scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question

Showing papers in "International Journal of Middle East Studies in 1980"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In Iran's Islamic Revolution of 1979, the world was taken by surprise, and the Western mass media have subsequently been alarming their readers with warnings of Islamic "revival, resurgence, and rumble".
Abstract: Iran's Islamic Revolution seems to have taken the world by surprise. The Western mass media have subsequently been alarming their readers with warnings of Islamic “revival,” “resurgence,” “rumble,” and “anger.” Strategists and political practitioners have joined in – invariably using the same or more academic-sounding jargon, such as the “arc of trouble” or the “crescent of crisis.” The area referred to stretches from Morocco to Indonesia, where nearly 800 million Muslims live and in which some of the world's most strategic raw materials and real estate are located. The rising attention and the West' alarm are quite understandable and indeed quite justifiable. After all, most of that alleged anger is directed at the West and its local allies and surrogates - the Shah being a case in point. The seizure of the American embassy in Teheran along with some fifty hostages in November 1979 highlighted this deep-seated resentment. But in neighboring Afghanistan another chapter of the Islamic drama is unfolding - this, time in the form of a resistance to the Soviets and their local surrogates. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December of 1979 compounded an already complicated situation. It plunged the world closer to the brink.

218 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The position of women in pre-twentieth-century Islamic society was an extremely depressed one, and although scholars were always cautious on this point, the popular belief, shared also, it would seem, by many Orientalists, is a stubborn one as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Popular belief, if not serious scholarship, maintains that the position of women in pre-twentieth-century Islamic society was an extremely depressed one. And although scholars were always cautious on this point, the popular belief, shared also, it would seem, by many Orientalists, is a stubborn one. The low status of women is said to have derived from the fact that the patriarchal family was supposedly the backbone of the social structure throughout Islamic society. Women, it was supposed, were often secluded in harems and, therefore, were barred from participating in public life, which meant that they could not pursue economic occupations, or go to court to defend their interests and legal rights. Moreover, it seems to have been generally agreed that women were frequently deprived of the benevolence bestwed on them by classical Islamic law, which mitigated the extremities of the pre-Islamic tribal law of Arabia. Thus, Islam reduced the number of women allowed to a man to four, in order to ensure their better treatment. Similarly, Islam denounced the usual deprivation of inheritance suffered by women, and assigned them a share in the estate of the deceased, although this was very much less than that assigned to male inheritors. It has generally been thought that even this modest improvement in the position of women was never, in fact, effected.

82 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Middle East was the cradle of the World's three great monotheistic religions as discussed by the authors, and to this day they continue to play a very important role in the world's affairs.
Abstract: The Middle East was the cradle of the World's three great monotheistic religions, and to this day they continue to play a very important role it its affairs.

81 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the introduction to his book published in 1926 describing the rise of trade unionism, Shaikh Tāhir al-Haddād, a pioneer of the trade union movement in Tunisia, interprets history in a fashion that comes very close to Marxism, although he rejects Marxist atheism and materialism.
Abstract: Some strides have been taken to improve the status of women in Islam, but the weight of conservatism is still very strong. How strong it is may be gauged from the following illustration. In the introduction to his book published in 1926 describing the rise of trade unionism, Shaikh Tāhir al-Haddād, a pioneer of the trade union movement in Tunisia, interprets history in a fashion that comes very close to Marxism, although he rejects Marxist atheism and materialism. No opposition came to this work from the pen of an 'alim. But three years later, when he published Our Woman in the Shari'a and in Society, arguing that the social status of woman in Muslim society was actually inferior to what Islamic teaching granted them and pleading for improvement in the social and legal positions of women, he was severely attacked by the conservatives, lost his job, and died a few years later, a forlorn man.

55 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the Ottoman system the population of the Empire was organized upon a confessional basis, not upon a territorial or linguistic one, and no intercommunal solidarity or social integation evolved in Ottoman society.
Abstract: In the Ottoman system the population of the Empire was organized upon a confessional basis, not upon a territorial or linguistic one. It was composed of religious communities each of which had its own internal organization and was controlled by a religious hierarchy. Socially and culturally each community (millet) formed a separate entity, each kept apart from the other. There was no attempt to create uniformity. Consequently, no intercommunal solidarity or social integation evolved in Ottoman society.

49 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine some aspects of the status of women in Morocco in terms of their familial roles and the patterns of domestic interactions that operate within the traditional, patriarchal, extended household.
Abstract: The subordination of women to men in Mediterranean societies is characterized by public segregation, relegation of women to the private sphere of the home, and control of their behavior through the operation of an elaborate code of “Honor and Shame,” a code whose outstanding features are the maintenance of virginity before marriage and strict fidelity after it. The specific expression of these criteria, however, varies greatly between the Christian and Moslem sides of the Mediterranean where two distinct cultural traditions prevail. In this essay, I shall examine some aspects of the status of women in Morocco in terms of their familial roles and the patterns of domestic interactions that operate within the traditional, patriarchal, extended household.

42 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the Middle East, when successful, postures of victory are precarious, subject to the transient recuperation of the vanquished as mentioned in this paper, and attempts to assert primacy, when unsuccessful, have often led to periods of retrenching.
Abstract: Conflict and conflagration are not unique to the Middle East. Rare is the region where, at some point in history, disparate peoples have not clashed and killed. Attempts to assert primacy, when unsuccessful, have often led to periods of retrenching. When successful, postures of victory are precarious, subject to the transient recuperation of the vanquished.

42 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The fall of Baku has been hotly disputed since that fateful day as mentioned in this paper, and one view, held by General Lionel C. Dunsterville, the commander of British troops committed to defend Baku, blames the local forces, especially the Armenians.
Abstract: the fall of the city has been hotly disputed since that fateful day. One view, held by General Lionel C. Dunsterville, the commander of British troops committed to the defense of Baku, blames the local forces, especially the Armenians. The Armenians were undisciplined, uncooperative, lazy, and unreliable in battle; they abandoned their positions as soon as they came under enemy fire. In short, with some exceptions, they were cowards who expected the British to do all the fighting. Under these conditions the small British contingent could not stop the enemy indefinitely. On the night of 14 September, when the local forces showed little inclination to resist a new attack, Dunsterville brought his men back to the safety of the Persian port of Enzeli, thus saving them from certain death. Another view, held by the leaders of the Baku Armenians, ascribes the fall of the city to British perfidy. These critics of British policy claim that Dunsterville did not keep his promise of a large British force for the defense of Baku. The effective British force did not exceed one thousand men and it was secretly withdrawn from the city in the heat of the battle, leaving the local troops, who were fighting valiantly, to their fate. This, the Armenians claim, was nothing less than treachery. Western historians have relied heavily on Dunsterville's published memoirs for their discussion of the British wartime involvement in Transcaucasia and of the Baku events in particular.1 They have, by and large, overlooked the Armenian view. Dunsterville's account, however, fails to withstand a critical examination in the light of recently opened British archival sources. This essay proposes a new interpretation of the British entanglement in Baku. It places most of the responsibility for the British debacle in Baku on Dunsterville's shoulders and gives some support to the critics of the British general. I The Russian revolutions of 1917 demoralized the Russian soldiers in the Caucasus and resulted in their mass exodus. In December, the British War Cabinet resolved to assist the Christian Armenians and Georgians of Transcaucasia in

41 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Marcel A. Boisard1
TL;DR: The legacy of Islam in the field of international law has not yet been studied at length as mentioned in this paper, however, many scholarly publications will deal with various aspects of Islamic history, among which is the contribution of the Arabo-Muslim culture to Western civilisation.
Abstract: On the occasion of the fifteenth century of the hijra , many scholarly publications will deal with various aspects of Islamic history, among which is the contribution of the Arabo-Muslim culture to Western civilisation. Philosophical and scientific contributions have already been discussed many times. The legacy of Islam in the field of international law has, however, not yet been studied at length.

36 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The reign of Reza Shah characterized a difficult and controversial period in the contemporary history of Iran as discussed by the authors, and it may be said that it represented not only the beginning of the Pahlavi dynasty, which reza Shah had founded in December 1925, but also what could be considered pioneering efforts designed to modernize a feudal system in a land that had in the past commanded a venerable culture.
Abstract: The reign of Reza Shah characterized a difficult and controversial period in the contemporary history of Iran. Properly speaking, it may be said that it represented not only the beginning of the Pahlavi dynasty which Reza Shah had founded in December 1925, but also what could be considered pioneering efforts designed to modernize a feudal system in a land that had in the past commanded a venerable culture. The scholarly literature dealing with the earlier period of Reza Shah's rule has developed almost in response to continuing interest shown in things Iranian, and particularly in the country's recent history.

35 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In a collection of essays, Peasant Society and Culture, Robert Redfield stresses that peasants are men of the countryside who are tied to the land and rooted in villages and who, at the same time, must take account of the city as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In his collection of essays, Peasant Society and Culture, Robert Redfield stresses that peasants are men of the countryside who are tied to the land and rooted in villages and who, at the same time, must take account of the city — whether that recognition involves its political power, its marketplace, its beliefs, its style of life, or the people it produces. Redfleld calls attention to two aspects of the interaction between town and countryside. On the one hand he focuses on the linkers, whether men (e.g., dons, senoritos, mandarins, mukhtars) or institutions (temples, schools, castes, mosques, or dramatic companies) of peasants and townsmen; on the other hand he focuses on the cultural materials (beliefs, ceremonies, art forms) they exchange. In both cases Redfield is interested in the process of exchange in its “social organizational” context. That is, he is interested in the day-to-day situations in which beliefs from the “great tradition of the reflective few” are heartily rejected or wholly accepted, or more usually tolerated, accommodated, and perhaps reinterpreted by a “little tradition of the largely unreflective many” (Redfield 1958, p. 70). And he is interested in the opposite process by which the beliefs of the many are accepted or rejected, or more usually tolerated, accommodated, and/or reinterpreted by the reflective few

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The international political implications of the Iranian revolution will not be known for many years to come, and American foreign policy makers and pundits will debate the question of "who lost Iran" long after that.
Abstract: The international political implications of the Iranian revolution will not be known for many years to come, and American foreign policy makers and pundits will debate the question of “who lost Iran” long after that. Even the international economic implications of the revolution will not be fully realized, or recognized, in the near future. It is, however, already amply clear that the fall of the Shah has had profound consequences on Iran's economic and trade relations with other countries, in general, and with the United States in particular. It is to the latter issue that this essay addresses itself.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this view, traditional societies lack the potential for generating significant social change from within this paper, and change results rather from the expansion of communications and diversification of technology worldwide from modem Europe and North America.
Abstract: In the historiography of Egypt it has long been accepted that private ownership of land was introduced in the nineteenth century.' This development in statute law has often been linked analytically to a process of "moderni~ation."~ Modernization theory posits a fundamental dichotomy between two ideal-type societies, the traditional and modern, which implies an equally sharp discontinuity between historical eras: before and after the beginning of modernization. In this view, traditional societies lack the potential for generating significant social change from within. Change results rather from the expansion of communications and diversification of technology worldwide from modem Europe and North America. In the process of modernization, traditional norms and structures break down in the host societies, and new, rational values and institutions emerge in their place. The development of Egypt's new land regime is usually considered one such change.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the focus of both Western and Middle Eastern scholars has hitherto focused on those who were, directly or indirectly, heavily influenced by Western thought and practices, such as at-Tahtawi, Abduh, Rida, Mustafa Kamil, Lutfi as-Sayyid, and those close to them.
Abstract: In discussing the intellectual and religious history of the modern Muslim world, the attention of both Western and Middle Eastern scholars has hitherto focused on those who were, directly or indirectly, heavily influenced by Western thought and practices. For Egypt, the center of Arab intellectual life, we have studies of at-Tahtawi, Abduh, Rida, Mustafa Kamil, Lutfi as-Sayyid, and those close to them; for Turkey studies of the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks, Zia Gokalp, and those influenced by Ataturk's Turkish nationalism; and for Iran of Malkum Khan, Afghani, various Babis, Al-e Ahmad, Shariati, and other Western-influenced thinkers. Naturally, there are large differences in the thought of those qualified here as Western-influenced; even the most traditional aiim usually reflects Western influence in a mediated way. The point is, however, that there has been little analysis of thinkers and leaders who appear to be primarily traditional, whether they be ulama educated entirely in madrasas and carrying out primarily traditional functions, or heads of Sufi orders operating mainly within their own traditions. This concentration by Western and Middle Eastern intellectuals on leaders who were able to a large degree secularized and Westernized has been based on certain generally unspoken assumptions about progress and development. The assumptions are that progress and development include Westernized, secularized educational systems and an increasingly Western lifestyle with a decreased role for both ulama and Sufis, whom it is not particularly important for one concentrating on trends with a viable future to study or understand. Even those who did study “traditionalist” movements such as the Egyptian Muslim Brethren tended to see them as a trend with no future.

Journal ArticleDOI
Peter Gran1
TL;DR: Two frameworks of interpretation of history and society have long struggled with each other in the West and in the Islamic world: one is the modernization theory of the American type, aligned at times with the older orientalism, the other is some form of political economy.
Abstract: Two frameworks of interpretation of history and society have long struggled with each other in the West and in the Islamic world: one is the modernization theory of the American type, aligned at times with the older orientalism, the other is some form of political economy. In the 1970s, the theory of political economy made a belated arrival in American intellectual life and still has scarcely the prestige it has in France, Germany, Italy, or the Islamic countries.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a descriptive comparison of the major Lebanese religious groups along various demographic, social, and economic dimensions and conclude that the recognition of differences as well as similarities among the religious groups is an essential ingredient to future political stability.
Abstract: Although a great deal has been said and written about the religious groups in Lebanon, little reliable factual information exists about them. No doubt this is due to the nature of the Lebanese political system: Since obtaining independence Lebanon has preferred not to conduct a population census, owing to the fear that the results might strain the political formula by which it is governed. The last census of the Lebanese population, conducted in 1932 under the French Mandate, showed a total population of 793,246 with a Christian majority in the ratio of 6 to 5. This has been the basis of the political formula for assigning political and administrative offices for nearly four decades (Salem, 1973, p. 20). The recent events in Lebanon have made it clear that non-observance or denial of religious similarities and differences by no means guarantees political stability. On the contrary, it is the author's belief that the recognition of differences as well as similarities among the religious groups is an essential ingredient to future political stability. The purpose of this paper, then, is to provide a descriptive comparison of the major Lebanese religious groups along various demographic, social, and economic dimensions.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Compte de Bonneval and Baron de Tott were only the most famous of a group of foreign advisers who were employed by the Ottoman government to help reform the military establishment during the eighteenth century.
Abstract: Ever since it had been recognized that the decay of the Ottoman Empire could not be arrested by traditional methods, foreigners and non-Muslims had played a significant part in the Empire's modernization. The Compte de Bonneval and Baron de Tott were only the most famous of a group of foreign advisers who were employed by the Ottoman government to help reform the military establishment during the eighteenth century. During the Tanzimat era, 1839–1876, when the Porte became irrevocably committed to modernization, foreigners and non-Muslims were employed in a multitude of capacities. They ranged from the Prussian Von Moltke who was to advise on the vital problem of reorganizing the army, to Giuseppe Donnizetti, brother of the composer, who was charged with the somewhat less important task of organizing a Western-style military band.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that an accurate historical awareness will add to, not subtract from, our understanding of in this case scripture, and that a true historical view enhances, rather than reduces, our apprehension of humanity's spiritual life.
Abstract: “Religion is poetry plus, not science minus” is a bon mot that I find not only charming but perceptive. Taking a cue from that way of putting things, let me develop a suggestion that an accurate historical awareness will add to, not subtract from, our understanding of in this case scripture. At one time, the historical or historicist interpretation of religious matters was seen as subtracting; as leaving something out. It was called “reductionist”; and was contrasted with theological, or with phenomenological or other, assessments. I will contend, rather, that a true historical view enhances, rather than reduces, our apprehension of humanity's spiritual life. I hope to show how this is so.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The current government under General Jaʻafar el-Numayri has been in power longer than any of its predecessors as mentioned in this paper and its success in ending the sixteen-year-old civil war between north and south has bolstered his position as head of state.
Abstract: The Democratic Republic of the Sudan was among the first of nonsovereign territories in Africa to obtain its independence from European political control. Formerly under the joint sovereignty of Britain and Egypt it became independent on January 1, 1956. Since its declaration of independence, Sudan has experienced three major self-proclaimed revolutions, and the format of government has twice changed between parliamentary democracy and military regimes. As of this writing, the current government under General Jaʻafar el-Numayri has been in power longer than any of its predecessors. General Numayri's success in ending the sixteen-year-old civil war between north and south has bolstered his position as head of state. Consequently, this success and at least three other factors have induced the world to pay considerable attention to Sudan.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, this paper argued that it was in the interest of the new regime of 1852, whose establishment was made possible by the support of the bourgeoisie, to favor the investment of capital acquired by its supporters, and to find new outlets abroad for the goods produced at an ever growing rate by France's new factories.
Abstract: French economic development under the July Monarchy led the class that most benefited by it, the bourgeoisie, to demand increased political power. It was in the interest of the new regime of 1852, whose establishment was made possible by the support of the bourgeoisie, to favor the investment of capital acquired by its supporters, and to find new outlets abroad for the goods produced at an ever growing rate by France's new factories.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: As far as I am concerned I remember that the first elements of Arab consciousness began to filter into my mind as a student in secondary schools, wherfrom I went out with my fellow schoolboys on strike on December 2nd [sic] of every year as a protest against the Balfour declaration whereby England gave the Jews a national home usurped unjustlu from its legal owners as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: As far as I am concerned I remember that the first elements of Arab consciousness began to filter into my mind as a student in secondary schools, wherfrom I went out with my fellow schoolboys on strike on December 2nd [sic] of every year as a protest against the Balfour declaration whereby England gave the Jews a national home usurped unjustlu from its legal owners.

Journal ArticleDOI
James Allman1
TL;DR: An analysis of recent fluctuations in fertility throughout the Middle East and North Africa including a discussion of the kinds of data needed for future analysis of the factors associated with fertility changes and the conditions which will favor or hinder an acceleration of the demographic transition in the region.
Abstract: Recent data from the Middle East and North Africa suggest that Dudley Kirks generalization about an accelerated demographic transition may apply to the Middle East and North Africa as well as to those regions where more information was available when he wrote his article. While fertility rates for the region remain generally very high there have been important declines in Egypt Turkey Tunisia and Lebanon. Differential fertility patterns based generally on urbanization occupation social class income and levels of education have developed in Algeria Morocco Jordan and Iran. These patterns may be forerunners of fertility declines as has been the case in other regions of the world. On the other hand there are some indications that fertility is increasing in some countries possibly in Saudi Arabia and the lower Gulf States. This paper provides an analysis of recent fluctuations in fertility throughout the Middle East and North Africa including a discussion of the kinds of data needed for future analysis of the factors associated with fertility changes and the conditions which will favor or hinder an acceleration of the demographic transition in the region. (excerpt)

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors tried to show that the revolutionary character ascribed to the Shi'i ulama in Iran has been greatly exaggerated and argued that the ulama's perception of the socioeconomic and political structure of Iranian society often did not basically differ from that of the secular power elite.
Abstract: In several scholarly works it has been asserted that opposition to tyranny is a fundamental and pervasive characteristic of Shi'i Islam.1 Here I shall try to show that the revolutionary character ascribed to the Shi'i ulama in Iran has been greatly exaggerated. I will argue that the ulama's perception of the socio-economic and political structure of Iranian society often did not basically differ from that of the secular power elite. Further, I will analyze the causes of the opposition of the ulama to the state during the early 1960s. It was in large part his analysis of these events that made Algar partially amend his conclusion to his study of the ulama in Qajar Iran, namely “that they failed to perceive the nature of what was being demanded and its implication for Iran and themselves.”2


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For nearly three centuries after the famous Battle of Poitiers (Tours), which is usually regarded as the high-water mark of Arab/Muslim expansion into Western Europe, the Muslims continued to maintain a series of relatively isolated presences in regions of Western Europe outside the Iberian Peninsula as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: For nearly three centuries after the famous Battle of Poitiers (Tours), which is usually regarded as the high-water mark of Arab/Muslim expansion into Western Europe, the Muslims continued to maintain a series of relatively isolated presences in regions of Western Europe outside the Iberian Peninsula. Although these presences have tended to be forgotten within the larger picture of Muslim/Christian relationships during the medieval period, the researches of some nineteenth and twentieth century scholars would seem to indicate that they left behind a considerably larger legacy than has previously been suspected.



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper presented an analysis of the pre-1958 political system in Iraq based on explanatory factors which are relevant to an understanding of the nature of similar pre-radical regimes in other Arab States and to understand how and why such political systems were transformed.
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to present an analysis of the pre-1958 political system in Iraq based on explanatory factors which are relevant to an understanding of the nature of similar pre-radical regimes in other Arab States and to an understanding of how and why such political systems were transformed. In order to understand the qualitative nature of the systemic change in the Arab States in the twentieth century it is essential to move away from concepts like “traditional” and “modern” and the rise of “new men” or “new social forces.” To explain how one kind of political system changed to another one requires the abstraction of those features which indicate the positive rather than residual attributes of that earlier system. Indeed some recent studies have attempted to do this, with analytic and conceptual awareness.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the early 1920s, the debate over the future of Palestine and recriminations over the broken promises of the past were at a fever pitch, and it had become clear that British control over Palestine would be formalized by a League of Nations Mandate which would then irnplement the provisions of the Balfour Declaration.
Abstract: When Winston Churchill visited Palestine in March, 1921, the debate over the future of Palestine and the recriminations over the broken promises of the past were at a fever pitch. It had become clear that British control over Palestine would be formalized by a League of Nations Mandate which would then irnplement the provisions of the Balfour Declaration. In Haifa, a delegation of Muslim and Christian Arabs met with Churchill to express their views on the intensifying conflict in Palestine. Churchill was given a prophetic warning, the accuracy of which has been of profound significance in the recent history of the Middle East:Today the Arabs belief in England is not what it was.… If England does not take up the cause of the Arabs, other powers will. From India, Mesopotamia, the Hedjaz andPalestine the cry goes up to England now. If she does not listen, then perhaps Russia will take up their call some day, or perhaps even Germany.