Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 2006"

A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence

Abstract: It has frequently been suggested that exceptionally large youth cohorts, the so-called “youth bulges,” make countries more susceptible to political violence. Within two prominent theoretical frameworks in the study of civil war, youth bulges are argued to potentially increase both opportunities and motives for political violence. This claim is empirically tested in a time-series cross-national statistical model for internal armed conflict for the period 1950–2000, and for event data for terrorism and rioting for the years 1984–1995. The expectation that youth bulges should increase the risk of political violence receives robust support for all three forms of violence. The results are consistent both with an expectation that youth bulges provide greater opportunities for violence through the abundant supply of youths with low opportunity costs, and with an expectation that stronger motives for violence may arise as youth bulges are more likely to experience institutional crowding, in particular unemployment. Some contextual factors have been suggested to potentially enhance the effect of youth bulges. In an empirical test of these propositions, the study suggests that youth bulges are particularly associated with an increasing risk of internal armed conflict in starkly autocratic regimes, but a similar effect is also found for highly democratic countries. The interaction of youth bulges with economic decline and expansion in higher education appear to increase the risk of terrorism but not of rioting. Recent studies in economic demography find that when fertility is sharply decreasing, causing lower dependency ratios, large youth cohorts entering the labor market may lead to economic boosts. This study finds some empirical evidence complementing these results, indicating that the effect of youth bulges on political violence may decline along with reduced dependency ratios.

Space Is More than Geography: Using Spatial Econometrics in the Study of Political Economy

Abstract: Although spatial econometrics is being used more frequently in political science, most applications are still based on geographic notions of distance. Here we argue that it is often more fruitful to consider political economy notions of distance, such as relative trade or common dyad membership. We also argue that the spatially autoregressive model usually (but not always) should be preferred to the spatially lagged error model. Finally, we consider the role of spatial econometrics in analyzing time-series–cross-section data, and show that a plausible (and testable) assumption allows for the simple introduction of space (however defined) into such analyses. We present examples of spatial analyses involving trade and democracy.

Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power

Abstract: Studies of global governance typically claim that the state has lost power to nonstate actors and that political authority is increasingly institutionalized in spheres not controlled by states. In this article, we challenge the core claims in the literature on global governance. Rather than focusing on the relative power of states and nonstate actors, we focus on the sociopolitical functions and processes of governance in their own right and seek to identify their rationality as practices of political rule. For this task, we use elements of the conception of power developed by Michel Foucault in his studies of “governmentality.” In this perspective, the role of nonstate actors in shaping and carrying out global governance-functions is not an instance of transfer of power from the state to nonstate actors but rather an expression of a changing logic or rationality of government (defined as a type of power) by which civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon into an entity that is both an object and a subject of government. The argument is illustrated by two case studies: the international campaign to ban landmines, and international population policy. The cases show that the self-association and political will-formation characteristic of civil society and nonstate actors do not stand in opposition to the political power of the state, but is a most central feature of how power, understood as government, operates in late modern society.

Democracy and Environmental Degradation

Abstract: In a relatively small but growing body of literature in political science and environmental studies, scholars debate the effect of democracy on environmental degradation. Some theorists claim that democracy reduces environmental degradation. Others argue that democracy may not reduce environmental degradation or may even harm the environment. Empirical evidence thus far has been limited and conflicting. This article seeks to address the democracy–environment debate. We focus on the effect of political regime type on human activities that directly damage the environment. Our discussion of the theoretical literature identifies different causal mechanisms through which democracy could affect environmental degradation. The empirical analysis focuses on the net effect of these competing mechanisms. We examine statistically the effect of democracy on five aspects of human-induced environmental degradation—carbon dioxide emissions, nitrogen dioxide emissions, deforestation, land degradation, and organic pollution in water. We find that democracy reduces all five types of environmental degradation. While the substantive effect of democracy is considerable, it varies in size across different types of environmental degradation. We also find nonmonotonic effects of democracy that vary across the environmental indicators.

A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs

Abstract: This article provides a “top-down” explanation for the rapid growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the postwar period, focusing on two aspects of political globalization. First, I argue that international political opportunities in the form of funding and political access have expanded enormously in the postwar period and provided a structural environment highly conducive to NGO growth. Secondly, I present a norm-based argument and trace the rise of a pro-NGO norm in the 1980s and 1990s among donor states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), which has actively promoted the spread of NGOs to non-Western countries. The article ends with a brief discussion of the symbiotic relationship among NGOs, IGOs, and states promoting international cooperation.

Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/AIDS and Security

Abstract: Should the global AIDS pandemic be framed as an international security issue? Drawing on securitization theory, this article argues that there is a complex normative dilemma at the heart of recent attempts to formulate the global response to HIV/AIDS in the language of international security. Although “securitizing” the AIDS pandemic could bolster international AIDS initiatives by raising awareness and resources, the language of security simultaneously pushes responses to the disease away from civil society toward military and intelligence organizations with the power to override the civil liberties of persons living with HIV/AIDS. The security framework, moreover, brings into play a “threat-defense” logic that could undermine international efforts to address the pandemic because it makes such efforts a function of narrow national interest rather than of altruism, because it allows states to prioritize AIDS funding for their elites and armed forces who play a crucial role in maintaining security, and because portraying the illness as an overwhelming “threat” works against ongoing efforts to normalize social perceptions regarding HIV/AIDS. These overlooked dangers give rise to a profound ethical dilemma as to whether or not the global AIDS pandemic should be portrayed as a security issue. The article concludes that securitization theory cannot resolve this complex dilemma, but that raising awareness of its presence does allow policy makers, activists, and scholars to begin drawing the links between HIV/AIDS and security in ways that at least minimize some of these dangers.

ABC's, 123's, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980–1999

Abstract: This study examines two ways by which education might affect the probability of civil war onset. First, educational investment provides a strong signal to the people that the government is attempting to improve their lives, which is apt to lower grievances, even in desperate times. Second, education can generate economic, political, and social stability by giving people tools with which they can resolve disputes peacefully, making them less likely to incur the risks involved in joining a rebellion. This theory is tested by examining the effect of educational expenditures, enrollment levels, and literacy rates on the probability of civil war onset from 1980 through 1999. The results provide evidence for both the grievance and stability arguments, providing strong support for the pacifying effects of education on civil war.

Economic Policy, Institutions, and Capital Flows: Portfolio and Direct Investment Flows in Developing Countries

Abstract: Scholars examining the cross-national mobility of capital have followed two distinct paths. Economists tend to focus on the determinants and economic effects of cross-country capital movements while political scientists largely concentrate on the political impact of capital mobility. This study fills an important gap in the literature by examining the effects of economic policy outcomes on capital inflows to developing countries, explicitly comparing the reactions of portfolio and direct investors. I find that portfolio investors are in fact sensitive to past government behavior and fiscal policy outcomes; portfolio investors reallocate funds as new information about government policy becomes available. Direct investors, on the other hand, are not sensitive to macrolevel economic policy outcomes but are concerned with political institutions. Countries with more stable and democratic political institutions attract more FDI. These findings have implications for developing country governments as they consider the sequence of market liberalizing reforms.

The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR

Abstract: Although the United Nations Commission on Human Rights served as the primary forum in which governments publicly named and shamed others for abusing their citizens, the practices of the commission have been largely ignored by political scientists. To address that deficiency, this study analyzes the actions of the commission and its members' voting records in the 1977–2001 period. It establishes that targeting and punishment by the commission decreasingly fit the predictions of a realist perspective, in which naming and shaming is an inherently political exercise, and increasingly fit the predictions of a liberal “reputation” perspective, in which governments hold others to their promises, and a constructivist “social conformity” perspective, in which governments distribute and respond to social rewards and punishments. With the end of the Cold War, the commission's targeting and punishment of countries was based less on partisan ties, power politics, and the privileges of membership, and more on those countries' actual human rights violations, treaty commitments, and active participation in cooperative endeavors such as peacekeeping operations.

Distribution of Transnational Terrorism Among Countries by Income Class and Geography After 9/11

Abstract: This article applies an autoregressive intervention model for the 1968–2003 period to identify either income based or geographical transference of transnational terrorist events in reaction to the rise of fundamentalist terrorism, the end to the Cold War, and 9/11. Our time-series study investigates the changing pattern of transnational terrorism for all incidents and only those involving U.S. people and property. Contrary to expectation, there is no evidence of an income-based post-9/11 transfer of attacks to low-income countries except for attacks with U.S. casualties, but there is a significant transference to the Middle East and Asia where U.S. interests are, at times, attacked. We also find that the rise of fundamentalist terrorism has most impacted those regions—the Middle East and Asia—with the largest Islamic population. The end to the Cold War brought a “terrorism peace dividend” that varies by income and geography among countries. Based on the empirical findings, we draw policy recommendations regarding defensive counterterrorism measures.

The human rights effects of world bank structural adjustment, 1981-2000

Abstract: Does the implementation of a World Bank structural adjustment agreement (SAA) increase or decrease government respect for human rights? Neoliberal theory suggests that SAAs improve economic performance, generating better human rights practices. Critics contend that the implementation of structural adjustment conditions causes hardships and higher levels of domestic conflict, increasing the likelihood that regimes will use repression. Bivariate probit models are used to account for World Bank loan selection criteria when estimating the human rights consequences of structural adjustment. Using a global, comparative analysis for the 1981‐2000 period, we examine the effects of structural adjustment on government respect for citizens’ rights to freedom from torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing, and disappearances. The findings show that World Bank SAAs worsen government respect for physical integrity rights. World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment conditions require loan recipient governments to rapidly liberalize their economies. According to previous research, these economic changes often cause at least shortterm hardships for the poorest people in less developed countries. The Bank and IMF justify the loan conditions as necessary stimuli for economic development. However, research has shown that implementation of structural adjustment conditions actually has a negative effect on economic growth (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003). While there has been less research on the human rights effects of structural adjustment conditions, most studies agree that the imposition of structural adjustment agreements (SAAs) on less developed countries worsens government human rights practices (Pion-Berlin 1984; McLaren 1988; Franklin 1997; Camp Keith and Poe 2000). This study focuses on the effects of structural adjustment conditions on the extent to which governments protect their citizens from extra-judicial killing, torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment.

Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness

Abstract: Some theories of foreign economic policy stress the importance of domestic interest groups, whereas others focus on the effects of domestic institutions. Debates between advocates of these approaches are longstanding, but little systematic empirical research has been brought to bear on the relative merits of these theories. We argue that while interest group demands and institutions are often regarded as having independent and competing effects, it is more fruitful to view the influence of each type of factor as conditional on the other. As explanations emphasizing societal interests contend, deteriorating macroeconomic conditions are a potent source of protectionist sentiment. The extent to which such conditions reduce commercial openness, however, depends centrally on a country's political institutions, especially the number of veto points in a country's policy-making structure and its regime type. We expect the effects of macroeconomic conditions on trade policy to become weaker as the number of veto points increases. We also expect both veto points and the societal pressures stemming from the economy to have a more potent impact on trade policy in democracies than in other regimes. The results of our statistical tests covering almost 60 countries during the period from 1980 to 2000 strongly support these arguments.

Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs

Abstract: Domestic audience costs can help leaders establish credible commitments by tying their hands. Most studies assume these costs without explaining how they arise. I link domestic audience costs to the citizens' ability to sanction the leadership for pursuing a policy they would not want if they had the same information about its quality. How can citizens learn about policy quality? I model two information transmission mechanisms: one potentially contaminated by politically motivated strategic behavior (leader and opposition), and another that is noisy and possibly biased (media). In equilibrium, audience costs can arise from strategic sources only in mixed regimes under relatively restrictive conditions, and cannot arise in autocracies or democracies. However, in democratic polities the media can play a mitigating role and does enable leaders to generate audience costs. Still, their ability to do so depends on the institutional protections guaranteeing freedom of the media from political manipulation. Domestic audience costs are not necessarily linear in regime type, as often assumed in applied research.

Forging Democracy at Gunpoint

Abstract: Can liberal interventionism build liberal democracy? This manuscript examines the military interventions undertaken by the U.S., U.K., France, and the UN in the post-World War II era to see if they had a positive impact on democracy in target countries. Empirical analysis centers on multivariate time series, cross section PCSE and relogit regressions of political liberalization and democratization from 1946 to 1996. The former is operationalized with annual difference data drawn from the Polity IV data collection, whereas the latter is a binary variable denoting countries that cross a threshold commonly used to indicate the establishment of democratic institutions. An updated version of the International Military Intervention data set enumerates foreign military interventions. We find little evidence that military intervention by liberal states helps to foster democracy in target countries. Although a few states have democratized in the wake of hostile U.S. military interventions, the small number of cases involved makes it difficult to draw generalizable conclusions from the U.S. record. We find stronger evidence, however, that supportive interventions by the UN's “Blue Helmets” can help to democratize target states.

Why political power-sharing agreements lead to enduring peaceful resolution of some civil wars, but not others?

Abstract: This paper develops a bargaining model that explains why political power-sharing agreements lead to peaceful resolution of civil wars between governments and insurgents in some cases, but not others. The model predicts that if the civil war ends in a military stalemate, the government uses its offer of a political power-sharing agreement to the insurgents as a tool to misrepresent private information about its military capacity and defeat the insurgency. This exacerbates commitment problems, increases the degree of support that insurgent leaders receive from their civilian supporters and consequently increases the likelihood of recurrence of civil war. Conversely, the model shows that when the war ends in a decisive military victory for the government or the insurgents, the offer of a political power-sharing agreement reduces the degree of support that insurgent leaders get from their civilian supporters and increases the costs of fighting for the insurgents. Hence, after a decisive military victory insurgents have incentives to accept the political power-sharing agreement and not revert to fighting. Results from Cox Proportional Hazard models estimated on a data set of 111 civil wars (1944–1999) provide robust statistical support for the model's predictions.

Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War

Abstract: I use a game theoretic model of diversionary war incentives to help explain the lack of a consistent empirical relationship between domestic conditions and the use of force abroad. I argue that when diversionary behavior is about demonstrating competence rather than creating a short-term “rally round the flag” effect, a leader has incentives to use force against a challenging target, and this may dissuade many would-be diversionary uses of force. I then combine the diversionary model with the bargaining approach to war and show that when war is costly and bargaining is allowed, the diversionary leader can be peacefully appeased short of war as long as the benefit of holding office is not too large compared with the cost of war and other factors. However, when the office holding benefit is sufficiently large, the diversionary incentive emerges as a new domestic politics based “rationalist explanation for war.”

Health and Human Security: The Public Health Impact of Violent Conflict

Abstract: The consequences of violent conflict permeate countless aspects of society, and are not limited to the political and economic institutions of a state. The concept of human security extends traditional, state-centric notions of security to include the security and well-being of people that live within states. Adhering to the human security framework, I examine the effect of militarized conflict on the populations of states by evaluating the relationship between war and public health while taking into account relevant political and economic factors, including democracy and wealth. I argue that interstate and intrastate conflict negatively influences the health achievement of states and, therefore, the human security of their populations. I assess this relationship by analyzing data on summary measures of public health in all states between 1999 and 2001. My analysis suggests that the negative effect of war on health is particularly intense in the short term following the onset of a conflict.

The Declining Risk of Death in Battle

Abstract: A recent article using the new Correlates of War (COW) data on the distribution of interstate, intrastate, and extrastate wars from 1816 to 1997 claims there was a relatively constant risk of death in battle during that time. We show that the authors' information is skewed by irregularities in the COW deaths data, and contest their pessimistic interpretation. Using revised information on battle deaths from 1900 to 2002 we demonstrate that the risk of death in battle by no means followed a flat line, but rather declined significantly after World War II and again after the end of the Cold War. Future users should note that the deaths data collected for the three conflict types by COW are not comparable, and using them as such tends to underestimate the share of fatalities due to major interstate conflicts.

Global Regime Formation or Complex Institution Building? The Principled Content of International River Agreements

Abstract: This paper analyzes the principled content of 62 international river agreements for the period 1980–2000. We ask two questions: whether governments are converging on common principles for governing shared river basins and whether the effort to create a global normative framework for shared rivers has shaped the principled content of basin-level international accords. The data reveal a complex process of normative development. A few core principles emanating from global legal efforts have shown significant growth, diffusion and deepening at the basin-specific level. Others are common in basin agreements but show no diffusion or deepening. Still others are weakly represented in the data. If joint articulation of common principles is necessary for regime formation, then there is only weak evidence for a global rivers regime. But the data also reveal normative developments not captured by a regime-theoretic lens: a backlash reinforcing sovereign rights, the emergence of two seemingly conflicting clusters of principles, and an ambiguous relationship between some principles typically thought to be mutually reinforcing. The results show the need to treat principled content as an important dependent variable in the study of cooperation and to view institution building as a dynamic, multi-dimensional and multi-level process.

Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements

Abstract: We argue that a factor widely seen as facilitating cooperation in an international dispute, mediation, is also a sign that a resulting agreement is likely to be short-lived. Mediators get the tough cases, disputes that are most likely to result in short-lived settlements—a selection effect. At the same time, mediation helps to resolve a conflict's underlying issues, making mediated settlements more likely to last—a process effect. We develop a theory that captures these opposing forces—focusing on the conditional effect of mediation on nonstate actors—and taking into account critical aspects of the disputants, conflict, conflict management processes and settlement. Using hazard analysis, Heckman two-stage probit and logistic regression, we statistically analyze over 1,400 settlements drawn from the just released International Conflict Management 2000 data set and also conduct a quantitative case study of mediation tools used in the former Yugoslavia. All analyses find strong support for the opposing effects of mediation; mediated agreements are more likely to be short-lived, unless they involve nonstate actors. This study advances our understanding of selection effects and the factors that lead to short-lived settlements, and provides policy makers and potential mediators a way to establish realistic expectations about the durability of dispute settlements.

Information Technology Adoption and Political Regimes

Abstract: What explains the different rates of internet use across nations, otherwise known as the worldwide digital divide? Essentially, this is a question about the determinants of technology adoption, a debate that has been dominated by two schools of thought—one focuses on the characteristics of the technology itself, the other, on the characteristics of the adopting body, that is, the social and institutional context in which adopters operate. This paper attempts to integrate these two theories by focusing on the features of both information technologies and adopting entities. We confirm the well-documented findings that income, trade, infrastructure, market-oriented policies, and political liberties explain one measure of the digital divide. However, we also find a more complex relationship between political liberties and internet adoption. Differences in political liberties do not lead to uniform differences in internet use, as the literature often assumes. Specifically, not all authoritarian regimes discourage internet use similarly. High-income, market-oriented autocratic states are less draconian. Although they fear the political consequences of internet expansion, they also welcome its economic payoffs. We provide quantitative and qualitative evidence that the more authoritarian the country, the stronger the impact of income on internet expansion. This may be beneficial for economic development, but contrary to modernization theories, it may not necessarily bolster forces of democratization in these regimes.

State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups

Abstract: Several policymakers argue against negotiating with transnational terrorists because of the inability of terrorist groups to form credible commitments. To succeed in negotiation, terrorists must convince target governments that they are credible bargaining partners. This paper explores how constraints from host states affect the ability of terrorists to form credible commitments. If facing sufficient threats, host states may have an incentive to broker peaceful agreements. Hosts that have the ability to monitor and impose moderate costs on terrorist groups can increase the likelihood of negotiated settlements. The paper concludes with an empirical test of the model's hypotheses using data on transnational terrorism in the pre-9/11 period from 1968 to 1991.

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making

Abstract: Do presidents incorporate the preferences of the public into their foreign policy decisions? Previous scholarship has begun to sketch out the sources of variation in the policy–public opinion linkage, but we still lack a clear understanding of the factors that increase or decrease presidential responsiveness. To better explore the relationship, we conceptualize presidential foreign policy making as a five-stage process—problem representation, option generation, policy selection, implementation, and policy review—arguing that the degree to which presidents are responsive to public opinion varies with fluctuations in public attentiveness. At stages in which public interest is high, presidents are more likely to incorporate mass preferences into their decision making than during stages of public quiescence. The key finding in our analysis of 34 foreign policy cases is that the public's “issue-attention cycle” varies systematically across foreign policy crises and noncrises. Examining these cycles of attention allows us to make predictions about the conditions under which public opinion is most likely to influence decision making.

Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921-2001

Abstract: A democratic leader, anticipating a “rally ‘round the flag effect,” may have an incentive to divert attention from domestic economic problems by becoming involved in military conflict abroad, undermining Immanuel Kant's prescription for “perpetual peace.” We assess the risk to the democratic peace by evaluating this diversionary incentive within a general dyadic model of interstate conflict, 1921–2001, using both directed and nondirected analyses. Our results indicate that economic conditions do affect the likelihood that a democracy, but not an autocracy, will initiate a fatal militarized dispute, even against another democracy. Economic growth rates sufficiently low to negate the democratic peace are, however, rare; and the behavior of five powerful democracies raises further doubts about the importance of diversions. We find no significant evidence that a bad economy makes a democratic state less likely to be targeted by others, nor does the timing of legislative elections influence the decision of democratic leaders to use force. Although economic conditions affect the likelihood of a fatal dispute for democracies, the influence is sufficiently small that Kant's hope for a more peaceful world does not seem misplaced.

Toward a Continuous Specification of the Democracy–Autocracy Connection

Abstract: It has recently been argued that apparent peace between democracies may be the result of political similarity rather than joint democracy, and that there may exist an “autocratic peace” which is similar to the democratic peace. If political similarity generally is the cause of peace rather than joint democracy specifically, then the democratic peace is merely a statistical artifact that follows from separating out a selected subset of data. In addition, we do not know whether the autocratic peace or democratic peace is stronger, if they both exist. Existing empirical specifications of the connection between joint regime type and international conflict have not been adequate to assess these arguments. I develop a specification of joint regime-type variables that uses continuous measures without arbitrary cutoffs and allows us to assess a larger set of hypothesized regime-type effects. I find that jointly democratic and jointly autocratic pairs of states are both less conflict prone than other pairings, but that political similarity apart from these extremes has a much smaller effect on the risk of conflict. The results suggest that political similarity between coherent regimes (those at extremes of the institutionalized democracy–autocracy scale) encourages dyadic peace. But although there is a lower risk of conflict in both jointly democratic and jointly autocratic dyads, I find that the democratic peace is clearly stronger than the autocratic peace.

Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation

Abstract: After bringing together independent information on contested territory, rivalries, and conflict escalation (militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and war), we examine the timing of the temporal ordering of these three processes. Contrary to conventional expectations, we find the contested territory-militarized dispute-rivalry ordering to be rare. Rivalries and contested territory often begin at the same time. Next, after setting up a unified model, we find the triadic combination of contested territory, contiguity, and strategic rivalry to be a strong explanatory combination for MIDs and war over time (1919–1992). We also control for other explanatory factors such as mixed regime type and major power status. These findings provide strong support for arguments such as Vasquez's steps-to-war theory that specify these sources of conflict escalation.

Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972–2000

Abstract: The research presented in this article examines one aspect of state socialization, the extent to which transnational military-to-military interactions have served as an effective mechanism of the democratic political socialization of states. Military organizations are very interesting when we consider avenues by which state socialization might occur because military organizations are an influential part of governments, and members share common beliefs and values as soldiers and officers that transcend borders. Thus, it would seem that a state's military structure is one likely channel whereby politically relevant individuals might learn new ideas and have the capability to reform existing institutional structures. The socialization process described in this study is three level: (1) individuals acquire new ideas; (2) coercion, incentives, and persuasion aid in institutionalizing these ideas in the underlying political structure of the state; and (3) once institutionalized, these new ideas/identity of the state influence the material and ideational structure of international society. Using Cox Proportional Hazard models and an original data set encompassing over 160 states during the years 1972–2000, the analyses find U.S. military-to-military contacts to be positively and systematically associated with liberalizing trends. This finding provides evidence that constructivist mechanisms do have observable effects, and that ideationally based processes play an important role in U.S. national security.

Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton

Abstract: Do the beliefs of leaders make a significant difference in determining if democracies are peaceful and explaining why democracies (almost) never fight one another? Our comparisons of Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton reveal that both leaders view democracies as more friendly than nondemocracies, and they have significantly less cooperative beliefs toward the latter than toward the former, a difference that extends to the behavior of their respective governments during the Kosovo conflict. We also find that individual differences in the operational codes of the two leaders matter in the management of conflict with nondemocracies; the leaders exhibit opposite leadership styles and behavior associated with the domestic political culture of the two states. Overall, these results support the dyadic version of the democratic peace and suggest that the conflict behavior of democratic states depends upon the beliefs and calculations of their leaders in dealing with nondemocracies.

Thucydides and Modern Realism

Abstract: This paper makes two main arguments about the relationship between Thucydides, modern realism, and the key conceptual ideas they introduce to situate and explain international politics. First, Thucydides refutes the central claim underlying modern realist scholarship, that the sources of state behavior can be located not in the character of the primary political units but in the decentralized system or structure created by their interaction. Second, however, analyses that discuss Thucydides exclusively with respect to this “third-image” realism do not take into account the most important emendation made to political realism in the last half of the twentieth century, Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics . Waltz reformulates the theory of how anarchic political structures affect the behavior of their constituent units and suggests that the question posed by realism—and to be asked of Thucydides—is not whether states behave according to the Athenian thesis or consistently observe the power-political laws of nature, but whether they suffer “costs” in terms of political autonomy, security, and cultural integrity if they do not. Many scholars are therefore incorrect to assume that demonstrating the importance of non-structural factors in The Peloponnesian War severs the connection between Thucydides and structural realism. Thucydides may in fact be a realist, but not for reasons conventionally assumed.

Gendered Realities of the Immunity Principle: Why Gender Analysis Needs Feminism

Abstract: The discipline of international relations has had different reactions to the increased salience of gender advocacy in international politics; some have reacted by asking feminist questions about IR, while others have encouraged the study of gender as a variable disengaged from feminist advocacy. This article takes up this debate simultaneously with current debate on gender and the noncombatant immunity principle. Through a causal analysis of the ineffectiveness of the immunity principle, it argues that feminism is an indispensable empirical and theoretical tool for the study of gender in global politics. Concurrently, it demonstrates that gender stereotypes in the immunity principle are a natural part of the gendered just war narrative, rather than a deviation from normal immunity advocacy. It concludes by arguing that the gendered immunity principle fails to afford any civilians protection, and by suggesting a more effective, feminist reformulation based on empathy.