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Showing papers in "International Organization in 2008"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article argued that the conventional hypothesis underestimates the extent to which non-democratic leaders can be held accountable domestically, allowing them to generate audience costs, and they identified three factors contributing to audience costs: domestic polit- ical groups can and will coordinate to punish the leader; whether the audience views backing down negatively; and whether outsiders can observe the possibility of domes- tic sanctions for backing down.
Abstract: Scholars of international relations usually argue that democracies are better able to signal their foreign policy intentions than nondemocracies, in part because democracies have an advantage in generating audience costs that make back- ing down in international crises costly to the leader+ This article argues that the conventional hypothesis underestimates the extent to which nondemocratic leaders can be held accountable domestically, allowing them to generate audience costs+ First, I identify three factors contributing to audience costs: whether domestic polit- ical groups can and will coordinate to punish the leader; whether the audience views backing down negatively; and whether outsiders can observe the possibility of domes- tic sanctions for backing down+ The logic predicts that democracies should have no audience costs advantage over autocracies when elites can solve their coordination dilemma, and the possibility of coordination is observable to foreign decision mak- ers+ Empirical tests show that democracies do not in fact have a significant signal- ing advantage over most autocracies+ This finding has important implications for understanding the relationship between regime type and international relations+

590 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper analyzed the relationship between global naming and shaming efforts and governments' human rights practices for 145 countries from 1975 to 2000, and found that governments put in the spotlight for abuses continue or even ramp up some violations afterward, while reducing others.
Abstract: “Naming and shaming” is a popular strategy to enforce international human rights norms and laws. Nongovernmental organizations, news media, and international organizations publicize countries' violations and urge reform. Evidence that these spotlights are followed by improvements is anecdotal. This article analyzes the relationship between global naming and shaming efforts and governments' human rights practices for 145 countries from 1975 to 2000. The statistics show that governments put in the spotlight for abuses continue or even ramp up some violations afterward, while reducing others. One reason is that governments' capacities for human rights improvements vary across types of violations. Another is that governments are strategically using some violations to offset other improvements they make in response to international pressure to stop violations.

559 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, Adler explores the theoretical implications of the logic of practicality in world politics and develops a theory of practice of security communities arguing that peace exists in and through practice when security officials' practical sense makes diplomacy the self-evident way to solving interstate disputes.
Abstract: This article explores the theoretical implications of the logic of practicality in world politics In social and political life, many practices do not primarily derive from instrumental rationality (logic of consequences), norm-following (logic of appropriateness), or communicative action (logic of arguing) These three logics of social action suffer from a representational bias in that they focus on what agents think about instead of what they think from According to the logic of practicality, practices are the result of inarticulate know-how that makes what is to be done self-evident or commonsensical Insights from philosophy, psychology, and sociology provide empirical and theoretical support for this view Though complementary with other logics of social action, the logic of practicality is ontologically prior because it is located at the intersection of structure and agency Building on Bourdieu, this article develops a theory of practice of security communities arguing that peace exists in and through practice when security officials' practical sense makes diplomacy the self-evident way to solving interstate disputes The article concludes on the methodological quandaries raised by the logic of practicality in world politics For helpful comments on earlier versions of this article, many thanks to Emanuel Adler, Janice Bially Mattern, Raymond Duvall, Stefano Guzzini, Jef Huysmans, Markus Kornprobst, Jennifer Mitzen, Iver Neumann, Daniel Nexon, David Welch, Alexander Wendt, and Michael Williams, as well as the journal's reviewers

499 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Abouharb et al. as discussed by the authors argue that dictatorships that practice torture are more likely to accede to the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT) than dictatorshiphips that do not practice torture.
Abstract: This article addresses a puzzle: dictatorships that practice torture are more likely to accede to the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT) than dictatorships that do not practice torture. I argue the reason has to do with the logic of torture. Torture is more likely to occur where power is shared. In one-party or no-party dictatorships, few individuals defect against the regime. Consequently, less torture occurs. But dictatorships are protorture regimes; they have little interest in making gestures against torture, such as signing the CAT. There is more torture where power is shared, such as where dictatorships allow multiple political parties. Alternative political points of view are endorsed, but some individuals go too far. More acts of defection against the regime occur, and torture rates are higher. Because political parties exert some power, however, they pressure the regime to make concessions. One small concession is acceding to the CAT.For detailed suggestions, I thank Rodwan Abouharb, Emanuel Adler, Lawrence Broz, Jose Cheibub, David Cingranelli, Jennifer Gandhi, Geoff Garrett, Valerie Frey, Stephan Haggard, Oona Hathaway, Darren Hawkins, Stathis Kalyvas, Judith Kelley, Paul Lagunes, Jeffrey Lewis, Ellen Lust-Okar, Nikolay Marinov, Lisa Martin, Covadonga Meseguer, Layna Mosley, Louis Pauly, Daniel Posner, Kal Raustiala, Dan Reiter, Darius Rejali, Ronald Rogowski, Peter Rosendorff, Mike Tomz, Jana Von Stein, Christine Wotipka, and especially the two anonymous reviewers. I am also grateful for comments from participants at the Kellogg Institute International Political Economy Seminar at Notre Dame; the UCLA International Institute Global Fellows Seminar; the University of Southern California Center for International Studies Workshop; the UCSD Project on International Affairs Seminar; and the Emory University Globalization, Institutions, and Conflict Seminar. For support, I thank the UCLA International Institute, the ETH Zurich, and the University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras.

366 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A new data set drawn from the IMF's records of conditionality provides an opportunity to study the bargaining process within an important international organization and answer questions about the institution's autonomy as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: International organizations are governed by two parallel sets of rules: formal rules, which embody consensual procedures, and informal rules, which allow exceptional access for powerful countries+ A new data set drawn from the IMF 's records of conditionality provides an opportunity to study the bargaining process within an important international organization and answer questions about the institution's autonomy+ I find evidence of U+S+ influence, which operates to constrain condition- ality, but only in important countries that are vulnerable enough to be willing to draw on their influence with the United States+ In ordinary countries under ordinary circumstances, broad authority is delegated to the IMF, which adjusts conditionality to accommodate local circumstances and domestic political opposition+ The IMF has refrained from exploiting the vulnerability of particular countries to maximize the scope of conditionality+ International organizations have become increasingly important actors in inter- national politics+ They have proliferated, have expanded in membership, have acquired new legal enforcement powers, and have extended their reach into the details of domestic political economy in their member states+ Af ew, including the International Monetary Fund ~IMF, or simply the Fund!, command significant resources and wield considerable authority+ Some critics have argued that these international organizations are sufficiently autonomous to create a democratic def- icit at the international level, as they pursue a vision of "undemocratic liberal- ism+" 1 Other critics have argued that international organizations are nothing more than instruments in the hands of powerful states+ 2 These critiques, of course, cannot simultaneously be true, and both run into difficulties+ The puzzle that the rogue-agency view cannot explain is why the principals have chosen to delegate so much authority+ In principal-agent terms, this view posits that both screening and monitoring have failed: the principals are unable to select agents with preferences similar to their own, and are unable

340 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the explanatory power of three factors, namely international harmonization, transnational communication, and regulatory competition, has been investigated for cross-national policy convergence in twenty-four industrialized countries between 1970 and 2000.
Abstract: In recent years, there is growing interest in the study of cross-national policy convergence. Yet we still have a limited understanding of the phenomenon: Do we observe convergence of policies at all? Under which conditions can we expect that domestic policies converge or rather develop further apart? In this article, we address this research deficit. From a theoretical perspective, we concentrate on the explanatory power of three factors, namely international harmonization, transnational communication, and regulatory competition. In empirical terms, we analyze if and to what extent we can observe convergence of environmental policies across twenty-four industrialized countries between 1970 and 2000. We find an impressive degree of environmental policy convergence between the countries under investigation. This development is mainly caused by international harmonization and, to a considerable degree, also by transnational communication, whereas regulatory competition does not seem to play a role.

244 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce a disaggregated model that measures ethnic groups' access to power by disaggregating both ethnicity and conflict to the level of explicitly geo-coded center-periphery dyads, which can measure the power balance between politically excluded ethnic groups and dominant actors in terms of group sizes, distances between the center and the periphery, and the roughness of the latter's terrain.
Abstract: Contemporary conflict research usually measures the influence of ethnicity on conflict by capturing ethnic constellations as country-based indices, such as ethnic fractionalization or polarization. However, such aggregated measures are likely to conceal the actual operation of actor-specific mechanisms. In this article, therefore, we introduce a disaggregated model that measures ethnic groups' access to power. We do so by disaggregating both ethnicity and conflict to the level of explicitly geo-coded center-periphery dyads. This procedure allows us to measure the power balance between politically excluded ethnic groups and dominant actors in terms of group sizes, distances between the center and the periphery, and the roughness of the latter's terrain. We rely on geographic information systems (GIS) to compute demographic and ethno-geographic variables. The dyadic analysis enables us to show that exclusion of powerful ethnic minorities increases the likelihood of conflict considerably. In addition, we show that the risk of conflict is positively associated with the extent of rough terrain in the peripheral group's home region and its distance from the political center.

194 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Judith G. Kelley1
TL;DR: In this article, a rigorous method for investigating the causal mecha- nisms underlying the rise of election monitoring, and "norm cascades" more gener- ally, is developed.
Abstract: Given that states have long considered elections a purely domestic matter, the dramatic growth of international election monitoring in the 1990s was remarkable+ Why did states allow international organizations and nongovernmental organizations ~NGOs! to interfere and why did international election monitoring spread so quickly? Why did election monitoring become institutionalized in so many orga- nizations? Perhaps most puzzling, why do countries invite monitors and nevertheless cheat? This article develops a rigorous method for investigating the causal mecha- nisms underlying the rise of election monitoring, and "norm cascades" more gener- ally+ The evolution and spread of norms, as with many other social processes, are complex combinations of normative, instrumental, and other constraints and causes of action+ The rise of election monitoring has been driven by an interaction of instrumentalism, emergent norms, and fundamental power shifts in the international system+ By dissecting this larger theoretical complexity into specific subclaims that can be empirically investigated, this article examines the role of each of these causal factors, their mutual tensions, and their interactive contributions to the evolution of election monitoring+

168 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors conducted large-scale, multivariate statistical tests of these two hypotheses, using annual data on exports for all pairs of countries from 1951 through 2001, and found that preferential trading arrangements and the World Trade Organization (WTO) significantly reduce export volatility.
Abstract: During the past half-century, states have established a large number of international trade institutions, both multilateral and regional in scope. The existing literature on this topic emphasizes that these agreements are chiefly designed to liberalize and increase the flow of overseas commerce. Yet such institutions have another function that has been largely ignored by researchers, namely, reducing volatility in trade policy and trade flows. Exposure to global markets increases the vulnerability of a country's output to terms of trade shocks. Governments seek to insulate their economies from such instability through membership in international trade institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO) and preferential trading arrangements (PTAs). We hypothesize that these institutions reduce the volatility of overseas commerce. We further hypothesize that, because market actors prefer price stability, trade institutions increase the volume of foreign commerce by reducing trade variability. This article conducts the first large-scale, multivariate statistical tests of these two hypotheses, using annual data on exports for all pairs of countries from 1951 through 2001. The tests provide strong support for our arguments. PTAs and the WTO regime significantly reduce export volatility. In so doing, these institutions also increase export levels.

156 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors apply this claim to the global trade regime and its chief flexibility provision, antidumping, and find that states joining the WTO are more likely to adopt domestic antidumping mechanisms.
Abstract: Do flexibility provisions in international agreements—clauses allowing for legal suspension of concessions without abrogating the treaty—promote cooperation? Recent work emphasizes that provisions for relaxing treaty commitments can ironically make states more likely to form agreements and make deeper concessions when doing so. This argument has particularly been applied to the global trade regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet the field has not produced much evidence bearing on this claim. Our article applies this claim to the global trade regime and its chief flexibility provision, antidumping. In contrast to prior work, this article explicitly models the endogeneity and selection processes envisioned by the theory. We find that states joining the WTO are more likely to adopt domestic antidumping mechanisms. Likewise, corrected for endogeneity, states able to take advantage of the regime's principal flexibility provision, by having a domestic antidumping mechanism in place, are significantly more likely to (1) join the WTO, (2) agree to more tightly binding tariff commitments, and (3) implement lower applied tariffs as well.

139 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The European Data Privacy Directive (EDP) as mentioned in this paper is a seminal piece of international civil liberties legislation that was adopted by the European Union in 1995 and has had far-reaching consequences internationally.
Abstract: Democratic nations have long struggled to set the proper balance between individual freedom and government control. The rise of digital communications networks, market integration, and international terrorism has transformed many national civil liberties issues into important international debates. The European Union was among the first jurisdictions to manage these new transnational civil liberties with the adoption of a data privacy directive in 1995. The directive substantially expanded privacy protection within Europe and had far-reaching consequences internationally. While international relations scholars have paid considerable attention to the global ramifications of these rules, research has not yet explained the origins of the European data privacy directive. Given the resistance from the European Commission, powerful member states, and industry to their introduction, the adoption of supranational rules presents a striking empirical puzzle. This article conducts a structured evaluation of conventional approaches to European integration—liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism—against the historical record and uncovers an alternative driver: transgovernmental actors. These transgovernmental actors are endowed with power resources—expertise, delegated political authority, and network ties—that they employ to promote their regional policy goals. This article uses the historical narrative of the data privacy directive to explain the origins of a critical piece of international civil liberties legislation and to advance a theoretical discussion about the role of transgovernmental actors as policy entrepreneurs within the multilevel structure of the European Union.An earlier version of this article was presented at the 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 28–31 August 2003. I would like to thank David Bach, Tim Buthe, Burkard Eberlein, Pat Egan, Henry Farrell, Orfeo Fioretos, Jane Gingrich, Virginia Haufler, Jonah Levy, Kate McNamara, Sophie Meunier, Craig Pollack, Mark Pollack, Elliot Posner, Kathryn Sikkink, Wolfgang Streeck, Steve Weber, Nick Ziegler, and John Zysman for extensive comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Funding for this research was provided by the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy and the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors demonstrate how the process of common knowledge creation between employers and unions changed the course of negotiations over national wage bargaining institutions, which can lead even powerful actors to accept institutions they had previously opposed.
Abstract: Domestic economic institutions change through processes of conflict and bargaining. Why do the strongest groups in such conflicts ever change their minds about the acceptability of institutional arrangements they once opposed? Drawing on the cases of Ireland in 1986–87 and Italy in 1989–93, this article demonstrates how the process of common knowledge creation between employers and unions changed the course of negotiations over national wage bargaining institutions. Common knowledge creation happens when existing institutions are in crisis. The institutional experimentation that follows such crises, characterized by deep uncertainty, places a premium on persuasive argument. The ideas most likely to serve as the basis for newly common knowledge will have analytical and distributive appeal to both unions and employers, and they must be ratified in public agreements, which I call common knowledge events. Common knowledge events establish new social facts, which can change the payoffs associated with different institutional outcomes. This can lead even powerful actors to accept institutions they had previously opposed.The author thanks Marius Busemeyer, Mary Louise Culpepper, Keith Darden, Orfeo Fioretos, Archon Fung, Peter Hall, Andrew Martin, Cathie Jo Martin, Victoria Murillo, Kathleen Thelen, and Gunnar Trumbull, along with three anonymous reviewers and the editors of IO, for comments and conversations that improved this article. Ben Ansell and Vikram Siddarth provided valuable research assistance. Financial support from the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University is gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are my own.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article developed a model of the redistributive political economy of education spending, focusing on the role of democracy and economic openness in determining the provision of education, and argued that democratization should be associated with higher levels of public education, lower private education spending and a shift from tertiary education spending toward primary education.
Abstract: This article develops a model of the redistributive political economy of education spending, focusing on the role of democracy and economic openness in determining the provision of education. I argue that democratization should be associated with higher levels of public education spending, lower private education spending, and a shift from tertiary education spending toward primary education spending. Furthermore, I argue that integration with the international economy should lead to higher public education spending, conditioned on regime type and income, and should push the balance between tertiary and primary education toward states' particular comparative advantages. These propositions are tested on a data set of more than one hundred states from 1960 to 2000, using a variety of panel data techniques, including instruments for democracy. The logic of the causal mechanism developed in the formal model is also tested on a number of case histories, including the Philippines, which shows great variation in democracy and openness, and India and Malaysia, which constitute unusual cases that lie “off the diagonal” of open democracies and autarkic autocracies.The author would like to thank Beth Simmons, Torben Iversen, Michael Hiscox, Jeffry Frieden, Jim Alt, Teri Caraway, John Freeman, Jane Gingrich, David Samuels, W. Phillips Shively, Mark Kayser, John Ahlquist, and Michael Kellerman for highly useful comments and criticisms. In addition, I thank the current and past editors, Lou Pauly, Emanuel Adler, David Stasavage, and Lisa Martin, and three anonymous reviewers for their suggestions.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a new explanation of postwar peace duration: periods of peace following wars last longer when the war ends in foreign-imposed regime change, and they tested this hypothesis on a new data set (an expansion of Fortna's ( 2004 ) data) of all periods of war following interstate war cease-fires, over the period 1914-2001.
Abstract: This research note develops a new explanation of postwar peace duration: periods of peace following wars last longer when the war ends in foreign-imposed regime change. This study tests this hypothesis on a new data set (an expansion of Fortna's ( 2004 ) data) of all periods of peace following interstate war cease-fires, over the period 1914–2001. It also tests for other possible factors affecting postwar peace duration, including international institutions, the revelation of information during war, third-party intervention during war, postwar changes in the balance of power, regime type, past conflict history, and others. The article finds strong support for the central hypothesis that peace lasts longer following wars that end in foreign-imposed regime change. This pacifying effect diminishes over time when a puppet is imposed, but not when a democracy is imposed. There are other results, including that the strength of a cease-fire agreement has almost no impact on peace duration.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine how European Union member states make choices about political institutions at intergovernmental conferences, the grand negotiations where many key institutional changes are made, and present strong evidence that institutionalism better captures negotiations compared to intergovernmentalism.
Abstract: This article examines how European Union member states make choices about political institutions at intergovernmental conferences, the grand negotiations where many key institutional changes are made. Using data on member-state preferences from the intergovernmental conference leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, I test competing bargaining theories, institutionalism, and intergovernmentalism, and present strong evidence that institutionalism better captures negotiations compared to intergovernmentalism. I present a formal model to discern between these competing theories of bargaining power, derive a statistical model directly from this formal model, and then use data from the European Union's Treaty of Amsterdam to test these theories and corresponding power sources. Veto power associated with institutional models better explains intergovernmental conference outcomes compared to power from size and economic might, often associated with intergovernmental analyses.I would like to thank Kathy Bawn, Julia Gray, Tim Groseclose, James Honaker, Joe Jupille, Thomas Konig, Jeff Lewis, Sven-Oliver Proksch, George Tsebelis, and the participants in UCLA's graduate student formal theory and statistical methods workshops for their insightful comments on various drafts of this article. I am also grateful for the comments from several anonymous reviewers and the editors at International Organization. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2006. Data and replication material are available at 〈http://faculty.unlv.edu/jslapin〉.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors proposed a new and more nuanced strategy for identifying preferences on exchange-rate valuation, taking into account the complex interrelationship between exchange rate and monetary policy, and the effects of these policies on balance sheets.
Abstract: In research on the political economy of exchange rates, a good understanding of who will endorse and who will oppose certain exchange-rate policies is central to understanding how actual exchange-rate policies are made and how the global exchange-rate system changes over time. Since existing classifications of exchange-rate level preferences have several shortcomings, this article proposes a new and more nuanced strategy for identifying preferences on exchange-rate valuation. This approach takes into account the complex interrelationship between exchange-rate and monetary policy, and the effects of these policies on balance sheets. In addition, the approach accounts for the dynamics of preference formation and change. Comparative case studies of currency crises in Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan show that considering actors' vulnerabilities to exchange-rate and interest-rate changes enhances understanding of their exchange-rate level preferences. The case studies also indicate that societal preferences affect policy outcomes. Exchange-rate stability was maintained in countries where private actors' vulnerabilities to depreciation were high. However, when pressure intensified, exchange rates were subsequently depreciated in countries where vulnerabilities to a monetary tightening exceeded the potential costs of depreciation.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For instance, this paper showed that countries are more likely to adopt IT when there is a conformity of preferences for tight monetary policy between the government and the central bank, and that the combination of a right-leaning government and a central bank without bank regulatory authority is associated with the adoption of IT.
Abstract: Since 1989, 25 countries have adopted a monetary policy rule known as inflation targeting (IT), in which the central bank commits to using monetary policy solely for the purpose of meeting a publicly announced numerical inflation target within a particular time frame. In contrast, many other countries continue to conduct monetary policy without a "nominal anchor" or any explicit policy rule. Inflation targeting has received much attention from policymakers and the IMF, but scholars of international political economy have not accounted for variation in adoption of IT. We construct a simple model that demonstrates that countries are more likely to adopt IT when there is a conformity of preferences for tight monetary policy between the government and the central bank. More specifically, the combination of a right-leaning government and a central bank without bank regulatory authority is likely to be associated with the adoption of IT. Results from Markov transition models estimated on a time-series cross-sectional dataset of 49 countries between 1987 and 2003 provide strong statistical support for our argument about the adoption of IT. Additionally, estimates from both Heckman selection models and non-parametric matching methods provide strong evidence of the association between IT and low inflation.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use the nuclear proliferation regime to show that dyadic diplomacy is not necessarily incompatible with the building of a multilateral regime; bilateralism is not the opposite of multilateralism, but an efficient component thereof; and they demonstrate that it is possible for the superpowers to design an optimal mix of threats and bribes in which states with low compliance costs join the regime on the terms of the multi- lateral treaty alone; states with intermediate compliance costs need additional cus- tomized incentives, delivered through bilateral agreements; and states with high compliance costs are not only
Abstract: I use the nuclear proliferation regime to show that dyadic diplomacy is not necessarily incompatible with the building of a multilateral regime; bilateralism is not the opposite of multilateralism, but an efficient component thereof+ Although this point will not be new to most students of institutions, no general rationale has so far been offered on the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy+ Start- ing from a characterization of proliferation as the result of a large number of prisoner's dilemmas played out between states engaged in local dyadic rivalries, I demonstrate that it is possible for the superpowers to design an optimal mix of threats and bribes in which states with low compliance costs join the regime on the terms of the multi- lateral treaty alone; states with intermediate compliance costs need additional cus- tomized incentives, delivered through bilateral agreements; and states with high compliance costs are not only left out of the regime but also punished for nonpartici- pation+ I draw a few comparative statics that I systematically test on Nuclear Prolif- eration Treaty ~NPT! membership data+ I discuss the applicability of the model to the currency, trade, and aid regimes+

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide an empirical examination of how the EU has used capacity building strategies in an effort to address violence against women, focusing on EU efforts to build the capacity of domestic advocacy organizations through the distribution of resources and the facilitation of transnational networking.
Abstract: One of the ways that international organizations promote policy agendas is through the use of management strategies, including initiatives that focus on domestic capacity building. As the European Union (EU) has evolved, it has used management strategies to expand its influence over a multitude of policy issues in innovative ways. This research note provides an empirical examination of how the EU has used capacity building strategies in an effort to address violence against women. In particular, I focus on EU efforts to build the capacity of domestic advocacy organizations through the distribution of resources and the facilitation of transnational networking. By using data I collected on the Daphne program, the EU's primary mechanism for addressing gender violence, and by employing both qualitative and social network analysis, I provide empirical evidence that demonstrates how the EU has provided new political opportunities for domestic organizations to improve their capacity to combat violence against women.I would like to acknowledge the following people for their comments and support at various stages of this project: Lee Ann Banaszak, Steven Bloom, Tobin Grant, Phil Habel, Scott McClurg, Emma Moburg-Jones, Meg Rincker, Steve Shulman, Fred Solt, Gina Yannitell Reinhardt, Michelle Wade, and anonymous reviewers.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors evaluated the effect of economic interests on public support for American global activism and found that those who were relatively well-positioned to benefit economically from the American-backed postwar international order, mainly those with better access to human and financial capital, or who hailed from relatively export-oriented parts of the country, should be more likely to support it.
Abstract: This research note evaluates the effect of economic interests on public support for American global activism. Those who were relatively well-positioned to benefit economically from the American-backed postwar international order, mainly those with better access to human and financial capital, or who hailed from relatively export-oriented parts of the country, should be more likely to support it. An analysis of American National Election Study data on support for isolationism between 1956 and 2000 supports this line of argument. Individual self-interest is probably the most important pathway through which the international economy has influenced public opinion. However, the aggregate effects of exports and imports on respondents' home states have also made a difference. The effects of these economic interests are substantively large and fairly consistent over time.A previous version of this work was presented to the 2006 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. I would like to thank Michael A. Bailey, Larry Bartels, Matthew Baum, Adam Berinsky, and Kenneth Schultz for their comments. Any remaining errors and omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop an argument focusing on institutional permeability, or the extent to which those organizations are accesible to non-state actors, and suggest that "democratizing" IOs by allowing ever-greater access to nonstate actors is likely to result in stronger, more constraining international rules, even in areas where states most jealously guard their sovereignty.
Abstract: Especially since the end of the Cold War, the Council of Europe ~CE! and the Organization of American States ~OAS! have acted to protect democracy in their member states from erosion or reversals, with CE policies more robust than those in the Americas+ What explains this variation? I develop an argument focus- ing on institutional permeability, or the extent to which those organizations are acces- sible to nonstate actors+ Permeability consists of three dimensions: range of third parties allowed access, level of decision making at which access is granted, and transparency of IO information to those third parties+ Higher levels of permeability are likely to produce higher levels of constraint on state behavior through increas- ing levels of precision and obligation in international rules and practices+ Alterna- tive explanations, summarized as regional democracy norms, domestic democratic lock-in interests, and the power of stable democracies cannot explain the variation in multilateral democracy protection+ More broadly, this article suggests that "democratizing" IOs by allowing ever-greater access to nonstate actors is likely to result in stronger, more constraining international rules, even in areas where states most jealously guard their sovereignty, such as the nature of their domestic political institutions+

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the domestic groups generally most favorable to FTAs differ in their preferences over rules of origin: industries with large returns to scale favor strict rules to gain scale economies in an FTA, while industries with multinational supply chains prefer to accommodate offshore procurement.
Abstract: The design of rules of origin in free trade agreements (FTAs) arouses spirited lobbying campaigns that mostly escape public attention. This article argues that the domestic groups generally most favorable to FTAs differ in their preferences over rules of origin: industries with large returns to scale favor strict rules of origin to gain scale economies in an FTA, while industries with multinational supply chains prefer lenient rules of origin to accommodate offshore procurement. An econometric analysis of rules of origin in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) finds tougher rules of origin the higher the external trade protection and the larger the returns to scale, and more permissive rules of origin the greater the involvement in foreign sourcing. The results suggest that rules of origin may be critical to building domestic coalitions for FTAs. Industry preferences toward rules of origin therefore have important implications for the politics of FTA ratification.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine how the offshoring of services segments labor markets and places low-skilled and high-skilled labor at odds on trade issues, and they find that low skilled occupations in motion picture services were most likely to support countervailing duties and Section 301 action against productions filmed abroad.
Abstract: Theories of trade and domestic politics have been applied extensively to manufacturing and agriculture; the political economy of trade in services, however, remains poorly understood. This article examines how the “offshoring” of services segments labor markets and places low-skilled and high-skilled labor at odds on trade issues. Drawing from a case where trade has been politically contentious of late—motion picture services in the United States—the article finds that offshoring can aggravate wage inequality, creating incentives for low-skilled workers to demand policy remedies. Consistent with this expectation, an ordered probit analysis of labor-group lobbying reveals that low-skilled occupations in motion picture services were most likely to support countervailing duties and Section 301 action against productions filmed abroad. The findings suggest that when services are tradable, labor-market cleavages are not purely factoral or sectoral, but occupational. This new politics of trade in services has important implications for trade policy in the United States and multilateral rulemaking in the World Trade Organization.