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Showing papers in "International Security in 2010"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the United States needs support from other states to carry out global governance, particularly from rising powers such as China and Russia, which are part of the liberal Western community, ruling out appeals to common values and norms.
Abstract: The United States needs support from other states to carry out global governance, particularly from rising powers such as China and Russia. Securing cooperation from China and Russia poses special problems, however, because neither state is part of the liberal Western community, ruling out appeals to common values and norms. Nevertheless, an alternative approach that is rooted in appreciation of China's and Russia's heightened status concerns may be viable. Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese and Russian foreign policy has been shaped by the goal of restoring both countries' great power status, which received major blows after China's Tiananmen Square repression and the Soviet Union's breakup and loss of empire. This desire for status can be explained by social identity theory, which argues that social groups strive for a distinctive, positive identity. Social identity theory provides a typology of strategies that states may use to enhance their relative status and suggests appropriate responses to sta...

322 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain the increase in transnational war volunteering as the product of a pan-Islamic identity movement that grew strong in the 1970s Arab world from elite competition among exiled Islamists in international Islamic organizations and Muslim regimes.
Abstract: Why has transnational war volunteering increased so dramatically in the Muslim world since 1980? Standard explanations, which emphasize US-Saudi support for the 1980s Afghan mujahideen, the growth of Islamism, or the spread of Wahhabism are insufficient The increase in transnational war volunteering is better explained as the product of a pan-Islamic identity movement that grew strong in the 1970s Arab world from elite competition among exiled Islamists in international Islamic organizations and Muslim regimes Seeking political relevance and increased budgets, Hijaz-based international activists propagated an alarmist discourse about external threats to the Muslim nation and established a global network of Islamic charities This “soft” pan-Islamic discourse and network enabled Arabs invested in the 1980s Afghanistan war to recruit fighters in the name of inter-Muslim solidarity The Arab-Afghan mobilization in turn produced a foreign fighter movement that still exists today, as a phenomenon partly di

245 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a theoretical and statistical analysis of how civil wars end reveals that the type of ending influences the prospects for longer-term outcomes, and that rebel victories are more likely to secure the peace than are negotiated settlements.
Abstract: Since 1990, negotiated settlements have become the preferred means for settling civil wars Historically, however, these types of settlements have proven largely ineffective: civil wars ended by negotiated settlement are more likely to recur than those ending in victory by one side or the other A theoretical and statistical analysis of how civil wars end reveals that the type of ending influences the prospects for longer-term outcomes An examination of all civil war endings since 1940 finds that rebel victories are more likely to secure the peace than are negotiated settlements A statistical analysis of civil wars from 1940 to 2002 and the case of Uganda illustrate why rebel victories result in more stable outcomes Expanding scholarly and policy analysis of civil war termination types beyond the current default of negotiated settlement to include victories provides a much larger set of cases and variables to draw upon to enhance understanding of the conditions most likely to support long-term stability, democracy, and prosperity

208 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In East Asia, the United States cultivated a "hub and spokes" system of discrete, exclusive alliances with the Republic of Korea, China, and Japan, a system that was distinct from th...
Abstract: In East Asia the United States cultivated a “hub and spokes” system of discrete, exclusive alliances with the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and Japan, a system that was distinct from th...

166 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a variety of theories of authoritarian control help to explain how Kim Jong-il and his family have remained in power and how this might change over time and explain the past resilience of the North Korean regime.
Abstract: Speculation about the future of the North Korean regime has been intense for nearly two decades. In the 1990s, economic crises and famine led to predictions of the Kim regime's imminent downfall. Today analysts highlight impending famine as well as threats to the regime's position brought by eroding information control. Several theories of authoritarian control help to explain how Kim Jong-il and his family have remained in power and how this might change over time. The Kim regime has employed a variety of authoritarian “tools” to protect itself both from popular revolt and from internal coups. Its social policies, reliance on certain ideas and nationalism, and use of force prevent the onset of revolution. Through numerous other tools (elite co-optation, manipulation of foreign governments for financial aid, and the “coupproofing” of domestic institutions), the regime protects itself from coups d'etat and elite unrest. This framework not only helps to explain the past resilience of the regime, but it sugg...

160 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an empirical analysis demonstrates that counterhegemonic balancing is frequent in Europe but much less frequent in the global system, as well as to more frequent and larger alliances with the leading sea power than against it, and that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory.
Abstract: Scholars often interpret balance of power theory to imply that great powers almost always balance against the leading power in the system, and they conclude that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory. They are wrong on both counts. Balance of power theory is not universally applicable. Its core propositions about balancing strategies and the absence of sustained hegemonies apply to the European system and perhaps to some other autonomous continental systems but not to the global maritime system. Sea powers are more interested in access to markets than in territorial aggrandizement against other great powers. Consequently, patterns of coalition formation have been different in the European system and in the global maritime system during the last five centuries. An empirical analysis demonstrates that counterhegemonic balancing is frequent in Europe but much less frequent in the global system. Higher concentrations of power in the global system lead to fewer and smaller rather than more frequent and larger balancing coalitions, as well as to more frequent and larger alliances with the leading sea power than against it.

133 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors assess the rationalist approach to war as one possible explanation of the conflict and conclude that bargaining theory is inadequate as an explanation for the Iraq War, because the problem of credible commitment was real, it could not be solved because of the prior beliefs of the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein was uniquely evil and because of Saddam's inability to signal accurately to multiple audiences, both factors now outside bargaining theory.
Abstract: The Iraq War has received little sustained analysis from scholars of international relations. I assess the rationalist approach to war—or, simply, bargaining theory—as one possible explanation of the conflict. Bargaining theory correctly directs attention to the inherently strategic nature of all wars. It also highlights problems of credible commitment and asymmetric information that lead conflicts of interest, ubiquitous in international relations, to turn violent. These strategic interactions were central to the outbreak of the Iraq War in 2003. Nonetheless, bargaining theory is inadequate as an explanation of the Iraq War. Although the problem of credible commitment was real, it could not be solved because of the prior beliefs of the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein was uniquely evil and because of Saddam's inability to signal accurately to multiple audiences, both factors now outside bargaining theory. Nor was the problem of private information an important impediment to bargaining; rather, the...

118 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, this article argued that China did not develop sufficient forces or doctrine to overcome its vulnerability to a first strike by the United States or the Soviet Union for more than three decades.
Abstract: After exploding its first nuclear device in 1964, China did not develop sufficient forces or doctrine to overcome its vulnerability to a first strike by the United States or the Soviet Union for more than three decades. Two factors explain this puzzling willingness to live with nuclear vulnerability: (1) the views and beliefs of senior leaders about the utility of nuclear weapons and the requirements of deterrence, and (2) internal organizational and political constraints on doctrinal innovation. Even as China’s technical expertise grew and financial resources for modernization became available after the early 1980s, leadership beliefs have continued to shape China’s approach to nuclear strategy, reflecting the idea of assured retaliation (i.e., using the fewest number of weapons to threaten an opponent with a credible second strike). The enduring effect of these leadership ideas has important implications for the trajectory of China’s current efforts to modernize its nuclear force.

109 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an analysis of data from a nationally representative survey of urban Pakistanis refutes four influential conventional wisdoms about why Pakistanis support Islamic militancy: there is no clear relationship between poverty and support for militancy, support for militant organizations is increasing in terms of both subjective economic well-being and community economic performance.
Abstract: Islamist militancy in Pakistan has long stood atop the international security agenda, yet there is almost no systematic evidence about why individual Pakistanis support Islamist militant organizations. An analysis of data from a nationally representative survey of urban Pakistanis refutes four influential conventional wisdoms about why Pakistanis support Islamic militancy. First, there is no clear relationship between poverty and support for militancy. If anything, support for militant organizations is increasing in terms of both subjective economic well-being and community economic performance. Second, personal religiosity and support for sharia law are poor predictors of support for Islamist militant organizations. Third, support for political goals espoused by legal Islamist parties is a weak indicator of support for militant organizations. Fourth, those who support core democratic principles or have faith in Pakistan's democratic process are not less supportive of militancy. Taken together, these resu...

104 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Vipin Narang1
TL;DR: A probe of various regional power nuclear postures reveals that such postures, rather than simply the acquisition of nuclear weapons, can have differential effects on deterrence and stability dynamics as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: A probe of various regional power nuclear postures reveals that such postures, rather than simply the acquisition of nuclear weapons, can have differential effects on deterrence and stability dynamics. The India-Pakistan dyad is a useful candidate for exploring these various effects because the three regional power nuclear postures—catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation—have interacted with each other in South Asia. In particular, Pakistan's shift from a catalytic posture to an asymmetric escalation posture in 1998 against a continuous Indian assured retaliation posture allows the effects of nuclear posture to be isolated in an enduring rivalry in which many variables can be held constant. The asymmetric escalation posture may be “deterrence optimal” for Pakistan, suggesting that nuclear postures do have different effects on conflict dynamics, but it has also enabled Pakistan to more aggressively pursue longstanding revisionist preferences in India, triggering more frequent and intense ...

98 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A comprehensive definition of biosecurity that encompasses naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate disease outbreaks can help to further research, analysis, and policymaking and can provide a common framework for the multidisciplinary research and analysis necessary to assess and manage these risks.
Abstract: Advances in science and technology, the rise of globalization, the emergence of new diseases, and the changing nature of conflict have increased the risks posed by naturally occurring and man-made biological threats. A growing acceptance of a broader definition of security since the end of the Cold War has facilitated the rise of biosecurity issues on the international security agenda. Developing strategies to counter biological threats is complicated by the lack of agreement on the definition of biosecurity, the diverse range of biological threats, and competing perspectives on the most pressing biological threats. A comprehensive definition of biosecurity that encompasses naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate disease outbreaks can help to further research, analysis, and policymaking. Operationalizing this broad conception of biosecurity requires a taxonomy of biological threats based on a levels-of-analysis approach that identifies which types of actors are potential sources of biological thre...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argued that the United States' non-strategic behavior results from a condition of moral hazard owing to the shifting of costs away from the average voter, who supports the use of a capital-intensive doctrine in conflicts where its effectiveness is low because the decreased likelihood of winning is outweighed by the lower costs of fighting.
Abstract: A capital- and firepower-intensive military doctrine is, in general, poorly suited for combating an insurgency. It is therefore puzzling that democracies, particularly the United States, tenaciously pursue such a suboptimal strategy over long periods of time and in successive conflicts. This tendency poses an empirical challenge to the argument that democracies tend to win the conflicts they enter. This apparently nonstrategic behavior results from a condition of moral hazard owing to the shifting of costs away from the average voter. The voter supports the use of a capital-intensive doctrine in conflicts where its effectiveness is low because the decreased likelihood of winning is outweighed by the lower costs of fighting. This theory better explains the development of the United States' counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam during Lyndon Johnson's administration compared to the dominant interpretation, which blames the U.S. military's myopic bureaucracy and culture for its counterproductive focus on firepower and conventional warfare.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The competitive violence theory as discussed by the authors posits that violence was primarily driven by competition among nationalists, and it can explain variation in both the timing and location of violence in nationalist conflict, which can explain why some nationalist movements turn violent and others remain primarily peaceful.
Abstract: Nationalist conflict has been one of the most pervasive and intractable types of conflict in the modern era. In some places, nationalist conflict has entailed lengthy wars, terrorist campaigns, and rural insurgency. Yet in many others, nationalist organizations have pursued peaceful strategies, engaging in bargaining, diplomacy, and popular protest. Why do some nationalist movements turn violent, whereas others remain primarily peaceful? Drawing on nationalist struggles against the French colonial empire, the competitive violence theory posits that violence was primarily driven by competition among nationalists. Nationalist violence erupted when colonial states pursued policies to restrict nationalist opposition and repress leading nationalists, creating a leadership vacuum and encouraging new nationalist actors to use violence to vie for influence. The competitive violence theory exemplifies an approach that can explain variation in both the timing and location of violence.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that Japan's postwar security policy has been driven by the country's powerful antimilitarism, which reflects the following normative and realist factors: pacifism, antitraditionalism, and fear of entrapment.
Abstract: Since the late 1990s, Japan has sent increasing numbers of its military forces overseas. It has also assumed a more active military role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Neither conventional constructivist nor realist approaches in international relations theory can adequately explain these changes or, more generally, changes in Japan's security policy since the end of World War II. Instead, Japan's postwar security policy has been driven by the country's powerful antimilitarism, which reflects the following normative and realist factors: pacifism, antitraditionalism, and fear of entrapment. An understanding of the influence of these three factors makes it possible to explain both Japan's past reluctance to play a military role overseas and its increasing activism over the last decade. Four case studies—the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the anti–Vietnam War period, increases in U.S.-Japan military cooperation during detente, and actions taken during the administration of Junichiro Koizumi...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The United States and West Germany made skillful use in 1990 of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's political weakness and his willingness to prioritize his country's financial woes over security concerns as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Washington and Bonn pursued a shared strategy of perpetuating U.S. preeminence in European security after the end of the Cold War. As multilingual evidence shows, they did so primarily by shielding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from potential competitors during an era of dramatic change in Europe. In particular, the United States and West Germany made skillful use in 1990 of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's political weakness and his willingness to prioritize his country's financial woes over security concerns. Washington and Bonn decided “to bribe the Soviets out,” as then Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates phrased it, and to move NATO eastward. The goal was to establish NATO as the main post–Cold War security institution before alternative structures could arise and potentially diminish U.S. influence. Admirers of a muscular U.S. foreign policy and of NATO will view this strategy as sound; critics will note that it alienated Russia and made NATO's later expansion possible. Ei...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article found that the United States' long-standing foreign policy orientation of liberal internationalism has been in serious decline because of rising domestic partisan divisions, and that there is no evidence of a Vietnam War or a post-Cold War effect on domestic partisan division on foreign policy.
Abstract: Recent research, including an article by Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz in this journal, has argued that the United States' long-standing foreign policy orientation of liberal internationalism has been in serious decline because of rising domestic partisan divisions. A reanalysis of the theoretical logic driving these arguments and the empirical evidence used to support them suggests a different conclusion. Extant evidence on congressional roll call voting and public opinion surveys, which is often used to support the claim that liberal internationalism has declined, as well as new evidence about partisan divisions in Congress using policy gridlock and cosponsorship data from other studies of American politics do not demonstrate the decline in bipartisanship in foreign policy that conventional wisdom suggests. The data also do not show evidence of a Vietnam War or a post–Cold War effect on domestic partisan divisions on foreign policy. Contrary to the claims of recent literature, the data show that g...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Theoretical insights from evolutionary psychology and biology can help academics and policymakers better understand both deep and proximate causes of Islamic suicide terrorism as discussed by the authors, and they can be integrated with more conventional social science explanations, which include international anarchy, U.S. hegemony and presence in the Middle East, and culturally molded discourse sanctioning suicide terrorism.
Abstract: Theoretical insights from evolutionary psychology and biology can help academics and policymakers better understand both deep and proximate causes of Islamic suicide terrorism. The life sciences can contribute explanations that probe the influence of the following forces on the phenomenon of Islamic suicide terrorism: high levels of gender differentiation, the prevalence of polygyny, and the obstruction of marriage markets delaying marriage for young adult men in the modern Middle East. The influence of these forces has been left virtually unexplored in the social sciences, despite their presumptive application in this case. Life science explanations should be integrated with more conventional social science explanations, which include international anarchy, U.S. hegemony and presence in the Middle East, and culturally molded discourse sanctioning suicide terrorism in the Islamic context. Such a consilient approach, melding the explanatory power of the social and life sciences, offers greater insight into the causal context of Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorism, the motivation of suicide terrorists, and effective approaches to subvert this form of terrorism.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A widely held and largely unchallenged view among many scholars and policymakers is that nuclear proliferation is the gravest threat facing the United States today, that it is more dangerous than ever and that few meaningful lessons can be drawn from the nuclear history of a supposed simpler and more predictable period, the Cold War as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: A widely held and largely unchallenged view among many scholars and policymakers is that nuclear proliferation is the gravest threat facing the United States today, that it is more dangerous than ever, and that few meaningful lessons can be drawn from the nuclear history of a supposed simpler and more predictable period, the Cold War. This view, labeled “nuclear alarmism,” is based on four myths about the history of the nuclear age. First, today's nuclear threats are new and more dangerous than those of the past. Second, unlike today, nuclear weapons stabilized international politics during the Cold War, when in fact the record was mixed. The third myth conflates the history of the nuclear arms race with the geopolitical and ideological competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, creating an oversimplified and misguided portrayal of the Cold War. The final myth is that the Cold War bipolar military rivalry was the only force driving nuclear proliferation. A better understanding of this his...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that deception may sometimes be in the national interest in some cases, where an easy victory is anything but assured, and that leaders resort to deception in such cases to preempt what is sure to be a contentious debate over whether the use of force is justified by shifting blame for hostilities onto the adversary.
Abstract: When do leaders resort to deception to sell wars to their publics? Dan Reiter and Allan Stam have advanced a “selection effects” explanation for why democracies win the wars they initiate: leaders, because they must secure public consent first, “select” into those wars they expect to win handily. In some cases, however, the “selection effect” breaks down. In these cases, leaders, for realist reasons, are drawn toward wars where an easy victory is anything but assured. Leaders resort to deception in such cases to preempt what is sure to be a contentious debate over whether the use of force is justified by shifting blame for hostilities onto the adversary. The events surrounding the United States' entry into World War II is useful in assessing the plausibility of this argument. President Franklin Roosevelt welcomed U.S. entry into the war by the fall of 1941 and attempted to manufacture events accordingly. An important implication from this finding is that deception may sometimes be in the national interest.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, positive inducements, such as policy concessions and economic favors, can serve two main purposes: (1) arranging a beneficial quid pro quo with the other side, and (2) catalyzing, via positive engagement, a restructuring of interests and preferences within the opponent's politico-economic system.
Abstract: Positive inducements as a strategy for dealing with regimes that challenge core norms of international behavior and the national interests of the United States (“renegade regimes”) contain both promises and pitfalls. Such inducements, which include policy concessions and economic favors, can serve two main purposes: (1) arranging a beneficial quid pro quo with the other side, and (2) catalyzing, via positive engagement, a restructuring of interests and preferences within the other side's politico-economic system (such that quid pro quos become less and less necessary). The conditions for progress toward either purpose can vary, as can the requirements for sufficient and credible concessions on both sides and the obstacles in the way of such concessions. For renegade regimes, a primary consideration involves the domestic purposes that internationally objectionable behavior can serve. An examination of the cases of North Korea, Iran, and Libya finds that negative pressures have been relatively ineffective, ...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that "naval nationalism" is an underdeveloped and unconvincing explanation for China's pursuit of expanded naval capabilities, and present Chinese rationales for the development of limited power-projection capabilities, which are consistent with a proper understanding of Chinese interests.
Abstract: In “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” Robert Ross seeks to explain why “China will soon embark on a more ambitious maritime policy, beginning with the construction of a power-projection navy centered on an aircraft carrier.”1 Ross argues that geopolitical constraints should lead China, a continental power, to pursue access denial as its optimal maritime strategy. He relies on “naval nationalism” to explain China’s development of naval power-projection capabilities, which he describes as a suboptimal choice given China’s geopolitical position. We argue that “naval nationalism” is an underdeveloped and unconvincing explanation for China’s pursuit of expanded naval capabilities. Instead, China’s development of a limited naval power-projection capability reoects changes in China’s threat environment and expanded Chinese national interests created by deeper integration into the world economy. In our critique, we arst identify oaws in Ross’s geopolitical analysis. Second, we discuss shortcomings in his causal argument. Lastly, we brieoy present Chinese rationales for the development of limited power-projection capabilities, which are consistent with a proper understanding of Chinese interests.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley as discussed by the authors argue that liberal internationalism in the United States is alive and well, but their analysis of congressional voting and public opinion fails to demonstrate the persistence of bipartisanship on foreign policy.
Abstract: Over the past two decades, political polarization has shaken the domestic foundations of U.S. grand strategy, sorely testing bipartisan support for liberal internationalism. Stephen Chaudoin, Helen Milner, and Dustin Tingley take issue with this interpretation, contending that liberal internationalism in the United States is alive and well. Their arguments, however, do not stand up to careful scrutiny. Their analysis of congressional voting and public opinion fails to demonstrate the persistence of bipartisanship on foreign policy. Indeed, the partisan gap that widened during George W. Bush’s administration has continued during the presidency of Barack Obama, confirming that a structural change has taken place in the domestic bases of U.S. foreign policy. President Obama now faces the unenviable challenge of conducting U.S. statecraft during an era when consensus will be as elusive at home as it is globally.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Caverley's main arguments are a welcome challenge to the established wisdom, but they are not supported by the historical evidence as discussed by the authors, since the U.S. military strategy to focus on pacification at the expense of search and destroy.
Abstract: Scholars have long argued about why the United States pursued a conventional military strategy during the Vietnam War rather than one based on counterinsurgency principles. A recent article in this journal by Jonathan Caverley presents a bold challenge to the historiography of the Vietnam War. Rejecting the standard historical focus on the organizational culture and strategic perspective of Gen. William Westmoreland and the U.S. Army, Caverley argues that the roots of the United States' strategy in Vietnam can be traced to the direct influence of civilian leaders and the strong constraint of public opinion. Caverley's main arguments are a welcome challenge to the established wisdom, but they are not supported by the historical evidence. Civilian officials in Lyndon Johnson's administration did not instruct the military on how to fight the ground war within the borders of South Vietnam. Westmoreland did not want to change U.S. military strategy to focus on pacification at the expense of search and destroy ...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as discussed by the authors concluded an intense, yearlong effort to revamp U.S. nuclear weapons policy to better address modern threats, but there were strong disagreements over what kinds of changes should be made.
Abstract: The release of the Barack Obama administration's much-anticipated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded an intense, yearlong effort to revamp U.S. nuclear weapons policy to better address modern threats. Despite general agreement that the United States' nuclear policy and posture was in need of overhaul, there were strong disagreements over what kinds of changes should be made. At the core of these debates was the issue of U.S. declaratory policy—the stated role and purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. Whereas some members of the administration advocated that the United States retain all of the flexibility and options afforded by the policy of calculated ambiguity, others contended that to fulfill President Obama's commitment to “put an end to Cold War thinking” and “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy,” the United States should adopt a more restrictive nuclear policy such as no first use (NFU), perhaps in the form of a declaration that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear wea...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Fuhrmann as discussed by the authors argues that there is a causal connection between peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation and that civilian nuclear assistance over time increases the likelihood that states will initiate nuclear weapons programs.
Abstract: In his article, Matthew Fuhrmann challenges the conventional wisdom about the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapons proliferation.1 The literature on nuclear proliferation focuses on the demand side and explains decisions to acquire nuclear weapons on the basis of security threats, hegemonic ambitions, national identity, or related factors.2 The role of civilian technical nuclear cooperation is generally discounted as a motivating factor in the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities. Fuhrmann argues that there is a causal connection between peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation and that civilian nuclear assistance over time increases the likelihood that states will initiate nuclear weapons programs. The implications of the notion that civilian nuclear technology promotes nuclear proliferation are disturbing, because they lead to the conclusion that the central bargain of the nuclear nonproliferation regime—namely, access to civilian nuclear technology in return for the renunciation of nuclear weapons—is not viable and that instead the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) might be a vector for the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The central thesis of Fuhrmann’s article seems implausible. Nuclear proliferation is exceedingly rare. One hundred eighty-nine states are members of the NPT, including ave nuclear states. There are only four states that are not members of the NPT and that have nuclear weapons. Of the four, the last one to make the decision to go nuclear and that received civilian nuclear assistance started its nuclear program in 1972. North Korea went nuclear in the absence of civilian nuclear assistance.3 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Correspondence: Nuclear Cooperation and Proliferation

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the case of the U.S. alliance of convenience with Iraq during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, Neorealism and two-level games theories broadly predict successful intra-alliance bargaining because of the United States' favorable position in the international system and the relatively tight constraints on executive power.
Abstract: Despite the ubiquity of the term "alliance of convenience," the dynamics of these especially tenuous alliances have not been systematically explored by scholars or policymakers. An alliance of convenience is the initiation of security cooperation between ideological and geopolitical adversaries in response to an overarching third-party threat; they are conceptually different from other types of alliances. Neorealist, two-level games, and neoclassical realist theories all seek to explain the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining between the United States and allies of convenience since 1945. Neorealism and two-level games theories broadly predict successful U.S. bargaining because of the United States' favorable position in the international system and the relatively tight constraints on executive power in the United States, respectively. By contrast, neoclassical realism predicts that tight constraints on executive power in the United States should have led the foreign policy executive to bargain unsuccessfully with allies of convenience. In the case of the U.S. alliance of convenience with Iraq during the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War, neoclassical realism best explains the outcome of U.S. bargaining with Iraq. This case has implications for other U.S. bargaining efforts.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Cost distribution theory suggests that the costs to the median voter in a democracy of fighting an insurgency with firepower are relatively low compared to a more labor-intensive approach, therefore, this voter will favor a capitalintensive counterinsurgency campaign despite the resulting diminished prospects of victory as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Cost distribution theory suggests that the costs to the median voter in a democracy of fighting an insurgency with firepower are relatively low compared to a more labor-intensive approach. Therefore, this voter will favor a capitalintensive counterinsurgency campaign despite the resulting diminished prospects of victory. Primary and secondary sources show that President Lyndon Johnson and his civilian aides were very much aware that, although they considered a main force—focused and firepower-intensive strategy to be largely ineffective against the insurgency in South Vietnam, it was politically more popular in the United States. Importantly, civil-military agreement on warfighting strategy does not undermine this explanation, which assumes that civilian leaders, and ultimately the public, play an essential role in that strategy's determination. Appointing and supporting Gen. William Westmoreland was just one means by which the Johnson administration ensured that the U.S. military emphasized the fight aga...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Horowitz as mentioned in this paper examined how religion affected the duration of the Crusades, and argued that religion has also shaped the behavior of conventional, Christian military forces, and pointed out the manifold ways in which religion can pervade and constitute all aspects of warfare.
Abstract: Michael Horowitz’s compelling article deserves praise for pushing the agenda on religion and war beyond two contemporary obsessions: the axation on religion and nonstate violent actors, particularly insurgents and terrorists, and the emphasis on Islam as the primary religious movement associated with violent conoict.1 By examining how religion affected the duration of the Crusades, Horowitz persuasively demonstrates that religion has also shaped the behavior of conventional, Christian military forces. This is a step in the right direction, but it is an all-too-cautious step. Because Horowitz overemphasizes the narrow, causal effects of religion, at the expense of exploring the manifold ways in which religion can pervade and constitute all aspects of warfare, his argument suffers from endogeneity and missing variable bias. As I show below, these difaculties result in an argument that both overstates and obscures the primary effects of religion on war. Historical analyses such as these distract from what should be scholars’ primary concern regarding international security and religion: exploring the role of religion in contemporary interstate war.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper argued that the United States in World War II is not a case of a democracy initiating a war it went on to lose, and therefore not evidence against the proposition that democracies are likely to win the wars they initiate.
Abstract: In “The Deception Dividend: FDR’s Undeclared War,” John Schuessler argues that in 1941 President Franklin Roosevelt took actions against Germany and Japan to increase the likelihood that the United States would enter World War II, despite public hesitance to do so.1 Schuessler writes, “The ‘undeclared war’ in the Atlantic and the oil embargo on Japan should be understood as designed, at least in part, to invite an ‘incident’ that could be used to justify hostilities” (p. 145). The broader implication is that if elected leaders can manipulate their countries into war despite public hesitation, then public opinion does not affect democratic foreign policy choices. More speciacally, the ability of elected leaders to circumvent public opinion would damage the selection effects explanation of why democracies win their wars. The selection effects argument, which Allan Stam and I have made, claims that democracies win the wars they initiate because public opinion constrains them to initiate only those wars they are highly conadent they will go on to win, and the marketplace of ideas better informs their policy choices.2 In this letter, I make three main points. First, even if one concedes the entirety of Schuessler’s historical interpretation, the United States in World War II is not a case of a democracy initiating a war it went on to lose, and therefore not evidence against the proposition that democracies are likely to win the wars they initiate. Second, the evidence does not clearly indicate that Roosevelt sought to provoke war, and there is evidence to the contrary. Third, it is hard to think of a better demonstration of selection effects theory than Roosevelt’s actions in 1941. He was deeply aware of public opinion and recognized that major foreign policy actions must be popular. Despite his grave concern about the imperative of U.S. aid to Britain, Roosevelt was careful not to get ahead of public opinion, taking only those actions the public supported and no more. He worked within the marketplace of ideas to inouence public opinion through persuasion and public speeches. His public claims about the seriousness of the Nazi and Japanese threat and the importance that the Soviet Union and Britain not lose the war reoected his genuine beliefs, and in hindsight appear to be right. The marketplace of Correspondence: FDR and Selection Effects Theory

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide additional information on the collection of actionable intelligence against the near-term target set, which Sugden describes as emerging, time-sensitive, soft targets, such as exposed WMD [weapons of mass destruction] launchers, terrorist leaders, and sites of state transfers of WMD to other states.
Abstract: In his article, Bruce Sugden provides a cogent, technically sophisticated assessment of the use of conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs) for the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) mission.1 To a large degree, however, the article elides one of the central issues in targeting, the “actionable intelligence” problem. Without actionable intelligence, CBMs will be of little use, so understanding the problems and prospects for acquiring such intelligence is central to evaluating their utility. In this letter, I critique the depiction of intelligence in Sugden’s article and provide additional information on the collection of actionable intelligence against the near-term target set, which Sugden describes as “emerging, time-sensitive, soft targets, such as exposed WMD [weapons of mass destruction] launchers, terrorist leaders, and sites of state transfers of WMD to terrorists or other states” (p. 117). I conclude by arguing that developing actionable intelligence on these targets is time consuming and requires the presence of U.S. assets, making both the prompt and global aspect of CBMs irrelevant.