Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 1996"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors put forward a theoretical explanation for why norms of international behavior change over time, drawing its hypotheses from an analogy to population genetics, and illustrated the model with a case study on the emergence of a norm of transparency in international security and briefly discussing how the model might apply in several other issue areas.
Abstract: This article puts forward a theoretical explanation for why norms of international behavior change over time. It argues that the mainstream neorealist and neoliberal arguments on the static nature of state interests are implausible, as the recent empirical work of the growing constructivist school has convincingly shown. But the constructivists have not yet provided a theoretical basis for understanding why one norm rather than another becomes institutionalized, nor has learning theory yet provided an adequate explanation. An evolutionary approach that draws its hypotheses from an analogy to population genetics offers a promising alternative. This article briefly outlines the constructivist critique of neorealism and neoliberalism. It develops the evolutionary analogy, illustrating the model with a case study on the emergence of a norm of transparency in international security and briefly discussing how the model might apply in several other issue areas.
512 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined how international rules and norms have affected U.S. policy choices in both the economic and security realms and identified two factors that condition the extent to which an actor's appeal to an international rule or norm will influence state behavior.
Abstract: Generally, scholars of international relations have attempted to show that international rules or norms influence state behavior by locating their causal significance at the level of state interactions. However, international rules and norms also affect a country's policy choice by way of the actions of domestic political actors. In particular, government officials and societal interest groups can appeal to an international rule or norm in an effort to further their objectives in the national arena. Through such appeals, international rules and norms can become incorporated into the policy debate, and, under some conditions, may ultimately affect national policy choice. The article identifies two factors that condition the extent to which an actor's appeal to an international rule or norm will influence state behavior: the domestic structural context and the domestic salience of the international rule or norm. This argument is explored through an examination of how international rules and norms have affected U.S. policy choices in both the economic and security realms. The security case examines the impact of President Bush's appeal to the norm of collective security to justify a response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The economic case covers the U.S. semiconductor industry's efforts to persuade the Reagan administration to obtain Japanese liberalization of its trade practices with regard to semiconductor devices.
485 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a formal model characterizes how future electoral prospects affect a government's decision to undertake adventurous foreign policies, and the model provides an explanation for the empirical phenomenon that democracies are more likely to become involved in war early in their electoral term.
Abstract: This article examines how reelection incentives influence foreign policy decision making in democratic states. A formal model characterizes how future electoral prospects affect a government's decision to undertake adventurous foreign policies. When governments are assured of reelection, they make unbiased decisions considering only international factors. Decision making is similarly unbiased when governments have no prospects of reelection. When the voters' evaluation of foreign policy outcomes could have an effect on election results then governments are biased towards violent, adventurous foreign policy projects. Institutional constraints are shown to reduce the magnitude of these biases. The bias in foreign policy decisions at the end of the electoral cycle influences decision making in other countries. As a nation approaches the end of its electoral cycle other nations are more conciliatory and less confrontational towards it. With endogenous crisis formation, the model provides an explanation for the empirical phenomenon that democracies are more likely to become involved in war early in their electoral term.
366 citations
TL;DR: Prospect theory, a psychological theory of decision making that has shed new light on foreign policy choices, maintains that people tend to take high risks when facing losses, while proceeding with great caution when anticipating gains as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Prospect theory, a psychological theory of decision making that has shed new light on foreign policy choices, maintains that people tend to take high risks when facing losses, while proceeding with great caution when anticipating gains This article introduces prospect theory to the study of comparative politics in order to account for the bold economic policy choices that presidents made in crisis-ridden Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, and the surprising degree of popular support that such risky and costly measures commanded in these countries; and conversely, to explain the cautious course of reform recently pursued in Chile, a country with better economic prospects Theories based on rational choice, the leading approach to political decision making, did not anticipate these decisions Particularly, these theories predicted that fear for their political survival would prevent democratic leaders from enacting tough economic policies This article thus suggests that hypotheses derived from prospect theory serve as a useful alternative to extant rational choice explanations in elucidating decision making during crises Why did democratic governments in contemporary Argentina, Brazil, and Peru run enormous risks by enacting tough shock programs of neoliberal adjustment and restructuring?1 These reforms impose high costs on many sectors of society, can elicit fierce resistance from powerful groups, and have a low likelihood of success Why did governments in fledgling democracies jeopardize their fate by embarking on such risky measures? And why did large numbers of people who knew they would be hurt by neoliberal reforms endorse their adoption? Why, on the other hand, did many Venezuelans protest violently against similarly harsh adjustment measures which their president, Carlos Andres Perez, boldly enacted in 1989? Why, by contrast, has the government in Chile's new democracy avoided all risk and accepted the basic outlines of the free-market model imposed by General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), which it had severely criticized before coming to power? And why have most Chileans supported this highly cautious stance?
160 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the probability of wars between contenders in local or international hierarchies increases significantly when power parity is achieved, presenting the potential challenger with the opportunity to successfully challenge the dominant state, and when the challenger's extraordinary buildup exceeds that of the dominant power, revealing its willingness and commitment to change.
Abstract: Starr (1978) argues that the initiation of war requires both opportunity and willingness. Most theories of international conflict, however, consider only one of these conditions. Power transition theory, which focuses on power parity as opportunity and negative evaluations of the status quo as willingness, is an exception. Although the logic of the theory is compelling and empirical support impressive, the theory suffers from a lack of generalizability, and from inadequate conceptualization and operationalization of evaluations of the status quo. We offer preliminary corrections for both of these weaknesses by (1) depicting the international system as a series of hierarchies rather than as a single hierarchy, thus providing some generalizability; and (2) using extraordinary military buildups to evaluate the relative commitment of the challenger and the dominant power to the modification or maintenance of the status quo, respectively. We argue that the probability of wars between contenders in local or international hierarchies increases significantly when power parity is achieved, presenting the potential challenger with the opportunity to successfully challenge the dominant state, and when the challenger's extraordinary buildup exceeds that of the dominant power, revealing its willingness and commitment to change. Empirical evaluation of the conflict behavior of major power contenders and of a subset of minor power contenders provides strong support for our reconceptualization of power transition theory.
156 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that rivalries between equal states that do not go to war are those in which territorial issues are not at stake, and that rivals without a territorial dispute join an ongoing war because of contagion factors.
Abstract: Many interstate enduring rivalries experience wars, some do not. This analysis presents and tests an explanation of whether, why, and how rivals go to war. It is argued that rivalries between equal states that do not go to war are those in which territorial issues are not at stake. Rivalries in the absence of territorial issues tend to go to war only by being embroiled in an ongoing war by a third party. A series of tests with emphasis on rivalries between major states occurring during 1816–1986 supports the territorial explanation. Two distinct paths to war are empirically identified—one leading to a dyadic war involving a territorial dispute(s) and a second path by which rivals without a territorial dispute join an ongoing war because of contagion factors.
139 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine how security concerns affect if and when interstate rivals end their rivalries by settling their outstanding differences over important issues and ceasing to threaten each other militarily.
Abstract: I examine how security concerns affect if and when interstate rivals end their rivalries by settling their outstanding differences over important issues and ceasing to threaten each other militarily. I argue that when leaders are simultaneously willing to accept some offered settlement, a rivalry will end, and argue that security concerns affect this willingness to accept different bargains. I hypothesize that external threats to the security of the rivals should increase leaders' willingness to accept given offers, increasing the probability that a rivalry will end, while high-salience issues should make it less likely that a rivalry will end. However, neither the dyadic power balance nor the occurrence of war between rivals should affect rivalry termination. I propose a new operationalization of rivalries and their termination which centers on disputed issues. In a statistical analysis of rivalries from 1816 to 1988, I find that external military threats and low issue salience do positively affect the probability that rivalries will end, and that the dyadic balance of power, the occurrence of war, and bipolarity do not affect rivalry duration.
133 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated several alternative hypotheses for explaining variation in junior party influence in eight important cases of foreign policy decision-making in Germany and Israel, and found that the most important variables for explaining junior Party influence in these cases are the unity of the junior and senior parties on the specific issue, junior party strategies of influence, and the locus of decisionmaking authority.
Abstract: The special characteristics of parliamentary systems and coalition politics play an important role in the foreign policy decision-making process of Germany and Israel. Germany and Israel have seen continuous coalition rule—cabinets in which senior and junior partners share the power to govern. Junior parties in Israeli and German coalition cabinets have been able to convert their junior status into significant influence on key foreign policy decisions. What explains this influence? This study investigates several alternative hypotheses for explaining variation in junior party influence in eight important cases of foreign policy decision making in Germany and Israel. Through structured case studies, this research finds that the most important variables for explaining junior party influence in these cases are the unity of the junior and senior parties on the specific issue, junior party strategies of influence, and the locus of decision-making authority. Finally, suggestions are offered regarding the investigation of other minority, or less powerful actors in the making of foreign policy.
97 citations
TL;DR: The authors argues that to view the significance of the liberal peace as a test of opposing "levels of analysis" misses deeper issues, and argues that properly constituted republics can, in fact, overcome the anarchy among them, and that the present liberal peace therefore challenges the adequacy of "systemic" theories of international politics.
Abstract: Much recent scholarship has focused upon the apparent absence of war among liberal democratic states-the liberal peace. To help explain the phenomenon, many refer to the political writings of Immanuel Kant, and the central role he envisioned for the liberal republic as the foundation for "perpetual peace." Against this view, "neorealists" contend that Kant, and modern interpreters, overlook the important and unremitting force of anarchy among states. For neorealists, no peace dependent on only the internal pacific disposition of liberal republics can endure. Supporters of the Kantian interpretation respond that properly constituted republics can, in fact, overcome the anarchy among them, and that the present liberal peace therefore challenges the adequacy of "systemic" theories of international politics. This article argues that to view the significance of the liberal peace as a test of opposing "levels of analysis" misses deeper issues. Kant's thought
84 citations
TL;DR: This article conducted a regression analysis of all thirty-eight major uses of force that occurred during a U.S. foreign policy crisis, 1950-1988, and found that the American people were more supportive of using military force to resist aggression than to engineer internal change in other countries.
Abstract: A new consensus has emerged in recent years that the public responds to foreign affairs in reasonable ways. Bruce Jentleson (1992) has contributed to this optimistic revisionism, arguing that the public is “pretty prudent” in the “post post-Vietnam period.” The American people, he suggests, now discriminate between using the military to force foreign policy restraint on aggressive adversaries and using it to coerce internal political change. We test Jentleson's hypothesis, with several theoretically interesting controls, using regression analyses of all thirty-eight major uses of force that occurred during a U.S. foreign policy crisis, 1950–1988. We do not find support for Jentleson's periodization of the post—World War II era; but our analyses do indicate that the American people have, throughout the postwar years, been more supportive of using military force to resist aggression than to engineer internal change in other countries.
81 citations
TL;DR: The evolutionary paradigm for global politics as discussed by the authors consists of four key propositions: the global political system is a population of policies or strategies; global politics constitutes a complex system that evolves in specifiable conditions; accounting for global political evolution is a four-phased learning process whose key operators are variation (innovation), cooperation, selection, and reinforcement; and global politics coevolves with global economics, community, and opinion.
Abstract: The evolutionary paradigm for global politics here presented consists of four key propositions: (1) The global political system is a population of policies or strategies; (2) global politics constitutes a complex system that evolves in specifiable conditions; (3) accounting for global political evolution is a four-phased learning process whose key operators are variation (innovation), cooperation, selection, and reinforcement; and (4) global politics coevolves with global economics, community, and opinion et cetera. The evolutionary paradigm sheds light on two processes in particular: the formation of institutions at the global level, and the rise and decline of world powers (the long cycle). Two propositions are central to this article: 1. The institutions of world politics evolve, that is, they undergo change subject to identifiable evolutionary processes; and 2. The rise and decline of world powers (the long cycle) is a mechanism of global political evolution. By institutions of world politics we mean constitutive and widely accepted arrangements in respect to war and peace, nation-states, alliances, and international organization, and to global leadership and international law. If we consider these arrangements in a sufficiently long perspective, say, over the span of the past millennium, we cannot but help noticing significant changes that have occurred in relation to these, that continue to affect them, and that therefore need to be understood and explained. We need a structural-historical theory of world politics. The rise and decline of world powers, which has been the lead story over the past few centuries of world politics, also needs to be understood in a wider framework. It is not the case of some eternal struggle for power but rather that of a mechanism that in the recent past has mediated major changes in world political and social organization. We need to see the long cycle not in isolation but as a feature of world institutional growth. That is why, to better understand world politics in its time dimension in particular, we require an evolutionary framework. What might be the salient features of such a paradigm?
TL;DR: The idea that biology rather than physics provides the proper model for economics is a constantly recurring one as mentioned in this paper, and there is an increased concern with dynamics, competitiveness, and innovation which appear to be important elements in generating the increased interest in the evolutionary model of economic behavior.
Abstract: The idea that biology rather than physics provides the proper model for economics is a constantly recurring one. There is an increased concern with dynamics, competitiveness, and innovation which appear to be important elements in generating the increased interest in the evolutionary model of economic behavior. The first part of this article briefly addresses conceptual issues, and argues that the basic unit of analysis should be “national systems of political economy.” Next, I analyze and compare the American and Japanese economies. Finally, I set forth a few speculations about whether or not one can evaluate these systems in evolutionary terms. My conclusion is that while evolutionary theory is a promising and fascinating approach to the study of economic systems, it is not yet a satisfactory one.
TL;DR: In this paper, an alternative "evolutionary" theory of long-term growth was proposed, and major stress was placed on institutional disruptions such as wars or revolutions and on the existence of political institutions such as multi-party democracy.
Abstract: Neoclassical attempts to explain long-term economic growth have met with very limited success. Strong empirical confirmation is lacking and the theoretical foundations of the approach are insecure. The present article sketches an alternative "evolutionary" theory of long-term growth and extends preceding work by the author in the area. Major stress is placed on institutional disruptions such as wars or revolutions and on the existence of political institutions such as multi-party democracy. Inspiration is taken from both the earlier ideas of Thorstein Veblen and the recent work of Nelson and Winter. A microeconomic process explaining the effect of disruption on productivity growth is also outlined. An econometric test confirms some of the major propositions in the article.
TL;DR: In this article, a simple method is proposed to combine COPDAB and WEIS events time series in order to create a single spliced time series from 1948 to 1993, which is used extensively in the study of international relations.
Abstract: Events data sets are used extensively in the study of international relations. The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) data from 1948 to 1978 and the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) data since 1966 are the two events data sets that are most widely used. In this article a simple method is proposed to combine (or splice) COPDAB and WEIS events time series in order to create a single spliced time series from 1948 to 1993. Past research on the compatibility of COPDAB and WEIS is inconclusive: some authors claim that COPDAB and WEIS are compatible, while others claim they are not. We here investigate six dyads and show that the compatibility of WEIS and COPDAB depends on the particular dyad in question, but the two series are generally compatible so that COPDAB and WEIS can be spliced into one time series in five out of six dyads. (One dyad contains too many periods of missing reports in the data.) The article is organized in the following sections: The COPDAB and WEIS data sets are described in the first section. The second section reviews the literature about the COPDAB and WEIS compatibility. The third section outlines our approach to the question of compatibility. Statistical tests for compatibility and the method for splicing the two data sets are provided in the fourth section. A summary of our findings is provided in the last section.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a sample of papers presented at two workshops held at the University of Washington, in May 1994, and May 1995, which represents a step in the direction of increasing that coherence and adding to the complexity.
Abstract: Change usually occurs imperceptibly and out of sight, so that it becomes hard to grasp and think about in a systematic fashion. We are most effectively alerted to the fact of change when its pace accelerates, and in particular when change manifests itself in the form of crises. The recent collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe is one such sign of crisis, because for a time that system stood for one of the directions of social change, a systemic alternative that at times it seemed a permanent feature, possibly even embodying a winning strategy. Another development of wide portent is rapid economic expansion of East Asia. At such times minds search for explanations of what they observe happening but cannot handle and seemingly can do little about. To some, such crises herald the dawn of a new age of democracy and peace; others observe a flare-up of ethnic strife and anticipate world chaos. That is when new theories of transformation arise and old ones are refurbished for the occasion. That is when and how new social science paradigms are either built or rediscovered. One such paradigm that might help us comprehend rapidly changing reality is an evolutionary one. It is distinguished by a well-grounded intellectual tradition in almost all the major disciplines, among them sociology (August Comte, Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parsons), archaeology (Gordon Childs), and philosophy (Karl Popper, Donald Campbell). Among the most elaborated contributions to such thought have been those in economics, involving such major figures as Thorstein Veblen, Friedrich von Hayek, andJoseph Schumpeter. Evolutionary economics has experienced a particularly notable growth in recent years. While rich, this tradition might not currently possess the coherence and the complexity of other paradigms in the social sciences. The present collection, a sample of papers presented at two workshops held at the University of Washington, in May 1994, and May 1995,1 represents a step in the direction of increasing that coherence, and adding to the complexity. It does so both by undertaking comparative assessments of paradigms and of the state of the field, and by attacking some recent problems in international relations and international political economy.
TL;DR: In this paper, a simple utility equation and a concept-of-choice model of choice are developed to interconnect the rational choice, short-term exogenous shock, and long-term socioeconomic perspectives on revolutionary collective action.
Abstract: Based uipoin the idea that leadership cotuld provide a rational and parsimonious soltution to the collective action problem, this article develops a simple uitility equation and a concepttual model of choice that is tised to interconnect the rational choice, short-term exogenous shock, and longrtun socioeconomic perspectives on revolutionary collective action. Leadership plays a critical role in overcoming both the initial barriers to collective action and the ongoing difficulties encountered in the pturstuit of public goods. Though much work remains to be accomplished, this modeling project builds a conceptual fotundation from which a more rigorotus, more formal depiction of the proposed relationships can be developed and from which the empirical testing of the dynamics of revoltution and other collective actions can be facilitated. Collective endeavors are faced with a simple obstacle: the free rider. When the product of a collective activity, such as the new government that is formed as a result of a mass revolution, cannot be withheld from noncontributors, individuals will attempt to avoid contributing to the activity. Why incur costs when the benefit is provided to all regardless of wh1o participates? This article examines the role leadership plays in overcoming both the initial and the continuing problems associated with the pursuit of collective action. First, an analysis of the costs and benefits related to the leadership position provides a means of explaining how the initial collective action problem can be overcome and a group can be formed to pursue the collective endeavor. Individuals taking on the role(s) of leadership receive benefits, identified as leadership benefits, associated with holding the leadership position. These benefits can be great enough to overcome the long odds and high costs associated with the initiation of collective endeavors, even in the most extreme case of collective action, revolution. The impact of leadership on group formation is qualified by structural factors which are explored in the case of revolution. Structural factors also impact how leadership influences the dynamics of the collective action groups once they have been formed and set in motion. An examination of the dynamic relationship between the number of participants and the estimated probability of success provides a foundation for describing how the value individuals place on the goals being pursued in the collective activity depends upon the structure in which the choice is being made. Leaders on both sides of the collective endeavor, supporting and
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the special case of proliferation by a small enemy of the United States such as North Korea as a signaling game wherein each side attempts to push the outcome toward its own preferred equilibrium.
Abstract: The nonproliferation regime, which denies countries access to critical materials, makes it more likely that defiant proliferators will develop unsafe arsenals. In order to manage proliferation, the U.S. could continue to uphold the regime, hoping to persuade the proliferator to return to non-nuclear status. It could attack, thereby ensuring that the proliferator is unable to join the nuclear club. Or it could concede the nonproliferation goal and render assistance to address the attendant safety concerns. Through a series of deductive models we argue that three factors are important in determining the right option: (1) U.S. preferences on proliferation, whether purist or pragmatist; (2) the proliferator's type, which can vary by size, affinity, and risk tolerance; and (3) the phase in the proliferation process to which the proliferator has advanced: preweaponization, after weaponization but before deployment, the deployment phase, and, finally, full deployment. We analyze the special case of proliferation by a small enemy of the United States such as North Korea as a signaling game wherein each side attempts to push the outcome toward its own preferred equilibrium. The North Koreans prefer the equilibrium in which the United States never attacks regardless of its type, whereas the United States prefers the equilibrium in which North Korea never deploys regardless of its type.
TL;DR: The threat to the stability of the international system was surely as great during the Napoleonic imperium as it was during the period of Soviet threat, 1945-1989 as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: We seek to validate four assertions in this article: (1) The threat to the stability of the international system was surely as great during the Napoleonic imperium as it was during the period of Soviet threat, 1945–1989. (2) While actors balanced against the USSR, they did not balance against Napoleonic France, at least until the end (1813–1815). (3) The difference between the two periods cannot be accounted for in the typical manner, by regarding the post-World War II system as “bipolar” and the Napoleonic system as “multipolar”; neither system was “bipolar” in power terms; both, however, were “bipolar” in terms of threat. (4) Therefore, a new explanation is required for the presence or absence of balancing in international relations.
TL;DR: The Long-Range Analysis of War (LORANOW) project as mentioned in this paper is an ongoing investigation on the earliest origins and evolution of warfare and politics, using multidisciplinary sources (archaeology, epigraphy, ethnology) and new coding procedures.
Abstract: This is a progress report of The Long-Range Analysis of War (LORANOW) Project, an ongoing investigation on the earliest origins and evolution of warfare and politics. Using multidisciplinary sources (archaeology, epigraphy, ethnology) and new coding procedures (integrated historical reconstruction), thus far approximately 2,300 wars have been recorded in the pilot datasets, indicating a tentatively lower onset rate (≈ 0.2 wars/year) than for the modern system (≈ 1.1 wars/year). Paleolithic “protowarfare” among the earliest humans in Afro-Eurasia is also discussed. Besides the early date for warfare at Jericho (ca. 7500 B.C.), findings thus far support the hypothesis that war and politics have had multiple independent origins (pleogenic theory), in at least three separate regions (trident model): Mesopotamia (Tigris-Euphrates Rivers basin, since ca. 3000 B.C.), China (Yellow River basin, since ca. 2500 B.C.), and Mesoamerica (Olmec-Mexican Gulf Coast, since ca. 900 B.C.). Two other possible, unconfirmed areas are Nubia and the Peruvian Andes.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop a theory of how economic incentives alter a state's external payoff environment and affect its internal preferences and choices and conclude that incentives may be compelling in altering state behavior and fostering bilateral cooperation over time, especially when both the sender and the recipient stand to gain in economic terms through the creation of new trade.
Abstract: This article develops a theory of how economic incentives alter a state's external payoff environment and affect its internal preferences and choices. Externally, incentives offer an exchange of economic gains from trade and technology transfer for political concessions. Incentives may be compelling in altering state behavior and fostering bilateral cooperation over time, especially when: (1) both the sender and the recipient stand to gain in economic terms through the creation of new trade; (2) the recipient's total utility for the goods or gains from trade remains substantially positive (this situation typically occurs when technology is a part of the package because technology alters a state's overall productive capacity); and (3) the sender has market power in the traded goods. Internally, incentives shape state preferences in a cooperative direction in four important ways, in contrast to sanctions. First, societal actors in the sender state who stand to gain economically from expanded trade lend support over time for an incentive thereby improving the policy's legitimacy and endurance. Public opinion is likely to follow the lead of elites. Second, certain actors in the recipient state who can appropriate the economic benefits tend to ally with the sender state and reinforce its efforts to move the recipient's policy preference in the direction of the sender's intent. Third, incentives are unlikely to create an impetus to elude or undermine its influence through the search for third-party suppliers or to create the economic conditions that invite new entrants. Finally, incentives convey more-precise information to decision-makers in the recipient state and in a manner that is unlikely to be filtered or avoided by them. As for the dependent variable of international cooperation, the theoretical argument commends investigation of diffuse factors that shape state preferences and influence cooperation.
While incentives are “under-theorized” in the international relations literature (despite considerable interest in economic coercion), they are not unnoticed by policy-makers. This article examines three pertinent historical case studies, in part to help generate hypotheses on how incentives work but also to offer some policy advice as to when incentives might work and what factors contribute to or detract from their practical effectiveness. The article concludes with suggestions for further research.
TL;DR: There is a tension in the social sciences between rational choice models and decision-making data, often drawn from psychological experiments as mentioned in this paper, and this tension has generated a number of important insights about international politics.
Abstract: There is a tension in the social sciences between rational choice models and decision-making data, often drawn from psychological experiments. Rational choice models assume that decision makers behave as if they were unitary actors, meeting formal criteria of rationality. The empirical results from psychology, as well as case studies of foreign policy decisions, show that humans rarely act as if they were rational. Nevertheless, there is also strong empirical support for rational choice models, and this approach has generated a number of important insights about international politics. Evolutionary models show how a collective actor, such as a state, can appear to behave rationally, even if the individuals who comprise that actor are not rational themselves.
TL;DR: Starr et al. as discussed by the authors used thematic content analysis to identify specific cognitive procedures for managing discordant information, and found that information processing may be influenced by multiple images of the same actor.
Abstract: International conflict has long been of intrigue to scholars, and numerous explanations have been forwarded in an attempt to understand the causes of conflict. This article seeks to build upon explanations of conflict by focusing upon the psychology of decision-making with regard to the impact cognitive images have upon policymakers as imperfect information-processors. While various studies concerning other aspects of the belief system have provided examples of cognitive techniques for managing information, little attention has been given to systematically analyzing the specific mechanisms. Employing thematic content analysis, this study engages in such an inquiry so as to achieve further understanding of the actual methods by which actors manage information contradictory to their image. Focusing specifically on Ronald Reagan and his image of El Salvador between the years 1980 and 1984, the findings of this study indicate that specific cognitive procedures for managing discordant information do indeed exist, and that information processing may be influenced by multiple images. International conflict has long been of intrigue to scholars, and numerous explanations have been forwarded in an attempt to understand the causes of conflict. This article seeks to build upon explanations of conflict by focusing upon the psychology of decision-making with regard to the impact cognitive images have upon policymakers as imperfect information-processors. By examining the procedures used by Ronald Reagan to manage information challenging his image of El Salvador, this study adds to our understanding of the cognitive dynamics involved in individual decision-making and reveals yet another avenue through which conflict may be defused or intensified. A number of studies examine how images relate to political perceptions, decision-making and behavior (Holsti, 1967; R. Cottam, 1977; M. Cottam, 1989, 1992a; Herrmann, 1984, 1985; Shimko, 1993). However, as of yet, little attention has been given to the cognitive mechanisms whereby actors maintain these images. It has been argued that decision makers are captives of their own beliefs and expectations, and that information concerning other actors is likely to be perceived in a manner consistent with one's image of that actor (Finlay, 1967). Concentrating on how a policymaker organizes, simplifies, and orders his political world view and examining the cognitive techniques through which he manages information about others may lead to an understanding of how information is processed and political Author's note: I would like to thank Harvey Starr, Rober-t Blanton, Char-les W. Kegley, Jr., and the editors and referees
TL;DR: There is a need for an orienting metaphor appropriate to unavoidable complexity and diversity in international affairs and that of disease, illness, and decline provides useful emphases with respect to threats, strategies for their prevention and treatment, and the conduct and mutual relevance of insecurity specializations.
Abstract: Insecurity in international affairs is inherently complex and diverse. As a result debates about its content and conception tend to be familiar, recurrent, and inconclusive as they attempt to exclude some possibilities as a general matter in favor of others. Consequences now and in the past have included incompleteness, partial irrelevance, and underspecification of policy recommendations. That has and does occur with respect to military versus nonmilitary content, expectations about feasible futures, objective versus subjective factors, and the characteristics of relevant entities. There then is a need for an orienting metaphor appropriate to unavoidable complexity and diversity. That of disease, illness, and decline provides useful emphases with respect to threats, strategies for their prevention and treatment, and the conduct and mutual relevance of insecurity specializations.
TL;DR: In this paper, the United States used economic sanctions to secure compliance with its export control policy by states and nonstate actors operating abroad throughout the 1980s, and the success and failure of these efforts varied widely and cannot be explained in terms of structural realist or hegemonic leadership arguments.
Abstract: The United States used economic sanctions to secure compliance with its export control policy by states and nonstate actors operating abroad throughout the 1980s. The success and failure of these efforts varied widely and cannot be explained in terms of structural realist or hegemonic leadership arguments, which have often been used to address such questions. This study suggests two ways to explain this variation. The first is to analyze American enforcement efforts using an approach focused on issue-and context-specific power, as suggested by the social power theorists. This approach provides increased precision and explanatory power, but it remains unable to account for failures of American efforts in issue-areas where the United States clearly possessed a preponderance of relevant resources. The second solution is to link control over outcomes to actors' dependence on the United States. Dependence arguments are similar to issue-specific power arguments in that they begin by assessing the distribution of resources between actors. In contrast to them, however, dependence arguments emphasize that the value of these resources is largely determined by factors outside of the particular relationship. Most important, the availability of resources from outside the particular relationship in question can undermine the utility an actor might otherwise derive from an asymmetrical distribution of resources in its favor. For this reason, dependence arguments emphasize that while issue-specific dominance may be necessary, it is not sufficient to secure control over outcomes. Arguments linking dependence to political power remain largely descriptive and underspecified in the international relations literature. Once refined and operationalized, however, dependence arguments can explain counterintuitive outcomes that the others cannot by clarifying the link between the distribution of resources and political power in world politics. Dependence arguments also enable state and nonstate actors to be evaluated within the same framework, which increases the argument's parsimony, and they provide guidelines for the use and analysis of economic sanctions.