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Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 1975"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The neo-classical models of international trade are based on almost the same assumptions as models of economic market exchange in general: only economic considerations enter the decision-making process and price is the valid expression of the exchange outcome; structural conditions of complete information and reasonable competition are assumed; instantaneous and correct investment, production and selling adjustments can be made by each producer; no national governments, international and supranational organizations have any influence on international exchange; historical and social constraints and limitations do not structure exchange and interaction opportunities as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The neo-classical models of international trade are based on almost the same assumptions as models of economic market exchange in general: only economic considerations enter the decision-making process and price is the valid expression of the exchange outcome; structural conditions of complete information and reasonable competition are assumed; instantaneous and correct investment, production, and selling adjustments can be made by each producer; no national governments, international and supranational organizations have any influence on international exchange; historical and social constraints and limitations do not structure exchange and interaction opportunities.1 However, current international economic exchange is dominated by large oligopolistic firms, multinational corporations, and state-trading organizations. Discriminating trading arrange-

49 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examines political legitimation as one institutional factor which helps to account both for the structural characteristics of mutual misperception in foreign policy and for the importance of political legitimacy in the cold war.
Abstract: Based on their respective social systems, both the United States and the Soviet Union defined and then sustained the cold war through an ideological division of the world. Although some effort has been made to account for this division, it is generally treated either apart from or incidental to the policy processes which led to the antagonisms of the postwar era. A partial exception is found in approaches which treat the cold war "in terms of a spiral of misconception" (Jervis, 1968: 454-455) based on the concept of the "mirror image" (White, 1965; Bronfenbrenner, 1961, 1964; Eckhardt and White, 1967). But these essentially social psychological approaches have in tuLrn been charged with ignoring important institutional factors which also contributed to the mutual misperception associated with the cold war (Gamson and Modigliani, 1971: 110). This paper examines political legitimation as one institutional factor which helps to account both for the structural characteristics of mutual misperception in foreign policy and for the

35 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a comparative study of the foreign policy behavior of 30 black African states in the middle 1960s is presented, and a typology of states and foreign policy patterns that permits testable, comparative hypotheses to be derived.
Abstract: As a comparative study of the foreign policy behavior of 30 black African states in the middle 1960s, we present a typology of states and foreign policy patterns that permits testable, comparative hypotheses to be derived. These hypotheses relating size, level of modernization, and inner or other directedness to four patterns of foreign policy—participation, conflict, political and economic dependence—are operationalized by use of the AFRICA data set and tested via regression and path analysis. Our findings support our typology and hypotheses, accounting for from 50% to 79% of the variance in each foreign policy pattern. They are also simple and interpretable to specialists in African and small state foreign policy behavior.

25 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Research progress in the comparative analysis of foreign policy has been impeded by the absence of a viable framework for analysis as mentioned in this paper, and the major published inventory of findings in this relatively young subfield demonstrates that research has been disparate, uneven, and non-cumulative.
Abstract: Research progress in the comparative analysis of foreign policy has been impeded by the absence of a viable framework for analysis. An examination of the major published inventory of findings in this relatively young subfield demonstrates that research has been disparate, uneven, and noncumulative (McGowan and Shapiro, 1973). Only one specific area of inquiry-the study of the relationship between domestic and foreign conflict behavior-has received more than cursory scrutiny (McGowan and Shapiro, 1973: 79-83, 198-199; Wilkenfeld, 1973). Like its parent field-international politics-the comparative study of foreign policy has tended to pursue an implicit course that involves the construction of islands or clusters of theory, a

25 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A major focus in recent international relations literature has been the problem of measuring the "effective distance" (Deutsch and Isard, 1961) between and among nation-states as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: A major focus in recent international relations literature has been the problem of measuring the "effective distance" (Deutsch and Isard, 1961) between and among nation-states. Hard, quantitative data have been generated on a variety of indices which are designed to measure the volume and intensity of interaction or the closeness of the relationship between pairs of nations: among others, diplomats exchanged (Russett and Lamb, 1969), airline traffic (Gleditsch, 1967, 1969), diplomatic notes and official visits (Galtung, 1966), trading patterns (Russett, 1967; Alker and Puchala, 1968; Savage and Deutsch, 1960), and common membership in international organizations as well as simple geographic distance (Russett, 1967) have been used. Stimulated by speculative inquiries which suggested the existence of regional subsystems, some scholars have attempted to use these data to delineate regions or clusters of nations characterized by relatively close relationships among their membership and relatively loose bonds between member nations and other state actors (Russett, 1967; Gleditsch, 1967;

20 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors evaluate three models with data from the Middle East subsystem: Graham Allison's organizational process paradigm, Charles McClelland's event/interaction model, and a combined interaction/organizational model.
Abstract: The dynamics of crisis behavior have long been an important subject of inquiry for students of international politics. Only recently, however, has there been any effort to examine empirically theoretical propositions regarding this phenonenon (e.g., Hermann, 1969; Holsti, 1965; Zinnes, 1968). In this paper, we seek to add to our knowledge of the international crisis process by evaluation of three models with data from the Middle East subsystem. The models examined are Graham Allison's organizational process paradigm, Charles McClelland's event/interaction model, and a combined interaction/organizational model. The empirical referents are the principal nations involved in the Suez and Six Day War Crises. Little previous empirical work exists on these models. To my knowledge, only Tanter (1972: 7-39) has done any systematic evaluation of these models. Tanter analyzed alliance behavior (NATO and the WTO) in pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods of the Berlin conflict of 1961. While Tanter's results for alliance

11 citations




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A fundamental reorientation of Soviet attitudes toward international politics took place during the Khrushchev years (especially 1956-1960), and the process by which it changes can serve as an indicator of parallel shifts in elite perspectives as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: A fundamental reorientation of Soviet attitudes toward international politics took place during the Khrushchev years (especially 1956–1960), a reorientation which was a necessary—though certainly not a sufficient—condition for the present period of detente. An attempt is made to delineate these basic changes in Soviet perceptions of international politics through an examination of the evolution of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Although it is fully recognized that the correspondence between private leadership views and the overt public doctrine is far from perfect, it is argued that a study of doctrine and the process by which it changes can serve as an indicator of parallel shifts in elite perspectives. To this end, an attempt is made, first, to set out the central tenets of the Stalinist world view, and second, to contrast these to the major revisions that Khrushchev introduced concerning: disarmament, the nature of “ruling circles” in the West, and the dynamics of international tension. A study of doctrinal revisionism in the Soviet Union provides substantial evidence of a continuing—though far from completed—process of growing Soviet acceptance of the existing international order.

8 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined North Vietnamese foreign policy decision-making during 1972 and 1973, using event data for source information, and is placed in the context of Allison's rational actor and bureaucratic politics models.
Abstract: This research provides one basis for more comparative study of governmental decision-making. It examines North Vietnamese foreign policy decision-making during 1972 and 1973, using event data for source information, and is placed in the context of Allison's (1971) rational actor and bureaucratic politics models. The rational actor analysis is used to identify North Vietnamese foreign policy goals and policy alternatives and possible decision strategies for interactions vis-a-vis the United States. No one decision strategy appears to correspond fully with North Vietnamese behavior, and in fact there appears to be a switch in strategies during the analysis period. The bureaucratic politics analysis is employed to identify the source of this switch and the reasons for its occurrence during 1972. That analysis suggests that the military began to support a negotiated settlement with the United States during 1972 to strengthen its bureaucratic position among North Vietnamese policy makers.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make an effort to assess the expected material, psychological, and political impact of future scarcity and limited growth in the international system of nations, and assess their expected material and psychological impact.
Abstract: Today's world is poor, unequal, and ungovernable. Quantitative data and analytic arguments are offered for the present state and current trends in these three respects in the international system of nations. Assumptions and perspectives of future scarcity and limited growth are viewed in light of these existing conditions, and an effort is made to assess their expected material, psychological, and political impact. The “limited growth” perspectives are seen as one-sided and partly unrealistic over the next thirty years, and as even more doubtful over the next fifty to one hundred years. Their psychological impact is seen as manageable under conditions of high levels of international communication, cooperation, and solidarity, but as dangerous and probably destructive in their absence. Both the realism and the timing of limited growth predictions deserve more critical attention, therefore, than they have received thus far.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explain U.S. government decision-making concerning arms transfers to Latin America in the postwar period can be explained in terms of rational strategy, bureaucratic politics, and executive parameters, and relationships that exist between these modes of analysis.
Abstract: The multiplicity of models and approaches to the study of political behavior provide for numerous and important insights, but also for a great deal of confusion as a consequence of explanatory overkill. However, different perspectives can be related to each other to provide an interlocking and consistent explanation which brings order and understanding out of theoretical chaos. U.S. government “decision-making” concerning arms transfers to Latin America in the postwar period can be explained in terms of rational strategy, bureaucratic politics, and executive parameters, and relationships that exist between these modes of analysis. The most important independent variable is the strategic perspective held by the members of the National Security Council. Variance in this perspective has given greater and lesser support to the arguments of bureaucracies having different concerns and interests. This has been especially true for those institutions that, having narrowly defined missions, tend to favor more rigid policies. As a result of its diffuse responsibilities, the State Department has tended to be more adaptable to a changed NSC perspective. The availability of arms for transfer and especially the Congress have provided important checks on arms transfers to Latin America.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In a recent article, Vincent as discussed by the authors analyzes the four voting dimensions in the 1961 General Assembly of the United Nations and concludes that economic development is by far the most important predictor.
Abstract: In a recent article, Vincent (1971) analyzes the four voting dimensions in the 1961 General Assembly of the United Nations. With fourteen independent variables measuring several governmental and societal attributes of nations, he uses a canonical correlation technique to determine which of the fourteen variables provides "the best overall predictor of the voting scores" (1971: 490). His conclusion is that economic development is by far the most important predictor, so important that "Economic Development might be viewed as something fundamental to the . . . outcomes at the United Nations" (1971: 495). In a subsequent study, Vincent (1973) elaborates on the analysis, but arrives at the same conclusion. He goes even further, however, and suggests a rank order of importance among the first three predictors of UN voting (1973: 578): "the relative importance of the three major predictors, in terms of their relationship to various international phenomena, should assume roughly the following balance: economic development .7, democracy .4, U.S. Relations .3."

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In 1970, Lindberg and Scheingold as discussed by the authors adopted a systems orientation to the analysis of regional integration, using the functionalist cotncepts of actor socialization and functional spillover as activators in the integration process.
Abstract: The last two decades have seen the rise of the study of regional integration as an approach to the analysis of international relations. The pioneering work was done by Deutsch (1954). Later, Haas (1958, 1964, and 1966) and Haas and Schmitter (1966) combined the functionalist insights of Mitrany (1966) with a host of politically relevant variables to develop a theoretical approach to the study of regional integration. Although only a pretheory, it has given us the most explicit explanation of the integration process. In 1970, Lindberg and Scheingold adopted a systems orientation to the analysis of regional integration. Using the systems concept of Easton (1965a, 1965b), Lindberg and Scheingold developed a system change model of integration. In this model, the functionalist cotncepts of actor socialization and functional spillover are used as "activators" in the integration process.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The International Organization Data Archive Project (IODA) as discussed by the authors is a collection of data from international organizations that was initiated under the auspices of the International Studies Association (ISA).
Abstract: In fall 1972 a program was initiated, under the auspices of the International Studies Association, to identify and collect existing sets of data in machine readable form on international organizations. This article is intended to serve three purposes: to report on the progress of the International Organization Data Archive Project, to publicize the archive's existence and to stimulate its use, and to share some thoughts on international organization data stimulated by our data gathering experiences.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the context of comparative politics, this article argued that comparative government texts are bad and that the fault lies in the field, not just the authors, but also the discipline itself.
Abstract: Readers of the original Furniss article on comparative government texts (March 1974) and the Smaldone-Furniss exchange (March 1975) in International Studies Quarterly were treated to one of the rare pretenses of discussion of education to appear in any scholarly social science journal. Unfortunately, it was only a pretense because it did not discuss either what and how students should learn about comparative politics as Smaldone likes to define it or "good thinking about the world" as Furniss appears to have defined it. Instead, all three pieces seem to have concluded that comparative politics texts are bad and that the fault lies in the field. I should say that I found Smaldone's response to represent mnore scholarly competence than either Furniss's article or comments, and I am only sorry that Smaldone did not do what Furniss was supposed to have done in the first place, i.e., study existing comparative politics educational material for its substantive educational goals and approaches. Perhaps if he had, he could have discussed education without using the occasion to launch a critical review of the field. What is instructive to the profession, however, is the ease with which the blame for what both suggest is poor educational material is placed on the discipline. It is like blaming the United States for its foreign policy. While corporate responsibility might protect business executives legally, collective responsibility does not protect national leaders morally or politically for their foreign policy errors. Why should the "discipline"

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the case of Southeast Asia, the Johnson Administration slowly destroyed itself by miring the nation in a tragic conflict through a series of incremenital signals of its commitment in Southeast Asia as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In autumn of 1962 the Kennedy Administration recorded a striking success in foreign affairs. By signaling the U.S. commitment to the removal of Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba through a series of incremental steps, President Kennedy realized his commitment while avoiding a military conflict with the Soviet Unioni. Yet between 1964 and 1968 the Johnson Administration slowly destroyed itself by miring the nation in a tragic conflict through a series of incremenital signals of its commitment in Southeast Asia. For such extremes of success and failure to follow so quickly from a common approach to conflict is naturally perplexing for policy makers and academic strategists alike. The partial explanation of the disparity between the Cuban and Southeast Asian cases offered here is based on the incomplete data available for these conflicts. It is premature in both of these instances to pretend to a thorough analysis which

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors make three points which hopefully will not only clarify our differences, but also form a developed, coherent statement about the state of comparative politics as a whole.
Abstract: I am pleased that my article has generated as thoughtful a response as that of Mr. Smaldone. In that article I attempted to use a consideration of texts to give an insight into the state of the discipline. That this effort has succeeded in this particular case is indicated by Mr. Smaldone's focus on the essential issues in the study of comparative politics. In this reply I want to make three points which hopefully will not only clarify our differences, but also form a developed, coherent statement. First, in my approach to the subject I adopted the strategy Smaldone seems to recommend for the study of comparative politics as a whole: I attempted first to see the types of work that are being used in comparative politics and then to draw what generalizations I could from this finding. I did not perceive my role as that of gatekeeper, and this being the case, I must reject the charge (repeated in various forms throughout his paper) that I "opened the door" to "a host of masqueraders." To continue the metaphor, I saw my task rather as one of peeking through a window into a room already full, overly full, of bodies. Which, if any, may have crashed the party I left to the determination of the reader. Second, I did not adopt the approach of granting my imprimatur according to a set of criteria established a priori,