Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 2005"
TL;DR: This paper found that states characterized by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict, and the basic link between gender inequality and intra-state conflict was confirmed by examining the norms of violence that facilitate a call to arms.
Abstract: We know, most notably through Ted Gurr's research, that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethnopolitical rebellion–intrastate conflict. I seek to discover what impact, if any, gender inequality has on intrastate conflict. Although democratic peace scholars and others highlight the role of peaceful domestic behavior in predicting state behavior, many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence—structural and cultural violence—results in a greater likelihood of violence at the state and the international level. This project contributes to this line of inquiry and further tests the grievance theory of intrastate conflict by examining the norms of violence that facilitate a call to arms. And in many ways, I provide an alternative explanation for the significance of some of the typical economic measures—the greed theory—based on the link between discrimination, inequality, and violence. I test whether states characterized by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict. Ultimately, the basic link between gender inequality and intrastate conflict is confirmed—states characterized by gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict, 1960–2001.
328 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine what aspects of democracy are most consequential in improving a state's human rights record and find that political participation at the level of multiparty competition appears more significant than other dimensions in reducing human rights abuses.
Abstract: Research on human rights consistently points to the importance of democracy in reducing the severity and incidence of personal integrity abuses. The prescriptive implications of this finding for policy makers interested in state building have been somewhat limited, however, by a reliance on multidimensional measures of democracy. Consequently, a policy maker emerges from this literature confident that “democracy matters” but unclear about which set(s) of reforms is likely to yield a greater human rights payoff. Using data from the Polity IV Project, we examine what aspects of democracy are most consequential in improving a state's human rights record. Analysis of democracy's dimensions elicits three findings. First, political participation at the level of multiparty competition appears more significant than other dimensions in reducing human rights abuses. Second, improvements in a state's level of democracy short of full democracy do not promote greater respect for integrity rights. Only those states with the highest levels of democracy, not simply those conventionally defined as democratic, are correlated with better human rights practices. Third, accountability appears to be the critical feature that makes full-fledged democracies respect human rights; limited accountability generally retards improvement in human rights.
321 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test the hypothesis that the adoption of pension privatization is shaped systematically by an interdependent logic, wherein the decision to privatize pensions in one country is systematically linked to corresponding decisions made by governments in relevant peer nations.
Abstract: In the last two decades, striking correlations in the location and timing of structural pension reforms have raised important questions about the kind of information used by policy makers in their decisions to adopt such measures. This study tests the hypothesis that the adoption of pension privatization is shaped systematically by an interdependent logic, wherein the decision to privatize pensions in one country is systematically linked to corresponding decisions made by governments in relevant peer nations. Duration analysis with time-varying covariates of data from 59 countries between 1980 and 1999 reveals that the decision to adopt a private pension reform in one country increases systematically as the proportion of peer nations that have adopted corresponding measures rises. Importantly, the effect of this peer dynamic varies across groups of nations, with the most powerful impact of peer decisions being found among Eastern European and Central Asian nations. Peer dynamics likewise contribute powerfully to the adoption of private pension reforms in Latin America, but do not significantly shape the hazard of privatization among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member nations. Even controlling for diffusion mechanisms, the analysis shows that pension reform decisions remain subject to domestic political and economic considerations, including demographic pressures, financial costs and incentives to reform, and constraints delimited by the political institutions in each nation.
287 citations
TL;DR: The authors studied the determinants of country reporting by an exemplary transnational actor, Amnesty International, during 1986-2000 and found that while human rights conditions are associated with the volume of their country reporting, other factors also matter, including previous reporting efforts, state power, U.S. military assistance, and a country's media profile.
Abstract: What shapes the transnational activist agenda? Do non-governmental organizations with a global mandate focus on the world's most pressing problems, or is their reporting also affected by additional considerations? To address these questions, we study the determinants of country reporting by an exemplary transnational actor, Amnesty International, during 1986–2000. We find that while human rights conditions are associated with the volume of their country reporting, other factors also matter, including previous reporting efforts, state power, U.S. military assistance, and a country's media profile. Drawing on interviews with Amnesty and Human Rights Watch staff, we interpret our findings as evidence of Amnesty International's social movement-style “information politics.” The group produces more written work on some countries than others to maximize advocacy opportunities, shape international standards, promote greater awareness, and raise its profile. This approach has both strengths and weaknesses, which we consider after extending our analysis to other transnational sectors.
263 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined to what extent gender equality is associated with lower levels of intrastate armed conflict and found that more equal societies, measured either in terms of female representation in parliament or the ratio of female-to-male higher education attainment, are associated with higher levels of intra-state armed conflict.
Abstract: In this article, I examine to what extent gender equality is associated with lower levels of intrastate armed conflict. I use three measures of gender equality: (1) a dichotomous indicator of whether the highest leader of a state is a woman; (2) the percentage of women in parliament; and (3) the female-to-male higher education attainment ratio. I argue that the first two measures in particular capture the extent to which women hold positions that allow them to influence matters of war and peace within a state. I further argue that all three measures, but especially the last two, capture how women are valued relative to men in a society, that is, the relative degree of subordination of women. Whereas female state leadership has no statistically significant effect, more equal societies, measured either in terms of female representation in parliament or the ratio of female-to-male higher education attainment, are associated with lower levels of intrastate armed conflict. The pacifying impact of gender equality is not only statistically significant in the presence of a comprehensive set of controls but also is strong in substantive terms.
238 citations
TL;DR: The authors analyzes and assesses how these methodological orientations are useful for understanding the gendering of international politics, the state and its security-seeking practices and its effects on the lives of women and men.
Abstract: Methodological issues have constituted some of the deepest sources of misunderstanding between International Relations (IR) feminists and IR theorists working in social scientific frameworks. IR theorists have called upon feminists to frame their research questions in terms of testable hypotheses. Feminists have responded that their research questions cannot be answered using social science explanatory frameworks. Deep epistemological divisions about the construction and purpose of knowledge make bridging these methodological divides difficult. These epistemological standards lead feminists to very different methodological perspectives. Asking different questions from those typically asked in IR, many IR feminists have drawn on ethnographic, narrative, cross-cultural, and other methods that are rarely taught to students of IR, to answer them. Drawing on a range of interdisciplinary scholarship on feminist methodologies and some recent IR feminist case studies, this article analyzes and assesses how these methodological orientations are useful for understanding the gendering of international politics, the state and its security-seeking practices and its effects on the lives of women and men.
235 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the use of gender essentialisms in transnational efforts to advocate for the protection of war-affected civilians is questioned, since they arguably undermine the moral logic of the civilian immunity norm on which their normative claims are based.
Abstract: This article offers an explanation for the use of gender essentialisms in transnational efforts to advocate for the protection of war-affected civilians. I question why human rights advocates would rely upon such essentialisms, since they arguably undermine the moral logic of the civilian immunity norm on which their normative claims are based. This can be understood, I argue, as part of a strategic framing process in which pre-existing cultural ideas, filtered through an environment characterized by various political constraints, impact the rhetorical strategies available to advocates. In-depth interviews with civilian protection advocates reveal that many believe that warring parties, the global media, transnational constituencies and partners in the international women's network will all be more receptive to their message if it is couched in terms of protecting “women and children” specifically. Network actors believe that while this may undermine the protection of adult male civilians and while it may reproduce harmful gender stereotypes, these problems are outweighed by the gains in access to needy populations and the benefits of getting “civilians” on the international agenda. I conclude by considering the extent to which this cost/benefit analysis is being contested and reconsidered by some actors within the civilian protection network.
211 citations
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe and finds that economic hardship and economic discrimination against ethnic minorities lead to higher flows of asylum seekers, while political oppression, human rights abuse, violent conflict, and state failure are also important determinants.
Abstract: This article analyzes the determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe. Potential asylum seekers balance the costs of staying versus the costs of migrating. Estimation results confirm that economic hardship and economic discrimination against ethnic minorities lead to higher flows of asylum seekers. However, political oppression, human rights abuse, violent conflict, and state failure are also important determinants. Migration networks and geographical proximity are important facilitators of asylum flows as predicted by theory and colonial experience, religious similarity, and casual contact with the developed world (aid, trade, and tourism) are not. Natural disasters and famines are also not statistically significant determinants. These events are typically short term and unexpected, whereas asylum migration to Western Europe requires preparatory planning. If Western European countries want to tackle the root causes of asylum migration, then they need to undertake policy measures that promote economic development, democracy, respect for human rights, and peaceful conflict resolution in countries of origin.
203 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors treat IOs as strategic actors that can choose among a set of strategies in order to pursue their goals in response to changing environmental pressures and constraints that potentially threaten their relevance and resource base.
Abstract: On those rare occasions when scholars of international organizations (IOs) consider the issue of change, they typically highlight the centrality of states. Although states are important for understanding when and why there is a change in the tasks, mandate, and design of IO, IOs themselves can initiate change. Drawing from sociological institutional and resource dependence approaches, in this article we treat IOs as strategic actors that can choose among a set of strategies in order to pursue their goals in response to changing environmental pressures and constraints that potentially threaten their relevance and resource base. We delineate six strategies—acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, manipulation, and strategic social construction, and suggest that the strategic choice by IOs is contingent on the level of both organizational insecurity and the congruence between the content of environmental pressures and organizational culture. We emphasize how IOs must make a trade-off between acquiring the resources necessary to survive and be secure, on the one hand, and maintaining autonomy, on the other. We apply this framework to the case of Interpol, investigating how different calculations of these trade-offs led Interpol staff to adopt different strategies depending on its willingness to accept, resist, or initiate changes that demand conformity to external pressures.
157 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an analytical framework identifying and categorizing the potential criminalizing effects of sanctions across place (within and around the targeted country) and time (during and after the sanctions period), and apply and evaluate this framework through an in-depth examination of the case of Yugoslavia.
Abstract: The upsurge in the use of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era has prompted much scholarly and policy debate over their effectiveness and humanitarian consequences. Remarkably little attention, however, has been devoted to their criminalizing consequences and legacy for the post-sanctions period. In this article, I develop an analytical framework identifying and categorizing the potential criminalizing effects of sanctions across place (within and around the targeted country) and time (during and after the sanctions period), and apply and evaluate this framework through an in-depth examination of the case of Yugoslavia. For comparative leverage and to assess the applicability of the argument beyond the Yugoslavia case, the analysis is briefly extended to other cases both within and outside the Balkans (Croatia and Iraq). The article suggests that sanctions can unintentionally contribute to the criminalization of the state, economy, and civil society of both the targeted country and its immediate neighbors, fostering a symbiosis between political leaders, organized crime, and transnational smuggling networks. This symbiosis, in turn, can persist beyond the lifting of sanctions, contributing to corruption and crime and undermining the rule of law. The article is one of the first efforts to integrate the study of sanctions and transnational crime, and suggests that the criminalized collateral damage from sanctions and its post-sanctions legacy should be made a more central part of the evaluation of sanctions.
157 citations
TL;DR: The authors examined the effectiveness of overt military intervention in slowing or stopping the killing during ongoing instances of genocide or politicide and found that interventions that directly challenge the perpetrator or aid the target of the brutal policy are the only effective type of military responses, increasing the probability that the magnitude of the slaughter can be slowed or stopped.
Abstract: This study examines the effectiveness of overt military intervention in slowing or stopping the killing during ongoing instances of genocide or politicide. Six alternative hypotheses regarding the potential effects of intervention on genocide/politicide severity are tested in a cross-national longitudinal analysis of all ongoing genodices or politicides from 1995 to 1997. The results suggest that interventions that directly challenge the perpetrator or aid the target of the brutal policy are the only effective type of military responses, increasing the probability that the magnitude of the slaughter can be slowed or stopped. Impartial interventions seem to be ineffective at reducing severity, and interventions to challenge the perpetrator do not make matters worse for the targets of genocide or politicide. The findings are consistent with recent arguments that attempts to prevent or alleviate mass killings should focus on opposing, restraining, or disarming perpetrators and/or removing them from power.
TL;DR: The authors evaluate the liberal claim that democratic states devote fewer resources to their militaries and find empirical support for the liberal argument, although regime type is not necessarily the strongest influence on military resource allocation.
Abstract: In this paper, we evaluate the liberal claim that democratic states devote fewer resources to their militaries. Low military spending is thought to avert conflict spirals and release more resources to fund domestic programs. While prominent in many liberal international relations theories, most notably in Immanuel Kant's, this proposition has received little empirical scrutiny. Using several indicators of military resource allocation and data on a wide range of states since 1816, we find empirical support for the liberal argument, although regime type is not necessarily the strongest influence on military resource allocation.
TL;DR: The authors provided the most comprehensive and extensive analysis to date of the possibility of a "rally "round the flag" effect, an increase in support for the government caused by involvement in international conflict in Britain, for the years 1948-2001.
Abstract: This paper provides the most comprehensive and extensive analysis to date of the possibility of a “rally ‘round the flag” effect—an increase in support for the government caused by involvement in international conflict—in Britain, for the years 1948–2001. We use a fractionally integrated time series model with an array of political and economic controls. Our primary dependent variable is intention to vote for the ruling party. The results confirm earlier studies that the Falklands War generated a rally effect, but they provide a more sophisticated understanding of the Gulf War rally. New results also include the findings that participation in international crises which stopped short of war did not engender rallies, and that there were no rallies for the Korean, Suez, or Kosovo Wars. The findings indicate that when they do occur rallies are heterogeneous in nature, that rallies are most likely when there is intense and direct threat to the national interest, that the relationship between multilateralism and rallies in the British case is tenuous, and that rallies for the ruling party are sometimes expressed through satisfaction with the prime minister.
TL;DR: In this paper, a set of theoretical arguments and hypotheses regarding the establishment of peacekeeping missions by third-party actors (the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad hoc groups of states) during the post-World War II period were derived.
Abstract: Since the end of World War II, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, there has been an expansion in the number of third-party peacekeeping missions established throughout the world. Most of the expansion in peacekeeping missions in the past decade or so has occurred in states experiencing intrastate or civil conflicts. The questions addressed in this study are under what conditions do third-party actors either decide to establish or decide not to establish peacekeeping missions in intrastate disputes, and specifically, what effect do international-level factors have on the likelihood that third-party peacekeeping personnel will be deployed in an intrastate dispute? The previous literature on third-party peacekeeping and interventions is used to derive a set of theoretical arguments and hypotheses regarding the establishment of peacekeeping missions by third-party actors (the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad hoc groups of states) during the post-World War II period. Specifically, I argue that several factors originating at the level of the international system influence the occurrence of third-party peacekeeping missions. The results of statistical analyses of the hypotheses largely support the notion that a set of international-level factors significantly influences the decisions of third-party actors to establish or not establish third-party peacekeeping missions, that international-level factors are more important than state-level factors, that these factors often have different effects on the likelihood of different types of third-party peacekeeping.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore among both enduring rivalries and civil wars whether the presence of a peacekeeping force enhances the prospects for gaining an agreement between protagonists, and they find that support for the pessimistic view of peacekeeping as it discourages diplomatic efforts and decreases the likelihood of achieving a settlement, although the results are clearer for interstate conflict than for civil wars.
Abstract: Peacekeeping has become an increasingly prominent tool for conflict management and there has been an accompanying explosion of scholarly studies on peacekeeping. Yet, such analyses typically ignore the process of getting a peace agreement itself, missing the potential impact that a peacekeeping force might have in facilitating a peace agreement between protagonists. In this paper, we explore among both enduring rivalries and civil wars whether the presence of a peacekeeping force enhances the prospects for gaining an agreement between protagonists. The academic literature suggests opposing logics: one suggesting the desirability of peacekeeping forces while the other implies that they may be counterproductive. We consider whether the presence of peacekeeping enhances or inhibits mediation and negotiation attempts. We also explore whether the success rates for international mediation and negotiation efforts in those conflicts are affected by the presence of peacekeeping forces. Our results suggest support for the pessimistic view of peacekeeping as it discourages diplomatic efforts and decreases the likelihood of achieving a settlement, although the results are clearer for interstate conflict than for civil wars.
TL;DR: This article used census practices and documentation to incorporate an illegal immigrant population from the Philippines to Sabah, Malaysia and found that illegal immigrants play an electoral role in Sabah because of the loosely institutionalized nature of citizenship, a feature common to many other developing countries.
Abstract: Why would a state encourage illegal immigration over the opposition of its citizens? According to the theories of immigration and citizenship, we should expect exactly the opposite: that states will monitor, control, and restrict illegal immigrants' access to citizenship on behalf of its citizens, as has been the experience of most countries. I use my research on Filipino immigration to Sabah, Malaysia to show how Malaysia utilizes census practices and documentation to incorporate an illegal immigrant population from the Philippines. Illegal immigrants play an electoral role in Sabah because of the loosely institutionalized nature of citizenship, a feature common to many other developing countries. Our examination of Malaysia reveals several elements of illegal immigration and citizenship that are common to migratory flows in other developing countries. I conclude by showing how this case is generalizable and what it tells us about illegal immigrant participation in the international system.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the case of software piracy and assess the mechanisms by which the new global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are transmitted from the international to the national levels.
Abstract: The end of the twentieth century was marked by a sea change in global governance in the realm of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Whereas countries historically retained substantial autonomy with regard to what they defined as intellectual “property” and the rights granted to the owners of intellectual property, the 1990s witnessed the establishment of new global obligations regarding national practices. This paper focuses on the case of software “piracy” to assess the mechanisms by which the new global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are transmitted from the international to the national levels. We first consider a set of national-level factors that many scholars have shown to be important determinants of IPR policy. We then supplement the standard emphasis on domestic factors with an analysis of new transnational factors: countries' multilateral obligations under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and bilateral pressures from the United States to increase the protection of IPRs. Population-averaged panel data models are used to assess the effects of these national and transnational determinants on levels of software piracy in 80 countries from 1994 to 2002. Our results indicate that membership in the WTO and bilateral pressures from the United States—particularly pressures that offer reciprocal concessions—lead to substantial increases in levels of protection in rich and poor countries. There is, in short, a new international political economy of intellectual property.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on two limitations in the literature on diversionary force: the common assumption that major powers are the only actors capable of diversion and the narrow conceptualization of regime type prevalent in literature, and distinguish mature democracies and autocracies from consolidating variants of these regimes.
Abstract: This article concentrates on two limitations in the literature on diversionary force. First is the common assumption that major powers are the only actors capable of diversion. Second is the narrow conceptualization of regime type prevalent in the literature. Instead of dichotomizing regimes, we distinguish mature democracies and autocracies from consolidating variants of these regimes. We draw hypotheses from the institutional approach and test them with time series cross-section negative binomial first-order autoregressive process estimates of 140 countries from 1950 to 1996. We find that not all democracies and not all autocracies divert. Mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities are the only regime types prone to this type of force. Our results suggest that the diversionary literature would benefit from more discriminating operationalizations of regime type and by looking beyond major powers to the actions of less powerful states.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the empirical linkage between U.S. foreign policy goals and arms export agreements with developing countries for the years 1981-2002 and find that during the Cold War years, human rights were not a significant determinant of arms transfers.
Abstract: During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the strategic goal to contain Communism. Human rights and democracy were of secondary importance. In the post-Cold War period, the promotion of human rights and democracy as foreign policy concerns rose in prominence. In the spirit of Andrew Pierre, who once characterized arms transfers as “foreign policy writ large ,” this study questions whether the transfer of U.S. arms mirrors America's foreign policy goals. To what extent do U.S. arms transfers reflect a concern for human rights and democracy? As a foreign policy instrument, do U.S. arms transfer patterns mark a transition between Cold War and post-Cold War worlds? To address these questions, I examine the empirical linkage between U.S. foreign policy goals and arms export agreements with developing countries for the years 1981–2002. I use a two-stage model to evaluate the decision-making process. The first-stage addresses whether a country is eligible to receive U.S. arms. If a country successfully passes through the selection stage, it progresses to the second stage where a decision is made about the amount of arms transferred. I use a Heckman model to estimate empirically the determinants of arms at both the initial selection stage and the subsequent amount stage. The findings indicate that during the Cold War years, human rights were not a significant determinant of arms transfers—although democracy was positively linked to U.S. arms in the selection stage. In the post-Cold War period, both human rights and democracy had a meaningful impact in determining the eligibility of a country to receive arms.
TL;DR: In this paper, a new theoretical synthesis suggests that the missing link between democratic constraints and pacific monadic behavior is leaders' perceptions of, and responses to, these constraints, and an analysis of 154 foreign policy crises provides strong support for this contingent monadic thesis: democracies led by constraint respecters stand out as extraordinarily pacific in their crisis responses.
Abstract: While a substantial body of theory suggests that democracies should behave peacefully toward all states (monadically), most empirical evidence indicates they are only pacific in their relations with fellow democracies (dyadically). A new theoretical synthesis suggests that the missing link between democratic constraints and pacific monadic behavior is leaders' perceptions of, and responses to, these constraints. Research on political leadership indicates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, leaders respond in systematically different ways to domestic constraints: “constraint respecters” internalize constraints in their environments, while “constraint challengers” view such constraints as obstacles to be surmounted. An analysis of 154 foreign policy crises provides strong support for this contingent monadic thesis: democracies led by constraint respecters stand out as extraordinarily pacific in their crisis responses, while democracies led by constraint challengers and autocracies led by both types of leaders are demonstrably more aggressive.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors test realist, liberal, and constructivist hypotheses against the paradigmatic case of regional peacemaking, Western Europe after World War II, and conclude that none of the three theories perfectly explains the process of FrancoGerman reconciliation after 75 years of bitter conflict.
Abstract: How do war-prone regions stabilize? This article tests realist, liberal, and constructivist hypotheses against the paradigmatic case of regional peacemaking, Western Europe after World War II. It concludes that none of the three theories perfectly explains the process of FrancoGerman reconciliation after 75 years of bitter conflict. Instead, the transition to stability occurred in two stages. The first stage, the transition, was driven by realist factors, principally the existence of a common Soviet threat and active American hegemonic participation. In the second stage, however, stability and cooperation were entrenched by liberal mechanisms, notably the institution of democratic political regimes and cooperative international institutions. I thus inductively arrive at the novel theoretical position that realist mechanisms may initially be required to compel regional rivals to put aside their differences, at least temporarily, and cooperate on the grounds of realpolitik, but liberal mechanisms are ultimately useful to sustain and deepen regional peace. How do war-prone regions stabilize? What can cause a group of states steeped in mistrust and violent conflict to put aside their grievances and build a constructive, stable future? Under what conditions can former enemies transform their relations from security competition to security cooperation? Is trust a prerequisite for regional cooperation and, if so, what type of trust? These are questions of fundamental theoretical importance. Presently, they are also of great practical importance as the international community seeks to forge lasting peace and stability
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the utility of moving beyond a simple "on-off" dichotomous view of contiguous land borders and found that the nature of contiguous borders matters and that the relationship between each of the three border measures and the likelihood of conflict is curvilinear concave.
Abstract: This study examines the utility of moving beyond a simple “on–off” dichotomous view of contiguous land borders. For each of the 301 contiguous land borders between states in the international system, measures of ease of interaction, salience, and overall border “vitalness” have been developed using Geographical Information Systems technology. These variables are used to test two major extant lines of thought in international relations literature, as well as our proposed alternative, regarding the expected effect of the “nature” of borders on interstate behavior. We conclude not only that the “nature” of contiguous borders matters but also that the relationship between each of the three border measures and the likelihood of conflict is curvilinear concave—with both high ease of interaction and high salience related to lower levels of conflict, and the middle range of both variables related to higher levels of conflict.
TL;DR: The authors explored the role that Le Monde coverage plays in the allocation of French development aid and found that higher levels of news coverage of a less developed country will lead to higher aid commitments, while the most important predictor of foreign aid is the official adoption of the French language by the aid recipient.
Abstract: This study explores the role that Le Monde coverage plays in the allocation of French development aid. It is expected that foreign policy officials will try to match the magnitude of their actions with what they expect is the public's perception of the importance of the aid recipient. News media salience serves as an easily accessible indicator of that domestic political importance and, in the case of foreign aid, this suggests that higher levels of news coverage of a less developed country will lead to higher aid commitments. Statistical analyses of French aid commitments during the period 1986–1998 demonstrate that while the most important predictor of foreign aid is the official adoption of the French language by the aid recipient, the levels of Le Monde coverage are consistently and significantly correlated with levels of French foreign aid.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that a unipolar system implies considerable potential for U.S. hegemonic intervention at the regional level but in East Asia, they find an equilibrium constructed out of both material and normative forces, defined as a concert, which presents a considerable restraint on all powers, including the United States.
Abstract: This paper presents two sets of arguments: one theoretical and one analytical. The theoretical arguments concern the relationship between regional ordering and systemic change. The paper questions the usefulness of the unipolar conception of the contemporary system arguing that the interaction of the Great Powers cannot be understood without reference to regional dynamics. Thus, a unipolar system implies considerable potential for U.S. hegemonic intervention at the regional level but in East Asia, we find an equilibrium constructed out of both material and normative forces, defined as a concert, which presents a considerable restraint on all powers, including the U.S. The paper then proceeds to examine these claims through an analysis of the foreign policies of the U.S., Russia, and China over the North Korean nuclear problem that emerged after 2002. It finds that China and Russia have substantive common interests arising from internal and external re-ordering in which they look to strategic partnerships, regional multilateralism, and systemic multipolarization as inter-locking processes. The paper finds that they have collaborated over the Korean crisis to prevent a U.S. unilateral solution but that this should not be construed as a success for an open counterhegemonic strategy as it was only under the constraining conditions of East Asian concert, including the dynamics within the U.S. alliance systems, that this collaboration was successful. Nevertheless, the paper concludes that regional multipolarity and systemic unipolarity are contradictory: a system that exhibits multipolarization at the regional level cannot be characterized as unipolar at the global level.
TL;DR: The authors argue that traditional liberal theory has attempted to downplay the contingency and resultant ambiguity of many of its moral precepts, and draw on the philosophical pragmatism of Richard Rorty to outline an approach to migration that remains open to the contingent construction of terms like "migrant", "refugee", and "asylum-seeker".
Abstract: The article engages a critical analysis of liberal theory in the context of transnational migration. Normative arguments provided by liberal-cosmopolitan and liberal-communitarian authors are contrasted. While sympathetic to such approaches, we argue that traditional liberal theory has attempted to downplay the contingency and resultant ambiguity of many of its moral precepts. Historically contingent borders underpin neat universal categories like “citizen” and “refugee,” which fail to reflect the diverse and contested experiences of migration. But such ambiguities need not undermine liberal approaches. Indeed, a proper engagement with the problematic and uncertain realities of migration can provide a spur to a more thoroughgoing ethical praxis. We draw on the philosophical pragmatism of Richard Rorty to outline an approach to migration that remains open to the contingent construction of terms like “migrant,”“refugee,” and “asylum-seeker.” By extending Rorty's concept of sentimental education, we provide an imaginative and politically challenging set of agendas for the ethics of migration.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a more complete explanation for war in general and the Crusades to the Holy Land in particular than the one given by realist and rationalist theories, and they make their theoretical contribution in the context of a recent debate among several IR scholars, such as John Ruggie, Marcus Fischer, Rodney Bruce Hall, and Friedrich Kratochwil.
Abstract: This paper aims to present a different, and thus a more complete, explanation for “wars” in general and the Crusades to the Holy Land in particular than the one given by realist and rationalist theories. It makes its theoretical contribution in the context of a recent debate among several IR scholars, such as John Ruggie, Marcus Fischer, Rodney Bruce Hall, and Friedrich Kratochwil, forwarding the constitutive nature of the explanation of war. Furthermore, it wishes to incorporate into IR research a more sensitive historical research on the Middle Ages and the Crusades, based on French historiography and the Annalists, highlighting the “ mentalite ” as a cognitive structure that constituted particular interests, patterns of politics, and ultimately the wars of the Crusades. To show the evolution of social institutions, such as norms of Just War, Christian chivalry, and the idea of the Last Emperor into social praxis, this paper also focuses on the crusading life itself through the Hohenstaufen Emperors, Henry VI and Frederick II.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the likelihood that alliances will form along ideological lines increases with the fear among at least two governments of ideology I that they are threatened by transnational rival ideology J.
Abstract: Recent research suggests a conditional relationship between states' domestic regimes or ideologies and their alliances. I argue that the likelihood that alliances will form along ideological lines increases with the fear among at least two governments of ideology I that they are threatened by transnational rival ideology J . Understanding the power of demonstration effects—that when J advances in one country it gains credibility in others— I -governments will have an incentive to enter an international agreement to oppose J domestically. Such domestic-security agreements will exacerbate the security dilemma, raising fears among J -governments that I -governments are forming a bloc directed at J and J -governments. J -governments will tend to respond by increasing cooperation among themselves, inducing corresponding fears among I -governments; the coalescing I - and J -blocs will tend to spiral into alliances. I - or J -governments wishing to avoid ideologically based alliances may signal an absence of rollback intentions through various means. I demonstrate this process of alliance formation with a lengthy case study of alliance formation in the Holy Roman Empire in the sixteenth century.
TL;DR: This article examined the philosophy of Machiavelli and developed a measure of his "imperial regimes" and found that these states, which can either be democratic or autocratic, should exhibit an increased propensity to initiate international conflict.
Abstract: Research examining the effect of regime type on conflict has focused on the democracy/autocracy continuum expounded in the political philosophies of liberal thinkers such as Kant and Schumpeter. While this concentration has yielded impressive results (democratic peace), it seems plausible that other conceptions of regime type may yield similar success. This paper examines the philosophy of Machiavelli and develops a measure of his “imperial regimes.” These states, which can either be democratic or autocratic, should exhibit an increased propensity to initiate international conflict. Testing this contention in Renaissance Italy (1250–1494) and the modern international system (1920–1992), this paper finds strong empirical support. Machiavelli's views illuminate key differences between democracies and autocracies that have been previously overlooked. Thus, it deepens rather than replaces our conception of how domestic institutions affect international conflict.
TL;DR: The article has been retracted due to plagiarism in this article due to the plagiarism of the article's author's work.Forward Links to Citing Articles:Retraction. International Studies Quarterly 50:1, p.
Abstract: Forward Links to Citing Articles:Retraction. International Studies Quarterly 50:1, p.1
This article has been retracted due to plagiarism
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that an unbundling of the war outcome, and the resulting possible recurrence of a challenge to the status quo, changes the very nature of deterrent threats and can lead to the failure of immediate deterrence.
Abstract: Most theoretical and formal arguments about rational deterrence assume that war is a game-ending move. In the asymmetric case, the logic of deterrent threats then rests on the relative merits of war and submission. Perfectly informed rivals ensure that immediate deterrence always succeeds although general deterrence may not. Does this strong result survive the repetition of the standard one-shot deterrence game? We show that an unbundling of the war outcome, and the resulting possible recurrence of a challenge to the status quo, changes the very nature of deterrent threats and can lead to the failure of immediate deterrence. If the status quo can be challenged repeatedly, it is rational, in case of challenge, for the rivals to threaten probabilistic escalation of the crisis to war with the following consequences: the challenger will challenge the status quo now and then; the defender finds it rational to resist at least for a while; the resulting recurrence of challenge, resistance, and escalation can lead the rivals to threaten, with some likelihood, wars that are long enough to be catastrophic for all parties. Most theoretical and formal arguments about rational deterrence assume that war is a game-ending move. The logic of deterrent threats then rests on the relative merits of war and submission, and perfectly informed rivals will never fight, although the defender may fail to deter a challenger from upsetting the status quo if she cannot credibly threaten war. 1 Perfectly informed rivals therefore ensure that immediate deterrence always succeeds although general deterrence may not. Does this strong result survive the repetition of the standard one-shot deterrence game? In this paper, we show that an unbundling of the war outcome, and the resulting possible recurrence of a challenge to the status quo, changes the very nature of deterrent threats and can lead to the failure of immediate deterrence. If the status