Showing papers in "International Security in 2000"

Structural Realism after the Cold War

Abstract: Some students of international politics believe that realism is obsolete.1 They argue that, although realism’s concepts of anarchy, self-help, and power balancing may have been appropriate to a bygone era, they have been displaced by changed conditions and eclipsed by better ideas. New times call for new thinking. Changing conditions require revised theories or entirely different ones. True, if the conditions that a theory contemplated have changed, the theory no longer applies. But what sorts of changes would alter the international political system so profoundly that old ways of thinking would no longer be relevant? Changes of the system would do it; changes in the system would not. Within-system changes take place all the time, some important, some not. Big changes in the means of transportation, communication, and war Žghting, for example, strongly affect how states and other agents interact. Such changes occur at the unit level. In modern history, or perhaps in all of history, the introduction of nuclear weaponry was the greatest of such changes. Yet in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly for others’ security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system. Changes in the structure of the system are distinct from changes at the unit level. Thus, changes in polarity also affect how states provide for their security. SigniŽcant changes take place when the number of great powers reduces to two or one. With more than two, states rely for their security both on their

The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships

Abstract: Theories of international politics and security depend on assumptions about emotion that are rarely articulated and which may not be correct. Deterrence theory may be fundamentally oawed because its assumptions and policy prescriptions do not fully acknowledge and take into account reasonable human responses to threat and fear. Similarly, liberal theories of cooperation under anarchy and the formation of security communities that stress actors’ rational calculation of the beneats of communication and coordination are deacient to the extent that they do not include careful consideration of emotion and emotional relationships. Further, it is no wonder that postconoict peacebuilding efforts too frequently fail and wars reerupt because peace settlements and peacebuilding policies play with emotional are that practitioners scarcely understand but nevertheless seek to manipulate. Systematic analysis of emotion may have important implications for international relations theory and the practices of diplomacy, negotiation, and postconoict peacebuilding. International relations theory has lately tended to ignore explicit consideration of “the passions.”1 Even realists, who highlight insecurity (fear) and nationalism (love and hate), have not systematically studied emotion. Why this ostensible neglect?2 First, the assumption of rationality is ubiquitous in inter-

The Banality of "Ethnic War"

Abstract: In this article I assess the violence that took place in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda in the 1990s and argue that the whole concept of “ethnic warfare” may be severely misguided. Speciacally, insofar as it is taken to imply a war of all against all and neighbor against neighbor—a condition in which pretty much everyone in one ethnic group becomes the ardent, dedicated, and murderous enemy of everyone in another group—ethnic war essentially does not exist. I argue instead that ethnic warfare more closely resembles nonethnic warfare, because it is waged by small groups of combatants, groups that purport to aght and kill in the name of some larger entity. Often, in fact, “ethnic war” is substantially a condition in which a mass of essentially mild, ordinary people can unwillingly and in considerable bewilderment come under the vicious and arbitrary control of small groups of armed thugs. I consider arst the violent conoicts in Croatia and Bosnia. These were spawned not so much by the convulsive surging of ancient hatreds or by frenzies whipped up by demagogic politicians and the media as by the ministrations of small—sometimes very small—bands of opportunistic marauders recruited by political leaders and operating under their general guidance. Many of these participants were drawn from street gangs or from bands of soccer hooligans. Others were criminals speciacally released from prison for the purpose. Their participation was required because the Yugoslav army, despite years of supposedly inouential nationalist propaganda and centuries

The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay

Abstract: Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 For more than a decade realism, by most accounts the dominant paradigm in international relations theory, has been under assault by the emerging paradigm of constructivism. One group of realists—the structural (or neo-/systemic) realists who draw inspiration from Kenneth Waltz’s seminal Theory of International Politics1—has been a particular target for constructivist arrows. Such realists contend that anarchy and the distribution of relative power drive most of what goes on in world politics. Constructivists counter that structural realism misses what is often a more determinant factor, namely, the intersubjectively shared ideas that shape behavior by constituting the identities and interests of actors. Through a series of inouential articles, Alexander Wendt has provided one of the most sophisticated and hard-hitting constructivist critiques of structural realism.2 Social Theory of International Politics provides the arst book-length statement of his unique brand of constructivism.3 Wendt goes beyond the more

Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia

Abstract: When and why does ethnicity matter in international relations? When do states founded on a preexisting cultural community act to protect the interests of co-ethnic populations living abroad? The primordial ties of kith and kin and the destabilizing perils of ethnic conoict have become important themes in international security over the last decade. Scholars and analysts, however, have only begun to understand the complicated relationship between dispersed ethnic groups, the states in which they live (host states), and the actions of governments that might make some historical or cultural claim to represent them (kin states).1 How do transborder communities inouence foreign policymaking? Are diasporas— ethnic communities divided by state frontiers—necessarily a source of insecurity? Or can nation-states use “their” diasporas as tools of nation and state building without threatening the interests of their neighbors? As many scholars have argued, transborder ethnic ties can or may increase the insecurity of states.2 But when do can’s and may’s become do’s and don’t’s?

The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice

Abstract: The debate over whether economic sanctions “work” is mired in a scholarly limbo. One writer contends that recent international relations scholarship has promoted optimism about the utility of such measures and sets out to challenge this trend,1 while another notes the pessimism that “pervades the sanctions literature” and proceeds to argue that it is unjustiaed.2 A third scholar cites the sanctions literature as an example of fruitless academic debate with little policy relevance.3 Such divergent readings of the scholarly literature are often explained by differences in ideology or fundamentally different theoretical orientations. This does not seem to be the case with respect to the sanctions debate. Under appropriate circumstances, it is quite possible for liberals, neoliberals, realists, neorealists, or globalists to argue in favor of using economic sanctions. If the sanctions debate is bogged down, the explanation does not seem to lie in the essentially contested nature of the subject matter. A second potential explanation is that scholars are talking past one another because they ask different questions, use different concepts, and set the discussion in different analytical contexts. In short, they are talking about different things. This article explores the second explanation. The basic paradox at the heart of the sanctions debate is that policymakers continue to use sanctions with increasing frequency, while scholars continue to deny the utility of such tools of foreign policy.4 Two explanations for this

Is Strategy an Illusion

Abstract: Strategy is the essential ingredient for making war either politically effective or morally tenable It is the link between military means and political ends, the scheme for how to make one produce the other Without strategy, there is no rationale for how force will achieve purposes worth the price in blood and treasure Without strategy, power is a loose cannon and war is mindless Mindless killing can only be criminal Politicians and soldiers may debate which strategic choice is best, but only paciasts can doubt that strategy is necessary Because strategy is necessary, however, does not mean that it is possible Those who experience or study many wars and strong reasons to doubt that strategists can know enough about causes, effects, and intervening variables to make the operations planned produce the outcomes desired To skeptics, effective strategy is often an illusion because what happens in the gap between policy objectives and war outcomes is too complex and unpredictable to be manipulated to a speciaed end When this is true, war cannot be a legitimate instrument of policy This article surveys ten critiques that throw the practicability of strategy into question It pulls together many arguments that emerge in bits and pieces from a variety of sources Some are my own formulation of skepticism implicit but unformed in others’ observations; few analysts have yet attacked the general viability of strategy head-on The notion that effective strategy must be an illusion emerges cumulatively from arguments that: strategies cannot be evaluated because there are no agreed criteria for which are good or bad; there is little demonstrable relationship between strategies and outcomes in war; good strategies can seldom be formulated because of policymakers’ biases; if good strategies are formulated, they cannot be executed because of organizations’ limitations; and other points explored below Unifying themes include the bar-

Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate

Abstract: The capitulation of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on June 9, 1999, after seventyeight days of bombing by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is being portrayed by many as a watershed in the history of air power. For the first time, the use of air strikes alone brought a foe to its knees-and at the cost of no NATO lives. The prophecies of Giulio Douhet and other air power visionaries appear realized.1 Lieut. Gen. Michael Short, who ran the bombing campaign, has argued that “NATO got every one of the terms it had stipulated in Rambouillet and beyond Rambouillet, and I credit this as a victory for air power.”2 This view is not confined to the air force. Historian John Keegan conceded, “I didn’t want to change my beliefs, but there was too much evidence accumulating to stick to the article of faith. It now does look as if air power has prevailed in the Balkans, and that the time has come to redefine how victory in war may be won.”3 Dissenters, of course, raise their voices. Noting the failure of air power to fulfill its promise in the past, they are skeptical of its efficacy in Kosovo. Instead, they point to factors such as the threat of a ground invasion; the lack of Russian support for Serbia, or the resurgence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as key to Milosevic’s capitulation. Without these factors, dissenters argue, air strikes alone would not have forced Milosevic’s hand. They also point out that air power failed to prevent the very ethnic cleansing that prompted Western leaders to act in the first place.4

The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force

Abstract: On May 22, 1995, the White House approved a visa for Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States in early June to attend his graduate school reunion at Cornell University. The decision to allow Taiwan’s most senior leader to enter the United States reversed more than twenty-ave years of U.S. diplomatic precedent and challenged Clinton administration public policy statements and private reassurances to Chinese leaders that such a visit was contrary to U.S. policy. Equally important, the visa decision followed a three-year evolution of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. In 1992 the Bush administration, in violation of its pledge in a 1982 U.S.-China arms sales communiqué to reduce the quantity of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, sold Taiwan 150 F-16 warplanes. In 1994 the Clinton administration revised upward the protocol rules regarding U.S. “unofacial” treatment of Taiwan diplomats, which had for the most part been in effect since 1981. Then the next year, the administration allowed Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States. From China’s perspective, Washington seemed determined to continue revising its Taiwan policy, thus encouraging Taiwan’s leaders to move closer toward a declaration of sovereignty from mainland China. Given China’s credible forty-ave-year commitment to use force in retaliation against Taiwan independence, such a declaration would likely lead to war. During the ten months following Lee’s visit to Cornell, the United States and China reopened their difacult negotiations over U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The negotiations reached a climax in March 1996, when China displayed a dramatic show of force consisting of military exercises and missile tests targeted near Taiwan, and the United States responded with an equally dramatic deployment of two carrier battle groups. The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation was the closest the United States and China had come to a crisis since the early 1960s. It was a critical turning point in post–Cold War U.S.-China relations and

Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia

Abstract: The comfortable notion that deep-lying stable cultural differences are fundamental to ethnic and national conoicts has taken a beating in recent scholarship. Essentialist, holistic, homogeneous conceptions of culture, such as agure in the popular works of Robert Kaplan and Samuel Huntington, have been seriously undermined by theoretical and empirical historical work.1 Rather than appearing coherent and uniform as it might look from afar, ethnicity at closer range looks fragmented, its cultural content contested and conoicted. Rather than primordial and organic, the nation has been reassessed as relatively modern, the product of deliberate intellectual and political work. And ethnic conoict, rather than the modern repetition of “ancient tribal struggles,” is seen as more contingent, requiring other kinds of causal explanation. This article employs a constructivist approach to analyze the ouidity and multiplicity of identities as they function in national formation and the practice of internal and foreign policy. Rather than conceiving of nations and states as possessing single identities from which their interests and behavior follow, the approach here proposes that political actors are capable of employing various identities, constituted both historically and by elites, that shape their attitudes and actions in domestic and international arenas. Because, arguably, interests are tied to identities— that is, what we think we need is connected to who we think we are—the

Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan

Abstract: After a decade of intense focus on Iraq and North Korea, the U.S. defense planning community needs to devote more attention to possible war in the Taiwan Strait. The ChinaTaiwan relationship is structurally unstable and potentially explosive. China (also known as the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) insists that Taiwan is a part of its territory, whereas Taiwan refuses to be ruled by Beijing. Although Taiwan’s new president, Chen Shui-bian, has stated that he will avoid declaring independence from the PRC, his Democratic Progressive Party has long called for just such a declaration of independence. Chen himself is willing to forgo one only because he believes that Taiwan is already sovereign.1 Beijing has welcomed President Chen’s restraint and has even offered to view Taiwan as an equal partner (rather than as a local renegade government) in negotiations on Taiwan’s future. But China also issued a recent white paper threatening that it will not wait for reuniacation indeanitely, stating that Chen must publicly renounce his party’s stand on independence and explicitly reafarm the “one China” principle, and reminding the international community that China reserves the right to use force against Taiwan to “safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity.”2 Chinese ofacials recognize that their military will not excel until their economy develops further—a conclusion that would seem to counsel strategic patience on Beijing’s part.3 They understand, however, that Taiwan is improving its own armed forces, and note

Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)

Abstract: In “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik craft a curiously rigid doctrine for realism and then puzzle over why the aeld is crowded with apostates.1 The answer, I propose, is that the church of realism can be a bit more catholic than Legro and Moravcsik claim. Legro and Moravcsik have written out of the book of realism a crucial insight that informs most realist theories (at least implicitly) and have thereby inadvertently excommunicated too many of the faithful. But they are wrong in a productive way, and correcting their mistake points in the direction of a fruitful research agenda for scholars—realists and antirealists alike.

Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics

Abstract: Efforts to develop a foundation for scientiac knowledge that would unite the natural and social sciences date to the classical Greeks. Given recent advances in genetics and evolutionary theory, this goal may be closer than ever.1 The human genome project has generated much media attention as scientists reveal genetic causes of diseases and some aspects of human behavior. And although advances in evolutionary theory may have received less attention, they are no less signiacant. Edward O. Wilson, Roger Masters, and Albert Somit, among others, have led the way in using evolutionary theory and social science to produce a synthesis for understanding human behavior and social phenomena.2 This synthesis posits that human behavior is simultaneously and inextricably a result of evolutionary and environmental causes. The social sciences, including the study of international politics, may build upon this scholarship.3 In this article I argue that evolutionary theory can improve the realist theory of international politics. Traditional realist arguments rest principally on one of two discrete ultimate causes, or intellectual foundations. The arst is Reinhold Niebuhr’s argument that humans are evil. The second is grounded in the work

The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy

Abstract: Why did Slobodan Milosevic decide he would rather aght the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) than agree to the Rambouillet formula for Kosovo? Why did he agree to settle the war on June 3, 1999, after some eleven weeks of NATO bombing? This article examines these two questions through the lens of strategy. First, I argue that Milosevic probably had a political-military strategy for his confrontation with NATO; he had a plausible theory of victory or at least of partial success. Milosevic’s strategy was to split the coalition, and he had the political and military means to try, which he skillfully employed. Second, I argue that the strategy on the whole worked surprisingly well. For the most part, Yugoslavia’s military machine lent excellent support to Serbia’s political efforts, though the Serbs did make one serious mistake: the early large-scale expulsion of Kosovar Albanians. Third, I try to show that an understanding of Milosevic’s strategy helps one understand how and why the war ended when it did. In particular, starting roughly in mid-May, Milosevic received a barrage of evidence that his strategy had stopped working—it had achieved what it could achieve. NATO was offering a compromise, and if Serbia did not accept it, meager though it was, the state would suffer serious damage in the coming weeks, with little chance of any additional concessions. This was not much, but it was something. The Serbs could not keep NATO out of Kosovo, but they did manage to get the United Nations (UN) Security Council into Kosovo. At that point, a continuation of the war held more chance of great costs than it did of signiacant gains, as NATO was starting to pound Serbia’s economy to pieces. Scholars and policy analysts are already asking questions about what the war in Kosovo may teach us about coercion—the manipulation of the threat of force and the use of force to compel others to do what an actor wishes. The conoict may prove a particularly instructive case, because NATO was obviously much more powerful than Serbia, but had a difacult time achieving its

China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security

Abstract: International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 52–79 © 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. David Shambaugh is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and is a nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. He is the author of many studies on contemporary China and East Asian affairs.

Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security

Abstract: Offense-defense theory argues that international conoict and war are more likely when offensive military operations have the advantage over defensive operations, whereas cooperation and peace are more likely when defense has the advantage. According to the theory, the relative ease of attack and defense—the offensedefense balance—is determined primarily by the prevailing state of technology at any given time. When technological change shifts the balance toward offense, attackers are more likely to win quick and decisive victories. This prospect of quick and decisive warfare exacerbates the security dilemma among states, intensiaes arms races, and makes wars of expansion, prevention, and preemption more likely. When technological innovation strengthens the defense relative to the offense, states are more likely to feel secure and act benignly.1 Offense-defense theory has deep roots, but has become increasingly popular in international relations scholarship and foreign policy analysis in recent years. The idea that the nature of technology affects the prospects for war and

The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks

Abstract: hould the United States threaten to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for an adversary’s use of chemical or biological weapons? The U.S. government has a clear policy on this matter: it is deliberately unclear about its plans. In March 1996, Secretary of Defense William Perry explained: “For obvious reasons, we choose not to specify in detail what responses we would make to a chemical attack. However, as we stated during the Gulf War, if any country were foolish enough to use chemical weapons against the United States, the response will be ‘absolutely overwhelming’ and ‘devastating.’”1 The purpose of this U.S. policy—which has become known as the “calculated ambiguity” doctrine—was underscored by Secretary of Defense William Cohen in November 1998: “We think the ambiguity involved in the issue of nuclear weapons contributes to our own security, keeping any potential adversary who might use either chemical or biological [weapons] unsure of what our response would be.”2 The doctrine’s proponents, both inside and outside the U.S. government, claim that such a threat to respond asymmetrically—retaliating with nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack—is an unfortunate necessity. They argue that, because the United States has foresworn the option of retaliating in kind, nuclear weapons threats are the only strong deterrent preventing so-called rogue nations from using their newly acquired chemical or biological arsenals.3 The calculated ambiguity doctrine, however,

Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry

Abstract: The end of the Cold War produced major changes in the U.S. defense sector. More than 2 million defense workers, military personnel, and civil servants have lost their jobs. Thousands of arms have left the industry. More than one hundred military bases have closed, and the production of weapons is down considerably. As signiacant as these changes are, they do not address the key issues in restructuring the post–Cold War defense sector. The Reagan-era defense buildup led contractors to invest in huge production capacity that no longer is needed. This capacity overhang includes too many open factories, each of which produces a “legacy” system that was designed for the Cold War. Many individual defense plants are also too large to produce efaciently at post–Cold War levels of demand. Until this excess capacity is eliminated, the United States will continue to spend too much on defense. The politics of jobs and congressional districts that many analysts thought governed the Cold War have triumphed in its aftermath. Today, years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, not one Cold War weapon platform line has closed in the United States. 1 The same factories still produce the same aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles (or their incremental descendants). During the Cold War, the high level of perceived security threat increased U.S. policymakers’ respect for military advice on weapons procurement and research and development (R&D) decisions. The military services’ expert knowledge checked Congress’s pork barrel instincts, and failed or unneeded weapon systems were often canceled. Today, however, contractors and congres

Understanding Decisionmaking, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review Essay

Abstract: Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d ed. New York: Longman, 1999 In 1971, Graham Allison published his revised Harvard government department dissertation, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.1 It was an ambitiously intelligent and sophisticated book, ranking among the most important studies in American political science in the 1970s and signiacantly inouencing other aelds. Over the years, Allison’s volume helped shape interpretations in disciplines interested in decisionmaking, and provoked many methodological and conceptual critiques, as well as some on issues of evidence, sources, and missile crisis history.2 The book made many analysts of policy more self-conscious about the models of process and of explanation they employed, and Essence

Breaking New Ground or Breaking the Rules: Strategic Reorientation in U.S. Industrial Policy

Abstract: Whether it has been in the process of building a new nation or the new economy, the United States has had to grapple with enduring industrial policy issues. At the time of the Founding Fathers, the question was how the then-less developed new nation should meet the challenge of Britain’s manufacturing prowess, and whether it should adopt Alexander Hamilton’s infant industry proposals for industrial subsidies and trade protection. Jumping ahead more than two centuries, the issues have included whether to dismantle the Department of Commerce and eliminate corporate welfare. Most recently the debate has reached into cyberspace, including whether to exempt internet commerce from taxes and legislate protections for online privacy. The common thread across these different eras and issues is the role played by industrial policies—broadly deaned as government measures that affect business operations, whether positive or negative, intended or unintended. The powerful association of the U.S. economy with the laissez-faire paradigm leads many to question whether industrial policies exist at all in the United States. For instance, former White House Chief of Staff John Sununu was quoted as saying, “We don’t do industrial policy.”1 Empirical evidence demonstrates otherwise. To cite one striking indicator, the Congressional Budget Oface estimates that federal support for business in the form of anancial subsidies, credit programs, loan guarantees, and tax preferences amounts to more

Military "Culture" and the Fall of France in 1940: A Review Essay

Abstract: Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997 On May 10, 1940, Germany’s panzers launched their westward assault on France. Attacking through the thick forests of the Ardennes, German forces rapidly breached French defenses near Sedan, then swept west to envelop the main French and British armies that had advanced to meet what French Commander in Chief Maurice Gamelin had expected to be the main German attack in Belgium. Adolf Hitler’s legions marched into Paris on June 12, 1940. A shattered French government, overwhelmed by the magnitude of its defeat, sued for peace and signed an armistice at Compiegne on June 22, 1940. The British Expeditionary Force oed across the English Channel, abandoning its equipment on the beaches of Dunkirk. Few defeats in military history have been as rapid, decisive, and unexpected. Sixty years later, the sudden collapse of France in May–June 1940, and the French foreign and military policy of the 1930s that contributed to that debâcle, remain a focus of security studies. The era appears to present a cautionary tale of a nation, and an army, that made just about every unfortunate choice possible. The ink was barely dry on the armistice of June 1940 when contemporaries advanced competing versions of the argument that France’s fate had been a sort of divine judgment invited by the inconsistencies and contradictions of its political culture. The most powerful indictment that the Third Republic exhibited all the symptoms of terminal decadence prior to its debâcle was made by Marc Bloch, whose posthumously published Strange Defeat offered a vision of a fearful, selash, and unpatriotic nation psychologically primed for calamity.1 The view that France’s collapse was the product of an

Spirals, Security and Stability in East Asia

Abstract: In his article “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,”1 Thomas Christensen argues that East Asia is primed for conoict. He contends that security dilemma theory, and two other exacerbating factors, predict spirals of tension between China and Japan. First, Chinese historical memories of Japanese aggression make China especially fearful of increases in Japanese military activities. Second, because China regards Taiwan as a renegade province rather than an independent country, the acquisition of even defensive weapons by Taiwan or Japan (a potential Taiwanese ally) threatens China and may provoke spirals. Based on these arguments, Christensen concludes that the United States should limit the Japanese role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. For example, the United States should not codevelop theater missile defense (TMD) with Japan because this could trigger spirals between Japan and China (p. 75). In this letter I argue that Christensen greatly overstates the potential for conoict in the region. First, I argue that he misapplies security dilemma theory to East Asia. Security dilemma theory actually predicts stability in the region, not dangerous spirals. Second, I show that Christensen’s application of security dilemma theory is falsiaed by evidence from the past afty years. This evidence conarms my argument that spirals are unlikely in East Asia, despite historical grievances and the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty. The implication of my analysis is that U.S. alliance policies in East Asia need not be hamstrung by fears that the region is primed for conoict. Japan can and should be a full and active member of the alliance that guarantees its security.

Debating New Delhi's Nuclear Decision

Abstract: Sumit Ganguly's article "India's Pathway to Pokhran II" is a relatively dispassionate effort to rationalize India's May 1998 nuclear tests and nuclear breakout (i.e., avowal of nuclear weapons).' His description of the main ingredients of India's nuclear decisionmaking before 1990 covers much of the relevant terrain. His assessment of the relative weight of nuclear weapon drivers (preferences of top policymakers, impulses in the nuclear and missile technology programs, and external pressures or threats) is open to serious questions, however, as is his interpretation of the reasons behind the fateful decisions of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Ganguly's explanation of India's nuclear breakout essentially rests on a retrospective selection of Indian elite statements that purport to reflect "perceptions" of Indian security interests. An Indo-centric perceptual analysis may be one reasonable starting point for explaining Indian decisions, but it is not necessarily the end point of a serious empirical analysis. Moreover, it is a shaky basis for Ganguly's U.S. policy recommendations. His analysis is not comparably grounded in the perceptions and interests of India's neighbors, and it begs other issues crucial to designing successful policy responses. Ganguly depicts India's pathway to overt nuclear weapons as a zigzag response to external threats and to the failure of the big powers to provide India nuclear security, notwithstanding India's earlier policy renunciation of nuclear weapons (pp. 150-151). He implies that India had to zig and zag because its resources were constrained and developing nuclear and delivery capabilities took a long time (Ganguly describes the process as "haphazard, discontinuous, and ridden with setbacks" [p. 171]), while problems in India's external security environment rose and fell episodically (see "five phases," pp. 149-171). Ganguly admits that domestic politics occasionally accelerated nuclear weapon-related decisions, but argues that these influences were not fundamental. He specifically denounces the observation that India's craving for international