Showing papers in "International Review of Law and Economics in 2001"

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explored the anticompetitive product market effects that wage agreements between employers' associations and labor unions can have when wages are generally binding, and argued that coverage extension rules should be a subject matter of antitrust policy, not only for their labor market implications, but also for their effects on product markets.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors extended the limited research that investigates the determinants of location choices among new United States immigrants and employed data that includes country of birth, major categories of admission, and state of intended residence for each new immigrant.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present empirical results that fill in the lacunae left by the previous studies and propose the use of six objective explanatory variables to capture the effects on corrupt practices.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors extend the two-period model by introducing the possibility of social learning of illicit gains between the second and the first period, which sheds light on deterring property crime, like larcency or auto theft.

TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of concealing an illegal activity which benefits the principal was studied, and it was shown that shifting the liability upon the agent, while the monetary sanction and the probability of detection are kept constant, reduces the principal's net benefit, thus favoring deterrence of wrongdoing.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors summarize the predictions from the theoretical literature on settlement failure and consider what these theories suggest in the application of divorce, and empirically test the predictions of the models are empirically tested using the Stanford Child Custody Study.

TL;DR: In this article, the mechanisms that are set in motion by the operation of competition among the governments inhabiting the different jurisdictional tiers of federal countries lead to outcomes that are different from those generated by the agreed-upon rules that govern the relations of national governments with each other in matters of international trade.

TL;DR: In this paper, a model of gun demand is proposed, in which people make decisions about gun ownership as they would any other durable consumer good, and two insights are generated: first, if the buyback program is unanticipated and never-to-be-repeated, it will reduce gun holdings only temporarily, by affecting the timing of consumption, and second, a repeated buyback, formally analyzed as a permanent buyback scheme, will actually raise gun holdings, since it permanently lowers ownership costs.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors apply a Coase theorem as a solution to establish rights on assets that jointly yield services subject to individual and joint consumption (private and public goods) under certain conditions, especially in cases where the governance costs of a centralized condominium are relatively high and the number of economic agents involved is also high.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate a situation in which an individual's propensity to engage in an illegal activity may depend also on the behavior of other individuals, and analyze the interactive behavior in this model and answer the following questions: When are individuals responding to others' behavior, when are they influencing others' behaviour.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the promisee (the employer) should not be awarded compensation for lost expected profits if the promisor (the employee) can vary his level of effort, which is a typical feature of labor contracts.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare the effects of three liability regimes on corporate governance and, in particular, on the relational investment structure of a publicly held firm and show that each liability regime provides a different set of incentives to investors and facilitates the operation of a different feedback mechanism.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors conclude that perjury rules governing testimony given in civil trials should give greater weight to information that surfaced after the defendant testified, which decreases a defendant's incentive to lie and to a lesser extent increases the accuracy of perjury adjudication.