Showing papers in "International Organization in 1995"
TL;DR: The authors show that there will exist negotiated settlements that rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight under very broad conditions, under the assumption that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it.
Abstract: Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain. Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain. Historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible.
3,062 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a complex process of globalization of goods and assets is undermining the effectiveness of state-based collective action, and the residual state retains great cultural force, and innovative projects for reinventing government are being tried.
Abstract: Globalization transforms collective action in domestic and international politics. As the scale of markets widens and as economic organization becomes more complex, the institutional scale of political structures can become insufficient for the provision of an appropriate range of public goods. A process of this sort occurred prior to the emergence of the modern nation-state, which itself constituted a paradigmatic response to this predicament. Today, however, a complex process of globalization of goods and assets is undermining the effectiveness of state-based collective action. Overlapping “playing fields” are developing, made up of increasingly heterogeneous—transnational, local, and intermediate—arenas. The residual state retains great cultural force, and innovative projects for reinventing government are being tried. Nevertheless, the state's effectiveness as a civil association has eroded significantly, and this may lead to a crisis of legitimacy.
675 citations
TL;DR: The relationship between left-labor power and fiscal expansions has increased with greater trade and capital mobility as discussed by the authors, and the political left and organized labor have had to pay a price for these expansions.
Abstract: The conventional wisdom about the domestic political effects of economic internationalization in recent decades is overdrawn and too simple. Increasing exposure to trade and capital mobility has not led all countries to pursue the same types of economic policies. The political power of the left and the strength of organized labor still have a marked bearing on macroeconomic policy. Rather than being constrained by internationalization, the relationship between left-labor power and fiscal expansions has increased with greater trade and capital mobility. However, the political left and organized labor have had to pay a price for these expansions. With greater exposure to world market forces, left-labor power has been increasingly associated with lower levels of corporate taxation and with higher interest rates. Nonetheless, common assertions about the demise of partisan politics must be reconsidered.
465 citations
TL;DR: The role of global norms in defining states' interests, rather than viewing norms solely as external constraints on state behavior, has been examined in this paper, where the crucial role of a strengthened global norm of racial equality in motivating U.S. anti-apartheid sanctions is discussed.
Abstract: The extraordinary success of transnational anti-apartheid activists in generating great power sanctions against South Africa offers ample evidence that norms, independent of strategic and economic considerations, are an important factor in determining states' policies. The crucial role of a strengthened global norm of racial equality in motivating U.S. anti-apartheid sanctions illustrates the limitations of conventional international relations theories, which rely primarily on structural and material interest explanations, and supports theoretically derived constructivist claims. In particular, this case suggests that analysts should examine the role of global norms in defining states' interests, rather than viewing norms solely as external constraints on state behavior.
393 citations
TL;DR: This paper showed how extant domestic institutions mediate in this relationship between internationally induced changes in domestic actors' policy preferences, on the one hand, and national policy and institutional outcomes on the other.
Abstract: Many analysts associate internationalization of markets with wide-ranging changes in domestic politics. An “open polity” approach shows how extant domestic institutions mediate in this relationship between internationally induced changes in domestic actors' policy preferences, on the one hand, and national policy and institutional outcomes on the other. The nature of labor unions and formal political institutions often results in political outcomes that differ significantly from those that would ensue if outcomes simply mirrored preference changes. In addition, while existing institutions may sometimes constrain governments from pursuing policies that would improve long-term economic performance, governments will often fail to change these institutions because of short-term political considerations.
382 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli offer a neofunctionalist account of the legal system of the European Union and argue that the Court of Justice has been the prime mover in European legal integration and national governments passively have accepted the court's lead.
Abstract: Developments in the European Union (EU) since the mid-1980s have generated considerable debate on the dynamics of the pooling of sovereignty and concomitant reductions in the authority of national governments.1 While most attention has been paid to the EU's internal market and monetary integration, its legal system is the clearest manifestation of burgeoning supranationalism. European law has "direct effect" in national jurisdictions (that is, it applies even if it has not been incorporated into domestic law). It also has supremacy over conflicting domestic laws. The 1958 Treaty of Rome and its subsequent amendments (the 1987 Single European Act and the 1993 Treaty on European Union) operate as a de facto constitution. Finally, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) exercises judicial review not only over interactions between member states but also over the behavior of governments within their national boundaries. In a recent article in this journal, Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli offer a neofunctionalist account of this remarkable legal system.2 They assert that the Court of Justice has been the prime mover in European legal integration and that national governments passively have accepted the court's lead. European law, they argue, operates both as a "mask" that conceals the real effects of legal integration and as a "shield" that effectively insulates the legal system from political tampering by member governments. In turn, Burley and Mattli contend that this explanation is superior to what they term the "neorationalist" accounts that I have given in this journal, and elsewhere with
375 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, social identity theory is used to argue that interstate relations are inherently competitive and that for cognitive and motivated reasons, competition, which can be coercive or cooperative, characterizes international politics.
Abstract: Is there escape from a self-help system? Realists say no. They assume states are egoistic actors in anarchy; this means states must either look out for themselves or risk destruction: structure generates a self-help system. Constructivists think escape is possible. Because identities are made, not given, we should not make a priori assumptions of state egoism: process generates self-help. Process could also generate an other-help security system. This article introduces a third approach that uses social identity theory to argue that interstate relations are inherently competitive. Thus, for cognitive and motivated—rather than structural or social—reasons, competition, which can be coercive or cooperative, characterizes international politics.
329 citations
TL;DR: The role of contingency, domination, and resistance has played in the operation of the prohibitionary norm against chemical weapons use as a symbol of uncivilized conduct in international relations as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: How is it, that among the countless technological innovations in weaponry, chemical weapons stand out as weapons that carry the stigma of moral illegitimacy. To provide an adequate account of the prohibitionary norm against chemical weapons use, one must understand the meanings that have served to constitute and delegitimize this category of weapons. Such an account is provided by genealogy, a method that examines the interpretive practices around which moral orders are constructed and behaviors are defined as normal or unacceptable. The genealogical method yields insights that illuminate neglected dimensions of the chemical weapons taboo: namely, the roles that contingency, domination, and resistance have played in the operation of this norm as a symbol of “uncivilized” conduct in international relations.
258 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge, when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection, and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives.
Abstract: Nontariff barriers to trade are most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups, when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection, and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives. Statistical results based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s support the argument that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge. More attention should be devoted to the interaction between societal and statist factors in cross-national studies of trade policy.
234 citations
TL;DR: This paper proposed a third type of indicator, the institutional attributes of the welfare state, to explain how domestic political institutions influence the evolution of international cooperation and how welfare principles institutionalized at the domestic level shape the participation of developed countries in the international aid regime.
Abstract: Foreign aid often is interpreted as an international projection of domestic income redistribution mechanisms, and many authors suggest that differences between welfare states account for variations in donor behavior. A new understanding of the welfare state can improve traditional explanations of this linkage. Existing studies of the welfare–aid relationship use two welfare state indicators: domestic spending and partisan politics. We propose a third type of indicator—the institutional attributes of the welfare state—and demonstrate its relevance. The level of foreign aid provided by a country varies with social spending, but even more so with the degree to which its welfare state embodies socialist attributes. This finding helps explain how domestic political institutions influence the evolution of international cooperation and, specifically, how welfare principles institutionalized at the domestic level shape the participation of developed countries in the international aid regime.
228 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors measure and explain the effect of international environmental institutions on the behavior of states and other actors and on the natural environment in three steps: first, they measure the outcome to be explained in terms of goal attainment, defined as the difference, over time or across cases, between actor behavior or the state of the environment on dimensions identified by institutional goals and certain end points determined by institutional goal.
Abstract: Analysts of international politics can measure and explain the effect of international environmental institutions on the behavior of states and other actors and on the natural environment in three steps. First, we measure the outcome to be explained in terms of goal attainment, defined as the difference, over time or across cases, between actor behavior or the state of the natural environment on dimensions identified by institutional goals and certain end points determined by institutional goals. Second, we assess the effect of an institution in terms of the extent to which the existence or operation of the institution contributes, ceteris paribus, to variation in goal attainment. We transform these two variables into a score of institutional effectiveness to indicate the degree to which institutions contribute to the resolution of the environmental problems that motivate their establishment. Third, we analyze the relationship between institutional effectiveness and specific dimensions of institutional design—such as decision-making rules, membership and access conditions, and the compliance system.
TL;DR: The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a strategic rational actor in its own right, with a well-internalized mandate to promote European integration according to the aims set forth in the Treaty of Rome as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Geoffrey Garrett now agrees with most of what we set out to prove in our original article.' First, we all now concur on the significance of the phenomenon under study. Garrett originally described the European Community legal system as the straightforward implementation of member state wishes.2 He now acknowledges that we have witnessed the construction of a "remarkable legal system," one not foreseen by the signatories to the Treaty of Rome.3 Second, Garrett now accepts our description of the court as a strategic rational actor in its own right, with a well-internalized mandate to promote European integration according to the aims set forth in the treaty.4 Third, whereas Garrett's original model takes account only of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the member states as the principal actors, he now agrees with our claim that the primary mechanism for the expansion of European law has been the court's
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose four additional ideal-type images, each of which is likely to lead to a specified set of strategic behaviors and apply to dyadic relations across the Persian Gulf from 1977 through 1990.
Abstract: Systemic theories of international politics are inadequate for explaining particular states' policies, and some neorealists reach for supplementary foreign-policy-level concepts. Yet these studies almost never provide the empirical evidence required by their motivational constructs. Available psychological studies rely too heavily on notions peculiar to the cold war—such as the image of the enemy. A new theory proposes four additional ideal-type images. Each image is likely to lead to a specified set of strategic behaviors. An application to dyadic relations across the Persian Gulf from 1977 through 1990 suggests that this theory can help account for otherwise puzzling behavior, and it illustrates a promising route toward a more sensitive interactionist international relations theory suited both to the former superpower relationship and to diverse others.
TL;DR: In this view, a Hobson's choice between anarchy and hierarchy is not necessary because an intermediary structure, here dubbed "negarchy" is also available as mentioned in this paper, which is a theory of security that is superior to realism because it addresses not only threats of war from other states but also the threat of despotism at home.
Abstract: A rediscovery of the long-forgotten republican version of liberal political theory has arresting implications for the theory and practice of international relations. Republican liberalism has a theory of security that is superior to realism, because it addresses not only threats of war from other states but also the threat of despotism at home. In this view, a Hobson's choice between anarchy and hierarchy is not necessary because an intermediary structure, here dubbed “negarchy,” is also available. The American Union from 1787 until 1861 is a historical example. This Philadelphian system was not a real state since, for example, the union did not enjoy a monopoly of legitimate violence. Yet neither was it a state system, since the American states lacked sufficient autonomy. While it shared some features with the Westphalian system such as balance of power, it differed fundamentally. Its origins owed something to particular conditions of time and place, and the American Civil War ended this system. Yet close analysis indicates that it may have surprising relevance for the future of contemporary issues such as the European Union and nuclear governance.
TL;DR: This article explore the hypothesis that transnational authority structures construct state identities and interests and propose a constructivist approach to examine the relationship between authority relations between states in informal empires, which is similar to our approach.
Abstract: Contemporary international politics embody a tension between formal equality and de facto inequality. States recognize each other as sovereign equals, yet the strong still push around the weak. Among the structures that reflect this tension are informal empires. The dominant assumptions in mainstream international relations theory, materialism and rationalism, privilege the formal equality of states in informal empires a priori: materialism by assuming that authority relations cannot exist between sovereign states; rationalism by assuming that states are sovereign over their own interests. A constructivist approach allows one to explore the hypothesis that transnational authority structures construct state identities and interests. An empirical analysis of the Soviet-East German relationship supports this hypothesis, which raises questions about the emerging study of international governance.
TL;DR: This article examined how institutions can shape the very interests and roles of states in such a manner as to encourage the development of relatively stable expectations and shared norms; that is, regional order.
Abstract: What accounts for the development of the Arab states system from the explosive mix of Arab nationalism and sovereignty to their simultaneous existence? To understand this development, one must first examine how institutions can shape the very interests and roles of states in such a manner as to encourage the development of relatively stable expectations and shared norms; that is, regional order. This approach illuminates how inter-Arab interactions and state formation processes led to the consolidation of sovereignty and a meaning of Arab nationalism that is consistent with sovereignty. Consequently, this region highlights how sovereignty—and its lack thereof—is consequential for understanding interstate dynamics, and how different meanings of the nation have different implications for security.
TL;DR: A transnational community of disarmament proponents achieved considerable success in influencing Soviet security policy in the 1980s on several issues, including two examined here: nuclear testing and strategic defenses as mentioned in this paper. But fundamental changes in the Soviet domestic structure after 1989, however, had the paradoxical effect of making transnational actors simultaneously less constrained in promoting their favored policies and less effective in getting them implemented.
Abstract: A transnational community of disarmament proponents achieved considerable success in influencing Soviet security policy in the 1980s on several issues, including two examined here: nuclear testing and strategic defenses. Fundamental changes in the Soviet domestic structure after 1989, however, had the paradoxical effect of making transnational actors simultaneously less constrained in promoting their favored policies and less effective in getting them implemented. Transnational relations and domestic structures in combination affect security policy. This interaction likewise has implications for theories of ideas, learning, and epistemic communities.
TL;DR: The authors argue that structural realism will not die as the cornerstone of international relations theory until an alternative is developed that takes its place, and in the absence of that alternative, students of world politics will continue to use it as their cornerstone; in an important sense, structural realism continues to define the discipline.
Abstract: Is realism dead? Has it finally succumbed to the theoretical and empirical onslaught to which it has been subjected? If the answer is yes, which theories have taken its place? If the answer is no, what explains its durability?' I argue in this essay that structural realism, qua theory, must be viewed as deeply and perhaps fatally flawed. Yet at the same time, qua paradigm or worldview, it continues to inform the community of international relations scholars. The reason for this apparent paradox is no less sociological than epistemological. Borrowing from Thomas Kuhn, I argue that structural realism will not die as the cornerstone of international relations theory until an alternative is developed that takes its place.2 In the absence of that alternative, students of world politics will continue to use it as their cornerstone; in an important sense, structural realism continues to define the discipline.
TL;DR: After the economic crisis of the early 1980s, developing countries adopted new policies regarding intellectual property protection only as a result of a coercive U.S. strategy, consistent with a neorealist explanation based on power as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: After the economic crisis of the early 1980s, developing countries adopted new policies regarding intellectual property protection only as a result of a coercive U.S. strategy, consistent with a neorealist explanation based on power. Targeted countries have complied only on paper, not in practice, however. In contrast, hegemonic powers have not employed overt coercion in the area of antitrust policy, consistent with interpretivist neoliberalism, which emphasizes learning and voluntarism. A nuanced analysis of power and ideas is necessary to account for the differences between the cases. The different mechanisms through which the new policies have been adopted suggest different prospects for these new policies.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain the stop-and-go nature of European integration and propose a new theoretical framework termed "dialectical functionalism" to describe the process of integration as one of action and reaction.
Abstract: Theories of integration fail to explain the stop-and-go nature of European integration. This failures stems from their one-sided attention to either the member states or the institutions of the European Union (EU). The process of integration is best described as one of action and reaction, involving the institutions of the EU, member states, and interest groups. Governments respond to European integration in one policy area by intervening more in adjacent areas, thus inducing policy competition between national states. When their rivalry becomes counterproductive, member states will be motivated to take new steps toward further integration. This interpretation explains the stop-and-go rhythm of European integration and results in a new theoretical framework termed ‘dialectical functionalism.’
TL;DR: A growing literature in international relations concludes that democratic states pursue distinctive foreign policies as mentioned in this paper, and that democracies do not engage each other in war and only rarely engage another country in serious disputes short of war.
Abstract: A growing literature in international relations concludes that democratic states pursue distinctive foreign policies. Specifically, democracies do not engage each other in war and only rarely engage each other in serious disputes short of war. Scholars have offered three basic explanations to support these findings. Each of the three invokes a different explanatory variable: norms, checks and balances, and trade. None of the three, however, provides a convincing explanation of the peace that is said to prevail between democratic polities: the distinction between norms and interests is unclear; substitutes for checks and balances exists in nondemocracies; and trade can deter conflict only under restrictive conditions.
TL;DR: It is argued that the transnationalization of the labor market blurs the boundaries between foreign and domestic constituents for unions, causing unions to resist those restrictionist immigration measures that impede organization of foreign-born workers.
Abstract: This article seeks to enhance our understanding of why the United States resisted restrictionist [immigration] legislation in the late twentieth century during times when one may have expected a movement toward closure as occurred in the 1920s....The article will supplement a state-centric approach with insights from the perspective of complex interdependence--the significance of transnational relations and the blurring of foreign and domestic politics. I will argue that the societal groups that influence the formation of U.S. immigration policy contain a transnational component which contributes to the maintenance of relatively open legislation....More specifically I will argue that the transnationalization of the labor market...blurs the boundaries between foreign and domestic constituents for unions causing unions to resist those restrictionist immigration measures that impede organization of foreign-born workers. Hence the pressures for restrictionism are weaker than anticipated by the conventional wisdom that expects labor to lobby for closure. (EXCERPT)
TL;DR: A review of the state of the art regarding the economic development of the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) can be found in this article, where the focus on states versus markets is becoming stale and that much of the scholarly interest lies in the politics behind the economics.
Abstract: The publication of books by both Alice Amsden and Robert Wade provide an opportune moment to reflect on the study of East Asian development.' After an initial surge of interest beginning in the 1970s, the field has reached a plateau, and scholars recently have cast a wide net in searching for ways to extend the field. In assessing the "state of the art" regarding the economic development of the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs), this review will treat three themes. First, I will argue that the focus on states versus markets is becoming stale and that much of the scholarly interest lies in the politics behind the economics. Second, I argue that political scientists have underexplored the historical origins of Korean and Taiwanese capitalism and that such attention promises to strengthen both theories and explanations of development. Third, I argue that the international system has been more important in promoting development in East Asia than accounts in the "first wave" have recognized. The purpose of this review is to assess the field, reveal
TL;DR: In this paper, the second-ranking powers' decisions to shoulder the burden of developing independent nuclear forces are at odds with collective goods arguments that portray especially strong temptations to ride free in the circumstances that prevailed at that time, a system dominated by two superpowers, each possessing large nuclear deterrent arsenals that could easily be employed on behalf of allies.
Abstract: The collective goods theory of alliances and neorealist theory yield conflicting expectations about the security policies of states. The former emphasizes the temptation to “ride free” on the efforts of others, while the latter emphasizes the incentives for self-help. In the cases of Britain, China, and France during the early cold war, the constraints identified by neorealist theory, reinforced by the advent of nuclear weapons, prevailed. Each discounted the value of the security benefits superpower partners could provide. The second-ranking powers' decisions to shoulder the burden of developing independent nuclear forces are at odds with collective goods arguments that portray especially strong temptations to ride free in the circumstances that prevailed at that time—an international system dominated by two superpowers, each possessing large nuclear deterrent arsenals that could easily be employed on behalf of allies. This analysis suggests that present efforts to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons by offering them international security guarantees are unlikely to succeed.
TL;DR: The most coherent explanation of the international arrangements pertaining to the issue-area of civil aviation is presented in this paper, where structural realism is used to compare against institutionalism and modified structural realism.
Abstract: Measured against institutionalism and modified structural realism, realism provides the most coherent explanation of the international arrangements pertaining to the issue-area of civil aviation. Although institutionalized international organizations govern technical and safety issues, no single regime has emerged to govern the important commercial matters that bear on states' relative gains and losses. Instead, since World War I states have entered into a multiplicity of denounceable bilateral agreements that in turn reflect the balance of bargaining power between them. States that have attempted to reorganize the system have been driven by their own interests and capabilities, with the stronger aviation powers professing a preference for liberalism.
TL;DR: In this article, the U.S. government influenced corporate decision making by augmenting corporate perceptions of risk so that prudent business stategies reinforced diplomatic preferences, leading to three subsequent sanctions efforts (Nicaragua, Libya and South Africa).
Abstract: One of the lessons drawn by many scholars from the 1982 U.S. sanctions against the Soviet-European gas pipeline was that the decline of American hegemony and the global spread of American business placed the overseas networks of U.S. multinational corporations beyond the control of the U.S. government for the purposes of economic sanctions. Through systematically examining three subsequent sanctions efforts (Nicaragua, Libya, and South Africa), this study qualifies the generalizability of this “lesson.” In none of the cases was the United States willing to incur alliance costs through applying extraterritorial controls, nor was it able to persuade American firms to substitute public preferences for private ones. Nonetheless, in each case, the U.S. government influenced corporate decision making by augmenting corporate perceptions of risk so that prudent business stategies reinforced diplomatic preferences.