International Journal of Game Theory 

About: International Journal of Game Theory is an academic journal published by Springer Science+Business Media. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Game theory & Repeated game. It has an ISSN identifier of 0020-7276. Over the lifetime, 1624 publications have been published receiving 54911 citations. The journal is also known as: Game theory (Print) & Game theory (Internet).

Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

Abstract: The concept of a perfect equilibrium point has been introduced in order to exclude the possibility that disequilibrium behavior is prescribed on unreached subgames [Selten 1965 and 1973]. Unfortunately this definition of perfectness does not remove all difficulties which may arise with respect to unreached parts of the game. It is necessary to reexamine the problem of defining a satisfactory non-cooperative equilibrium concept for games in extensive form. Therefore a new concept of a perfect equilibrium point will be introduced in this paper2).

A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria

Abstract: A class of noncooperative games (of interest in certain applications) is described Each game in the class is shown to possess at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies

The assignment game I: The core

Abstract: The assignment game is a model for a two-sided market in which a product that comes in large, indivisible units (e.g., houses, cars, etc.) is exchanged for money, and in which each participant either supplies or demands exactly one unit. The units need not be alike, and the same unit may have different values to different participants. It is shown here that the outcomes in thecore of such a game — i.e., those that cannot be improved upon by any subset of players — are the solutions of a certain linear programming problem dual to the optimal assignment problem, and that these outcomes correspond exactly to the price-lists that competitively balance supply and demand. The geometric structure of the core is then described and interpreted in economic terms, with explicit attention given to the special case (familiar in the classic literature) in which there is no product differentiation — i.e., in which the units are interchangeable. Finally, a critique of the core solution reveals an insensitivity to some of the bargaining possibilities inherent in the situation, and indicates that further analysis would be desirable using other game-theoretic solution concepts.

Cores of Convex Games

Abstract: The core of ann-person game is the set of feasible outcomes that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. A convex game is defined as one that is based on a convex set function. In this paper it is shown that the core of a convex game is not empty and that it has an especially regular structure. It is further shown that certain other cooperative solution concepts are related in a simple way to the core: The value of a convex game is the center of gravity of the extreme points of the core, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set solution of a convex game is unique and coincides with the core.

Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points

Abstract: Equilibrium points in mixed strategies seem to be unstable, because any player can deviate without penalty from his equilibrium strategy even if he expects all other players to stick to theirs. This paper proposes a model under which most mixed-strategy equilibrium points have full stability. It is argued that for any game Г the players’ uncertainty about the other players’ exact payoffs can be modeled as a disturbed game Г*, i.e., as a game with small random fluctuations in the payoffs. Any equilibrium point in Г, whether it is in pure or in mixed strategies, can “almost always” be obtained as a limit of a pure-strategy equilibrium point in the corresponding disturbed game Г* when all disturbances go to zero. Accordingly, mixed-strategy equilibrium points are stable — even though the players may make no deliberate effort to use their pure strategies with the probability weights prescribed by their mixed equilibrium strategies — because the random fluctuations in their payoffs will make them use their pure strategies approximately with the prescribed probabilities.