract: This article examines US President Barack Obama's foreign policy rhetoric on Syria, specifically in relation to the threat of chemical weapons and the prohibitionary taboo surrounding their use. It contends that Obama's rhetorical construction of the taboo is not simply a commitment to the control of these horrific weapons (where such arms have been comprehended as so extensively vile as to preclude their employment), but that this also represents the strategic linguistic exploitation of these normative ideals in order to directly shape policy. By analysing of presidential speeches made during the conflict, it demonstrates that Obama has manipulated pre-existing conceptions of chemical weapons as taboo, and also as forms of weapons of mass destruction, to deliberately construct policy in line with his own political ambitions�most notably as a way of forcing a multilateral solution to the situation in Syria. This article challenges existing perceptions of the chemical weapons taboo as an inherently normative constraint, arguing that this instead comprises a more agency-driven construct. Static notions of the taboo must be abandoned and subsequently replaced with a framework of understanding that recognizes how the taboo can be used as a deliberate driver of foreign policy.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed the current state of affairs with reference to the three principal sets of actors in this war: Al-Shabaab, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its international partners, and various actors currently involved in building the Somali Federal Government's security forces.
Abstract: The attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2013 intensified international scrutiny of the war against Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen (Movement of the Warrior Youth). This article analyses the current state of affairs with reference to the three principal sets of actors in this war: Al-Shabaab, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its international partners, and the various actors currently involved in building the Somali Federal Government's security forces. It argues that although the newly reconfigured Al-Shabaab poses a major tactical threat in Somalia and across the wider Horn of Africa, the movement is becoming a less important actor in Somalia's national politics. As Al-Shabaab loses territory and its popularity among Somalis continues to dwindle, other clan- and region-based actors will become more salient as national debates over federalism, the decentralization of governance mechanisms beyond Mogadishu and the place of clannism will occupy centre stage. As a consequence, AMISOM's principal roles should gradually shift from degrading Al-Shabaab towards a broader stabilization agenda: encouraging a national consensus over how to build effective governance structures; developing an effective set of Somali National Security Forces; and ensuring that the Federal Government delivers services and effective governance to its citizens, especially beyond Mogadishu in the settlements recently captured from Al-Shabaab. As it stands, however, AMISOM is not prepared to carry out these activities. More worryingly, nor is the Somali Federal Government.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2013 led to calls for a tough international response in order to uphold the norm against what is often portrayed as a particularly odious form of warfare as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The use of chemical weapons in Syria in August 2013 led to calls for a tough international response in order to uphold the norm against what is often portrayed as a particularly odious form of warfare. The condemnation of poison weapons has a long history and this article examines the origins of the international norm against their use. It focuses particularly on the proceedings of the first Hague Peace Conference and suggests that this represented the emergence of an important distinction between the customary norm against poison and poisoned arms, and a newly codified norm against the use of asphyxiating gas projectiles, which was primarily an attempt to limit the potential of new weapons technologies. However, psychological responses to the wide-scale use of chemical weapons in the First World War underscored a deep revulsion to this form of warfare and blurred the distinction between gas projectiles and poison. While the Hague Conventions ultimately failed to avert the use of chemical weapons, the formation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol reaffirmed the norm against the use of poison in war and represented both a legal and moral condemnation of chemical and biological weapons that continues to be enshrined in international law today.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In 2010, and in anticipation of a controversial and contested Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the UK House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) issued a stinging critique of strategy making in the UK, accusing the government of having ‘all but lost the capacity to think strategically' as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In 2010, and in anticipation of a controversial and contested Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the UK House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) issued a stinging critique of strategy making in the UK, accusing the government of having ‘all but lost the capacity to think strategically’ (PASC 2010, p. 3). Two years later, in 2012, it was still lamenting ‘the government’s inability to express coherent and relevant strategic aims’ (PASC 2012, p. 38). These criticisms have been echoed in the strategic studies and foreign policy analysis literature, including calls for a revival of grand narratives of national interest to drive strategic practice (Layton 2012, pp. 59–60), for a new relationship between political decision-making and professional expertise in strategy making (Strachan 2006, pp. 77–80) and the reinvigoration of institutional capacities for strategic thinking and action in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and elsewhere (Cornish and Dorman 2010, pp. 408–409). Related themes are apparent too in the burgeoning literature on risk, which identifies distinct challenges of strategic practice associated with contemporary patterns of complexity, uncertainty and interdependence and calls for better strategy making in response (Rasmussen 2006, pp. 203–206).

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show how western efforts to aid Austria combat famine and its financial crisis were linked, and how they had a profound impact on the new League of Nations, the world's first multipurpose intergovernmental organization.
Abstract: From its foundation in 1918, the new Austrian republic was gripped by famine and a crisis of confidence in its currency that threatened to tip the new state into hyperinflation and revolution. This article shows how western efforts to aid Austria combat famine and its financial crisis were linked, and how they had a profound impact on the new League of Nations, the world's first multi-purpose intergovernmental organization. It also demonstrates the importance of the incipient wartime international bureaucracy for League agency. Contrary to the expectations of its architects, member governments, international financiers, businessmen and economists began to see the League as a useful tool to meet common needs that today would be called the search for human security. The article demonstrates how the Austrian food and financial crisis was the founding moment in the institutionalization of international economic and financial coordination, cooperation and oversight. It established the Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations, whose work would later inform its successors, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Union. The study speaks to the ways in which the notion of security has broadened in the past two decades to embrace economic, social, political and environmental concerns. But the notion of �human security� is not new; it was written into the body of the League.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The idea that values and national interests were merging was a central plank in Tony Blair's 'Doctrine of the International Community' (Cook 1997a; Blair 1999) as discussed by the authors, and the idea of a values-interests merger has been maintained in the foreign policy of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition.
Abstract: What is good for Britain is also good for the rest of the world. The increasingly consistent, and surprisingly unchallenged, claims that Britain’s national interest and its moral responsibilities to international society and to vulnerable non-citizens are merging seem to lean towards this controversial sentiment. Accompanying Labour’s foreign policy with an ethical dimension, the idea that values and Britain’s national interests were merging was a central plank in Tony Blair’s ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ (Cook 1997a; Blair 1999). Despite claims of a return to national interest and a more ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy, suggestion of a values-interests merger has been maintained in the foreign policy of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. Analysing speeches and documents, this article explores the implications of this claim. Although ethical reflection in British foreign policy is not necessarily new, the idea that concern for non-citizens should be manifested in overt commitments, to which governments are held accountable, represents an innovation that has endured beyond Labour’s tenure. Understandably, the coalition has made concerted attempts to depart from the more controversial and hubristic aspects of Labour’s internationalism. The coalition claims a foreign policy with a more pragmatic approach, more measured and modest ambition and closer attention paid to national interest.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, the authors examines what motivated the dominions to make such a sustained and costly contribution to the war effort of the British empire during the First World War with particular reference to Australia, and argues that imperial loyalty, now discounted as anachronistic, was the dominant ideology.
Abstract: This article examines what motivated the dominions to make such a sustained and costly contribution to the war effort of the British empire during the First World War With particular reference to Australia, it argues that imperial loyalty, now discounted as anachronistic, was the dominant ideology Not only did it inspire the initial generous support for the British war effort but, for many Australians, the empire's cause invested with meaning the battle losses which were proportionately the highest of any dominion army The Gallipoli campaign of 1915 is now celebrated as having given birth to the foundational narrative of the young Australian nation, but at the time this embryonic nationalism too was positioned within the framework of imperial loyalty Moreover, with the conservative forces dominating federal politics after the divisive debates about conscription in 1916 and 1917, �loyalty� became entrenched as the litmus test of political reliability Hence, while Australia's Prime Minister W M (Billy) Hughes aggressively asserted the rights of the dominions to a new and more independent role within the imperial relationship in 1918 and 1919, this agenda for change found little support at home It is therefore ahistorical to see the First World War as the birth of Australian nationalism in the sense that the term is understood today Rather, imperial loyalty was affirmed by the British victory as the dominant ideology and proved able to accommodate the growing sense of national singularity that the war fuelled

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the analysis of mid-twentieth century international relations and argue that Arnold J. Toynbee deserves recognition as a pioneering world historian or a controversial interpreter of the politics of the Middle East, but as an acute commentator on the international relations of a troubled age.
Abstract: Arnold J. Toynbee (1889–1975) has long been neglected or discounted by scholars of international relations and historians of international thought. Yet his contributions to International Affairs, as well as his Surveys of international affairs and his A study of history demonstrate both his capacity for acute interpretation of contemporary events and the depth of his learning about past international societies. This article examines his analysis of mid-twentieth century international relations, that ‘Time of Troubles’ which he believed would only be escaped through a recovery of ‘creativity’ and profound change in the ways in which world politics were practised. It explores the foundations of his approach to the field, demonstrated both in his Surveys of international affairs and his twelve volume magnum opus, A study of history, as well as his essays in journals. It analyses his diagnosis of the causes of our contemporary ‘Time of Troubles’, in the light of past episodes in world history Toynbee thought analogous to that present condition of international relations. And it traces his retreat from political solutions to the challenges faced in the twentieth century and his movement towards religious responses as a putative alternative. It concludes by arguing that Toynbee deserves recognition, not simply as a pioneering world historian or a controversial interpreter of the politics of the Middle East, but as an acute commentator on the international relations of a troubled age.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the ecosystem services framework in the context of warfare, and highlight both the potential and the challenges that may accompany adoption of such a framework by the international community.
Abstract: Environmental degradation resulting from warfare is a growing concern, particularly with increasing recognition of humanity's dependence on healthy ecosystems. Though environmental legislation does exist that seeks to prevent or mitigate environmental harm before, during and after conflict, it has limited scope and effectiveness. This may be one reason why the environmental laws of war are so rarely applied in attempts to bring parties responsible for environmental harm to justice. Enforcement of such legal instruments also requires appropriate quantification of environmental damage, which is particularly difficult in a warfare context. A focus on the loss of environmental resources, habitats or ecosystems is only part of the story�the real cost of environmental damage is in the loss of ecosystem services that such resources provide, both now and in the future, and which regional and global human societies depend upon. The ecosystem services framework, wherein the costs of damage to ecosystem services are quantified in economic terms, may prove a more effective way of highlighting the environmental damage resulting from warfare. Moreover, quantification along monetary lines is potentially more likely to establish a solid case for justifiable reparations than criteria relating to loss of biodiversity or ecosystem health, which are more difficult for society and governmental agencies to place specific values on. This article discusses the ecosystem services framework in the context of warfare, and highlights both the potential and the challenges that may accompany adoption of such a framework by the international community.

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TL;DR: In this paper, the detrimental impact of armed conflict on biodiversity and the dangers posed by the return of peace, which is likely to result in increased biodiversity exploitation, are discussed, and methods to realize the value of biodiversity in the Democratic Republic of Congo through the benefits of ecosystem services and income generated from monetizing biodiversity.
Abstract: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is endowed with an abundance of natural resources, and the presence of high-value resources such as coltan and diamonds is well known. The country is also endowed with a wealth of biodiversity, although the value of this is often overlooked. This article describes the detrimental impact of armed conflict on this biodiversity and the dangers posed by the return of peace, which is likely to result in increased biodiversity exploitation. The resulting loss of key carbon sinks crucial to the global fight against climate change will affect not only the DRC, but also the international community. Biodiversity is therefore identified as a threat to security but also a valuable asset for development, and this article discusses methods to realize the value of biodiversity in the DRC through the benefits of ecosystem services and income generated from monetizing biodiversity. It concludes by arguing that the false dichotomy of conservation and development as separate entities and objectives needs to change so that conservation becomes a central pillar of security and development work in the DRC and other regions of current or recent armed conflict around the world.

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TL;DR: This paper examined the British and German armies as learning organizations during the First World War and found that the organizational cultures of these two armies shaped the way in which they learned, predisposing the British army towards radical, often technological, solutions to the tactical and operational challenges of the first World War battlefield, while inclining the German army towards incremental and tactical solutions to same problems.
Abstract: The idea that the armies of the First World War were incapable of learning is one of the most enduring myths of the conflict. This image of �lions led by donkeys� has proved difficult to modify, despite the sizeable scholarly literature on the tactical, technological and organizational adaptation and innovation undergone by all armies during the war. By examining the British and German armies as learning organizations during the war, this article contributes to the growing literature on wartime adaptation and innovation, as well as the wider literature on organizational learning in wartime. It demonstrates how the organizational cultures of these two armies shaped the way in which they learned, predisposing the British army towards radical, often technological, solutions to the tactical and operational challenges of the First World War battlefield, while inclining the German army towards incremental and tactical solutions to the same problems.

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TL;DR: The mandate system was created as part of the overall machinery of the League of Nations in an attempt to ''promote world peace� in the aftermath of the First World War as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The mandate system was created as part of the overall machinery of the League of Nations in an attempt to �promote world peace� in the aftermath of the First World War. The �A� mandates, with which this article is concerned, were the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire that had been occupied and conquered by France and Britain by the end of the war. Was the mandate system in any sense an improvement on colonialism? To the extent that the period of foreign rule was rather short in comparison with other colonial regimes, one can perhaps say that it was. On the other hand, however high-minded its stated aims, the mandate system was a product of the imperial framework of its day, in which the white races were regarded as superior to the brown or black races. The supervisory instruments of the League (specifically the Permanent Mandates' Commission) were inadequate to deal with any shortcomings on the part of the mandatory, and there are a number of examples of situations where, for example, the legitimate interests of minorities were ignored to suit the wider interests of the powers. In general, the mandated states lacked institutional underpinning, and their immediate legacy was a string of weak states throughout the Arab world, where many of the institutions of civil society were destroyed in the course of military coups in the 1950s and 1960s.

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TL;DR: In this article, structural analogies between the strategic situation in Europe in the summer of 1914 and in East Asia today, with particular emphasis on the probability of the outbreak of a major war are examined.
Abstract: The article looks at structural analogies between the strategic situation in Europe in the summer of 1914 and in East Asia today, with particular emphasis on the probability of the outbreak of a major war. The author examines analogies regarding the nature of the international system, i.e. is the international system characterized by outright anarchy or by a more or less developed and institutionalized understanding among the main actors about the way to preserve peace and to organize economic exchange? The article addresses domestic factors (nationalism, democratic, authoritarian or semi-democratic regimes) and investigates military dynamics against the backdrop of geography and the availability of military equipment and technologies. Possible routes of military escalation are also discussed. Special attention is paid to states that have isolated themselves and that dispose of military means that might promise swift victory. The article comes to the conclusion that there are very few similarities between Europe in 1914 and East Asia today, but that both the high degree of militarization of the Korean peninsula and the evolving military competition between the US and China in the region do imply the possibility of a major armed conflict in a not too distant future.

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TL;DR: For example, Brazil's relations with the United States have not been constructive for more than a generation as discussed by the authors, with limited cooperation, considerable discord and some open clashes, including the exposure of the US government's massive surveillance of the South American giant Petrobras.
Abstract: US�Brazilian relations sunk to one of their lowest points ever following last year's exposure of the US government's massive surveillance of the South American giant�including the correspondence of President Rousseff and the business operations of Brazil's national oil company, Petrobras. Brazilian authorities responded angrily. The Brazilian president called off a highly valued state visit to Washington, denounced the US for violations of sovereignty and human rights, and proceeded to bypass the US to purchase nearly $5 billion worth of fighter aircraft from Sweden. In fact, US�Brazil ties have not been constructive for more than a generation. Yes, relations are mostly amiable, but with limited cooperation, considerable discord and some open clashes. Washington views Brazil primarily as a regional actor, and wants its cooperation mainly on inter-American issues. For Brazil, regional collaboration means working with other Latin American nations�not the United States. Brazil usually wants the US to keep a distance from the region. The US is no more enthusiastic about Brazil assuming a global role; differences over some of the world's most dangerous political and security challenges have made Washington uneasy about Brazil's engagement in international affairs and critical of its foreign policy judgements. Relations will probably improve, but they could get worse. The two governments need to acknowledge that their relationship is fragile and troubled, and take steps both to rebuild trust and to avert further deterioration and new confrontations. They have to be more careful with each other.

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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that European legitimacy requires responses in different realms: first, an acknowledgement of Europe's "transnational democratic interdependence", second, an anchoring of the functionalist European superstructure in "national democratic legitimacy", and third, a grounding of both European and national power in "local democratic legitimacy".
Abstract: A truly democratic European Union seems to have become the graal of European politics, the project's redemptive promise and unreachable horizon. Much has been written about the gap between promise and performance and about the obstacles to EU democratization. Here, we suggest that one way to apprehend the ‘democratic deficit’ debate as it has evolved in the wake of the euro crisis is to think of it as a ‘democratic trilemma’. We argue that European legitimacy requires responses in different realms: first, an acknowledgement of Europe's ‘transnational democratic interdependence’; second, an anchoring of the functionalist European superstructure in ‘national democratic legitimacy’; and third, a grounding of both European and national power in ‘local democratic legitimacy’. While the very notion of trilemma points to the tensions that arise in trying to satisfy these requisites simultaneously, we nevertheless need to look for ways of alleviating the trilemma rather than coming up with democratic magic bullets in a single one of these realms. While our main goal is to reframe and open up the debate around the key concepts of empowerment, mutual recognition and flexibility, we also provide examples of what this may mean.