Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 1994"
TL;DR: The post-Cold War surge in so-called tribal conflict is shown to be the continuation of a trend that began in the 1960s as mentioned in this paper, and the main issue of the fifty most serious current ethnopolitical conflicts is contention for state power among communal groups in the immediate aftermath of state formation, revolution, and efforts to democratize autocratic regimes.
Abstract: The post—Cold War surge in so-called tribal conflict is shown here to be the continuation of a trend that began in the 1960s The main issue of the fifty most serious current ethnopolitical conflicts is contention for state power among communal groups in the immediate aftermath of state formation, revolution, and efforts to democratize autocratic regimes The end of the Cold War contributed to the long-term trend mainly by increasing the number of states with such power transitions Communal conflicts across fault lines between civilizations and religious traditions are more intense than others but have not increased in relative frequency or severity since the end of the Cold War Nor is there a strong global force leading toward the further fragmentation of the state system: since 1989 no serious new secessionist conflicts have begun outside the Soviet and Yugoslav successor states, and in 1993–94 the regional trend is toward accommodation The most protracted and deadly ethnopolitical conflicts are likely to occur in poor, weak, heterogenous states like those of Africa They will continue to pose severe humanitarian problems but are foreseeable and, in principle, are capable of being contained and transformed through constructive regional and international action Six general international strategies to restrain emerging ethnopolitical conflicts are identified
382 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the degree of capital market integration between states meets even the restrictive criteria established by structural realists for consideration as a structural feature of international politics.
Abstract: This article argues that the degree of capital market integration between states meets even the restrictive criteria established by structural realists for consideration as a structural feature of international politics; that is to say, the degree of international capital mobility systematically constrains state behavior by rewarding some actions and punishing others. Key terms are defined, and a heuristic model of the "capital mobility hypothesis" is introduced. Evidence from both U.S.-Japanese and intra-European monetary relations appears to corroborate the model. However, since the distribution of costs generated by monetary independence under conditions of relatively mobile capital can be asymmetrical, caution is warranted when generalizing about the effects of heightened capital mobility on individual states' monetary autonomy.
355 citations
TL;DR: Machine coding, when combined with the numerous sources of machine-readable text that have become available in the past decade, has the potential to provide a much richer source of event data on international political interactions than that currently available.
Abstract: This article discusses research on the machine coding of international event data from international and regional news sources using the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS). First, we suggest that the definition of an “event” should be modified so that events are explicitly and unambiguously defined in terms of natural language. Second, we discuss KEDS: a Macintosh-based machine coding system using pattern recognition and simple linguistic parsing to code events using the WEIS event categories. Third, we compare the Reuters international news service reports with those of two specialized regional sources: the foreign policy chronologies in the Journal of Palestine Studies and the German language biweekly publication Informationen .
We conclude by noting that machine coding, when combined with the numerous sources of machine-readable text that have become available in the past decade, has the potential to provide a much richer source of event data on international political interactions than that currently available. The ease of machine coding should encourage the creation of event coding schemes developed to address specific theoretical concerns; the increased density of these new data sets may allow the study of problems that could not be analyzed before.
190 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that presidents are led to use greater levels of military force the greater the threat to the nation's overseas defense commitments and their own domestic reputation for taking forceful action, and the less likely the threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union.
Abstract: During the Cold War American presidents have used military force in support of U.S. foreign policy over 200 times (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978; Zelikow, 1986). In order to explain and predict this activity, I develop a model of presidential decision making that incorporates the concept of an "opportunity to use force" which most previous research has neglected. I hypothesize that presidents are led to use greater levels of military force the greater the threat to the nation's overseas defense commitments and their own domestic reputation for taking forceful action, and the less likely the threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union. I examine 458 international crises from 1948 through 1988, and using tobit analysis I find that most of the hypothesized relationships are statistically significant. The findings support the value of using opportunities to use force as the unit of analysis and the greater impact of international versus domestic conditions in presidents' decision making.
142 citations
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the degree of popular consensus about a nation's identity, core values, and mission as a source of social integration and a broad constraint on foreign policy making, and identifies cosmopolitan liberalism, nativism, and multiculturalism as three rival ideologies of American nationalism, comparing their main principles and competing approaches toward integrating a diverse society.
Abstract: This article analyzes the degree of popular consensus about a nation's identity, core values, and mission as a source of social integration and a broad constraint on foreign policy-making. It identifies cosmopolitan liberalism, nativism, and multiculturalism as three rival ideologies of American nationalism, comparing their main principles and competing approaches toward integrating a diverse society. The paper presents a synthesis of recent survey evidence to assess the relative degree of support for these competing conceptions of American identity. The relationship of these conceptions to the foreign policy orientations delineated in the Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau typology is examined to speculate about how shifts in American nationalism may shape the general direction of foreign policy in the future.
99 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a constrained optimization model was proposed to demonstrate that a mix of arms and alliance is a better characterization of states' security policies, and that states choose the mix according to the relative costs associated with each approach, as well as the level of their own capabilities.
Abstract: Recent work on alliances, notably Walt (1987, 1988), emphasizes that states form alliances to balance against threats. In this article, I construct a constrained optimization model to demonstrate that a mix of arms and alliance is a better characterization of states' security policies. States choose the mix according to the relative costs associated with each approach, as well as the level of their allies' military capabilities. I test the predictions of the model using econometric analysis of data on France and Austria prior to World War I and Israel and Syria in the contemporary period. The empirical results illustrate states' tendencies to rely on their allies' arms when allied support is relatively cheap and their allies are militarily strong; whereas they tend to rely on their own capabilities when allied support is relatively costly and their allies are militarily weak. Research on alliances tends to emphasize states' desires to balance against security threats (Walt, 1987, 1988) and receive the benefits of allies' arms at a low cost (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). Both of these arguments beg the question of why states often rely on their own capabilities, even when they face serious and immediate threats. In this article, I construct and test a formal, theoretical model of security choices in which states sometimes add arms and sometimes make concessions to their allies in order to acquire greater external support. Both Walt and Olson and Zeckhauser overlook-or, at least, understate-the potential costs of relying on allies' promises of military support. My model demonstrates the central importance of these costs; the empirical analysis supports my theoretical hypotheses. The result of this paper is a clearer understanding of the relationship among arms, alliance ties, and security. Much of the literature on alliances is imprecise about definitions, which leads authors to overstate their conclusions. For example, many cases that Walt (1987) refers to as alliances, including Israel's relationship with the United States, are actually patron-client relationships (Efrat and Bercovitch, 1991; Quandt, 1993; Schoenbaum, 1993). In these cases, the small state uses ties to its patron to acquire its own arms. This situation differs from Olson and Zeckhauser's (1966) description of a free riding alliance in that the state actually offers its own deterrent, instead of relying on the deterrent value of its ally's arms. But it has many of the same advantages because the security the state receives from its
76 citations
TL;DR: The authors analyzed all interstate wars involving great powers from 1495 to 1991 and found that the initiators of wars involving Great Powers won only slightly more than half the time in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, whereas they were about twice as likely to win as targets in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Abstract: All interstate wars involving Great Powers from 1495 to 1991 are analyzed in order to investigate a controversy about the success rate of war initiators and factors that might have an impact on that success rate. We find that the initiators of wars involving Great Powers won only slightly more than half the time in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, whereas they have been about twice as likely to win as targets in the 19th and 20th centuries. The difference in success rates can apparently be accounted for in part by factors such as intervention on behalf of targets and the duration of wars, although these factors have their clearest impact only on wars in which Great Powers fight against minor powers. Wars involving Great Powers on both sides were more common in the earlier centuries, and the initiators of the increasingly uncommon wars between Great Powers have won only rarely in the most recent two centuries. The absence of wars between Great Powers in the last 50 years might suggest that Great Powers have “learned” over time to avoid becoming involved in wars against each other.
72 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a method capable of distinguishing the two main competing models of the foreign policy decision-making process, the rational and the psychological, is presented, and the results in this case support the psychological theories, although much wider testing is needed to establish the relative validity of competing approaches.
Abstract: International relations scholars have long debated the usefulness of two main competing models of the foreign policy decision making process, the rational and the psychological. However, there have been few efforts at direct empirical testing in historical cases, largely because both models are so underpredictive that the question has been thought methodologically intractable. In consequence, most work in the field has relied on one or the other of these models, usually ignoring the other. This pessimism is misplaced; although certain hurdles must be overcome, successful competitive testing of decision making theories is possible. This article constructs a method capable of distinguishing the two models in historical cases, and uses it to test for psychological effects on German foreign policy decision making in the Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906. The findings in this case support the psychological theories, although much wider testing is needed to establish the relative validity of the competing approaches.
47 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a model which links the domestic politics of EC members to their regional bargaining, and demonstrate that a high level of dynamic issue linkage is one of the key features that distinguish EC bargaining from other negotiations among states.
Abstract: The recent successes of the EC have reinvigorated the study of regional integration. This essay reviews integration theory, and offers a model which links the domestic politics of EC members to their regional bargaining. Two domestic variables, policy-making mode and government strength, help to determine the size of states' bargaining positions. EC bargaining is encouraged by dynamic issue linkage, or linkage across issues and time. A high level of dynamic issue linkage is one of the key features that distinguish EC bargaining from other negotiations among states. The utility of this model is demonstrated in a brief case study of EC social policy-making.
45 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a computer model that provides an explicit spatial representation of the international system, involves a large number of actors, endogenizes the outer boundaries of these actors as well as the polarity structure of both the regional and global structure, and provides these agents with a bounded and historically contingent decision scope.
Abstract: Neorealism focuses solely on how states maintain balance of power equilibria, neglecting the dynamic process by which these states consolidated their power. The present study evaluates neorealist propositions by bringing them to bear on both the emergence and the consolidation of the state system, asking not only why certain polarity structures maintain themselves but also why they emerge in the first place. To analyze this issue, I present a computer model that (1) provides an explicit spatial representation of the international system; (2) involves a large number of actors; (3) endogenizes the outer boundaries of these actors as well as the polarity structure of both the regional and global structure; and (4) endows these agents with a bounded and historically contingent decision scope. The simulation findings cast the neorealist arguments in a new, dynamic light. As expected by structural realists, unit-level factors play a subordinate role, but only under conditions of violent and persistent interstate competition. Contrary to what is usually believed, defensive technology and alliances are likely to lead to unipolarity rather than contribute to stability. The collapse of the regional balance in Renaissance Italy illustrates how the difference between regional and global alignments may undermine the systemic balance. Finally, I argue that these theoretical qualifications should discourage exaggerated faith in strategic laissez-faire in contemporary Eastern Europe.
44 citations
TL;DR: A review of available data on actual patterns of territorial conquest, war initiation, and balancing behavior by states suggests that such a law-based approach yields valuable new insights into the structural dynamics of states' strategic choices as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Neorealist models of international politics have usefully called attention to the importance of system structure in determining states' strategic behavior. Neorealism errs, however, in equating international structure with the distribution of capabilities among states in the system. Since it is logically possible (even in an anarchic realm) for legal norms to determine strategic behavior, and since international law does exist, a theory of international politics should instead equate international structure with the legal principles regarded by states as imposing binding constraints on their strategic actions. A review of available data on actual patterns of territorial conquest, war initiation, and balancing behavior by states suggests that such a law-based approach yields valuable new insights into the structural dynamics of states' strategic choices. The law-based approach also resolves several troubling empirical anomalies associated with neorealist theory.
TL;DR: This paper assess the impact of five procedural changes in the area of defense and foreign policy: the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the legislative veto on arms sales, legislative participation in trade negotiations, the conditions attached to U.S. security assistance, and the reporting requirements imposed on the intelligence community.
Abstract: New institutionalists argue that analysts are mistaken to separate process from policy in studying Congress's role in policy making. Rather, Congress changes the structure and procedures of decision making in the executive branch in order to influence the content of policy. Attempts to substantiate this claim have examined procedural changes in domestic affairs. This paper extends the argument by assessing the impact of five procedural changes in the area of defense and foreign policy: the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the legislative veto on arms sales, legislative participation in trade negotiations, the conditions attached to U.S. security assistance, and the reporting requirements imposed on the intelligence community. The five case studies suggest that procedural changes do at times enable Congress to build its preferences into U.S. foreign policy, but the successes are partial rather than total. Procedural changes meet only partial success because of executive branch opposition and the cost of monitoring and punishing noncompliance. The findings point to the need to incorporate more sophisticated assumptions about Congress and the bureaucracy into future research.
TL;DR: The results of the experiments indicate that the practice of collective security promotes the endurance of the entire system and shows that states that practice collective security principles are more likely to survive in a realist world than states that operate according to realist principles.
Abstract: For hundreds of years realists have debated idealists about the nature of the interstate system and the most effective means to promote the endurance of the system and the survival of individual states. This paper uses a computer simulation called EARTH ( E xploring A lternative R ealpolitik T heses) to explore the viability of collective security in a realist world. The results of our experiments indicate that the practice of collective security promotes the endurance of the entire system. Our results also show that states that practice collective security principles are more likely to survive in a realist world than states that operate according to realist principles.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the contribution of this literature to understanding the absence of a nuclear regime in the Middle East and the likely paths which may lead to one in the future.
Abstract: A major task of the literature on international regimes is the attempt to identify the conditions under which regimes are likely to emerge. The article evaluates the contribution of this literature to understanding the absence of a nuclear regime in the Middle East and the likely paths which may lead to one in the future. I identify four possible stylized outcomes: overt deterrence, regional “opaqueness,” controlled proliferation, and a nuclear-weapons-free-zone; only the last two fulfill the definitional requirements of a regime. I explore how the three major theoretical thrusts in regime theory—neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and reflectivism—explain why regional opaqueness—rather than overt deterrence or a regime—has been the outcome so far. I then suggest that analyzing the domestic consequences of each regional outcome appears more useful than its conceptual alternatives in explaining why opaqueness was maintained, and why it may be abandoned. The article ends with some lessons from this case for the study of regional and international regimes.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define an alliance as a collection of countries that jointly abide by "collective security strategies" with respect to each other, but not to members outside the alliance, and establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for an alliance system to be stable.
Abstract: Alliances play a central role in international relations theory. However, aside from applications of traditional cooperative game theory that ignore the issue of enforcement in anarchic systems, or interpretations of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma in the attempt to understand the source of cooperation in such systems, we have little theory on which to base predictions about alliance formation. This essay, then, builds on an n-country, non-cooperative, game-theoretic model of conflict in anarchic systems in order to furnish a theoretical basis for such predictions. Defining an alliance as a collection of countries that jointly abide by "collective security strategies" with respect to each other but not with respect to members outside of the alliance, we establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for an alliance system to be stable. In addition, we show that not all winning or minimal winning coalitions can form alliances, that alliances among smaller states can be stable, that bipolar alliance structures do not exhaust the set of stable structures, and that only specific countries can play the role of balancer.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend the theory of alliance portfolios to include the conjecture that alliances may provide full or partial public goods, suggesting that free riding losses may be at least partly recouped through portfolio benefits.
Abstract: When the collective effort of a military alliance has the characteristics of a public good, the total effort may be suboptimal because of free riding, causing losses in the allocative efficiency of the alliance. However, the same low correlation of ally effort that indicates the presence of free riding also produces portfolio efficiency benefits in the form of a gain in military returns and a lower risk than the constituent allies would experience on their own. A measure of these portfolio gains is suggested and applied to NATO and the Warsaw Pact fbr the period 1963-1988, and both are compared to the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance for the period 1879-1914. NATO and the Entente exhibited larger portfolio gains than their adversarial alliances. The public or collective good model suggests that alliances may produce a suboptimal effort. Yet these efficiency losses may be offset by consequences of the very conditions that lead to public good suboptimality. Free riding on the alliance implies a low positive (or even negative) correlation of the military efforts of allies, and this in turn reduces the overall risk of the alliance effort and hence the risk associated with each country's share of the benefit from that effort. Alliances are like diversified investment portfolios, providing each member with a better combination of risk and return than they would be able to achieve by themselves. When allies free ride on each other they actually lower the overall risk of the alliance, offsetting part of the public good losses entailed by free riding. Previous work on modelling alliances as analogous to investment portfolios specified and measured proxies for the risk and return of individual countries, and the absolute benefits to the representative ally of sharing purely private military effort with other countries, using the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente as examples (Conybeare, 1992). The present effort extends this work both theoretically and empirically. The theory of alliance portfolios is broadened to include the conjecture that alliances may provide full or partial public goods, suggesting that free riding losses may be at least partly recouped through portfolio benefits. Empirically, the application of the portfolio model is applied to two more alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact, between 1963 and 1988), a new measure of alliance return is offered (weighting a country's military
TL;DR: In this article, the authors illustrate a method for predicting the outcome of policy decision making inside China, and conclude that, despite a dramatic increase in military expenditures and a significant strengthening of China's naval force in the South China Sea, China is unlikely to engage in any significant uses of force to pursue its agenda.
Abstract: Chinese foreign policy is represented as a function of internal, domestic political considerations. Through the analysis of Chinese policy, we illustrate a method for predicting the outcome of policy decision making inside China. The substantive issue is China's expected approach toward territorial disputes in the South China Sea, especially surrounding the Spratly Islands. We address the extent to which China can be expected to reallocate resources from economic reform to foreign policy undertakings in that area and how likely China is to utilize force to impose its will on weaker neighbors.
The approach represents a marked departure from the predominant neorealist paradigm in international politics. We assume that decision makers seek an optimal compromise between enhancing their security and pursuing their specific policy or ideological goals. Using this perspective, we conclude that, despite a dramatic increase in military expenditures and a significant strengthening of China's naval force in the South China Sea, China is unlikely to engage in any significant uses of force to pursue its agenda in the South China Sea.
TL;DR: Two types of experiments examine the kinds of reasoning people use when thinking about foreign policy and indicate that scholars concentrating on decision making would be remiss to represent reasoning processes as exclusively case or model or even explanation based.
Abstract: This article uses two types of experiments to examine the kinds of reasoning people use when thinking about foreign policy. Case-based, explanation-based, and model-based reasoning are offered as an appropriate taxonomy of reasoning styles, and laboratory experiments are the vehicle for empirical analysis. The first experiment uses a thought checking methodology. When combining over all subjects and scenarios in that experiment, explanation-based reasoning emerges as dominant, with the other two occurring with roughly equal probability. Case-based reasoning comes in second for general life scenarios and model-based reasoning comes in second for the international politics scenarios. The dominant role of explanation-based reasoning becomes even stronger for more expert respondents (graduate students in political science), and is not significantly diminished for respondents trained in the case method of instruction. The predominance of explanation-based thoughts over case-based and model-based thoughts is replicated, and even accentuated, in a second experiment involving a protocol analysis of unconstrained thoughts. The results of both types of experiments indicate that scholars concentrating on decision making would be remiss to represent reasoning processes as exclusively case or model or even explanation based. Reasoning in the area of foreign policy seems to be slightly more explanation based, but exhibits characteristics of each of the three modes of reasoning.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify three background conditions that facilitate peaceful territorial change: an asymmetrical distribution of power between the parties involved in the process, a similar type of political regime of the members of the dyad; and a convergence of norms and rules of international law and morality sustained by the parties with reference to the disputed territory.
Abstract: This article deals with the process of change in the international status quo of territories, and how such changes may be brought about “peacefully,” by means other than war. The main question I address is: Under what conditions and circumstances will alterations in the status quo of territories take place without warfare or other unilateral coercive means?
In order to answer the above question, this study identifies three background conditions that facilitate peaceful territorial change: an asymmetrical distribution of power between the parties involved in the process; a similar type of political regime of the members of the dyad; and a convergence of norms and rules of international law and morality sustained by the parties with reference to the disputed territory. In addition, it is important to understand the variables that make the process of peaceful territorial change likely to occur. This process will be affected by the different interests of the parties in a given territory, their degree of cooperation and reciprocity, and their strategies of bargaining and negotiation.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined a cooperative equilibrium under a wide range of circumstances in which shifts occur in the level of interdependence as well as in the extent of relative gains concerns and the length of the shadow of the future.
Abstract: To date, no systematic study has yet examined whether economic interdependence is a structural determinant of international cooperation. Using a two-state monetary policy interaction model, I examine a cooperative equilibrium under a wide range of circumstances in which shifts occur in the level of interdependence as well as in the extent of relative gains concerns and the length of the shadow of the future. The analysis reveals that the level of interdependence influences each state's ability to pursue balancing behavior which prevents the other state from gaining a disproportionate advantage. In two-state interaction, the deleterious impact of relative gains on cooperation diminishes progressively under growing interdependence. The result refines liberal institutionalism by suggesting that cooperation is possible even if states' preferences contain relative gains concerns. Also, the result modifies Snidal's (1991a, 1991b) recent finding that the impact of relative gains attenuates in large- n interactions, while relative gains still impede cooperation in two-state PD cases. I show that a similar attenuation of the relative gain impact can arise in two-state interaction under high interdependence. The recent experiences of the Group of Seven (G-7) states support the liberal institutionalist hypothesis that there exists a positive relationship between the level of economic interdependence and the degree of monetary policy cooperation.
TL;DR: The authors formally introduced the concept of momentum to the theoretical vocabulary of international politics and examined the assumptions underlying momentum, translating the phenomenon into observable effects, and testing its utility with an event data set drawn from newspaper accounts of the roughly half year preceding the Gulf War.
Abstract: Scholars, policymakers, and lay observers share the vocabulary of conflict. But, strangely enough, international politics theorists ignore "momentum"-a commonly acknowledged source of competitive outcomes. This study formally introduces the concept of momentum to the theoretical vocabulary of international politics. It does so by examining the assumptions underlying momentum, translating the phenomenon into observable effects, and testing its utility with an event data set drawn from newspaper accounts of the roughly half year preceding the Gulf War. Factor analyses of relative behavior intensities suggest that behavior, over the long term, cycled in a manner consistent with momentum and engulfed all conflict participants. Scholars, policymakers, and lay observers share the vocabulary of conflict. But, strangely enough, international politics theorists ignore "momentum"-a commonly acknowledged, yet theoretically promising, source of competitive behavior. The neglect of the concept is somewhat understandable given the confused and varied use of the term; even empirical treatments of the concept in social scientific research do not entirely match implied meanings. Nevertheless, while elusive, momentum can be explicitly defined and studied through simple causal relationships to determine whether it should be considered a valid explanation for international cooperative, competitive, and conflictual outcomes. This study formally introduces the concept of momentum to the theoretical vocabulary of international politics. It does so by examining the assumptions underlying momentum, translating the phenomenon into observable effects, and testing its utility with an event data set drawn from newspaper accounts of
TL;DR: In this article, a rational-actor model was used to predict individuals' savings behavior as a result of their expectations of nuclear war, and the model showed a significant negative impact of war expectations on savings in much of the 1948-1993 era.
Abstract: We test a rational-actor model predicting individuals' savings behavior as, in part, a result of their expectations of war. To do so we analyze the effect on savings of a newly compiled and cleaned survey time-series of the American public's expectations of nuclear war, and a previously employed measure of elite expectations from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists . An econometric time-series analysis shows a significant negative impact of war expectations on savings in much of the 1948–1993 era.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used data for the period 1816-1992 to test hypotheses regarding the occurrence and repercussions of arms control agreements (ACAs) and evaluate the extent to which the ACAs are associated with a significant transformation of the international environment.
Abstract: This article uses data for the period 1816–1992 to test hypotheses regarding the occurrence and repercussions of arms control agreements (ACAs). In particular, it evaluates the extent to which the ACAs are associated with a significant transformation of the international environment. It establishes that agreements that restrict the level of arms tend to be introduced in periods of military buildup decelerations, but fail to be accompanied by lower military spending patterns beyond the short run; and that agreements are followed by a significant decrease in the frequency of international conflict.