Showing papers in "International Organization in 2000"
TL;DR: The authors argue that actors have a third mode of social action at their disposal: arguing and deliberating about the validity claims inherent in any communicative statement about identities, interests, and the state of the world.
Abstract: This article introduces a mode of social action and interaction that has so far been largely overlooked in the U.S.-dominated international relations debate between rational choice and social constructivism that focuses mainly on the differences between instrumental rationality and norm-guided behavior. Drawing on insights from a theoretical debate within the Germanspeaking international relations community, I suggest that actors have a third mode of social action at their disposal: arguing and deliberating about the validity claims inherent in any communicative statement about identities, interests, and the state of the world. Arguing and truth-seeking behavior presuppose that actors no longer hold fixed interests during their communicative interaction but are open to persuasion, challenges, and counterchallenges geared toward reaching a reasoned consensus. The preconditions for argumentative rationality, particularly a “common lifeworld” and the mutual recognition of speakers as equals in a nonhierarchical relationship, are more common in international relations than is usually assumed. Arguing processes are more likely to occur the more actors are uncertain about their interests and even identities, the less they know about the situation in which they find themselves and the underlying “rules of the game,” and the more apparently irreconcilable differences prevent them from reaching an optimal rather than a merely satisfactory solution for a widely perceived problem (“problem solving”). Moreover, arguing is likely to increase the influence of the materially less powerful, be it small states or nonstate actors such as INGOs. I illustrate these claims empirically with two plausibility probes. The first concerns the East–West talks leading to a negotiated settlement of the Cold War in Europe and German unification within NATO. The second case focuses on the implementation of international human rights norms into domestic practices of Third World states.
2,008 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine why international actors seek different types of legalized arrangements to solve political and substantive problems and show how particular forms of legalization provide superior institutional solutions in different circumstances.
Abstract: We examine why international actors—including states, firms, and activists—seek different types of legalized arrangements to solve political and substantive problems. We show how particular forms of legalization provide superior institutional solutions in different circumstances. We begin by examining the baseline advantages of “hard” legalization (that is, precise, legally binding obligations with appropriate third-party delegation). We emphasize, however, that actors often prefer softer forms of legalization (that is, various combinations of reduced precision, less stringent obligation, and weaker delegation). Soft legalization has a number of significant advantages, including that it is easier to achieve, provides strategies for dealing with uncertainty, infringes less on sovereignty, and facilitates compromise among differentiated actors.Although our approach is largely interest-based, we explicitly incorporate the normative elements that are central in law and in recent international relations theorizing. We also consider the important role of nonstate actors who, along with states, are central participants in contemporary international legalization. We illustrate the advantages of various forms of international legal arrangements with examples drawn from articles in this special issue and elsewhere.
1,415 citations
TL;DR: In contrast to most international regimes, human rights regimes are not generally enforced by interstate action as discussed by the authors, and the distinctiveness of such regimes lies instead in their empowerment of individual citizens to bring suit to challenge the domestic activities of their own government.
Abstract: The e ftieth anniversary of the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights marks an appropriate moment to reconsider the reasons why governments construct international regimes to adjudicate and enforce human rights. Such regimes include those established under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These arrangements differ from most other forms of institutionalizedinternational cooperation in both their ends and their means. Unlike international institutions governing trade, monetary, environmental, or security policy, international human rights institutions are not designed primarily to regulate policy externalities arising from societal interactions across borders, but to hold governments accountable for purely internal activities.In contrast to most international regimes, moreover, human rights regimes are not generally enforced by interstate action.Although most arrangements formally empower governments to challenge one another, such challenges almost never occur. The distinctiveness of such regimes lies instead in their empowerment of individual citizens to bring suit to challenge the domestic activities of their own government. Independent courts and commissions attached to such regimes often respond to such individual claimsby judging that the applicationof domestic rules or legislationviolates international commitments,even where such legislationhas been
959 citations
TL;DR: This paper developed an empirically based conception of international legalization to show how law and politics are intertwined across a wide range of institutional forms and to frame the analytic and empirical articles that follow in this volume.
Abstract: We develop an empirically based conception of international legalization to show how law and politics are intertwined across a wide range of institutional forms and to frame the analytic and empirical articles that follow in this volume. International legalization is a form of institutionalization characterized by three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation. Obligation means that states are legally bound by rules or commitments and therefore subject to the general rules and procedures of international law. Precision means that the rules are definite, unambiguously defining the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation grants authority to third parties for the implementation of rules, including their interpretation and application, dispute settlement, and (possibly) further rule making. These dimensions are conceptually independent, and each is a matter of degree and gradation. Their various combinations produce a remarkable variety of international legalization. We illustrate a continuum ranging from “hard” legalization (characteristically associated with domestic legal systems) through various forms of “soft” legalization to situations where law is largely absent. Most international legalization lies between the extremes, where actors combine and invoke varying degrees of obligation, precision, and delegation to create subtle blends of politics and law.
905 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the theoretical implications of the observation that ethnic identities are socially constructed for explaining ethnic violence, distinguishing between two classes of mechanisms: individuals are viewed as the agents who construct identities, and constructivist explanations for ethnic violence tend to merge with analyses that stress strategic action by both elites and mass publics.
Abstract: We examine the theoretical implications of the observation that ethnic identities are socially constructed for explaining ethnic violence, distinguishing between two classes of mechanisms. If individuals are viewed as the agents who construct identities, then constructivist explanations for ethnic violence tend to merge with analyses that stress strategic action by both elites and mass publics. In contrast, if discursive formations are the agents that construct ethnic identities, then constructivist explanations tend to merge with accounts that stress internal logics of specific cultures. Using the books under review as a “sample,” we find considerable evidence linking strategic aspects of ethnic identity construction to violence and more limited evidence implicating discursive systems. The most common narrative in these texts has largescale ethnic violence provoked by elites, often motivated by intra-ethnic conflicts. Followers follow, despite the costs, out of increased fear of thugs and armies “let go” by elites (both the other side's and their “own”) and often in pursuit of local grievances that may have little ethnic component. Several other mechanisms are also discussed, including the role of discursive systems in conditioning publics for violence and the role of violent efforts to enforce “everyday primordialism” by policing supposedly primordial ethnic boundaries.
900 citations
TL;DR: In many issue-areas, the world is witnessing a move to law as mentioned in this paper, as governments and individuals faced the following international legal actions: the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Britain's ban on homosexuals in the armed forces violates the right to privacy, contravening Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Abstract: In many issue-areas, the world is witnessing a move to law. As the century turned, governments and individuals faced the following international legal actions. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Britain's ban on homosexuals in the armed forces violates the right to privacy, contravening Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia indicted Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic during a NATO bombing campaign to force Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo. Milosevic remains in place in Belgrade, but Austrian police, bearing a secret indictment from the International Criminal Tribunal, arrested a Bosnian Serb general who was attending a conference in Vienna. In economic affairs the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body found in favor of the United States and against the European Union (EU) regarding European discrimination against certain Latin American banana exporters. A U.S. district court upheld the constitutionality of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) against claims that its dispute-resolution provisions violated U. S. sovereignty. In a notable environmental judgment, the new Law of the Sea Tribunal ordered the Japanese to cease all fishing for southern bluefin tuna for the rest of the year.
532 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify two ideal types of international third-party dispute resolution: interstate and transnational, and identify the types of cases brought under transnational dispute resolution lead more readily to challenges of state actions by international courts.
Abstract: We identify two ideal types of international third-party dispute resolution: interstate and transnational. Under interstate dispute resolution, states closely control selection of, access to, and compliance with international courts and tribunals. Under transnational dispute resolution, by contrast, individuals and nongovernmental entities have significant influence over selection, access, and implementation. This distinction helps to explain the politics of international legalization—in particular, the initiation of cases, the tendency of courts to challenge national governments, the extent of compliance with judgments, and the long-term evolution of norms within legalized international regimes. By reducing the transaction costs of setting the process in motion and establishing new constituencies, transnational dispute resolution is more likely than interstate dispute resolution to generate a large number of cases. The types of cases brought under transnational dispute resolution lead more readily to challenges of state actions by international courts. Transnational dispute resolution tends to be associated with greater compliance with international legal judgments, particularly when autonomous domestic institutions such as the judiciary mediate between individuals and the international institutions. Overall, transnational dispute resolution enhances the prospects for long-term deepening and widening of international legalization.
431 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the dimensionality and stability of global conflict as well as the substantive content of the voting alignments that have replaced the Cold War East-West dimension.
Abstract: I apply nominate scaling to analyze a database of Cold War and post–Cold War roll call votes in the United Nations General Assembly. I investigate the dimensionality and stability of global conflict as well as the substantive content of the voting alignments that have replaced the Cold War East-West dimension. I find that post–Cold War conflict in the UN General Assembly is mostly one-dimensional. This single dimension positions countries on a continuum that runs from a group of Western countries at one extreme to a “counterhegemonic” bloc of countries that frequently clashes with the West, and the United States in particular. Levels of democracy and wealth are important independent determinants of the voting behavior of states. The positions of countries along the single dimension are remarkably stable across time, issue area, and issue importance. Except for the Eastern European countries switching sides, they are very similar to the positions on the Cold War East-West dimension. Contrary to expectations, post–Cold War conflict shows little resemblance to Cold War North-South conflict.
413 citations
TL;DR: The puzzle of NATO's persistence is best addressed as part of a larger inquiry into institutional change as mentioned in this paper, and whether institutions adapt to change depends on whether their norms, rules, and procedures are specific or general assets and on whether the asset mix matches the kinds of security problems faced by their members.
Abstract: The puzzle of NATO's persistence is best addressed as part of a larger inquiry into institutional change. Institutions persist because they are costly to create and less costly to maintain, but this institutionalist argument is incomplete. Whether institutions adapt to change depends on whether their norms, rules, and procedures are specific or general assets and on whether the asset mix matches the kinds of security problems faced by their members. Assets specific to coping with external threats will not be useful for coping with problems of instability and mistrust, so alliances with only the former will disappear when threats disappear. Alliances that have specific institutional assets for dealing with instability and mistrust and general institutional assets will be adaptable to environments that lack threats. I assess these hypotheses in a test case of NATO's institutional assets during and after the Cold War.
381 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors suggest some possible negative consequences of legalization, arguing that these consequences must be weighed against the positive effects of legalization on increasing national compliance, since the case for further legalization must be strong to justify far-reaching change in the global trade regime.
Abstract: If the purpose of legalization is to enhance international cooperation, more may not always be better. Achieving the optimal level of legalization requires finding a balance between reducing the risks of opportunism and reducing the potential negative effects of legalization on domestic political processes. The global trade regime, which aims to liberalize trade, has become increasingly legalized over time. Increased legalization has changed the information environment and the nature of government obligations, which in turn have affected the pattern of mobilization of domestic interest groups on trade. From the perspective of encouraging the future expansion of liberal trade, we suggest some possible negative consequences of legalization, arguing that these consequences must be weighed against the positive effects of legalization on increasing national compliance. Since the weakly legalized GATT institution proved sufficient to sustain widespread liberalization, the case for further legalization must be strong to justify far-reaching change in the global trade regime.
350 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the influence of trade flows on military disputes of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), a broad class of commercial institutions that includes free trade areas, common markets, and customs unions, is examined.
Abstract: The relationship between foreign trade and political conflict has been a persistent source of controversy among scholars of international relations. Existing empirical studies of this topic have focused on the effects of trade flows on conflict, but they have largely ignored the institutional context in which trade is conducted. In this article we present some initial quantitative results pertaining to the influence on military disputes of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), a broad class of commercial institutions that includes free trade areas, common markets, and customs unions. We argue that parties to the same PTA are less prone to disputes than other states and that hostilities between PTA members are less likely to occur as trade flows rise between them. Moreover, we maintain that heightened commerce is more likely to inhibit conflict between states that belong to the same preferential grouping than between states that do not. Our results accord with this argument. Based on an analysis of the period since World War II, we find that trade flows have relatively little effect on the likelihood of disputes between states that do not participate in the same PTA. Within PTAs, however, there is a strong, inverse relationship between commerce and conflict. Parties to such an arrangement are less likely to engage in hostilities than other states, and the likelihood of a military dispute dips markedly as trade increases between them.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the relationship between international financial markets and government policy outcomes, with a focus on the government bond market in developed democracies, and conclude that governments of developed democracies face strong but narrowly defined financial market pressures.
Abstract: A central research question in international political economy concerns the influence of financial markets on government policy outcomes. To what extent does international capital mobility limit government policy choices? I evaluate the relationship between international financial markets and government policy outcomes, with a focus on the government bond market in developed democracies. Evidence includes interviews with financial market participants and a cross-sectional time-series analysis of the determinants of interest rates. This evaluation suggests that governments of developed democracies face strong but narrowly defined financial market pressures. Financial market participants are concerned with a few macroeconomic policy indicators, including inflation rates and government deficit/GDP ratios, but not with micropolicy indicators, such as the distribution of government spending across functional categories. In these areas, governments retain policymaking autonomy. I conclude by exploring the role of financial market influences within domestic politics and offering suggestions for further research.
TL;DR: In this article, a set of more than sixty post-1957 regional trade pacts is studied, and the authors find that the level of legalism in each agreement is strongly related to the economic asymmetry, in interaction with the proposed depth of liberalization.
Abstract: Dispute settlement mechanisms in international trade vary dramatically from one agreement to another. Some mechanisms are highly legalistic, with standing tribunals that resemble national courts in their powers and procedures. Others are diplomatic, requiring only that the disputing countries make a good-faith effort to resolve their differences through consultations. In this article I seek to account for the tremendous variation in institutional design across a set of more than sixty post-1957 regional trade pacts. In contrast to accounts that emphasize the transaction costs of collective action or the functional requirements of deep integration, I find that the level of legalism in each agreement is strongly related to the level of economic asymmetry, in interaction with the proposed depth of liberalization, among member countries.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine state compliance with three primary norms of international human rights law: the prohibition against torture, the prohibition of disappearance, and the right to democratic governance, and argue that a broad regional norm shift has led to increased regional and international consensus with respect to an interconnected bundle of human rights norms.
Abstract: Human rights practices have improved significantly throughout Latin America during the 1990s, but different degrees of legalization are not the main explanation for these changes. We examine state compliance with three primary norms of international human rights law: the prohibition against torture, the prohibition against disappearance, and the right to democratic governance. Although these norms vary in their degree of obligation, precision, and delegation, states have improved their practices in all three issue-areas. The least amount of change has occurred in the most highly legalized issue-area—the prohibition against torture. We argue that a broad regional norm shift—a “norms cascade”—has led to increased regional and international consensus with respect to an interconnected bundle of human rights norms, including the three discussed in this article. These norms are reinforced by diverse legal and political enforcement mechanisms that help to implement and ensure compliance with them.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of multilateral cooperation on sanctions events using James Fearon's (1998) breakdown of cooperation into bargaining and enforcement phases as a framework for discussion.
Abstract: Scholars and policymakers generally assume that multilateral cooperation is a necessary condition for economic sanctions to be of any use. However, previous statistical tests of this assumption have shown that sanctions are more successful with lower levels of cooperation. This puzzle calls into question established theories of economic statecraft as well as theories of international cooperation. In this article I test possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of multilateral cooperation on sanctions events using James Fearon's (1998) breakdown of cooperation into bargaining and enforcement phases as a framework for discussion The empirical results show that when multilateral economic sanctions fail, their failure is due to enforcement, not bargaining problems Without the support of an international organization, cooperating states backslide from promises of cooperation Backsliding occurs because of domestic political pressures and uncertainty about the intentions of the other sanctioning countries; backsliding causes an initial burst of cooperative behavior to decay over time. Without institutional support, cooperation is worse than useless—it is counterproductive. This result suggests that international cooperation is a more fragile equilibrium than previously thought but undercuts realist arguments that international organizations are unimportant.
TL;DR: The authors argue that voting rules and negotiating competence in the European Union determine both the probability that the negotiating parties conclude an international agreement and the substantive outcome of the negotiations, for a given distribution of preferences, internal EU institutional mechanisms affect the outcomes of international trade agreements.
Abstract: The member states of the European Union (EU) have transferred their sovereignty over trade policymaking to the supranational level. When entering into trade negotiations with third countries, they must first reach a common bargaining position among themselves and later defend that position with a “single voice” at the international table. How do the institutional rules, through which the fifteen different voices are aggregated into a single one, affect international outcomes? Differentiating between a “conservative” and a “reformist” negotiating context, I argue that voting rules and negotiating competence in the EU determine both the probability that the negotiating parties conclude an international agreement and the substantive outcome of the negotiations. The recent EU–U.S. trade negotiations on agriculture, public procurement, and open skies are all evidence that, for a given distribution of preferences, internal EU institutional mechanisms affect the outcomes of international trade agreements.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a rational choice theory of reassurance focusing on costly signals and identify the conditions under which players can use costly signals to reassure the other side, and discuss the implications of the model in the context of the reassurance strategies pursued by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War.
Abstract: Many scholars have argued that mistrust can prevent cooperation. These arguments often fail to adequately address the possibility that states can take steps to reassure each other, build trust, and thereby avoid conflict. I present a rational choice theory of reassurance focusing on costly signals and identify the conditions under which players can use costly signals to reassure the other side. The central result is that reassurance will be possible between trustworthy players in equilibrium if trustworthy actors are more willing to take risks to attain mutual cooperation than untrustworthy actors. I discuss the implications of the model in the context of the reassurance strategies pursued by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War.
TL;DR: The Asia-Pacific region offers an example of low legalization of regional institutions and perhaps an explicit aversion to legalization as mentioned in this paper, which suggests that legalization is best viewed as driven by the demands of economic integration and as a strategic response by governments in particular institutional settings.
Abstract: The Asia-Pacific region offers an example of low legalization of regional institutions and perhaps an explicit aversion to legalization. An examination of three key regional institutions—ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum)—confirms a regional process of institution building without legalization. Recent developments in these institutions permit some discrimination among competing explanations for low legalization. On the one hand, ASEAN has embraced a legalized dispute-settlement mechanism; Asian governments have also employed legalized global institutions. On the other hand, the ARF and APEC continue to resist clear-cut legal obligations and third-party dispute resolution. This pattern suggests that legalization is best viewed as driven by the demands of economic integration and as a strategic response by governments in particular institutional settings. These explanations undermine alternatives based on domestic legal culture and uniformly high sovereignty costs. The Asian economic crisis has reopened a debate over regional institutions, which may fix on legalization as part of a new regional institutional design.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine three important consequences of legalization: its effects on government compliance with international agreements, its impact on the evolution of international norms, and the conditions under which it will harden and spread.
Abstract: The intersection of law and politics provides tentative answers for two questions: First, why, among the variety of institutional forms available to governments, are legalized institutions preferred in some contexts and not in others? Second, what are the consequences of legalization? Explanations for variation in legalization are directed to the supply of legalized institutions, grounded in the preferences of the most powerful states. Those preferences are shaped, in turn, by domestic political demands for legalization as well as unanticipated domestic political dynamics that can increase legalization over time. Domestic political demands for legalization have increased as a result of international economic integration; the effects of democratization have been more ambiguous. Outside the industrialized democracies, the intersection of supply and demand is often different: supply of legalized institutions is lower and sovereignty costs are often higher. The authors in this special issue examine three important consequences of legalization: its effects on government compliance with international agreements, its impact on the evolution of international norms, and the conditions under which it will harden and spread. In each case, domestic political links are central to the effects of legalization. International agreements and institutions that are legalized, compared with those that are not, seem to be more deeply rooted in domestic politics: their existence often draws on both anticipated and unanticipated actions by domestic actors; their consequences are shaped by domestic characteristics and constituencies.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a generalizable framework for explaining variation in the use of the European Union's legal system by domestic actors to influence national policy, and explore the generalizability of this framework to other international contexts.
Abstract: Under what conditions do domestic actors use international legal mechanisms to influence domestic policy? Drawing on the European case, where legalization has progressed the furthest, I develop a generalizable framework for explaining variation in the use of the European Union's legal system by domestic actors to influence national policy. Four steps are involved in using the European legal process to pressure for policy change: (1) there must be a point of European law that creates legal standing and promotes the litigant's objectives; (2) litigants must embrace this law, adopting a litigation strategy; (3) a national court must refer the case to the European Court of Justice or apply ECJ jurisprudence; and (4) domestic actors must follow through on the legal victory to pressure national governments. Different factors influence each step, creating cross-national and cross-issue variation in the influence of EU law on national policy. Raising a significant challenge to neofunctionalist theory, I argue that negative interactive effects across the four steps and backlash created by the success of integration can stop or even reverse the expansionary dynamic of the legal process. I conclude by exploring the generalizability of this framework to other international contexts.
TL;DR: This article explored why governments committed themselves to these rules and the conditions under which they complied with their commitments and found that governments tended to make and keep commitments if other countries in their region did so as well.
Abstract: For the first time in history, international monetary relations were institutionalized after World War II as a set of legal obligations. The Articles of Agreement that formed the International Monetary Fund contain international legal obligations of the rules of good conduct for IMF members. Members were required to maintain a par value for their currency (until 1977), to use a single unified exchange-rate system, and to keep their current account free from restrictions. In this article I explore why governments committed themselves to these rules and the conditions under which they complied with their commitments. The evidence suggests that governments tended to make and keep commitments if other countries in their region did so as well. Governments also complied with their international legal commitments if the regime placed a high value on the rule of law domestically. One inference is that reputational concerns have a lot to do with international legal commitments and compliance. Countries that have invested in a strong reputation for protecting property rights are more reluctant to see it jeopardized by international law violations. Violation is more likely, however, in the face of widespread noncompliance, suggesting that compliance behavior should be understood in its regional context.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the politics behind the new reliance on citizen armies and argue that material and ideational turmoil provided important antecedent conditions for change, and conclude that the interaction between domestic politics and path dependency provides a promising source of hypotheses for explaining the conditions under which new ways of war emerge and spread.
Abstract: Mercenary armies went out of style in the nineteenth century; it became common sense that armies should be staffed with citizens. I argue that even though realist explanations focusing on the fighting prowess of citizen armies and sociological explanations focusing on the fit between citizen armies and prevailing ideas can rationalize this change, they cannot explain it. I examine, instead, the politics behind the new reliance on citizen armies and argue that material and ideational turmoil provided important antecedent conditions for change. Beyond this, individual states were more likely to move toward citizen armies when they had been defeated militarily and when the ruling coalition was split or indifferent about the reforms tied to citizen armies. Finally, the apparent success of citizen armies in France and then Prussia made do mestic conditions for reform easier to obtain in other countries, reinforcing the likelihood that the solution would be replicated. I conclude that the interaction between domestic politics and path dependency provides a promising source of hypotheses for explaining the conditions under which new ways of war emerge and spread.
TL;DR: In this paper, an agent-specific grim trigger strategy is proposed to penalize past defections at the leader of the nation responsible rather than at the nation itself, where the focus of punishment on specific agents of the people (leaders) rather than the nation's itself, means that citizens want to remove leaders who defect.
Abstract: Using the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game as a modeling platform, we examine how domestic political institutions affect the ability of nations to trust and cooperate with each other. We propose a strategy, the agent-specific grim trigger, in which national leaders direct punishments for past defections at the leader of the nation responsible rather than at the nation itself. Leaders refuse to cooperate with those leaders who have cheated them in the past. However, by being prepared to cooperate with new leaders, cooperation can be restored. The focus of punishment on specific agents of the people (leaders), rather than the nation itself, means that citizens want to remove leaders who defect. Hence, domestically accountable leaders pay audience costs for failing to cooperate. These costs make accountable leaders more trustworthy and foster greater cooperation. In contrast, when replacing leaders is difficult, cooperation is less robust; and once cooperation falters, agent-specific punishment policies often lead to prolonged hostilities and periods of acrimonious relations between states.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that political processes and partisan objectives inform expectations about the government's commitment to the exchange rate and that the probability of a speculative attack will be higher when markets expect the cabinet to end and when the cabinet dissolution is likely to produce a leftward shift in policy.
Abstract: Recent models of speculative currency crises contend that market expectations of policy behavior can trigger a speculative attack. We argue that political processes and partisan objectives inform expectations about the government's commitment to the exchange rate. First, market actors anticipate periods when the partisan identity of a government may change through an election or a cabinet collapse. Second, party labels provide information to currency traders about the policy objectives of a potential government. Consequently, we contend that the probability of a speculative attack will be higher when markets expect the cabinet to end and when the cabinet dissolution is likely to produce a leftward shift in policy. A discrete timesurvival model is used to estimate the probability that a cabinet will dissolve in any given month for sixteen parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 1995. The predicted values are then used as a proxy for market expectations in a model of speculative currency crises.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the trend toward using hard legal instruments in international trade governance and explain this trend in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Abstract: I examine the trend toward using hard legal instruments in international trade governance and explain this trend in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). I suggest that hard law (1) reduces intergovernmental transaction costs, (2) reduces private risk premiums associated with trade and investment, (3) promotes transparency and provides corollary participation benefits, (4) tends to restrain strategic political behaviors, and (5) may increase the range of integration effects by encouraging private actors to enforce intergovernmental obligations. I compare the legalization model of NAFTA with those of the European Union (EU) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
TL;DR: The literature under review represents the current thinking on that question as mentioned in this paper, all by mainstream economists, accept that free trade makes for good policy, since it results in efficiency gains that are enjoyed by consumers.
Abstract: During the 1980s, economists began to observe a trend of rising income inequality in the advanced industrial economies. At the same time, the data revealed that these economies were becoming increasingly exposed to imports of manufactured goods from developing countries. The question that follows is whether these outcomes are causally related, as economic theory suggests is possible.The literature under review represents the current thinking on that question. These studies, all by mainstream economists, accept that free trade makes for good policy, since it results in efficiency gains that are enjoyed by consumers. But these scholars also recognize that free trade can alter the returns to the factors of production, creating new patterns of winners and losers.Although this body of literature provides an impressive display of technical skills and formal economic reasoning, and on the whole gives convincing evidence that trade is only one culprit among many in explaining the problems facing blue-collar workers, it still sheds relatively little light on the political economy of the outcome. That is, it tells us little about the role that political, economic, and labor market institutions might play in shaping factor returns. This deeper understanding requires that we take a fresh look at existing institutions and the material interests and ideas underpinning them. Only then will we discover why societies have allowed a certain group of citizens—mainly the least skilled and least educated—to fall by the economic wayside.
TL;DR: One of the most important puzzles of twentieth-century international relations is why the American conception of security vis-a-vis the European Powers shifted from unilateralism to internationalism after World War II but not after World World War I as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: One of the most important puzzles of twentieth-century international relations is why the American conception of security vis-a-vis the European Powers shifted from unilateralism to internationalism after World War II but not after World War I. In this article I document that this shift was measurably one of collective ideas and explain the transformation. Scholarship on the sea change in American global thinking has been hampered by the lack of attention to the broader issues of when and why collective ideas change. To address this gap I offer a general framework to account for ideational change: I highlight the interaction between collective ideas and events that allows individuals and societies to overcome barriers to ideational change in some circumstances but not others. This argument clarifies the otherwise puzzling development of American ideas and offers a template for understanding change in other areas.
TL;DR: The authors show that divided government does not have a consistent effect on trade policy outcomes and that congressional Democrats were relatively free trading regardless of the president's party affiliation, and that the same has been true of Republicans.
Abstract: Scholars assert that divided government impedes the liberalization of U.S. trade policy. They claim that presidents favor freer trade and will use the negotiating authority Congress delegates to them to reach agreements lowering trade barriers. Since presidents gain more support from their congressional co-partisans, less liberalization ensues under divided government. This theory rests on the premise that party is unrelated to congressional trade policy preferences beyond legislators' tendencies to support their presidential co-partisans. Yet before 1970 congressional Democrats were relatively free trading regardless of the president's party affiliation. Since then, the same has been true of Republicans. Divided government facilitates the trade policies of presidents from the protectionist party since they win more support from their “opposition” in this area. Divided government does impede the efforts of presidents from the free-trading party to liberalize. I conclude that divided government has no consistent effect on trade policy outcomes.