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JournalISSN: 0269-8595

International Studies in The Philosophy of Science 

Routledge
About: International Studies in The Philosophy of Science is an academic journal published by Routledge. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Philosophy of science & Scientific realism. It has an ISSN identifier of 0269-8595. Over the lifetime, 757 publications have been published receiving 9859 citations. The journal is also known as: I.S.P.S. & ISPS.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms and of probabilistic dependencies, and that an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanism, or solely in the sense of probability, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences.
Abstract: We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences—pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue that the epistemic theory of causality provides the required unification.

350 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This work argues against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism, and presents four other arguments to show that similarity and isomorphic are not the constituents of scientific representation.
Abstract: I argue against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism. These reductive theories aim to radically naturalize the notion of representation, since they treat scientist's purposes and intentions as non-essential to representation. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that similarity and isomorphism are common but not universal means of representation. I then present four other arguments to show that similarity and isomorphism are not the constituents of scientific representation. I finish by looking at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim to radically naturalize scientific representation are likely to be successful.

245 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Michele Lamont Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2009 330 pp., ISBN 9780674032668, US$27.95, €25.20, £20.95 (hardback); ISBN 978674057333, US $17.95 and €16.20 (paperback) This is a muc...
Abstract: Michele Lamont Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2009 330 pp., ISBN 9780674032668, US$27.95, €25.20, £20.95 (hardback); ISBN 9780674057333, US$17.95, £13.95, €16.20 (paperback) This is a muc...

242 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a number of arguments are developed concerning their epistemic and ontological status and some questions concerning the relations between cause and causal explanation and mechanisms are also addressed, in response to many perplexities about the nature of activities.
Abstract: This article deals with mechanisms conceived as composed of entities and activities. In response to many perplexities about the nature of activities, a number of arguments are developed concerning their epistemic and ontological status. Some questions concerning the relations between cause and causal explanation and mechanisms are also addressed.

204 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The semantic approach to theories has recently come under criticism on two fronts: (i) it is claimed that it cannot account for the wide diversity of models employed in scientific practice, a claim which has led some to propose a "deflationary" account of models; and (ii) the sense of "model" used by the approach differs from that given in model theory as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The semantic, or model‐theoretic, approach to theories has recently come under criticism on two fronts: (i) it is claimed that it cannot account for the wide diversity of models employed in scientific practice—a claim which has led some to propose a “deflationary” account of models; (ii) it is further contended that the sense of “model” used by the approach differs from that given in model theory. Our aim in the present work is to articulate a possible response to these claims, drawing on recent developments within the semantic approach itself. Thus, the first is answered by utilizing the notion of a “partial structure”, first introduced in this context by da Costa and French in 1990. The second claim is undermined by consideration of van Fraassen's understanding of “model” which corresponds well with that evinced by modem mathematicians. This latter discussion, in particular, has an impact on the continuing debate regarding the relative merits of the semantic and syntactic views and the developm...

168 citations

Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Journal in previous years
YearPapers
202310
202218
20214
202018
201918
201736