International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 

About: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism is an academic journal published by Brill. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Skepticism & Argument. It has an ISSN identifier of 2210-5697. Over the lifetime, 199 publications have been published receiving 564 citations.

On Extended Rationality

Abstract: The discussion highlights the need to distinguish between perceptions and the experiences implicated by perceptions, noting that Coliva’s framework makes perception irrelevant to justified belief, except for being the contingent means by which we are furnished with experiences that are the real source of justified belief. It then addresses two issues concerning the problem of cognitive locality. The problem concerns what enables us rationally to suppose that our perceptual experiences mostly put us in touch with reality. The issues addressed are: (1) whether, assuming that there is a problem of cognitive locality, Coliva’s Moderate position adequately addresses it; and (2) whether Coliva gives us enough to make sense of the claim, central to the Moderate position, that certain background presuppositions are constitutive of empirical rationality.

The Animal in Epistemology : Wittgenstein's Enactivist Solution to the Problem of Regress

Abstract: This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism following peer review. Subject to embargo, embargo end date: 23 May 2017. The version of record [ (October 2016) 6 (2-3): 97-119. First published online October, 2016] is available online at doi: 10.1163/22105700-00603003

After the Spade Turns: Disagreement, First Principles and Epistemic Contractarianism

Abstract: Reasons, Wittgenstein warned, come to an end; we hit bedrock; the spade is turned. Long philosophical tradition, not to mention common sense, agrees. You can’t justify everything. In this paper, I examine a case where it is not only especially compelling that reasons run out—it is especially troubling. The case is when there is disagreement over explicitly epistemic first principles. Epistemic first principles are principles that announce that basic methods for acquiring beliefs are reliable. Where we disagree over such principles, we face the alarming prospect of being unable to defend them without relying on the very methods whose reliability is in question. I then explore, however briefly, what options remain in such situations for still engaging in what we might call rational persuasion. I suggest our prospects depend on whether we can make sense of giving objective practical reasons for our epistemic first principles.

McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism?

Abstract: In a series of recent articles, Duncan Pritchard argues for a “neo-Moorean” interpretation of John McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy. Pritchard introduces a distinction between “favouring” and “discriminating” epistemic grounds in order to show that, within the radical sceptical context, an absence of “discriminating” epistemic grounds allowing one to distinguish brain-in-a-vat from non-brain-in-a-vat scenarios does not preclude possessing knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses. I argue that Pritchard’s account fails. First, the distinction between “favouring” and “discriminating” epistemic grounds only works for “mules-disguised-as zebras” examples, but breaks down in the radical sceptical case. Second, McDowellian disjunctivism neutralizes the radical sceptical threat, but does not refute it. Third, the “highest common factor” conception is itself responsible for generating the sceptical problem and once this is undermined by McDowellian disjunctivism, scepticism no longer stands in need of direct refutation. I conclude by showing that one can either be a McDowellian disjunctivist or a neo-Moorean, but not both.

Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory

Abstract: This paper applies speech-act theory to craft a new response to Pyrrhonian skepticism and diagnose its appeal. Carefully distinguishing between different levels of language-use and noting their interrelations can help us identify a subtle mistake in a key Pyrrhonian argument.