Showing papers in "International Security in 1985"

Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power

Abstract: The question \"what causes alignment?\" is a central issue in debates on American foreign policy, and the choices that are made often turn on which hypotheses of alliance formation are endorsed. In general, those who believe that American security is fragile most often assume that Soviet allies are reliable and America's are prone to defect, while those who believe it is robust tend to view American allies as stronger and more reliable than those of the U.S.S.R. These divergent beliefs clash over a variety of specific issues. For example, should the U.S. increase its commitment to NATO, to prevent the growth of Soviet military power from leading to the \"Finlandization\" of Europe? Alternatively, should the U.S. do less in the expectation that its allies will do more? Should the U.S. oppose leftist regimes in the developing world because their domestic ideology will lead them to ally with the Soviet Union, or can a policy of accommodating radical nationalist regimes lead to good relations with them? Can Soviet or American military aid create reliable proxies in the Third World? Is it worth the effort and expense? Each of these questions carries important implications for American national security policy, and the answers ultimately turn upon which hypotheses of alliance formation are believed to be most valid. Despite the obvious importance of understanding how states select their partners, most scholarly research on alliances has ignored or obscured these questions.' This article is intended to, correct these omissions by outlining

Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved

Abstract: of all the political and military decisions in history, few have been subject to more analysis and comment than the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is mystifying, therefore, that historians have not long ago exploded the demonstrable myth that those attacks probably saved half a million lives of American soldiers, sailors, and marines, and prevented numerous British fatalities .and vast numbers of Japanese deaths, as President Truman alleged in his autobiography a decade after the war’s end.’ Such a justification was neither needed nor used by President Truman in the weeks immediately following the obliteration of Hiroshima, followed within days by the surrender of Japan, since the public overwhelmingly approved of the action. As time went by, however, and questions were increasingly asked about the necessity and wisdom of launching the age of nuclear weapons in this manner, estimates of deaths averted were adduced as an important element-perhaps the most important element-of the moral justification for Truman’s decision. By the time historians were given access to the secret files necessary to examine this subject with care, the myth of huge numbers of American, British, and Japanese lives saved had already achieved the status of accepted history. Even when secret wartime documents were declassified, historians did not focus on the striking inconsistencies between these documents and those parts of the principal decision-makers’ memoirs that dealt with estimates of lives saved. Had they done so, and followed the subject where it led, they would have been forced to conclude that the number of American deaths prevented by the two bombs would almost certainly not have exceeded 20,000 and would probably have been much lower, perhaps even zero.

The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited?

Abstract: o v e r the years a substantial literature has developed about the conventional military balance in Europe and the respective strategies of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A certain asymmetry exists in this literature. NATO strategy has always been controversial; students of the subject concur in its content but disagree as to its wisdom. Many critics contend that a Soviet conventional offensive would probably succeed in its objective, generally assumed to be the destruction of NATO forces behind the Rhine River line.’ Studies abound that propose a

Nuclear War at Sea

Abstract: The subject of nuclear warfare at sea, and the difficulties of controlling escalation of conflict at sea, has so far drawn very little attention from the strategic community.' This is despite the fact that more than a third of the nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union are deployed on sea-based platforms; the control of these weapons by central national authorities is physically loosest; and the doctrines and operational procedures associated with sea-based nuclear weapons are subject to less well-defined thresholds and, in some cases, are quite provocative. Moreover, there are good reasons for believing that the first use of nuclear weapons could take place at sea, and for concern that the escalation dynamics of nuclear warfare in this theater are far less constrained than those that would attend nuclear operations on land. There are several reasons for this lack of attention. The nuclear weapons based at sea-both tactical and strategic-are less "visible." The details of their deployment and their supporting infrastructure are generally closed to public scrutiny. And the employment doctrines for these weapons have never been officially presented in a form that would permit informed critiques to be readily explicated. Some of the considerations that require serious attention are as follows: -Accidents at sea. -The attractiveness of ships as nuclear targets. -The launch autonomy of naval commanders. -Problems raised by dual-capable systems and platforms. -Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) strategy.

A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea

Abstract: I T h e 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea between the United States and the Soviet Union' is a virtually forgotten remnant of an era that produced dozens of U.S.-Soviet accords. Although it was almost ignored in both the American and Soviet announcements of the various agreements that emerged from the May 1972 Moscow summit, the agreement has helped to avert potentially dangerous incidents between the U.S. and Soviet navies. Most of the achievements of detente have lost their luster with the passage of time, but the agreement's effectiveness appears to have survived the deterioration of U.S.Soviet relations. The agreement deserves to be considered more closely, not only because it has reduced the oft-overlooked dangers of naval incidents, but also because of its potential utility as a model for other agreements to govern incidents in the air or in space. More generally, the success of the agreement demonstrates that confidence-building measures-constraints on military activities and improvements in communications that are intended to reduce the risk of inadvertent war or surprise attack-represent a workable alternative to traditional arms control proposals that impose quantitative or qualitative limits on weapons. The 1972 agreement has reduced the number of dangerous incidents and cases of harassment at sea. Before the agreement, encounters between U.S. and Soviet warships on the high seas frequently led to tense situations as opposing vessels maneuvered to disrupt one another's formations or ha-

Redressing the Conventional Balance: NATO's Reserve Military Manpower

Abstract: T w o arguments are advanced in this article. First, the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional balance in Central Europe today is shaky but not beyond repair. NATO stands within striking distance of a high-confidence capacity to defend successfully, but does not yet have one. Current NATO conventional forces might be able to thwart a Pact attack, but their margin of safety is woefully thin and the possibility of a NATO defeat is quite real. A robust NATO defense would require at least 20 more “division-equivalents”’ beyond the roughly 52 division-equivalents that will be available two months after mobilization when present NATO modernization plans are completed around 1990. The provision of these additional forces should be an important NATO goal. Second, NATO conventional capabilities can be strengthened dramatically by equipping and reorganizing available trained European military manpower to form new operational combat units. (Most of these new formations would be reserve units.) If this were done, the gap between NATO conventional forces and NATO requirements could be erased at a relatively modest cost. For the European nations contributing forces to the defense of the NATO Central Region, a ten-year program to create 20 new division-equivalents could require a real average spending increase of 1.4 percent per year. Indeed, the same group of nations has enough under-utilized, trained manpower to field 45 new division-equivalents, a feat that could be accomplished over 15 years for an average annual spending increase of 1.7 percent above inflation. An increase of only 20 division-equivalents could shift the continental balance of forces sufficiently to give NATO something it now appears to lack, a convincing conventional defense posture. The provision of 45 additional division-equivalents would create near equality in the Central Region balance, a goal that has long been considered-quite erroneouslyto be utterly beyond NATO’s means. The following section outlines alternate methods of estimating the current conventional balance in Central Europe. Section 11, also using alternate meth-

Inexcusable Restraint: The Decline of American Military Power in the 1970s

Abstract: I t is the thesis of this article that the legacy of the 1970s has been-and indeed remains-a potentially very dangerous mismatch between U.S. security objectives and the capabilities provided to support those objectives. Furthermore, we contend that the cumulatively very substantial adverse shift in the complex military balance beween East and West during the 1970s: (1) was discernible at the time to those who wished to see; and (2) at least with respect to broad trends is not particularly controversial. The Carter Administration has to be the particular, though far from exclusive, target of the charge of neglecting U.S. defenses, because the more salient facts concerning the slide in American military performance were far clearer in the late than in the early 1970s. Recognition of adverse trends in relative military capability and, more arguably, consequent dangers of political disadvantage was by no means confined to the conservative campaign rhetoric of 1980 or to the many publications of The Committee on the Present Danger. On the contrary, it is instructive to note what two well-respected senior officials of the Carter Administration had to say in 1979-1980 about American defense and arms control performance over a period that included, at that time of writing and speaking, three years of their \"watch.\" In January 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown offered the following somber assessment:

Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs: Does the Demise of Authoritarian Rulers Lead to Political Instability?

Abstract: “ w h e n Tito dies, will Yugoslavia fall apart?” That question was common in the 1970s as American foreign-policymakers looked at a country whose regional and ethnic components appeared to be held together by a unique ruler and wondered about the implications of his passing for U.S. strategic interests. “When Marcos dies, will the Philippines explode?” That question is common in the 1980s, as observers worry about another country vital to the United States. And what about Jordan after Hussein, Morocco after Hassan, or many other such cases where the long endurance of authoritarian leaders overlays internal political strains? Non-democratic regimes usually have unreliable arrangements for the legitimate transfer of power, and doubts about how it can be accomplished smoothly may increase the longer a single leader lasts in office. There is a widespread presumption that countries ruled for extended periods by authoritarian leaders degenerate into chaos when those rulers die and their special personal status no longer holds the lid on their countries’ tensions. It is, however, also possible to assume the contrary. Little agreement and less knowledge exist concerning the extent to which the death of long-tenure leaders tends to generate political instability. In some analyses, prolonged leadership has been taken as a sign of underlying political stability. An alternative hypothesis sees prolonged leadership as an obstacle to incremental change and hence its end as likely to release pent-up forces and produce major political instability. Which view is valid? Why or why not? Does it matter? The notion that death of a long-standing authoritarian leader results in instability has been borne out in some cases, partially in others, and not at all in yet others.’ The reasons for these variations and what they suggest

Arms Control Treaty Compliance: Buildup to a Breakdown?

Abstract: I F o r the first time in the history of nuclear arms control, the United States and the Soviet Union are drifting toward a treaty compliance crisis of enormous proportions. Virtually all of the major nuclear arms agreements of the 1970s are unraveling under the weight of accumulating problems that neither side has been willing to confront during the past five years. If left unchecked, the erosion of existing restraints will add further complications to the negotiations now underway in Geneva. Worse yet, it may prompt both sides to intensify their military programs to the point at which, in a few years time, a total breakdown of restraint becomes possible. In Washington, the immediate issues of concern are whether the Soviets have been deliberately violating these agreements and, if so, what an appropriate response should be. In January 1984 and again in February 1985, President Reagan publicly accused the Soviets of “violations or probable violations” of several major arms control agreements, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement of 1979 (SALT II) . l The major charges fall into three categories. STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS. The Soviet Union is constructing a large phased-array radar near the city of Krasnoyarsk in Central Siberia, which the

A Strong Start in a Difficult Decade: Defense Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years

Abstract: 1 T h e Nixon-Ford Administrations spanned eight of the more demanding years in the recent history of the United States. America entered the 1970s after a decade of increased consciousness-raising in both domestic and foreign affairs: the 1960s became synonymous with protest against inequities at home and ineptitude abroad. By the time President Nixon entered office in 1969, the United States was a victim of political paralysis. Trying to rebuild our national defense amidst this turmoil seemed to require the labors of both Hercules and Sisyphus, and demanded the most adroit of political skills. As Secretary of Defense during the first Nixon Administration after nine terms in the House of Representatives, I was on the frontline of efforts to reassess and strengthen the national security policy of the United States after nearly a decade of idealistic promises and grim realities. This essay provides an opportunity to reflect on this reassessment and strengthening process, and to note some of the most important dimensions of our programs in the first Nixon and second Nixon-Ford terms. While my direct experience as Secretary of Defense covers only the years of 1969 to 1973, and as counsellor to the President from 1973 to 1974, I will make certain generalizations for the 19741977 period as well. The following topics, each of which will be examined in terms of basic principles, are of central importance for understanding the defense policies of the Nixon-Ford years: (1) objectives, premises, doctrines, and defense programs; (2) strategic forces and arms control; (3) NATO forces; and (4) U.S. security assistance programs under the Nixon Doctrine. I will conclude with five general lessons for American national security policy that I believe can

Extending Deterrence with German Nuclear Weapons

Abstract: I T h e paramount goal of American defense policy is to deter direct attacks against the United States; this objective is achievable with relative ease. Extended deterrence is a second and more difficult task. It consists of deterring aggression against other countries and regions of principal interest to the United States-most notably Western Europe. Since its creation, NATO has considered its conventional military forces insufficient for an adequate defense, so the U.S. has buttressed these capabilities with threats to initiate the use of nuclear weapons if conventional defense fails. In the Eisenhower Administration, NATO policy was ”massive retaliation”; since the Kennedy Administration (officially since 1967), it has been ”flexible response.” Flexible response asserts that NATO will initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons if the Warsaw Pact attacks and NATO’s conventional defense is failing. As a final stage, it threatens direct nuclear attacks against the Soviet Union if NATO is losing a limited nuclear war. Similar, if less explicit, policies apply to other regions including Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf. Deterrence always involves maximizing the likelihood that the adversary will be deterred and minimizing the risks if deterrence fails; current American extended deterrence policies are deficient in both respects. When the United States possessed a nuclear monopoly, the threat to punish aggression with a nuclear response was credible, and it was logical to assume that the Soviets would be deterred. The threat retained some credibility even after the United States lost its monopoly but retained an overwhelming nuclear advantage against the Soviet Union. Now, however, the superpowers are mutually vulnerable. Because the United States possesses neither a counterforce capability sufficient to disarm the Soviet Union nor a defense against Soviet retaliation, the first use of nuclear weapons could trigger (immediately or through escalation) a Soviet response that would annihilate the United States. Under these circumstances, the nuclear guarantee becomes irrational and

Will SALT II Survive

Abstract: pronounced dead,’ SALT I1 still clings to a thread of life. Themuch-maligned treaty, which by its own terms would have expired at the end of 1985, will have spent its entire scheduled lifespan in limbo: never ratified, never even voted upon by the full Senate and repudiated by the Reagan Administration, it has nonetheless been observed (or very nearly so) by both the United States and the Soviet Union since the date of signature more than six years ago. The treaty received its most recent reprieve only last June when, after much suspense and contrary to most press speculation, the President announced that the United States would continue to comply. This article will trace the history of SALT I1 since its signature, review the policy debate that preceded the President’s decision, and assess the implications of the decision.

The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform

Abstract: I A f t e r the civil war, Emory Upton, commandant of cadets at West Point and protege of General William T. Sherman, proposed revolutionary reforms in command and manpower policies in an attempt to improve the U.S. Army’s performance and professionalism. Upton’s proposals had merit; but like many reformers throughout history, he did not pay sufficient attention to the character of his countrymen or to their political traditions and institutions in his quest for change. As Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski have said:

Pitfalls in Force Planning: Structuring America's Tactical Air Arm

Abstract: I Occasionally one encounters spirited placards on the walls of Strategic Air Command squadrons that declare: ”Fighters are fun, but bombers are important.” This perception is widely shared by many people, both civilian and military, outside the operational world. It is reinforced by the classic image of the swashbuckling, silk-scarved (and now G-suited) fighter pilot, whose main reason for existence, according to this view, is assumed to be aerial jousting against likeminded opponents in swirling dogfights that bear little relevance to the larger course of modern campaigns. Yet however vital a strong bomber and missile force may be to deterring a Soviet nuclear attack, there is nothing frivolous about the fighter business for the kinds of conventional conflicts the United States and its allies are more likely to encounter. Since the earliest years of World War 11, American planners at the highest levels have recognized that ”the gaining of air superiority is the first requirement for the success of any major land operation.”’ This fact has been painfully revalidated in subsequent years by the Israelis, who in the past two decades have repeatedly called upon their tactical air arm as a decisive factor in turning back enemies equipped with latest-generation weaponry. Granted,