Showing papers in "International Journal in 2000"

Greed and grievance: economic agendas in civil wars.

Abstract: Grievance or Greed - an Overview of the Key Issues, A. Adebajo Doing Well Out of War, P. Collier Ingenuity Gaps, Honey Pots and Dutch Disease - Testing the Links Among Natural Resource Scarcity, Innovation and Internal Armed Conflict, I. de Soysa Incentives and Disincentives for Violence, D. Keen Globalization and War Economies - Promoting Order or the Return of History?, M. Duffield Commercial Agendas in Civil Wars, W. Reno Arms and Elites - Regulation and Self-regulation of Private-Sector Transactions, V. Gamba and R. Cornwell Criminal Agendas in Civil War, M. Mwanasali Financial Sanctions - Cheaper Than Cruise Missiles and Potentially More Effective , S.D. Porteous.

[The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for Statehood]

Abstract: This book offers an overview of the Sikh diaspora, exploring the relationship between home and host states and between migrant and indigenous communities. The book considers the implications of history and politics of the Sikh diaspora for nationality, citizenship and sovereignity.; The text should serve as a supplementary text for undergraduates and postgraduates on courses in race, ethnicity and international migration within sociology, politics, international relations, Asian history, and human geography. In particular, it should serve as a core text for Sikh/Punjab courses within Asian studies.

[Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict]

Abstract: Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict by John B. Dunlop (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, xi, 234 pp, $54.95 cloth, $18.95 paper). Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus by Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal (New York: New York University Press, 1998, xiv, 416 pp, $39.50). Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power by Anatol Lieven (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, xii, 436 pp, $57.95 cloth, $25.60 paper). Prisoner of the Mountains directed by Sergei Bodrov (Orion Pictures, 1997, 99 minutes).In November 1994 Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia, was worried about his standing in the opinion polls. Elections to the State Duma the previous year had not gone well, and the legislature was now dominated by a 'red-brown' opposition of old-line communists and nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovskii's somewhat misleadingly named Liberal Democratic party. Meanwhile, chronic economic difficulties, rising crime, and increasingly flagrant corruption continued to erode Yeltsin's popularity. Even more worrisome, in the Caucasus region on Russia's southern border, Islamic separatists were threatening the Russian Federation's fragile unity.The crisis in the south centred on Chechnya, a small Muslim nation on the northern edge of the Caucasus mountain range that had declared its independence from Moscow in November 1991, shortly after the collapse of the USSR. Ironically, Yeltsin initially encouraged Chechen separatism in his campaign to weaken the authority of his archrival, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Although Yeltsin now opposed the move, over the next two years he did little to re-establish Moscow's authority over the breakaway republic. There were far bigger fish to fry at home, such as the struggle with the Supreme Soviet that had ended in a bloody showdown in October 1993.As for Chechnya, President Dzhokhar Dudaev, a charismatic former Soviet air force general with a penchant for melodramatic rhetoric and Cosa Nostra couture, had proven spectacularly unfit to govern his infant regime. With an unusually high number of BMWs and Mercedes-Benzes racing about the streets, there were many outward signs of prosperity in the capital, Grozny. Yet much of the republic's civic apparatus, such as schools and hospitals, had all but ceased to function. In the words of a British journalist: 'Dudaev seemed much more interested in the idea of calling Chechnya independent than in the practicality of making it work.' By 1994, Chechens were growing increasingly unhappy with their leader's laissez-faire style. There were many signs that his many domestic political opponents might soon force Dudaev out of office.Yeltsin was not prepared to wait. His own heavy-handed efforts to encourage Dudaev's foes had ended ignominiously on 26 November 1994, when an attempt to seize Grozny by opposition forces reinforced with Russian armour was easily quashed. The humiliation of this Caucasian Bay of Pigs only further encouraged hard-liners in the Kremlin. At the same time, although the presidential election was still more than a year away, it seemed that decisive action would surely boost Yeltsin's sagging political fortunes. One leading official reasoned: 'It is not only a question of the integrity of Russia. We need a small victorious war to raise the president's ratings.' After all, only two months earlier United States troops had easily occupied the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, in a similar operation to restore 'legitimacy' there. The Russian minister of defence, Pavel Grachev, boasted that one paratroop brigade would need no more than two hours to secure Grozny.General Grachev proved to be too optimistic. On 31 December, a day that happened to coincide with the minister's birthday, some 6,000 Russian ground troops launched a major assault on the Chechen capital. Even though Dudaev's men had done little to prepare the city's defences, it would take seven weeks of vicious urban combat and heavy artillery strikes to drive them out of their capital. …

Rwanda Revisited: Search for the Truth

Abstract: Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN document S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, 82pp. Online at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/1999/1257.The flood of books, commentaries, TV documentaries, theses, and commission reports on the Rwanda genocide seems to know no end. Some early superficial or partisan accounts have given way to better informed, if no less tragic, recitals of those terrible events. Nevertheless, such is the controversy and confusion generated by the genocide that blighted Rwanda and shamed the world that great expectations awaited the two 'official' reports under review, anticipating that they would clarify the outstanding issues. The secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan - a central figure in the drama - commissioned the first and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) initiated the second.(f.1) Neither disappoints. While not free of controversy or in total agreement on every point, the two assessments taken together are about as definitive as one can expect at this stage. Their judgments are bound to carry great weight. No one with an interest in the causes, course, complexities, and consequences of the genocide can afford to ignore them. Both reports were partly funded by Canada.The authors of the reports share two distinctions. First, they alone were 'accorded the opportunity to research the confidential records of the UN' (OAU 132; UN 4) and were able to interview a wide range of (largely the same) individuals who were actively involved. Secondly, they were given a genuinely free hand in reaching their own conclusions, and they took full advantage of that independence to write frankly, even brutally.The UN Inquiry comprised a three-man team: a former Swedish prime minister as chair, a former Korean foreign minister with experience as United Nations special representative in Cyprus, and a Nigerian general who had served as field commander of ECOMOG, the West African peacekeeping force, in Liberia and as head of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem. The OAU panel consisted of seven 'Eminent Personalities,' two of whom were former heads of state (of Botswana and Mali) and two were illustrious women, one Liberian and the other Swedish. The remaining three were an Algerian ambassador, a retired Indian chief justice, and Stephen Lewis, UNICEF deputy executive secretary and, earlier, one of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's inspired appointments as Canadian ambassador to the United Nations. The senior writer on the project was another Canadian, the indomitable Gerry Caplan.(f.2)The mandates of the two bodies differed in significant respects. The Inquiry was enjoined to establish the facts related to the United Nations role and response in Rwanda and to 'draw relevant conclusions and identify the lessons to be learnt.' The actions of African organizations and governments, as well as outside powers, are, in the main, left to the OAU panel and others to explore (UN 1, 4). Moreover, the period under review covers only nine months - from the launching of UNAMIR, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, in October 1993 to the winding down of organized killing following the military conquest of the country by the (Tutsi) Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in July 1994.The OAU report is considerably more comprehensive in terms of time frame, territorial scope, and range of actors. Its investigations extended to regional as well as Rwandan developments 'surrounding' the genocide over nearly four years, from the Arusha Peace Accords in August 1993 to the overthrow of the Mobutu Sese Seko regime in neighbouring Zaire in May 1997 (p 288). Five introductory chapters set the conflict in context by tracing the roots and evolution of the crisis from colonial times to Arusha, and seven concluding chapters carry the post-genocide story to the end of the decade.The OAU eminences, unlike their UN counterparts, were explicitly enjoined to examine the roles played by the OAU, internal and external forces, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as the UN, 'before, during and after the genocide. …

How sanctions work : lessons from South Africa

Abstract: SANCTIONSReviews by Margaret P. Doxey, Emeritus Professor, Trent UniversityEdited by Neta C.Crawford and Audie KlotzNew York: St. Martin's, 1999, xv, 292pp, US$59.95 cloth (ISBN 0-312-21854-0), US$19.95 paper (ISBN 0-312-21856-7)It is not surprising that extensive use of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council since 1990 and continued reliance on sanctions as a foreign policy tool by the United States have prompted much scholarly activity. Numerous conferences, seminars, and symposia have been sponsored by governmental and non-governmental bodies, and a steady stream of reports, books, and articles has appeared in print. Most of these included policy prescriptions for a wiser choice of measures and greater efficiency in applying them. And although 'constructive engagement' tended to be discredited as a means of ending apartheid in South Africa, doubts about the efficacy of negative measures and concern for their adverse effects on innocent parties has revived interest in offering positive inducements to good behaviour as an alternative to negative sanctions.The three books reviewed here are all welcome additions to the sanctions literature. Two are edited works that use the case study approach to offer description, analysis, and prescription in respect of positive and negative measures; the third is a theoretically focused, single-author work which briefly addresses policy questions in the final chapter.In The Sanctions Paradox Daniel Drezner charges that recent literature on economic statecraft offers 'well-crafted theories that lack empirical support or well-crafted case studies that produce generalizations of dubious quality' (p 19). His criticism has some validity, although the overall judgment is too harsh. Drezner is careful to acknowledge the theoretical and methodological limits to his own work, and the reader who reasonably expects more balance in his analysis will not be disappointed. He develops a 'conflict expectations model' in which sanctions are viewed as policy gains that can be used to advantage in future conflicts and uses a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods to test its validity. Russian economic coercion of other members of the former Soviet Union and attempts by the United States and other Western countries to check nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula provide the material for well-presented and interesting case studies.Drezner contends that because sanctions are grounded in expectations of conflict they are more often used against enemies than against allies; the paradox that gives the book its title is the finding, shared with many other scholars, that allies are more susceptible to pressure than adversaries. Drezner's explanation is that the latter are less concerned to avoid conflict with the governments that impose sanctions - indeed they expect it.Heavy use of mathematical modelling does not make for an easy read, but there is much of interest in this book, and the case studies, particularly those concerning Russia and its neighbours, break valuable new ground.In How Sanctions Work Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz have assembled a set of essays that describe the wide range of sanctions imposed on a variety of South African targets. Arms embargoes, oil sanctions, disinvestment, diplomatic and cultural isolation are dealt with by American, Canadian, and South African authors.Following their introductory chapter, the editors present a 'framework for analysis' for evaluating the direct, indirect, and counterproductive consequences of sanctions (p 25). Tables set out models of influence (compellence, normative communication, resource denial, and political fracture) and 'sites' (that is, targets) where consequences should be felt. Sites are listed as elite decision-makers, the economy, civil society, regional and global spillover. The disaggregation of specific targets is a welcome feature of this book, given the extent of concern over the adverse consequences of comprehensive economic sanctions and recent focus on targeted measures that seek to deprive decision-makers and elites of the use of financial assets and other amenities. …

The Canadian Middle Power Myth

Abstract: THE RHETORIC OF 'MIDDLEPOWERHOOD' has dominated Canada's external political identity since the Second World War. Middle-power status has been used to justify a voice in international organizations, leadership in international initiatives, and consultation with Canadian officials on matters of concern to the international community. Canada has used the middle power concept to further its foreign policy aims and to promote nationalism through an internationally recognized identity.For all its importance, 'middle power' is rarely defined, and limited explanations are never specific. This vagueness is deliberate and conceals a striking reality: Canada's status as a middle power is a myth. The history of middlepowerhood uncovers a tradition of Canadian rhetoric crafted to justify the attainment of disproportionate influence in international affairs.(f.1) This subtle process of nationalist self- promotion had its genesis in 1942 when diplomat Hume Wrong introduced the functional principle, and it continues to be manifest in the Canadian human security agenda today.In 1933, David Mitrany legitimized the concept of functionalism in international relations, evaluating the potential for a successful world government by dividing the world into two types of states: great and small. Recognizing that some of the smaller states were increasing in strength, and seeking to ensure successful and co-operative international governance, he proposed to acknowledge the differing capacities of the smaller powers through 'a functional structure of political authority.'(f.2)Mitrany's ideas undoubtedly influenced Hume Wrong when he wrote to Norman Robertson, the undersecretary of state for external affairs, about Canada's role and status in the direction of war and the shaping of peace during inter-allied World War II negotiations: 'the principle, I think, is that each member of the grand alliance should have a voice in the conduct of war proportionate to the general war effort. A subsidiary principle is that the influence of the various countries should be greatest in connection with those matters with which they are most directly concerned.'(f.3) Wrong's 'functional principle' was narrower than Mitrany's 'functionalism.' It stipulated that individual small-state involvement in international affairs should be based upon certain conditions: the relevance of the state's interests, the direct contribution of the state to the situation in question, and the capacity of the state to participate.(f.4) Wrong did not intend to contest the role of the great powers - their inherent right to influence over all aspects of global governance was conceded. The principle was to apply to all remaining states. There were indeed two tiers of powers in the international system. However, some of the smaller powers deserved greater relative status predetermined by three criteria: relevance, contribution, and capacity. Functional powers were small powers. The functional principle was a 'functional' means of differentiating between smaller states, based on their relative capacities at a specific time.The tenets of the functional principle helped elevate Canada's status within the international community during World War II. Canada became a leading non-great power. It had a functional voice in the shaping of international relations. Over time, however, that was not enough. With the war coming to a close, Brooke Claxton, the minister of defence, proposed to extend the principle beyond its original meaning: 'the nations of the world must come to think of representation in terms of function rather than status.'(f.5) Claxton hoped to change the power structure.Great powers had formal status that would soon be recognized in the charter of the United Nations. Regardless of the state of the French economy, the British military, or Soviet political stability, the three remained great powers. Great-power status was differentiated objectively. It hardly fluctuated, and it allowed certain states to maintain a disproportionate influence in international affairs. …

The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s

Abstract: The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s by Robert Thomas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, xx, 443pp, US$47.50 cloth, US$18.50 paper)The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention by Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup (Amonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999, xviii, 501pp, US$49.95, ISBN 1-56324-308-3)Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide by Branimir Anzulovic (New York: New York University Press, 1999, 233pp, US$24.95 cloth, ISBN 0814706711)'Of making more books there is no end...' writes Ecclesiastes (Chapter 12, Verse 12). Certainly the torrent of books on the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed seems in no danger of drying up. One reason may be that most people still find it hard to understand how a reasonably prosperous, liberal (albeit communist - after a fashion - but no Stalinist dictatorship), tolerant, modern European state could suddenly tear itself apart with appalling bloodshed and cruelty.Branimir Anzulovic offers one answer: it was Serbian national myths that predisposed Serbs to aggression and genocide, although he does note at the beginning of his Conclusion that 'many Serbs want to live in peace with their neighbors and build an orderly and tolerant society.'(Those who have lived in Belgrade may cavil at 'orderly'). What has prevented them from doing so is a nationalist obsession with a Greater Serbia, aided and abetted by the Serbian Orthodox Church. Their myths lead them to believe that Serbs are a special people, favoured by God. Myth and history also combine to make them fearful of foreign domination - and even of their disappearance as a people.Anzulovic explores the myths in some detail, starting with the defeat of the mediaeval Serbian empire by the Ottoman Turks in 1389 in the battle of Kosovo Polje, and the epic poetry that has glorified it. He also has a lot to say about the blood-thirsty Montenegrin epic, 'The Mountain Wreath.' Certainly this style of literature is full of gore and does not engender tolerance towards Muslims, but it is not unique to Serbia; nor is the sense of being 'special.'The book includes some off-hand comments of dubious historical merit. To say that Serbia sponsored the assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince in Sarajevo in 1914 is, at best, misleading. So too is the reference to 'the decisions [presumably by the victorious Allies] to put several nations under the Serbian yoke in the early twentieth century,' which has been the standard Croatian nationalist line for almost eighty years.A more extraordinary (and irritating) argument is that since the Serbian national holiday of Vidovdan does not, as has been commonly supposed, celebrate St Vitus (not a saint in the Serbian Orthodox calendar) but rather the pagan Slav sun and war god vid, it 'symbolized the triumph of the Dinaric pagan-heroic ethos and a marriage of this ethos to imperial ambitions.' Whatever truth there may have been to this a century ago, it has no relevance today. Vid is much less well known to Serbs than the Norse gods are to Scandinavians (or, for that matter, to us).The author of this book obviously has no use for the Serbs and thinks that the creation of Yugoslavia was a poor idea. His exploration and debunking of Serbian myths (some of which has been done elsewhere) is interesting, but the influence he ascribes to them can only contribute to the demonization of the Serbs, which is already too prevalent.The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an altogether different kind of book and is probably the best account in print of that confusing and unhappy period. While the authors do not in any way whitewash the Serbs, their account is thoughtful and balanced: no one comes out of it entirely blameless. The book also offers a perceptive analysis of the role of outside powers - what they could or could not have done to change the logic of war.It contains many insights and some surprises. While most of the book deals with the war in Bosnia-Herzegonvina and the (generally unsuccessful) efforts to bring it to an end, the authors do spend some time on the importance of events in Croatia to the Bosnian struggle both at the beginning and towards the end. …

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina : ethnic conflict and international intervention

Abstract: Throughout American history, people with strong beliefs that ran counter to society's rules and laws have used civil disobedience to advance their causes. From the Boston Tea Party in 1773, to the Pullman Strike in 1894, to the draft card burnings and sit-ins of more recent times, civil disobedience has been a powerful force for effecting change in American society.This comprehensive A-Z encyclopedia provides a wealth of information on people, places, actions, and events that defied the law to focus attention on an issue or cause. It covers the causes and actions of activists across the political spectrum from colonial times to the present, and includes political, social economic, environmental, and a myriad of other issues."Civil Disobedience" ties into all aspects of the American history curriculum, and is a rich source of material for essays and debates on critical issues and events that continue to influence our nation's laws and values. It explores the philosophies, themes, concepts, and practices of activist groups and individuals, as well as the legislation they influenced. It includes a detailed chronology of civil disobedience, listings of acts of conscience and civil disobedience by act and by location, a bibliography of primary and secondary sources, and a comprehensive index complete the set.

Transformations in Security and Identity after the Cold War: Turkey's Problematic Relationship with Europe

Abstract: INTRODUCTIONTurkey's relationship with the European Union (EU) is a particularly difficult one. The 1990s witnessed the transformation of the European Community into the EU and its subsequent enlargement. When Turkey was not included in the enlargement process, even though the EU opened accession negotiations with all the countries of central and eastern Europe and with Malta and Cyprus, Turkey's relations with the EU deteriorated. The situation was unsettling for Turkey, which wanted to be part of Europe and a member of the EU. At its Helsinki summit in December 1999, the Council of the European Union elevated Turkey's status from that of an applicant to that of a candidate. Nevertheless, Turkey remained the only candidate country with which the EU did not open accession negotiations.It is our contention that the ambivalence in Turkey's relations with the EU is a result of transformations in European security and identity since the end of the cold war, a transition period in which the changing systemic parameters challenged Turkey's position in Europe and when centuries-old questions about Turkey's 'Europeanness' resurfaced.This article attempts to answer the following questions: what impact does the reformulation of European security have on Turkey? Is European identity being redefined in such a way that Turkey is excluded? Do reformulations of security and identity in Europe further complicate the difficult relationship between Turkey and the EU?Our approach is, of course, only one way of looking at Turkish-EU relations. One could argue that Turkey's inclusion in the EU is problematic not only because of the factors analyzed in this article, but also because of Turkey's economic problems, its shortcomings in upholding democratic principles, the Kurdish issue, the Cyprus problem, or the size of its population. These factors all pose serious obstacles to Turkey's integration into the EU. However, since some of the other countries with which the EU is currently negotiating have serious economic and political problems of their own, one must conclude that there is another variable in the equation in the case of Turkey. Because Turkey is not even in the same basket as Romania or Bulgaria, it is our contention that that variable is the reformulation of European identity in the post-cold war era. We acknowledge that the EU may have taken other factors into consideration in its expansion talks, such as stabilizing the fragile political environment in the prospective member countries and the fact that it is easier to absorb some of them because of their size. Nonetheless, we believe that the perspective in this article sheds new light on Turkey's relations with the EU.Post-cold war Europe has witnessed two parallel developments in security and identity. The first is the transformation in European security that is the result of a re-projection of the 'Western security community' inherited from the cold war. A cold war collective defence system has been transformed into a system of collective security. But the tools used to build this new structure - a European Security Architecture(1) - come from the old cold war institutions. Collective security is carried out by this new structure through the wider promotion of the Western values of democracy and free markets in the belief that the spread of these values and the acceptance of the institutions that guard them will yield stability in Europe's peripheral regions.During the cold war, Turkey belonged to the 'Western security community.' Thus, its identity as part of Europe in that period centred on the issue of security. In the post-cold war era, Turkey is still considered a component of the European Security Architecture. At the same time, its Europeanness is increasingly questioned. Indeed, it is the only country within the European Security Architecture that is challenged on this issue. The paradox is that, although Turkey fully participates in the European Security Architecture, even here it encounters problems because it is excluded from the EU's evolving defence arm - CESDP (Common European Security and Defence Policy) - which is part of this architecture. …

[Transforming Development: Foreign Aid for a Changing World]

Abstract: The practice of rich countries providing financial assistance to developing countries has become increasingly controversial. Foreign aid is now characterized more by its failures than its successes, making foreign assistance budgets easy targets for politicians. In academic and policy circles the claim is made that foreign aid has outlived its usefulness. The original essays in Transforming Development take a more optimistic view, and instead of foreseeing the end of foreign aid, show how it might be revived. The essays in this volume argue that foreign aid is, first and foremost, a humanitarian enterprise. The contributors suggest ways to reform the practice of development assistance including new approaches to development financing and novel strategies for increasing the effectiveness of foreign aid, maintaining that development assistance must continue to receive donor support. This forward-looking collection is an ideal text for undergraduate and graduate courses in international development and a valuable resource for practitioners and policy-makers in the field.

The G8’s Role in the New Millennium

Abstract: Part 1 Explaining G8 effectiveness: continuity and leadership in an age of globalization, Sir Nicholas Bayne explaining G8 effectiveness, John J. Kirton the G8 and the new political economy, Michael R. Hodges G8 summits and compliance, Ella Kokotsis and Joseph P. Daniels. Part 2 Finacial challenges: Japan's summit contributions and economic challenges, Koji Watanabe supervising the international financial system, Joseph P. Daniels promoting growth in the world economy, Bronwen Curtis managing the global economy, Charles Goodhart. Part 3 The broader challenges: negotiating multilateral rules to promote investment, Alan Rugman designing effective policies for employment creation, Richard Layard combating transnational financial crime, George Staple, QC.

Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy

Abstract: THE POST-COLD WAR DEBATES over whether and how Canada should be involved in overseas conflicts are coming to a close. Canada will both fight and keep the peace, due in large part to Lloyd Axworthy, who stepped down after four years as minister of foreign affairs to take a position at the University of British Columbia. Henceforth, when the Canadian Forces go abroad, they will do so, as they did in Kosovo, explicitly or implicitly in support of 'human security.' Axworthy, the author of the Canadian human security agenda, has thus won an important political victory and a long-lasting ministerial legacy extending beyond the Department of Foreign Affairs to its sometime arch-rival, the Department of National Defence. For with his human security concept he has paved the way for nothing short of rescuing Canadian defence policy from military irrelevance and strategic sterility.Although Axworthy placed human security at the heart of Canadian foreign policy, he did not coin the term. It came into international parlance largely as a result of a 1994 report by the United Nations Development Programme. Axworthy's own approach to the concept has been broad. As the Department of Foreign Affairs put it in a 1999 'concept paper' issued with his imprimatur: 'In essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives.From a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing on the security of territory or governments. Like other security concepts - national security, economic security, food security it is about protection. Human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk and taking remedial action where prevention fails.'(f.1)THE END OF THE NATIONAL INTERESTThe human security concept will endure as the justification for Canadian military intervention overseas, especially because it has opened the door to abandoning the Canadian national interest as the touchstone for decision-making. As foreign minister, Axworthy never quite gave up on the national interest when he talked about the role of the Canadian military in human security. For example, in justifying Canadian participation in the Kosovo War, he took recourse to the old and creaky argument that the Canadian national interest can be found just about anywhere in the world: 'in an increasingly interconnected world, where we are travelers, exporters and importers, investors and donors, we cannot afford to ignore the problems of others - even if we wanted to.'(f.2) Therefore, he went on, the pursuit of human security overseas, as in Kosovo, serves Canadian interests.This approach is neither convincing nor necessary to justify human security interventions. Take Kosovo. Few Canadians travel there, export to or from there, or invest money there. The same can be said of virtually all the other places where the Canadian Forces recently have been deployed on peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. Where is the Canadian national interest in East Timor or, for that matter, on the Ethiopian-Eritrean frontier where Canada recently dispatched a very small peacekeeping contingent to join the United Nations effort?During the cold war, the dispatch of Canadian troops on peacekeeping missions to distant places outside the area of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was much more clearly in the national interest. Had a nuclear war ever occurred, the effects on Canada would have been calamitous. Canadian peacekeeping in locations such as the Middle East thus helped to dampen the possibility of a direct clash between the superpowers, reducing the chances of nuclear war. This link between Canadian security and Canadian military intervention disappeared along with the Soviet Union. …

Homosexual Personnel Policy in the Canadian Forces: Did Lifting the Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance?

Abstract: AS THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THAT PERMIT GAY and lesbian soldiers to serve in the armed forces grows, it is increasingly important to determine whether official decisions to include homosexual service members in the military lead to changes in organizational performance. Although most member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), along with a handful of other nations, allow gay and lesbian soldiers to serve, there has been little empirical analysis of whether the decision to lift a gay ban influences the ability of armed forces to pursue their missions. Theoretical studies have addressed this topic, but there has been no in-depth empirical work on the consequences of a decision to lift a gay ban.Canada is a case in point. A few careful studies appeared in the immediate aftermath of Canada's decision in 1992 to abolish restrictions on gay and lesbian soldiers. However, the long-term impact of the new policy could not be determined in those early studies, and even the most thorough analyses was based on few sources.(f.1) In 1993, an American officer, Lt Gen Calvin Waller, stated that because Canada had not been involved in armed conflict since the ban was lifted: 'We really do not know what those results are going to be.'(f.2) Our rationale for considering the evidence that has accumulated over the eight years since the ban was lifted is that senior Canadian officials predicted that changing the policy might compromise military effectiveness. Hence, the Canadian experience affords an opportunity to assess the impact of the policy change against early forecasts by senior military leaders. After discussing the historical evolution of homosexual personnel policy in Canada, we examine whether Canada's decision to abolish restrictions on gay and lesbian soldiers influences military effectiveness. Our findings, based on a review of primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews with 29 military personnel and experts from the academic, non-governmental, and policy communities, is that Canada's decision to lift its gay ban had no impact on military performance, readiness, cohesion, or morale.(f.3)HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF HOMOSEXUAL PERSONNEL POLICYBefore 1988, gays and lesbians were prohibited from serving in the Canadian Forces. The military did not allow openly gay recruits to enlist, dismissed soldiers who were discovered to be homosexual, and required service members who suspected another soldier of being gay to inform their commanding officer. The pre-1988 policy, outlined in regulation CFAO 19-20, 'Homosexuality-Sexual Abnormality-Investigation, Medical Examination and Disposal,' stated: 'Service policy does not allow homosexual members or members with a sexual abnormality to be retained in the Canadian forces.(f.4)Military policy dealing with homosexual service members came under increasing judicial and political scrutiny after the passage of the Canadian Human Rights Act in 1978 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1985. Although the Human Rights Act did not cover sexual orientation explicitly, it did require employers to justify exclusionary or restrictive policies. Nor was sexual orientation included in the enumerated list of prohibited grounds for discrimination in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 15 of the charter did, however, allow the restriction of other forms of discrimination if the courts so ruled.A Department of Justice review of federal regulations in 1985 determined that the Canadian Forces were in potential violation of the equal rights provisions of the charter in a number of areas, including discrimination against gays and lesbians. In response to the Department of justice findings, the Department of National Defence (DND) conducted a survey of 6,580 soldiers, which found that military personnel, particularly men, were strongly against removing the gay ban. Service members expressed concern about all aspects of serving with gays and lesbians: 62 per cent of male soldiers stated that they would refuse to share showers with or undress or sleep in the same room as a gay soldier, and 45 per cent declared that they would refuse to work with gays. …

Britain, Southeast Asia, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950

Abstract: Preface List of abbreviations Maps 1. Wartime plans for post-war Southeast Asia, 1942-1945 2. Southeast Asia after the Japanese surrender, 1945-1946 3. The re-establishment of colonial regimes in Southeast Asia, 1946 4. Concession and conflict, 1947 5. The impact of Communism, 1948 6. Commonwealth and Colombo, 1949-1950 Personalia Notes Bibliography Index.

State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea, 1953-1960

Abstract: List of Tables - Preface - Acknowledgements - List of Abbreviations - A Note on Romanization - Introduction - Historical Setting: the Division of Korea, the Korean War, and the Evolution of Syngman Rhee's Anti-Communist Policy - The Ending of the Korean War and Syngman Rhee's Search for a U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defence Treaty, April - August 1953 - The Post-Armistice Security Policy of Syngman: The Strengthening of R.O.K. Forces, September 1953 - November 1954 - Internal and External Challenges to the Rhee Regime and Rhee's Growing Concern for Regime Security, November 1954 - May 1956 - The Primacy of Regime Security and the Vulnerability of State Security, May 1956 - November 1958 - The Domestic Use of State Security and the Collapse of the Rhee Regime, December 1958 - April 1960 - Conclusion: the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea - Bibliography - Index

Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade 1750-1950

Abstract: Drug epidemics are clearly not just a peculiar feature of modern life; the opium trade in the nineteenth century tells us a great deal about Asian herion traffic today. In an age when we are increasingly aware of large scale drug use, this book takes a long look at the history of our relationship with mind-altering substances. Engagingly written, with lay readers as much as specialists in mind, this book will be fascinating reading for historians, social scientists, as well as those involved in Asian studies, or economic history.

Hobson's Choice: Does Canada Have Any Options in Its Defence and Security Relations with the United States?

Abstract: Enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canadian territory. William Lyon Mackenzie King, 20 August 1938 [W]hat we have to fear is more a lack of confidence in the United States as to our security, rather than enemy action... If we do enough to assure the United States we shall have done a good deal more than a cold assessment of the risk would indicate to be necessary. Maurice Pope, April 1944THE CANADA-UNITED STATES DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP has been a real bargain for the Canadian government, allowing it to enjoy a level of security it could never have reached with its own resources. In return, Ottawa must make sure that its territory will not be used as a forward base or a port of entry for eventual enemies of the United States. The problem is that Canadians do not necessarily share either American perceptions of what constitutes a threat or their view of how a perceived threat should be countered. Consequently, the government of Canada often adopts defensive measures that it does not always consider necessary. Thus, according to Paul Letourneau and Michel Fortmann, when faced with a Pentagon 'which almost unilaterally defines the nature of the threat, Canada essentially tries to limit American ambitions, whilst preserving the friendly character of their exchanges.'(1) This was certainly an apt description of the situation that prevailed during the Second World War and the cold war. It is our contention that little has changed in the dynamics of the United States-Canadian defence and security relationship since the cold war ended. The risks of diverging in any meaningful way from what the United States expects of Canada are still considered far too great for any Canadian government to contemplate seriously.Since 1993, when the Liberal government came to power in Ottawa, bilateral relations between Canada and the United States have seemed to be nothing less than agreement and harmony, especially over questions of defence and security. Despite its rhetoric, which is full of references to the need for greater independence vis-a-vis the United States, the government of Jean Chretien has developed a good relationship with the administration of Bill Clinton in the United States.(2) Nevertheless, changes in United States threat perceptions and defence doctrines could force Canada to adopt measures that do not necessarily correspond to its priorities and might even conflict with some of its policies, notably in the areas of the fight against non-military threats and the defence of North American aerospace. Unfortunately, Canada has little choice. Refusal could endanger the very foundations of the American pillar of Canada's defence policy.DIFFERING PRECEPTIONS AND PRIORITIESThe different views of the two governments on what constitutes a threat and how to deal with it affect the grand orientations of Canadian and American security policies. United States strategic priorities have evolved over the last few years. The American government can hardly escape its 'international responsibilities,' that is, putting American interests first and protecting the country's dominant position, any more than it could during the cold war. Washington has no qualms about using force against perceived 'trouble-makers' such as Serbia, Iraq, or North Korea. But what changes the defence equation in the United States is the increasing number of insidious and unpredictable threats against its territory. Terrorism, drug trafficking, attacks against cyberspace, proliferation of missile technology, and sophisticated industrial spying have all become objects of increasing concern.Nobody should be surprised that more and more Americans worry just as much, if not more so, about the security of the territory of the United States itself as about protecting their international interests, or that an important segment of the political elite is turning toward isolationism and defence of the homeland. …

[The Euro-Asian World: A Period of Transition]

Abstract: Part 1 The politics of security in Euro-Asia: Euro-Asian conflicts and peacekeeping dilemmas the "game" of security in Central Asia a new great game in the Transcaucasus? the geopolitics of Caspian energy. Part 2 The Euro-Asian economies in transition: modernization, neo-modernization and the transformation strategy economic transition in the Czech Republic - a real success? economic misconduct in Eastern Europe economic transition in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Central Asian regional integration and new trade patterns.

Directions in Canada's International Security Policy: From Marginal Actor at the Centre to Central Actor at the Margins

Abstract: INTRODUCTION: DEFENCE AND SECURITYFor some time now, Canadians have not been overly concerned about national defence.(f.1) They have felt no threat of imminent invasion; they have not seen their core values or institutions under challenge by some foreign, or even some domestic, force; they have not been coerced into domestic or foreign policies inimical to their preferences.(f.2) Indeed, the idea of national defence seems to be of decreasing relevance to most Canadians, except for the perception by some that the movement for Quebec sovereignty directly challenges Canadian security.(f.3)But that does not mean that there has been no activity in this sector of public life. Since 1993 a series of government documents has emanated from the House, Senate, and the Departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and of National Defence (DND);(f.4) parliament has convened hearings; and the informed public has offered its assessments of foreign and defence policy.(f.5) To this list can be added the special reports commissioned to address specific concerns, including the Reserves, the Somalia Inquiry, maritime and naval issues, United Nations rapid reaction capability, procurement matters such as fixed wing and helicopter aircraft and conventionally powered submarines, the military justice system, and the 'quality of life' concerns of the families of members of the Canadian Armed Forces. What animates many of these efforts is a need to reorganize, reform, and refocus the Canadian military in the post--cold war world and to relocate it within Canadian society.Both DFAIT and DND undertook internal assessments in the late 1980s of their respective capacities to formulate and implement policies attuned to the dramatic changes unfolding during the period, especially around East-West relations. Already, then, some analysts in Ottawa and in the academic community were keenly aware of the need to rethink their ideas about international security.(f.6) But even with well informed reviews and reports, the analyses and sentiments have still not been codified or consolidated into an overall strategic view of Canada's place in the world of war and peace. This is not the place to pursue the larger issue, but it is worth noting that, in spite of much effort by people within and outside of official circles, no single statement or document clearly articulates for Canadians what it means today to have a professional Canadian Armed Forces. Why should a significant, albeit decreasing, proportion of the government's budget and taxpayers' dollars go towards maintaining a military force?(f.7)From Bosnia and Kosovo to Chechnya, the Great Lakes Region to Sierra Leone, Afghanistan to Sri Lanka, and Algeria to the Gulf, the use of organized force does not seem to have diminished. Enduring rivalries and protracted conflict and violence, whether intra- or interstate, are indicative of both the continuing utility and the perverse misuse of military force. It is equally obvious that none of these or, for that matter and to our good fortune, any other example directly threatens Canada - or at least only so far as it offends Canadian values and, for some, Canadian interests. Canadians and their government make that determination. For reasons ranging from the normative to the instrumental, they present these activities in ways that link Canadians to the event or to the outcome. These are not, in and of themselves, national defence concerns, though they are issues that are potentially within the mission and mandate of the Canadian Armed Forces.Of course, some analysts have perceived palpable threats to Canada or to Canadian interests in a number of recent cases: fish and maritime zones on east and west coasts; Arctic issues; questions about the penetration of Canada by non-Canadian cultural forces, which are at least as relevant as they were thirty years ago; and who really controls the economy. The same issues, with their own particular colour, inform much of the nationalist debate around Quebec and federalism. …

Ethical Values and Canadian Foreign Policy: Two Case Studies

Abstract: IT IS WIDELY EXPECTED THAT SOMETIME IN 2001 there will be a review of Canadian foreign aid policies. In anticipation, Canadian non-government organizations (NGOs) are mobilizing to do what they can to ensure that there is no substantial retreat from the putative humanitarian objectives of Canadian aid. Now is perhaps a good time to ask how much success civil society groups have had in the past in promoting a more ethically responsible Canadian foreign policy. A partial answer can be found by looking at their sustained efforts over several decades to influence Canadian policies on two major foreign policy issues in which one might expect that ethical considerations would play a significant role - Canadian policies toward apartheid South Africa and toward foreign aid.In recent years, two theoretical approaches have dominated the scholarly literature on Canadian foreign policy: statist and dominant class.(f.1) Neither approach suggests that ethical considerations have been a significant component of the dominant world view of senior Canadian foreign policy decision-makers or that lobbying from within Canadian civil society has forced the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to become more engaged with issues such as sustained oppression and severe poverty beyond Canada's borders. Both approaches reckon that such 'soft' policy objectives as promoting human rights or helping the world's poorest peoples are filtered out within the decision-making process. Dominant class theorists emphasize the role of the dominant ideology within Canadian decision-making circles in sifting out such objectives, while statist theorists identify the interests that act as the sieve in less ideological and more narrowly bureaucratic terms. However, both clearly imply that civil society efforts to promote more ethical foreign policies have had little impact.A closer look at the development of Canadian foreign aid policies and Canadian policy towards apartheid South Africa, two policies that have long been the focus of sustained ethical lobbying by the Canadian churches, the NGO community, and many other civil society public interest groups, indicates a need for a more nuanced reading of civil society efforts to secure a more ethically responsive Canadian foreign policy.ETHICAL VALUES AND CANADIAN FOREIGN AID(f.2)The literature on the determinants of Canadian aid policies mentions a surprisingly wide range of influences, including, among others, the politics of the cold war, the example and influence of other major donors, the importance attached by the Canadian government to Canada's primary alliances, Canada's historic links with the Commonwealth and la francophonie, bureaucratic politics within the Canadian government, and the government's particular responsiveness to Canadian trade and investment interests. Canadian ethical values, in contrast, are rarely emphasized.(f.3)At its inception, Canadian development assistance was very much a product of cold war alliance politics. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, only the United States, France, and Britain had significant foreign aid programmes. Because the purpose of the aid was to counter the expansion of Soviet influence, the United States pressed its allies to assume part of the burden. Canadian aid thus began, timidly and somewhat begrudgingly, as an obligation arising from its major alliances rather than directly from the ethical values of Canadian society.An exceptional confluence of factors and events over the next ten years, at most, produced a rapid expansion of the aid programme and a sustained effort to ensure that it reached and helped the poorest people and countries. The most fundamental factor was the upsurge of deep rooted public support for strong social welfare programmes in Canada.(f.4) This essentially ethical development within Canadian public philosophy created an intellectual and ideological environment in Canada that made foreign aid seem a particularly appropriate way to contain communism. …

A Global Bioprospecting Regime: Partnership or Piracy?

Abstract: THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (CBD) is one of the most complex and demanding of recent international environmental agreements. It came into existence at a time when contemporary concerns over the rapid loss of biodiversity in the northern and, especially, in the southern hemispheres were visible in a wide variety of settings. The Earth Summit in Rio de Janerio, at which the CBD was opened for signature in 1992, brought together thousands of government officials and interested non-governmental parties. At that time, biodiversity issues were recognized as a central concern for groups as diverse as transnational representatives of indigenous peoples and the executives of pharmaceutical giants in the United States, Japan, and Europe.The latter image might startle those who view biodiversity as an environmental cause rather than as a medical tool or industrial commodity. However, medicines have always been found in nature, which remains a promising repository of new compounds for pharmaceutical research and development. Perhaps 80 per cent of the world's people - most of them outside of the industrialized nations - rely on natural medicines for their primary health care needs. Meanwhile, some 25 per cent of industrially produced medicines, from aspirin to the anti-cancer agent taxol, are based on natural compounds; and the majority show some correlation between their modern therapeutic attributes and traditional medicinal uses.(f.1) However, renewed industrial interest in the potential value of biological diversity is tempered by considerations enshrined in the third objective of the CBD: 'the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.' Access and benefits sharing (ABS) has become a significant issue for negotiation between various 'users' in the industrialized North and 'suppliers' in the biodiversity-rich South.Although the authors of the CBD acknowledged that indigenous and local communities were important stakeholders in biodiversity conservation, the representation of their interests in bioprospecting nevertheless remains somewhat limited. Because indigenous peoples and local communities play a key custodial role in the conservation and 'sustainable use' of biological diversity, and particularly the components of biodiversity that have traditional medicinal value, their tragic marginalization and cultural decline is frequently seen as detrimental to the conservation of biological diversity. The new bioprospecting 'regime,' as articulated in the CBD, offers some hope to those on the margins of their states and may promote a broader appreciation of their knowledge and cultures. At the same time, the exploitation of biodiversity by Northern corporations and governments and the appropriation of indigenous knowledge threatens the cultural integrity of native peoples. Moreover, the new regime, as it stands, invites opportunistic behaviours that may undermine the cohesion of local and global indigenous movements. Although the terminology of 'sustainable development' is bandied about and ABS contracts are generally phrased in terms of 'partners,' we are tempted to ask whether 'neoimperialism,' or even piracy, are not more accurate words for bioprospecting under the CBD.A contemporary project in the troubled state of Chiapas, Mexico, that has the 'benefit' of United States government funding is indicative of the unresolved tensions evoked by bioprospecting projects. Amidst a localized armed struggle and accusations of systemic state abuse of indigenous populations, a team led by researchers from the University of Georgia is attempting to explore and export the indigenous medicinal plant knowledge of Mayan healers. A consortium of eleven local healers' groups asked Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), a Canadian non-governmental organization (NGO), to report their opposition to the project, now in its second year. RAFI's press release reiterated the opinion that those who reject the commercial exploitation of their traditional knowledge by outsiders see bioprospecting as a form of advanced piracy, even when the prospectors are respected scholars who seem sincere in their efforts. …

The international politics of national missile defence - A response to the critics

Abstract: INTRODUCTIONTo encourage more informed discussion of national missile defence (NMD) and to widen a dangerously narrow public debate on the subject, this article challenges critics of NMD to confront the logical and factual errors in their arguments against deployment. Because the American programme has important implications for Canadian foreign and security policies (and Canadian-American relations more generally), critics should be prepared to defend their positions beyond simply reiterating the same superficial criticisms. The Canadian public should expect nothing less from the academic community (not to mention our elected officials) than a sophisticated exchange of ideas on such an important issue.The first four sections of this article deal with the four core arguments most often used by critics to describe the aftermath of NMD deployment - impending demise of arms control agreements(1); nuclear proliferation by Russia and China; technological limitations of interceptor technology; and financial costs. Section five addresses the implications for Canadian security and defence policies.'Critic' throughout this article refers to individuals (or groups) who offer any one of the critiques evaluated below. Although there is extensive overlap in the positions of those opposed to NMD, all critics do not share precisely the same views or assign equal weight to the various arguments - there is no homogeneous position, nor is one likely to emerge in such a complex issue. Among opponents of NMD are experts and practitioners in the fields of foreign, security, and defence policies; currently serving and retired military officers; and scientists and engineers (including recipients of the Nobel Prize) with extensive knowledge of NMD and the physics of interceptor technology. Any critic, but especially those with impressive credentials, should be prepared to confront the weaknesses in the position he or she puts forward. Many critics will disagree with some or all of the points I raise.(2) But the fact remains that we desperately need a meaningful and substantive debate on the topic. Without it, the discussion (and attendant policy prescriptions) will continue to be driven entirely by political agendas and stifled by efforts to protect the intellectual capital invested in defending simplistic (and largely outdated) assertions about the dangers of defending people against ballistic missiles.THE DEMISE OF THE NPT AND ABMThe most common criticisms of NMD are associated with warnings about the demise of the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. Signed in 1968 and 1972, respectively, these treaties are the two pillars of nuclear disarmament and arms control that, according to proponents, were responsible for slowing the pace of proliferation during the cold war and stabilizing the longest nuclear rivalry in history. Because they continue to be essential for controlling proliferation and maintaining a stable nuclear environment, it is imperative that their underlying principles and fundamental logic should not be undermined.What critics fail to point out is that the worst abuses of horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology occurred after the treaties were signed. Regardless of the indicator used to track nuclear proliferation - overall nuclear stockpiles, numbers of strategic warheads in submarine launched ballistic missiles, inter-continental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers,(3) production and stockpiles of weapons' grade plutonium, thefts of fissile material, trade in dual use technology tied to the atomic energy industry, trade in ballistic missile technology, and so on - the evidence of an increase in the pace of proliferation is clear. Recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan are but the latest illustration of the same pattern. To claim that the NPT and the ABM treaty are essential parts of the international arms control structure doesn't say much for the treaties or for the prospects for serious arms control and disarmament in the future. …

Canada and War Crimes: Judgment at Tokyo

Abstract: AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, Canada found itself in a position to develop for the first time an appropriate role for a middle power in world affairs. Free of a colonialist past and committed to world peace, Canada sought to contribute to the resolution of conflict through moral suasion, mediation, and strong support for justice through international law. An active role in the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson's Nobel Peace Prize for Canadian diplomacy during the Suez crisis in 1956, and Canada's continuing enthusiasm for peacekeeping operations are three examples frequently cited in support of this conventional wisdom. The fact that the one-worldism associated with Pearson and his Ottawa colleagues was moderated by a sharp sense of the realities of power politics is less often mention. In practice, their liberal idealism was tempered behind the scenes with a considerable scepticism about the wisdom of crusades and an emphasis on agreements among sovereign nation states as the basis of international relations. The attempt by the Allied powers to punish the 'arch villains' of the Second World War for 'crimes against humanity' is a case in point.The first warning of what was to come surfaced when Great Britain, under pressure from the governments-in-exile in London, proposed in October 1941 that the Commonwealth and Allied governments issue a formal declaration condemning German atrocities and promising punishment by organized justice: 'brutalities which are being committed in occupied countries are contrary to the dictates of humanity; are a reversion to barbarism and will meet with sure retribution... Careful record is being kept... so that in due time the world may pronounce its judgment. With victory will come retribution.'(1)The American president, Franklin Roosevelt, responded with a guarded public statement condemning what he called the frightful acts of desperate men, which only sowed the seeds of hatred and which would one day bring 'fearful retribution.' Britain's prime minister, Winston Churchill, was less cautious. He immediately declared that 'Retribution for these crimes must henceforward take its place among the major purposes of the war.' Meanwhile, the governments of the occupied countries jointly declared that punishment of those responsible for war crimes was among their principal war aims. With this encouragement, Churchill raised the issue again in his meeting with Roosevelt in July 1942; the Americans suggested establishing a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes to investigate atrocities and report from time to time to the Allied governments. On 7 October 1942, Lord Symon, Britains' lord chancellor, announced the establishment of the commission and the determination of the Allies to punish those whose 'actions violated every tenet of humanity.'Canada responded to these initiatives hesitantly and reluctantly. The Cabinet agreed in principle to support an Allied statement condemning atrocities. Vincent Massey, the Canadian high commissioner in London, would be allowed to attend the public signing ceremony for the exiled governments' joint declaration, but strictly as an observer. In general, Ottawa regarded war crimes as a European problem, of concern mainly to the occupied countries. Canada's interest in the issue was slight, at best. Moreover, talk of revenge stirred up memories of the attempt to 'Hang the Kaiser' as the chief war criminal at the end of the First World War - a misguided Imperial policy, the wisdom of which Sir Robert Borden and others had doubted at the time, and, in hindsight, sight, a fiasco.(2) The threat of retribution might have some potential utility as a weapon of political warfare, which could be used to drive a wedge between the Axis leadership and ordinary people. 'By punishing these war criminals, we are trying also to divide the German people and their leaders whom we brand as criminals,' noted one official: 'we hope that when things really start to go bad for the Axis, these people will remember our statements that we are only after the war criminal and that they will get rid of them. …

Enviroment modelling for concurrent engineering

Abstract: The research and development in the area of computer integrated construction have looked at various fragments of the domain to be used as a glue for the integration of the profession. Examples of these fragments include products and processes. In this paper, environment modelling is suggested, asan approach that provides a more complete picture of the domain requires the support of information technology. An environment-modelling framework is proposed, which decomposes an abstract concurrent engineering environment into several modelling spaces. or practical reasons, two-dimensional orthogonal frameworkF decomposition is used. Along the first axis, the framework is decomposed according to the modelling aspect (construction, information system, generic), and along the second axis according to the level of detail (neutral, aspect, application). In this paper, we present the decomposition criteria, the resulting framework, and some essential components of the envi-ronment. Reported is the work in progress accomplished as a part of the European Union's ESPRIT project ToCEE.