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Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 2003"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The theory of "securitization" developed by the Copenhagen School provides one of the most innovative, productive, and yet controversial avenues of research in contemporary security studies as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The theory of “securitization” developed by the Copenhagen School provides one of the most innovative, productive, and yet controversial avenues of research in contemporary security studies. This article provides an assessment of the foundations of this approach and its limitations, as well as its significance for broader areas of International Relations theory. Locating securitization theory within the context of both classical Realism influenced by Carl Schmitt, and current work on constructivist ethics, it argues that while the Copenhagen School is largely immune from the most common criticisms leveled against it, the increasing impact of televisual communication in security relations provides a fundamental challenge for understanding the processes and institutions involved in securitization, and for the political ethics advocated by the Copenhagen School.

873 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the process through which women's organizations succeeded in placing front and center on the UN agenda two issues that had been perceived as exclusively private: violence against women and reproductive rights and health.
Abstract: How, why, and under what conditions are NGOs able to influence state's interests? To answer these questions, I examine the process through which women's organizations succeeded in placing front and center on the UN agenda two issues that had been perceived as exclusively private: violence against women and reproductive rights and health. I develop a theoretical framework drawing on both the agenda-setting and social movement literature. I suggest that NGOs attempt to influence states' interests by framing problems, solutions, and justifications for political action. Whether they are successful in mobilizing support is contingent on the dynamic interaction of primarily two factors: (1) the political opportunity structure in which NGOs are embedded, comprising access to institutions, the presence of influential allies, and changes in political alignments and conflicts; and (2) the mobilizing structures that NGOs have at their disposal, including organizational entrepreneurs, a heterogeneous international constituency, and experts. I find that in the beginning of the agenda-setting process, the influence of NGOs is rather limited, their frames are highly contested, and structural obstacles outweigh organizational resources. However, over time the influence of NGOs increases. As they establish their own mobilizing structures, they become capable of altering the political opportunity structure in their favor, and their frames gain in acceptance and legitimacy.

336 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article found that economically important trade does have a substantively important effect in reducing dyadic militarized disputes, even with extensive controls for the influence of past conflict. But they found only limited support for the role of costly signals in establishing the liberal peace, and no evidence that democratization increases the incidence of interstate disputes; and contrary to realists' expectations, allies are not less conflict prone than states that are not allied.
Abstract: Previous studies provide strong evidence for the Kantian theory of peace, but a satisfactory evaluation requires establishing the causal influence of the variables. Here we focus on the reciprocal relations between economic interdependence and interstate conflict, 1885–1992. Using distributed-lags analyses, we find that economically important trade does have a substantively important effect in reducing dyadic militarized disputes, even with extensive controls for the influence of past conflict. The benefit of interdependence is particularly great in the case of conflict involving military fatalities. Militarized disputes also cause a reduction in trade, as liberal theory predicts. Democracy and joint membership in intergovernmental organizations, too, have important pacific benefits; but we find only limited support for the role of costly signals in establishing the liberal peace. We find no evidence that democratization increases the incidence of interstate disputes; and contrary to realists' expectations, allies are not less conflict prone than states that are not allied. Democracies and states that share membership in many international organizations have higher levels of trade, but allies do not when these influences are held constant.

300 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Correlates of War Project (COW) has been used for the analysis of war since 1816 as mentioned in this paper, with a focus on inter-state, extra-systemic, and civil war types.
Abstract: Students of world politics disagree about the approaching outlook for war. Are we in the midst of an era of peace with a declining prospect of war, or are we facing a future characterized by increasing “ethnic” conflicts? This puzzle has led scholars to call for a more comprehensive examination of the phenomenon of war. A discussion concerning this need for a new look at war had also arisen within the Correlates of War Project. For more than three decades the Correlates of War Project's database has served the research needs of most of the quantitative world politics community, especially in identifying and trying to account for several classes of war (inter-state, extra-systemic, and civil) throughout the international system since 1816. However, a number of the disagreements in the literature concerning the prospects of war derive from the tendency of many researchers to rely on only one of our data sets (e.g., inter-state war). Here we wish to stimulate a broader view of war by examining the interplay among the three major types of war. Historical developments of the past half-century, and especially since the end of the Cold War, have rendered the original COW war typology increasingly incomplete. Consequently, we developed a modified typology of war and attempted to format the descriptive variables in ways that would facilitate a more comparative and comprehensive analysis of warfare. While the reader should be reassured that Inter-state Wars remain as previously defined, we introduce the term “Intra-state War” in place of our original Civil War category, and the term “Extra-state War” in place of our initial Extra-systemic War category, allowing us to reclassify several such wars. This revised typology coupled with an update of the data allows us to take a fresh look at the question whether, from the perspective of the past two centuries, war is in fact becoming less common. The article concludes with a series of analyses that describe the patterns and trends of all types of war—reflecting the new typology—since the Congress of Vienna. These analyses reflect a disquieting constancy in warfare and hint at patterns of interchangeability or substitutability among the types of war.

235 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined which factors can explain the allocation of aid by four regional development banks as well as three United Nations agencies and found that most donors examined also exhibit a bias apparent in bilateral aid allocation in favor of less populous countries.
Abstract: This paper examines which factors can explain the allocation of aid by four regional development banks as well as three United Nations agencies. The results suggest the following: most donors examined also exhibit a bias apparent in bilateral aid allocation in favor of less populous countries. Some of them also share another bias of bilateral donors who give more aid to their former colonies. However, the three United Nations agencies contravene a third bias of bilateral aid allocation and provide more aid to countries geographically more distant from the centers of the Western world. While the regional development banks with the possible exception of the Inter-American one focus exclusively on economic need as measured by per capita income, the three United Nations agencies also take into account human development need in their aid allocation as measured by the Physical Quality of Life Index. Some tentative evidence is found that respect for political freedom is rewarded with higher aid receipts at the aggregate multilateral level and by the Inter-American Development Bank as well as perhaps, in a few estimations, two of the three United Nations agencies. Neither respect for personal integrity rights nor low levels of perceived corruption play any role in the allocation of aid by the donors looked at. In general, higher military expenditures and arms imports are not associated with higher aid receipts, with a few notable exceptions.

232 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on the mechanisms through which governments adopt institutions supporting transparency in order to signal to their societies and to external actors that the information they offer is indeed credible and argue that such signals are more likely to be offered as the public receives increasing amounts of alternative information from international organizations.
Abstract: In recent years there has been an increased interest in political science in the concept of “transparency.” The literature has emphasized the effects that government transparency can have, especially on democratic consolidation. Yet there has been very little research focusing on the causes of transparency. This study discusses some of the possible factors affecting government transparency and offers several aggregate tests of their relevance. It emphasizes the mechanisms through which governments adopt institutions supporting transparency in order to signal to their societies and to external actors that the information they offer is indeed credible. It argues that such signals are more likely to be offered as the public receives increasing amounts of alternative information from international organizations. The discussion thus links processes taking place at the international level with those in the domestic realm.

146 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that globalization forces leaders to choose between pursuing competitive political goals and maintaining economic stability, revealing the intensity of leaders preferences, reducing the need for military contests as a method of identifying mutually acceptable bargains.
Abstract: Studies of signaling in international relations reveal how punishing bluffing ex post through domestic audience costs or opposition groups facilitates credible ex ante communication among states and reduces the impetus toward war. Global integration of economic markets may also reduce uncertainty by making talk costly ex ante. Autonomous global capital can respond dramatically to political crises. To the degree that globalization forces leaders to choose between pursuing competitive political goals and maintaining economic stability, it reveals the intensity of leaders’ preferences, reducing the need for military contests as a method of identifying mutually acceptable bargains. Asymmetric integration can dampen the pacific effects of globalization, but asymmetry does not in itself exacerbate dispute behavior. We present the theory and offer preliminary corroborative tests of implications of the argument on postwar militarized disputes.

133 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors developed a model of strategic interaction between speculators in currency markets and policymakers in governments, showing that speculative attacks occur when economic fundamentals are weak or when there is uncertainty about the capability and/or willingness of governments to defend the currency peg.
Abstract: Speculative currency attacks are a regular feature of the international political economy. Nevertheless, not all speculative attacks result in a devalued currency. In many cases, politicians were willing and able to defend the exchange rate peg. I develop a model of strategic interaction between speculators in currency markets and policymakers in governments. This model indicates that speculative attacks occur when economic fundamentals are weak or when there is uncertainty about the capability and/or willingness of governments to defend the currency peg. I show that the government’s decision to defend the peg reflects institutional, electoral, and partisan incentives. I test hypotheses from this model on a sample of 90 developing countries between 1985 and 1998 using a strategic probit model.

127 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that U.S. Treasury, the International Monetary Fund, and the Kim Dae-jung South Korean administration represented key practices associated with the Asian model as "cronyism" and as "corruption", thereby normatively delegitimating these practices, thereby effecting the demise of the Asian development model in Korea.
Abstract: I demonstrate the constitutive effects of discursive strategies and explore the discursive conditions in which changing ideas generate these effects. I perform an extensive analysis of the discursive strategies generated by three key actors in the Asian financial crisis. I argue that all three, U.S. Treasury, the International Monetary Fund, and the Kim Dae-jung South Korean administration, represented key practices associated with the Asian model as “cronyism” and as “corruption,” thereby normatively delegitimating these practices, thereby effecting the demise of the Asian model of development in Korea. I argue that these discursive practices generate narrative structures that have a constitutive effect on the subsequent discursive and economic practices of actors. The manner in which the narratives represent “causes” of the crisis constitute and reconstitute the social meanings by which past and current social and economic practices are legitimated or de-legitimated. The structures constituted by these social meanings re-create and reconstitute the present and future conditions for strategic action. I conclude with a demonstration of how these narratives institutionalize the discourses they construct through changes in Korean state and commercial institutions.

124 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a new unified territorial explanation of conflict that accounts for the possibility of certain factors affecting the rise of a militarized dispute, as well as the probability that a dispute will escalate to war.
Abstract: This article develops a new unified territorial explanation of conflict that accounts for the possibility of certain factors affecting the rise of a militarized dispute, as well as the probability that a dispute will escalate to war. In the past, research linking territorial disputes to a relatively high probability of war outbreak has been criticized for underestimating the potential problem of sampling bias in the militarized interstate dispute (MID) data. This study utilizes newly available data on territorial claims going back to 1919 to determine, using a two-stage estimation procedure, whether the presence of territorial claims in the dispute onset phase affects the relationship between territorial militarized disputes and war in the second stage. It is found that territorial claims increase the probability of a militarized dispute occurring and that territorial MIDs increase the probability of war, even while controlling for the effect of territorial claims on dispute onset. The effect of territory across the two stages is consistent with the new territorial explanation of conflict and war and shows no sampling bias with regard to territory in the MID data.

108 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Michael Mousseau1
TL;DR: In this article, an interdisciplinary theory is presented that links the rise of contractual forms of exchange within a society with the proliferation of liberal values, democratic legitimacy, and peace among democratic nations.
Abstract: Drawing on literature from Anthropology, Economics, Political Science and Sociology, an interdisciplinary theory is presented that links the rise of contractual forms of exchange within a society with the proliferation of liberal values, democratic legitimacy, and peace among democratic nations. The theory accommodates old facts and yields a large number of new and testable ones, including the fact that the peace among democracies is limited to market-oriented states, and that market democracies—but not the other democracies—perceive common interests. Previous research confirms the first hypothesis; examination herein of UN roll call votes confirms the latter: the market democracies agree on global issues. The theory and evidence demonstrate that (a) the peace among democratic states may be a function of common interests derived from common economic structure; (b) all of the empirical research into the democratic peace is underspecified, as no study has considered an interaction of democracy with economic structure; (c) interests can be treated endogenously in social research; and (d) several of the premier puzzles in global politics are causally related—including the peace among democracies and the association of democratic stability and liberal political culture with market-oriented economic development.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a comparison between two prominent cases of regime-making efforts: deforestation (non-regime) and ozone depletion (regime), is made, based on analysis of multilateral scientific assessments, observation of UN meetings, and interviews with scientists.
Abstract: Knowledge-based approaches to the study of international environmental cooperation tend to treat knowledge as a single variable. It is more useful to distinguish between different types of information and to analyze their roles in policy formation separately. Disaggregating knowledge reveals important aspects of the interplay between knowledge, interests, and power which otherwise remain hidden, and helps solve empirical puzzles and theoretical contradictions. Its utility is illustrated in a comparison between two prominent cases of regime-making efforts: deforestation (non-regime) and ozone depletion (regime). The study relies on analysis of multilateral scientific assessments, observation of UN meetings, and interviews with scientists and policymakers. The evidence suggests that reliable information about the cross-border consequences of a problem is of critical importance in regime formation as it facilitates utility calculations and the formation of interests. By contrast, other types of seemingly relevant scientific knowledge appear to be of far lesser importance. Moreover, contrary to power-over-knowledge theorizing, the state of knowledge cannot be easily explained with reference to political power.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of international regimes on the political influence of domestic players in state decision-making are investigated. But the authors do not consider the effect of domestic institutions and partisanship at the domestic level.
Abstract: States' decisions about regulating international capital movements are shaped in part by institutions and partisanship at the domestic level, but the effects of domestic-level variables are themselves contingent on the constraints imposed by the international system. We amend the veto-players hypothesis to account for the effects of international regimes on the political influence of domestic players in state decision-making. The history of changes in international financial regulations over the past four decades provides an ideal case to study the interaction of international regimes and domestic decision-making systems. We create a data set of all capital controls policy changes that 19 OECD parliamentary democracies made during the years 1951–1998. Using these new data, we find that states with a higher number of veto-player parties in government enact fewer capital controls policy changes. Furthermore, ideologically right-of-center governments in these industrialized countries are more likely than others to enact capital controls liberalizations. We also find, however, that the independent effects of these domestic-level variables disappear after the mid-1980s, when the systemic constraints imposed on individual states increased substantially.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore three interrelated causal mechanisms for inter-state bargaining: the state leaders' increased expectations about future commerce create an incentive for these actors to consider peaceful bargains as an alternative to costly war, security coordination under the umbrella of a commercial institution provides fuller information about state military capabilities, thus making interstate bargaining for dispute resolution more efficient.
Abstract: While the commercial institutional peace research program provides empirical evidence that international institutions, especially preferential trade arrangements, help reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict, it fails to delineate clearly how such institutions matter. Building from the logic that low opportunity costs for fighting, private information, and commitment problems constitute important causes of war, this article explores three interrelated causal mechanisms. First, the state leaders' increased expectations about future commerce create an incentive for these actors to consider peaceful bargains as an alternative to costly war. Second, security coordination under the umbrella of a commercial institution provides fuller information about state military capabilities, thus making inter-state bargaining for dispute resolution more efficient. Third, in bringing together high-level state leaders on a regular basis, commercial institutions may create the trust necessary to overcome commitment problems in inter-state bargaining. I explore how these mechanisms have operated within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Economic Community of West African States.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the circumstances under which economic globalization has led (and not led) to a convergence in the regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the European Union (EU) and the United States.
Abstract: This paper examines the circumstances under which economic globalization has led (and not led) to a convergence in the regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the European Union (EU) and the United States. While the EU has taken a precautionary approach to regulating biotech products, the U.S. has decided that these products are no different from those made using more traditional methods. As such, the U.S. government has implemented no novel legislation or risk assessment procedures to regulate them. These varying regulatory responses pose an interesting puzzle for scholars who are interested in examining the impact of economic globalization on domestic regulatory institutions and policy outcomes. Despite the fact that agricultural biotech products were developed for highly competitive and globally integrated agri-business markets, the paper argues that biotechnology regulation has followed very different paths in the two polities with the EU mimicking the environmental politics model and the U.S. remaining largely nonadversarial in its approach. We investigate why this has occurred by focusing on differences in the domestic political economies surrounding biotechnology issues in the two regions. The paper then examines why the U.S. biotechnology policy mode recently has shown signs of gravitating toward the EU model, signifying a potential for convergence to the top. Although no new statutes have been enacted or rules adopted yet, there are noticeable changes in the regulatory climate. The paper argues that these changes can be attributed to developments in the domestic political economy, especially the StarLink episode and how this opened the ‘‘policy window’’ for the pressures of globalization to influence the potential ratcheting-up of U.S. standards. Background This paper examines why the regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) has diverged and, why in the last three years, the U.S. is showing signs of moving toward the EU regulatory model. Given that multinational enterprises (MNEs) dominate the agricultural Authors’ note: Previous versions of this draft were presented at the Seminar on Political Consumerism, Stockholm, 2001 annual conferences of the Academy of Management and the International Studies Association. We received valuable feedback from David Levy, Michele Micheletti, Jacqueline Miller, Tom Prescot, Bryan Ritchie, Shanthu Shantharam, David Vogel, and Naoh Zerbe.

Journal ArticleDOI
David C. Kang1
TL;DR: The authors examined the assumptions underlying these theories and revealed how the assumptions can become mis-specified, and showed that scholars have made mistakes in both areas: either they misunderstood the initial conditions, or they misunderstood their theory.
Abstract: Ever since the first Korean war in 1950, scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one, started by an invasion from the North. Whether seen as arising from preventive, preemptive, desperation, or simple aggressive motivations, the predominant perspective in the west sees North Korea as likely to instigate conflict. Yet for fifty years North Korea has not come close to starting a war. Why were so many scholars so consistently wrong about North Korea's intentions? Social scientists can learn as much from events that did not happen as from those that did. The case of North Korea provides a window with which to examine these theories of conflict initiation, and reveals how the assumptions underlying these theories can become mis-specified. Either scholars misunderstood the initial conditions, or they misunderstood the theory, and I show that scholars have made mistakes in both areas. Social science moves forward from clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. However, just as important is the rigorous assessment of a theory, especially if the predictions fail to materialize. North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.–ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. The real question has not been whether North Korea would preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell further and further behind. The explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the Munich case is used to show that democratic norms do matter in threat perception and establish that they are not simply the epiphenomena of state interests.
Abstract: President Franklin D. Roosevelt's assessment of Hitler as a potential threat to American security in the aftermath of the Munich crisis highlights the role of liberal-democratic norms in shaping the threat perceptions of democratic leaders. A critical factor in Roosevelt's post-Munich expectation of future trouble for the United States was his judgment that Hitler's contempt for democratic processes of accommodation forecasted unlimited aims. Since Roosevelt did not link his perception of threat to regime type, however, this episode also calls into question a central tenet of the theory of democratic peace: the notion that democracies invariably harbor a “presumption of enmity” toward nondemocracies. Nevertheless, the Munich case allows us to see which democratic norms do matter in threat perception and establishes that they are not simply the epiphenomena of state interests. Moreover, Roosevelt's response to the Munich crisis shows that threat can be assessed primarily on the basis of intentions and suggests how democratic predispositions can provide indicators of intent. Finally, in analyzing why some democratic leaders derive diagnostic information about aggressive intentions from such indicators, while others do not, this article explores the connection between different leaders' perceptions and the foreign policy processes of democratic states.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examined the consequences of financial globalization for democratization in emerging market economies by focusing on the currency markets of four Asian countries at different stages of democratic development and showed that in young and incipient democracies politics continuously causes changes in the probability of experiencing two different currency market equilibria: a high volatility "contagion" regime and a low volatility "fundamentals" regime.
Abstract: We examine some of the consequences of financial globalization for democratization in emerging market economies by focusing on the currency markets of four Asian countries at different stages of democratic development. Using political data of various kinds—including a new events data series—and the Markov regime switching model from empirical macroeconomics, we show that in young and incipient democracies politics continuously causes changes in the probability of experiencing two different currency market equilibria: a high volatility “contagion” regime and a low volatility “fundamentals” regime. The kind of political events that affect currency market equilibration varies cross-nationally depending on the degree to which the polity of a country is democratic and its policymaking transparent. The results help us better gauge how and the extent to which democratization is compatible with financial globalization.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article developed a simultaneous equations model of democracy and dyadic conflict and found that dyadic military disputes reduce joint democracy and joint democracy reduces the probability of a dyadic militarized interstate dispute (MID).
Abstract: Many statistical studies in international relations investigate the claim that democracies do not fight one another Virtually all of these studies employ a single-equation design, where the dependent variable measures the presence or absence of a dyadic militarized interstate dispute (MID) A separate group of studies argues that conflict affects democracy and that its effect could be positive or negative By and large, these two bodies of literature have not incorporated one another's insights We argue that democracy and dyadic conflict affect each other significantly and that statistical models that ignore the reciprocal nature of these effects may make incorrect inferences To test this argument, we develop a simultaneous equations model of democracy and dyadic conflict Our sample includes all the politically relevant dyads from 1950 to 1992 We find that dyadic military disputes reduce joint democracy and joint democracy reduces the probability of MIDs Compared with the single-equation estimates in the literature, the absolute effect of joint democracy in our paper is smaller while in relative terms, the effect is similar in size The effect of joint democracy on MID involvement is considerably smaller for noncontiguous countries than for contiguous ones The effects of a number of control variables in the MID equation are also found to differ from those reported previously in single- equation–based studies

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the relationship between cultural similarities and differences on the part of the representatives of contending states and mediators, and outcomes of mediation efforts in militarized disputes.
Abstract: The article investigates the relationship between cultural similarities and differences on the part of the representatives of contending states and mediators, and outcomes of mediation efforts in militarized disputes. A distinction is made between social culture, defined primarily in terms of religious identity, and political culture, defined according to the state's political system. Analysis of 752 mediation attempts in militarized disputes occurring between 1945 and 1995 yields support for the hypothesis that mediation is more likely to succeed when the parties are from similar social cultures. The results, however, suggest that the relationship is more complex than that suggested by a simple categorization of states based on Huntington's “clash of civilizations” thesis. We also find that mediation is more likely to succeed when the parties share democratic political cultures, a finding that is consistent with the cultural/normative explanation for the democratic peace.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined the behavior of states involved in militarized interstate disputes to test two possibilities: first, that states contending with ethnic rebellion are more likely to be the victims of aggression by outside actors.
Abstract: Current scholarship on the international relations of ethnic conflict holds that such domestic-level conflict can spread to become interstate conflict. Empirical research, theoretical discussions, and case studies have concluded that states suffering from violent ethnic conflict, specifically ethno-political rebellion, can be either the victims of aggression or themselves the aggressors when ethnic conflict spreads to the international level. From both a scholarly perspective and the standpoint of policymaking it is important to know which possibility is more likely. This paper examines the behavior of states involved in militarized interstate disputes to test two possibilities: first, that states contending with ethnic rebellion are more likely to be the victims of aggression by outside actors. Alternatively, that states contending with ethnic rebellion are more likely to take aggressive action against outside states. Statistical analysis of ethnic rebellion data and militarized interstate dispute data covering the period 1980–1992 finds that states suffering from ethnic rebellion are more likely to use force and use force first when involved in international disputes than states without similar insurgency problems.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the absence of systematic data on war precipitants that would allow one to compare the effects of catalysts and other factors, the explanatory payoff associated with examining nonlinear interactions among multiple rivalries in bringing about wars that spread more widely than anticipated is under conceptualized.
Abstract: "Streetcar" interpretations of world politics emphasize the significance of contingent catalysts vis-a-vis structural variables and multiple, nonlinear chains of causation, among other things. Ultimately, though, it is difficult to evaluate the significance of catalysts in the absence of systematic data on war precipitants that would allow one to compare the effects of catalysts and other factors. More concrete but under conceptualized is the explanatory payoff associated with examining nonlinear interactions among multiple rivalries in bringing about wars that spread more widely than anticipated. World War I is a good case in point. A very large number of interstate rivalries contributed in various ways and over a number of years to the outbreak of a world war that no one sought precisely in the way in which it emerged. Focusing on the structure of their interactions also facilitates the synthesis of a number of alternative interpretations of why World War I began. Examining the effects of interconnected and "ripe" rivalry fields in other major power war contexts should prove to be equally beneficial.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The anticipated growth of new communications technologies, including the Internet and other digital networks, will make it increasingly difficult for states to tax global commerce effectively as mentioned in this paper, and greater harmonization and coordination of national tax policies will likely be required in the coming years in order to address this problem.
Abstract: The anticipated growth of new communications technologies, including the Internet and other digital networks, will make it increasingly difficult for states to tax global commerce effectively. Greater harmonization and coordination of national tax policies will likely be required in the coming years in order to address this problem. Given that the history of the state is inseparable from the history of taxation, this “globalization of taxation” could have far-reaching political implications. The modern state itself emerged out of a fiscal crisis of medieval European feudalism, which by the 14th and 15th centuries was increasingly incapable of raising sufficient revenues to support the mounting expenses of warfare. If new developments in the technology of commerce are now undermining the efficiency of the state as an autonomous taxing entity, fiscal pressures may produce a similar shift in de facto political authority away from the state and toward whatever international mechanisms are created to expedite the taxation of these new forms of commerce.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This model captures some of the tensions implicit in the ''Alliance'' and ''Adversary'' games, two related but theoretically isolated models due to Snyder, and delineates and explores the circumstances that give rise to the ''deterrence versus restraint'' dilemma.
Abstract: To explore the impact of alignment patterns in a rudimentary state system, we develop and analyze the Tripartite Crisis Game, a three- person game among Challenger, Defender, and Protege ´ This model captures some of the tensions implicit in the ''Alliance'' and ''Adversary'' games, two related but theoretically isolated models due to Snyder Our analysis enables us to delineate and explore the circumstances that give rise to the ''deterrence versus restraint'' dilemma It also provides an answer to Fearon's empirical puzzle: when convincing commitments are possible, why are halfhearted signals sometimes sent? Our most surprising result concerns the impact of Protege ´'s threat on Challenger's optimal behavior When Challenger is willing to fight to back up its demand, but is nonetheless only weakly or moderately motivated, Protege ´'s threat to realignFthough directed at DefenderF can dissuade Challenger from initiating a crisis But when Challenger is willing to fight and stands to gain a great deal, Protege ´'s threat may actually prompt Challenger to make a demand Our analysis uncovers this unexpected pattern of behavior and suggests when it occurs That Protege ´'s threat to realign sometimes bolsters deterrence, and some- times undermines it, has implications for the selection bias issue in studies of alliance reliability and helps to explain why some alliances are stabilizing while others are associated with crises and war The nonlinear consequences of Protege ´'s commitment seem to us to constitute another ''paradox of war''

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article investigated the degree to which decision-makers employ analogical and abstract reasoning and found a preference for explanation-based reasoning and discussed some of the implications of these findings. But they did not find that analogical reasoning was the primary reason for most of the decisions.
Abstract: Analogical, or case-based reasoning has received quite a bit of attention in the literature on foreign policy decision-making. There has been little attention paid to whether analogical reasoning does indeed predominate or to what degree abstract reasoning plays a role in the decision-making process. If decision-makers do not primarily reason by analogy (an empirical question), then the focus on such reasoning runs the risk of ignoring important aspects of problem formulation and the scope of possible solutions considered. Hence, this article investigates the degree to which decision-makers employ analogical and abstract reasoning. The empirical data are from the Senate hearing regarding the first American program for development aid. This case permits an empirical assessment of the consensus in the foreign aid literature that the Marshall Plan was the central analogy for this aid. In addition, it has been argued that in public discourse, decision-makers should be expected to use analogies as justifications for their preferences. The study finds a preference for explanation-based reasoning and discusses some of the implications of these findings.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors raise the issue of moral credibility in international relations and show that considerations of preserving moral prestige can become crucial for armed humanitarian intervention and contrast realist and constructivist explanations about the causes of humanitarian intervention.
Abstract: This paper raises the issue of moral credibility in international relations and shows that considerations of preserving moral prestige can become crucial for armed humanitarian intervention It contrasts realist and constructivist explanations about the causes of humanitarian intervention and demonstrates that traditional accounts do not provide a complete understanding of the phenomenon of intervention In the case studied here, Britain engaged in a relatively costly humanitarian intervention against the Barbary pirates, slave trade in Christian Europeans due to her willingness to defy moral criticism and exhibit consistency with her professed moral principles No material incentives and/or constraints influenced the British decision, and neither was it affected by a sense of felling, with regard to the Christian slaves Instead, allegations that Britain urged Europe to abolish the black slave trade out of selfish interests, while at the same time turning a blind eye toward the Christian slave trade of the pirates, undermined British moral prestige and became the cause of the Barbary expedition

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on the Treaty on Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, signed in Moscow on July 16, 2001.
Abstract: Why would a declining power help arm a neighboring and once-hostile rising power? Current international relations literature cannot explain relationships in which one powerful country contributes directly to its long-term relative decline in order to make smaller, short-term gains. This study focuses on one example, the Treaty on Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, signed in Moscow on July 16, 2001. Presenting evidence that this alliance embodies a relationship that is based primarily on sales of arms from Russia to China, the authors argue that this association cannot be explained by current theory. Three variables appear most important to understanding the arms sales element of this case: declining relative position discloses the structural factors behind Russia's actions; domestic policy explains its willingness to make what had appeared as rash sacrifices; and identity issues explain the core motivations and interests of each actor.

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TL;DR: The authors argue that states pursue the national interest and that survival is only a potential means to that end, and employ this assumption within the cultures of anarchy framework to formulate an explanation for the willingness of states to cede autonomy to international institutions.
Abstract: In order to explain the creation and maintenance of a number of important international institutions, scholars must reconsider a commonly held assumption about what states want. Structural realists show that the assumption that states desire survival explains a wide range of outcomes. Yet the survival assumption prevents both realists and liberal institutionalists from offering a plausible account of international organizations that are costly to autonomy. The cultures of anarchy argument helps explain when the desire to survive is more or less salient but is burdened with the survival assumption nonetheless. I argue that it is useful to assume that states pursue the national interest and that survival is only a potential means to that end. By employing this assumption within the cultures of anarchy framework, we can begin to formulate an explanation for the willingness of states to cede autonomy to international institutions. Recent events in world politics make it necessary for international relations scholars to reassess the utility of one of the most important and long-standing assumptions in international relations theory. For millennia, prominent political thinkers have suggested that the primary aim of independent political entities is survival. For Aristotle, the test of a good government is its staying power (The Politics: 6.5.1). Cicero is even more explicit, saying, ‘‘the state ought to be so organized that it will endure forever y when a state is destroyed y it is somewhat as ifFto compare small things with greatFthis whole world should perish and collapse’’ (On the Commonwealth: 3.23). And of course, Machiavelli’s The Prince, if taken literally, is a kind of how-to book for the survival of a regime, if not a state. He says, ‘‘[c]ruelty can be described as well used (if it is permissible to say good words about something evil in itself) when it is performed all at once, for reasons of self-preservation’’ (27). Modern international relations theory is no less enamored with the idea that states seek to survive, even if the claim is posited less in normative terms than as a useful way of explaining events in international affairs. For prominent realists, institutionalists , and constructivists, the survival motive is understood to be the best shorthand for the aims and desires of states. Indeed, in order to explain the degree of cooperation or conflict in the world, contemporary international relations scholarshipFalmost to a personF begins by positing a survival motive. This paper

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TL;DR: For example, the authors found that women are more supportive of the peace process with Israel than men, and that women were more likely to support it than men when compared to men.
Abstract: This study explains the variations in the Palestinians' support of the peace process with Israel. It uses multivariate Logit analysis, employing a large public opinion poll conducted in January 2000. It tests seven hypotheses, drawn from various perspectives, on the conditions of Palestinian support of or opposition to the peace process. The study supports several of our hypotheses including the positive association between the Palestinians' perceptions of democracy and the support of peace and Palestinian women's support of the peace process. These results are important because they reconfirm the findings of the vast international relations literature, which established a strong linkage between democracy and peace and that women are more peace-oriented than men. The study further suggests that the Palestinians associate their support of the peace process positively with their trust of domestic political institutions, a sound nation-building process, and governmental public accountability, and negatively with the perception of governmental corruption. It also reveals that the Palestinians' positive evaluation of their domestic institutions and Israel's commitment to a just and fair settlement to the conflict are more important determinants of the support of the peace process than efforts to improve their economic conditions and that the economic conditions have, at best, a small impact upon the support of or the opposition to peace. Lastly, the study points to the presence of a positive relationship between support of the peace process and each of political institutionalization, party identification, and the second level of leaders. This finding points to an emerging trend among Palestinians toward political maturation and stabilization of their domestic politics.

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TL;DR: The authors examines the statistical consequences of estimating in over-expansive samples with unmodeled treatment effects. But their empirical analyses demonstrate that overexpansive data can produce somewhat misleading results: the new models produce interesting findings that emerge as treatment effects are identified.
Abstract: This article illustrates the importance of testing empirical models in samples appropriate to the theories the models are intended to test. While social science appears to mandate that we prefer general theories to limited ones, the generality of a theory rests in its logical application to a set of observations, not solely to its statistical survival in a large data set. Theories in international relations, especially those linking domestic turmoil and international conflict, are advancing, but are sometimes applied to samples larger than the related theories indicate. This paper examines the statistical consequences of estimation in overexpansive samples with unmodeled treatment effects; we argue that samples containing cases that cannot experience the causal phenomenon in question produce unmodeled treatment effects, and we reexamine three published articles whose samples are perhaps broader than their theories suggest they should be. The empirical analyses demonstrate that overexpansive samples can produce somewhat misleading results: the new models produce interesting findings that emerge as treatment effects are identified.