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Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 1998"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the role of transparency in promoting international regime compliance and effectiveness, and identify the sources of transparency and the incentives and capacities that relevant actors have to contribute to a particular regime's transparency.
Abstract: Scholars and practitioners alike have stressed the important role of transparency in promoting international regime compliance and effectiveness. Yet many regimes fail to create high levels of transparency: governments and nongovernmental actors regularly fail to monitor or report on their own behavior, the behavior of other actors, or the state of the problem these regimes seek to resolve. If more transparency often, if not always, contributes to regime effectiveness, then identifying the sources of transparency becomes an important research task. Regime transparency depends upon both the demand for information and the supply of information. Specifically, regimes can seek “effectiveness-oriented” information to assess whether regime members are collectively achieving regime goals or “compliance-oriented” information to assess whether particular actors are individually fulfilling regime commitments. The incentives and capacities that relevant actors—whether governments, nongovernmental organizations, or corporate actors—have to provide such information depend on whether the regime's information system is structured around self-reporting, other-reporting, or problem-reporting. Although many of these factors are determined by characteristics of the actors involved or the structure of the problem, regimes can increase transparency by enhancing the incentives and capacity actors have to contribute to a particular regime's transparency.

277 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the extent to which democracy and Islam are mutually exclusive is tested empirically with implications for civilizational conflict and the democratic peace, and three measures of democracy are used: a political rights index, an index of liberal democracy, and a measure based on institutionalization.
Abstract: The extent to which democracy and Islam are mutually exclusive is tested empirically with implications for civilizational conflict and the democratic peace. Three measures of democracy are used: a political rights index, an index of liberal democracy, and a measure based on institutionalization. Environmental variables such as sea borders and rainfall that minimize external threat to democratic systems are found to predict better to the more rudimentary political rights index, while cultural variables, including Islam in a negative direction, are more clearly associated with liberal democracy. The measure of democratic institutionalization behaves in a manner intermediate between the two. Divergence of the structures of explanation for these measures suggests that conclusions concerning the likelihood of war between democracies can depend on the specific index of democracy employed. The absence of a significant negative association between Islam and the political rights index under controlled conditions suggests that the probability of civilizational conflict is low.

174 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a new scoring system for doing operational code analysis and test its reliability and validity by measuring and modeling President Jimmy Carter's operational code is introduced, based upon the valences and scaled intensities of verbs uttered in the speeches.
Abstract: In this article we introduce a new scoring system for doing operational code analysis and test its reliability and validity by measuring and modeling President Jimmy Carter's operational code. Using speeches from the public record, we construct indices for the elements of the operational code construct. Based upon the valences and scaled intensities of verbs uttered in the speeches, President Jimmy Carter's views of the political universe and approaches to political action in different issue areas are identified and compared. The results of the analysis provide reasonable support for the face, construct, and content validity of the operational code indices. We find that Carter's view of the political universe and approach to political action were consistent across issue areas during the first three years of his term as president. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan President Carter's support for human rights remained steadfast. Statistically significant shifts occurred in his views of the Soviet Union and others in the political universe and in his approach to political action regarding the conduct of U.S.-Soviet relations and other issues.

150 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article used data on U.S. uses of force between 1949 and 1994 to test a model that also considers the influence of these conditions on the supply of this policy instrument, finding that conditions that have complementary demand and supply effects make military force both more useful and less costly to employ.
Abstract: A growing body of empirical research addresses the influence of domestic political and economic circumstances on the use of force. Most models explain the use of force as a function of various domestic and international demands for military force. This article uses data on U.S. uses of force between 1949 and 1994 to test a model that also considers the influence of these conditions on the supply of this policy instrument. Conditions that have complementary demand and supply effects—making military force both more useful and less costly to employ—are associated with frequent U.S. uses of force in the postwar era. These conditions include high unemployment, strong investor confidence, wartime presidential election years, and the absence of ongoing wars. Some of these same conditions contribute to a motivated bias in international threat perception, leading U.S. decision makers to perceive more opportunities for the use of force when it is most convenient for them to employ it.

133 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined the extent to which cultural similarity vitiates the relationship between joint democracy and the incidence of interstate war and found that cultural factors are significant correlates of war, but they do not vitiate the impact of joint democracy on war.
Abstract: This article examines the extent to which cultural similarity vitiates the relationship between joint democracy and the incidence of interstate war. Previous empirical findings which suggest that cultural/normative explanations of the democratic peace are more robust than institutional/structural ones invite an analysis of the impact of broader cultural factors on the relationship between joint democracy and war involvement. The author suggests several ways that cultural factors might mitigate the democratic peace phenomenon and conducts a multivariate logistic analysis of state dyads from 1820 to 1989 to test the main query. Of the cultural variables, religious similarity within dyads is associated with a decreased likelihood of war onset, while both ethnic and linguistic similarity have the opposite effect. Democratic dyads, on average, have higher religious similarity levels than nondemocratic dyads, which, ostensibly, might play a role in reducing conflict within democratic dyads. However, the findings clearly demonstrate that although cultural factors are significant correlates of war they do not vitiate the impact of joint democracy on war. It appears that where a pair of states share a common democratic political culture it exerts a conflict dampening impact that overrides ethnic, linguistic, or religious factors.

122 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
Ronen Palan1
TL;DR: The relationship between offshore and the concept of state sovereignty is explored in this article, where the authors argue that far from escaping the state, offshore is intimately connected with the state system and that having created offshore, sovereignty and self-determination are themselves constrained and (re-)enabled in turn.
Abstract: From modest beginnings in the wholesale financial market specializing in government debt, offshore has expanded rapidly, penetrating and then dominating an ever growing portion of international economic life. This article reflects on the relationship between offshore and the concept of state sovereignty. My argument is that far from escaping the state, offshore is intimately connected with the state system. The concepts of sovereignty and national self-determination played simultaneously an enabling and constraining role in the development of offshore. Furthermore, having “created” offshore, sovereignty and self-determination are themselves constrained and (re-)enabled in turn. Offshore therefore is not a diminution of state sovereignty but a legally defined realm marking differential levels of intensity by which states propose to apply their regulation. Such a bifurcation of juridical space represents a process by which the state is reimagining its relationship to its territory.

114 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors suggest emphasizing substantive, not just procedural, democratization, exercising a maternalized discourse of dissent, and applying hybrid strategies of social mobilization across states, societies, cultures, and movements.
Abstract: Authoritarianism in East Asia's capitalist developmental state (CDS) is highly gendered. A hybrid product of Western masculinist capitalism and Confucian parental governance, CDS authoritarianism takes on a hypermasculinized developmentalism that assumes all the rights and privileges of classical Confucian patriarchy for the state while assigning to society the characteristics of classical Confucian womanhood: diligence, discipline, and deference. Society subsequently bears the burden of economic development without equal access to political representation or voice. Women in the CDS now face three tiers of patriarchal authority and exploitation: family, state, and economy. Nevertheless, new opportunities for democratization may arise even in the hypermasculinized state. We suggest: (1) emphasizing substantive, not just procedural, democratization, (2) exercising a maternalized discourse of dissent, and (3) applying hybrid strategies of social mobilization across states, societies, cultures, and movements. South Korea during the 1960s–1970s serves as our case study.

105 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a simple game-theoretic model of economic coercion was developed to show that both "senders" and "targets" of economic sanctions incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behavior.
Abstract: Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions or what determines their success. These events are often explained away as “symbolic politics” driven completely by domestic-level factors. This article develops a simple game-theoretic model of economic coercion to show that both “senders” and “targets” of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behavior. Conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect on coercion events. First, senders that anticipate frequent conflicts will be more willing to initiate economic coercion, even if such attempts are costly. Senders that anticipate few conflicts will not threaten sanctions unless they incur minimal costs and the target would suffer significantly. While a robust anticipation of future disputes might make the sender prefer a coercive strategy, it also reduces its ability to obtain concessions. Target states that anticipate frequent conflict with the sender will make fewer concessions. Ironically, a sender will obtain the most favorable distribution of payoffs when it cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. These hypotheses are tested statistically, with the results strongly supporting the conflict expectations model.

101 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a plausibility probe of the hypothesis that democracy increases the likelihood of interstate agreement is performed, using both logistic regression and negative binomial regression methods to assess the relationship between democracy and cooperation.
Abstract: A rapidly growing body of research suggests that democracy enhances prospects for the peaceful settlement of interstate conflicts To what extent can democracy also be linked with increased international cooperation? Building upon the literature on political cooperation as well as recent discussions of the “democratic peace,” this study offers a plausibility probe of the hypothesis that democracy increases the likelihood of interstate agreement The analysis, which draws upon a data set covering dyadic interactions among Mercosur nations during the 1947–1985 period, utilizes both logistic regression and negative binomial regression methods to assess the relationship between democracy and cooperation The findings offer only limited support for the hypothesis that democracy promotes cooperation and challenge the recent literature on the relative peace among democracies in several theoretically suggestive ways The study points to the potential fruitfulness of more extensive and rigorous research on the nexus between domestic institutions and international cooperation

94 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors reconstructs the interwar discourse of international relations among American political scientists and seeks to challenge the orthodox view that the scholarship of this period was essentially idealist in nature, and argues that this period cannot be construed as idealist.
Abstract: This article reconstructs the interwar discourse of international relations among American political scientists and seeks to challenge the orthodox view that the scholarship of this period was essentially idealist in nature. It aims to make a contribution to the growing body of literature devoted to examining the institutional history of international relations. My purpose is to demonstrate that the conventional label of idealism that has been attached to the interwar period of international relations scholarship seriously misrepresents the actual character of the conversation that was being directed toward understanding international politics. By carefully reconstructing the internal discourse of the field, many of the field's long forgotten individuals and ideas are brought back to life. The article concludes by highlighting some of the lessons that the interwar discourse offers to the study of international relations today and argues that this period cannot be construed as idealist.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors tried to identify theoretically the characteristics of alliances that distinguish those that are followed by war from those that were followed by peace, and concluded that all of the above expectations are confirmed.
Abstract: The empirical literature has found that interstate alliances are, with the exception of the nineteenth century after 1815, usually followed by war rather than by peace. This analysis tries to identify theoretically the characteristics of alliances that distinguish those that are followed by war from those that are followed by peace. It is argued that alliances that embody settlements of territorial disputes are most peaceful. Alliances consisting exclusively of major states or of states that have been successful in their last war are predicted to be war prone, while those that have the opposite characteristics are predicted to be followed by peace. An empirical analysis of the data shows that all of the above expectations are confirmed. The analysis concludes by using these characteristics to reexamine the classic Levy, 1981, study.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors in question were familiar with the type of thinking that later came to be called Realist, but held that industrial modernisation rendered it increasingly anachronistic and dangerous.
Abstract: The article presents a “revisionist” synopsis of the thinking of some important early twentieth-century “Idealist” IR writers. I contend that these writers ground their interpretations of international relations on a shared paradigm that has hitherto gone largely unrecognised. Following a critique of certain widely held views of IR Idealism, I draw attention to a number of aspects or themes in this body of writing in an attempt to establish the underlying paradigm. I argue that the authors in question were familiar with the type of thinking that later came to be called Realist, but held that industrial modernisation rendered it increasingly anachronistic and dangerous. The crucial difference between Idealism and Realism is in their respective theories of history. In order to understand Idealist IR thinking, it is essential to realise the extent to which it relies on the notion, not so much of progress (as is usually asserted) as of an inescapable, directional historical process.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a limited information model of the strategic interaction between workers and capitalists is used to demonstrate ways in which the agency-centered approach can begin to make preferences endogenous, with special attention given to the way they treat the preferences that actors hold.
Abstract: Two analytically distinct approaches to the study of domestic politics have been referred to as the “new institutionalism.” The fundamental difference between the two brands of institutionalism can be seen in the way they handle the relationship between “agents” and “structures.”“Structure-based” approaches to institutions give ontological primacy to structures and view agents as being constituted by them. “Agency-centered” approaches view human agents as ontologically primitive and view institutions as structures that are created by goal-maximizing individuals. The two approaches are compared, with special attention given to the way they treat the preferences that actors hold. I argue that contrary to arguments made by many structure-based theorists, the agency-centered approach is capable of contributing to discussions regarding the sources of actor preferences. A limited information model of the strategic interaction between workers and capitalists is used to demonstrate ways in which the agency-centered approach can begin to make preferences endogenous.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the conditions under which public opinion can act as a domestic constraint on the ability of international negotiators to reach agreement and find that public opinion plays a critical role in determining whether public preferences serve as a constraint on decision makers.
Abstract: This article aims to broaden the theoretical foundations of the two-level games approach to understanding international negotiations by considering the conditions under which public opinion can act as a domestic constraint on the ability of international negotiators to reach agreement. In determining the role that public opinion plays, three factors are of central importance: (1) the preferences of the public relative to those of decision makers and other domestic constituents; (2) the intensity of the issue under negotiation; and (3) the power of the public to ratify a potential agreement. Evidence from the last decade of Anglo-Irish negotiations over the future and status of Northern Ireland shows that public opinion acts as a constraint on negotiators when the public has the power to directly ratify an international agreement. When the public's power to ratify an agreement is indirect, the intensity of the issue under negotiation will play a critical role in determining whether public preferences serve as a constraint on decision makers.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors showed that if trade is based on relative comparative advantages, and countries specialize on the basis of factor endowments, democratic convergence (or any type of regime convergence for that matter) empowers as many free traders as protectionists, with negative consequences for trade; only if trade was fueled by scale economies, and country specialize along product lines, then may political convergence not hurt trade.
Abstract: Even if a democracy were more likely to pursue free trade than an autocracy (an unproven generalization), the simultaneous spread of democracy in the world would not necessarily yield a reduction in protection, but might in fact cause an increase. The reason for this paradoxical outcome is the fact that democratic convergence creates power profiles identical across nations. Similar regimes tend to empower the same classes of producers, with the result that if trade is based on relative comparative advantages, and countries specialize on the basis of factor endowments, democratic convergence (or any type of regime convergence for that matter) empowers as many free traders as protectionists, with negative consequences for trade; only if trade is fueled by scale economies, and countries specialize along product lines, then may political convergence not hurt trade. Empirically, I show that this model helps explain the timing of nineteenth-century European trade liberalization better than existing explanations; it also helps us understand the easiness with which liberalization proceeded in the postwar era; and it casts a new light on the difficulties presently encountered, with democracy spreading at a time when product specialization is on the retreat.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the core finding of prospect theory, a psychological theory of decision making under risk, was used to explain why political leaders adopt drastic, costly neoliberal policies in a number of countries, but not in others.
Abstract: Why did political leaders adopt drastic, costly neoliberal policies in a number of countries, but not in others? Why did these painful measures elicit popular support in some nations, while triggering rejection and protest elsewhere? To complement extant explanations for these puzzling developments, the article draws on the core finding of prospect theory, a psychological theory of decision making under risk: people tend toward bold, risky choices when facing prospects of losses, but opt for caution when anticipating gains. Accordingly, leaders enact and citizens support drastic reforms only when they face deep crises, such as hyperinflation. This argument yields predictions about the different stages of the reform process, which the article assesses through a wide-ranging examination of reform politics in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Boolean analysis corroborates most of the predictions derived from prospect theory, but also suggests the importance of economic and political-institutional context factors.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors combine the formal theory of dialogical disputation, a family of theories drawn from linguistic pragmatics, and formal proof procedures to model political interactions.
Abstract: This essay proposes dialogical analysis as a method of modeling political interactions. The method combines the formal theory of dialogical disputation, a family of theories drawn from linguistic pragmatics, and formal proof procedures. By analyzing models of their explicit and implicit contents in context, the method identifies the argumentative thrust of negotiation dialogues and shows systematically how the parties signal intent and commitment to one another. The paper illustrates the method by applying it to superpower interactions in the 1980s INF negotiations. The analysis indicates that American force deployments did not motivate the Soviet retreat from their early insistence on compensation for European missiles. The change in the Soviet position is better attributed to their strategic reconceptualization of the Cold War insecurity dilemma.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors describe the effects of the stereotypes that result from this practice and propose several ways of engaging in focused interaction to address these ingroup-outgroup barriers we have constructed, and discuss the impact of these stereotypes.
Abstract: Highlighted by the dramatic changes that are occurring in the world and the number of problems that are now global in scope, there is an increasing need for dialogue among the subfields and specializations that comprise the field of international studies. But because the questions we raise, the ways we define the prime movers in international politics, and the information we seek often differ, we prefer to interact with those who share our view of the world rather than with those who might challenge it. This article describes some of the effects of the stereotypes that result from this practice and proposes several ways of engaging in focused interaction to address these ingroup-outgroup barriers we have constructed.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explored the effect that political markets have upon capital markets' performance as measured by the market risks within the long-term government bond markets in nineteen democracies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between 1955 and 1992.
Abstract: One of the critical challenges of contemporary democracy is securing a balance between the markets of representation and the markets of exchange and capital within democracies. This article explores the effect that political markets have upon capital markets' performance as measured by the market risks within the long-term government bond markets in nineteen democracies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between 1955 and 1992. Our theory linking political markets and capital markets will be developed around the logic of transaction cost economics. We will argue that critical aspects of transaction costs within political markets generate corresponding transaction costs and risks within capital markets thereby reducing market efficiency. Specifically, we demonstrate that, based on cross-national evidence drawn from three panels over the time period 1955–1992, stochastic political markets generate transaction costs within long-term government bond markets, the consequences of which are reflected in rising market risk within these capital markets. Our pooled cross-sectional sample confirms that stochasticity in institutional structure presents trade-offs for democracy. Stochasticity may reflect more responsive and generally sensitive representative institutions, but often at the price of risk-laden capital markets. We consider the implications of these findings at the conclusion of the article.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors highlight how the international competitive environment itself can shape and reshape domestic and state structures, and show that shifts in international competitiveness can induce changes in domestic structures as the country's computer and semiconductor industry dramatically moves from industry follower to technological pioneer.
Abstract: A dominant orthodoxy in political-economic analyses of international competition is to highlight how national industrial performance and the competitive balance between nations are determined by domestic features of national political economies. In contrast, this article reverses these causal arrows by highlighting how the international competitive environment itself can shape and reshape domestic and state structures. Japan's high-profile, large-scale national research and development programs in computer and semiconductor technologies serve as instructive testing grounds for this argument. Illustrating how shifts in international competitiveness can induce changes in domestic structures, Japan's R&D projects display a secular decline in the government's interventionist capabilities as the country's computer and semiconductor industry dramatically moves from industry follower to technological pioneer.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The critique of rational deterrence constitutes one of the most comprehensive and sustained attacks on a "theory" in the field of international relations, a theory that many still believe is a sound, parsimonious, policy-relevant explanation of both human-social and military-strategic behavior as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The critique of rational deterrence constitutes one of the most comprehensive and sustained attacks on a “theory” in the field of international relations, a theory that many still believe is a sound, parsimonious, policy-relevant explanation of both human-social and military-strategic behavior. The attempt to identify the theoretical problems that plague the theory's behavioral assumptions,1 the methodological errors embedded within a great deal of deterrence literature,2 and the practical problems associated with implementing deterrence as a strategy3 encompass the main thrusts of the critique. As Fischoff (1987:73) claims in his summary of the findings from this body of work, “deterrence emerges as a shabby parody of a scientific theory. Its fundamental behavioral assumptions are wrong. Its basic terms are ill-defined. It is used in inconsistent and contradictory ways. Commonly cited examples of effective deterrence are often based on flawed readings of history, sometimes reflecting ignorance, sometimes deliberate misrepresentation.” Like Fischoff, many remain convinced that these findings provide more than enough evidence to discard deterrence as a weak, if not irrelevant, theory of crisis management behavior. In this article I highlight several fundamental problems with the logic and evidence cited by critics to draw these conclusions. The argument develops in five stages. The first outlines the elements of the main “necessary” condition hypothesis most frequently cited, tested, and rejected by critics of deterrence theory. The second section describes nine additional deterrence hypotheses derived from the logic of necessity and sufficiency, and specifies the relationship between these core hypotheses and the empirical evidence required to support and/or refute them. The third introduces the methodology used to test each hypothesis. It is followed by the fourth stage: discussion of data and findings. I conclude my argument with a few observations about the status and future of deterrence theory and testing.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, game theory is used to analyze civilian attempts to push back military influence in two countries where the armed forces have enjoyed strikingly dissimilar levels of power and privilege after the transition of democracy: Argentina and Chile.
Abstract: This article invokes game theory to analyze civilian attempts to push back military influence in two countries where the armed forces have enjoyed strikingly dissimilar levels of power and privilege after the transition of democracy: Argentina and Chile. It finds that civilian governments in both countries have managed to make progress in challenging military prerogatives. But they have made relatively more progress in areas unrelated to human rights. While civilians have had to respect military immunity in the human rights sphere, they have managed to erode other limitations on popular sovereignty that the officer corps imposed as a condition for leaving power. The resulting accommodation I describe reflects the pragmatic approach to politics that civilian and military leaders have assumed in post-authoritarian Latin America.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a methodology for counterfactual analysis of high-level United States foreign policy recommendations is proposed, based on modal logic and possible worlds semantics, and applied to the problem of the "winnability" of U.S. policies regarding Vietnam.
Abstract: Counterfactual reasoning is a component in much historical and political research. A proposal for exploring counterfactuals is elaborated, based on philosophical work on modal logic and possible worlds semantics. It is proposed that phenomena have essences which are unchanging in all possible worlds and that counterfactual analysis consists of making inferences about the contingent properties of these phenomena. Essential properties can be expressed as contingent relations bound, in different counterfactual situations, to different contingent properties. This methodology is applied to counterfactual explorations of a particular phenomenon: the “winnability” of high-level United States foreign policy recommendations. In two cases, the question is asked of whether “harder line” U.S. policies regarding Vietnam would have been adopted. Using the methodology elaborated in the first half of the article, it is found that as early as 1961, recommendations for the overt use of U.S. ground combat troops could have been accepted.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a detailed explanation of interest-formation and interest-specification in a particular case (the Japanese interest in the recovery of the Northern Territories), supplemented by comparative discussion, argues that national interests are idiosyncratic and best treated exogenously.
Abstract: Theories of international relations commonly rely upon strong assumptions about state preferences, or derive them from ancillary theories that themselves make strong assumptions about the sources of state preferences By means of a detailed explanation of interest-formation and interest-specification in a particular case (the Japanese interest in the recovery of the Northern Territories), supplemented by comparative discussion, this paper argues that national “interests” are idiosyncratic and best treated exogenously It assesses the implications for international relations theory and addresses some common objections

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the U.S., domestic producers have conflicting economic interests; they want protection against foreign competitors, against the possibility of retaliation, and against the perceived injuries sustained from investment restrictions abroad as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Domestic producers in the U.S. have not lobbied for formal restrictions on incoming foreign direct investment in the same way that they have for import barriers, even though both types of foreign competition depress profits. At the same time, many U.S.-based multinational corporations, despite their global orientation, have put forth demands for government policies that favor American ownership. Domestically based producers have conflicting economic interests; they want protection against foreign competitors, against the possibility of retaliation, and against the perceived injuries sustained from investment restrictions abroad. Economic interests, then, lead to indeterminate predictions of how firms will respond to IFDI. Firms will only demand policies that they see as feasible (which depends on the presence of domestic institutions to channel demands and supply the policy output) and legitimate (which depends on how the policy accords with widely held norms regarding the proper role of the state). Understanding the domestic responses to globalization requires more research on the political, as well as economic, origins of policy demands.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Hungarian case illustrates the ability of small, open, and geopolitically weak states to parlay shifts in the global environment into a bargaining asset as discussed by the authors, showing that MNC/host state bargaining in the post-Cold War period hinges more on the global positions of multinationals than on the structural vulnerabilities of capital-importing states or the internal capacity of host states.
Abstract: The demise of communism triggered large flows of foreign direct investment into Eastern Europe. This article examines the impact of recent changes in the international environment—the transformation of world production systems and the rise of neoliberalism—on bargaining between multinational corporations and post-communist governments. It focuses on the Hungarian automobile industry, one of the region's largest recipients of FDI. The Hungarian case illustrates the ability of small, open, and geopolitically weak states to parlay shifts in the global environment into a bargaining asset. The ascent of lean production heightened pressure on auto MNCs to develop local supplier systems capable of fast delivery of components to East European subsidiaries. The pull of backward integration was particularly strong for Japanese producers, whose non-European status enabled Hungarian state authorities to secure commitments to raising domestic content. Transplanting Japanese-style production in Eastern Europe proved less vexing for European MNCs, whose status as EU-based companies freed them of local-content requirements and whose preexisting supplier networks obviated heavy investments in the Hungarian components industry. But while Western auto producers enjoyed highly favorable terms of entry into Eastern Europe, even they could not elude the paradoxical effects of global changes on MNC/host state relations. The very eastward extension of the European Union's nondiscriminatory rules that facilitated EU-based firms' entry into Hungary also permitted host state authorities to parry efforts by MNCs to obtain particularistic concessions after entry. The Hungarian case thus demonstrates that MNC/host state bargaining in the post-Cold War period hinges more on the global positions of multinationals than on the structural vulnerabilities of capital-importing states ( per dependency theory) or the internal capacity of host states ( per statist theories).

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined the degree and nature of bias in the military spending estimates of the two main sources of such data, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Abstract: I seek to determine the degree and nature of bias in the military spending estimates of the two main sources of such data—the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). I examine how ACDA and SIPRI revise their estimates of foreign military spending. I do so by evaluating ACDA and SIPRI growth rate estimates from successive statistical volumes for a full sample of countries and years as well as for seven identified regions (Africa, East Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, NATO Europe, and the Warsaw Pact), to determine whether, and by how much, early and late estimates of each organization depart from its own or the other's final estimates. The findings reveal that systematic (or patterned) error for some regions is high and that unpatterned error for some regions is extremely high. The latter finding is important because unpatterned error can become systematic with changes in sample size.

Journal ArticleDOI
Sofia A. Perez1
TL;DR: The authors argued that the market-driven convergence thesis does not adequately capture the political dynamic behind financial interventionism and liberalization in two European countries: France and Spain, and argued that dirigisme was abandoned not because of changing sectoral pressures or the lack of viability of external controls, but because it raised the political costs of monetary austerity for elected authorities.
Abstract: two European countries: France and Spain. The article offers an integrated historical perspective on regulatory change which suggests that the market-driven convergence thesis does not adequately capture the political dynamic behind financial interventionism and liberalization in the two countries. The introduction of dirigisme and its later-day abandonment were driven less by the "state vs. market" dynamics emphasized in much of the literature than by macroeconomic policy choices on the part of postwar elites. Focusing on similarities and differences in the timing and pattern of reform, the article argues that dirigisme was abandoned in France and Spain not because of changing sectoral pressures or the lack of viability of external controls, but because it raised the political costs of monetary austerity for elected authorities. This link between regulatory choices and the politics of macroeconomic adjustment has implications that are likely to be critical in any country undergoing financial liberalization.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors used a model developed by Brams and Doherty (1993) to examine negotiations among a country of origin, a countryof asylum, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in a refugee crisis.
Abstract: This paper uses a model developed by Brams and Doherty (1993) to examine negotiations among a country of origin, a country of asylum, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in a refugee crisis. A unique feature of the paper is its treatment of the country of asylum as a separate player in the negotiations, which makes the choice to permit or deny settlement in the asylum country endogenous. The model is applied to two groups of Rwandese refugees: Tutsis living in exile in Burundi for three decades and Hutus in Zaire during the 1990s. The contrasting circumstances surrounding these two refugee crises provide an opportunity to study asylum countries that were sympathetic and unsympathetic, and to model changing attitudes in the country of origin and the international community toward the refugees. For both crises, the predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the unfolding of the negotiation process and the opportunities that eventually became available to the refugees.