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Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 2012"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors provided the first global quantitative evidence of the conditional importance of HRO shaming in transnational advocacy efforts, using a new data set of the shaming events of more than 400 HROs toward governments.
Abstract: Do the “shaming” activities of HROs (human rights international non-governmental organizations) have a direct influence on state behavior? We argue, consistent with existing scholarship, that states targeted or “shamed” by these organizations do improve their human rights practices. However, mere shaming is not enough. Improvements in human rights practices result from the interaction of shaming by HROs with (i) a domestic presence of HROs within the targeted state and/or (ii) pressure by third-party states, individuals, and organizations. Using a new data set of the shaming events of more than 400 HROs toward governments, we test these propositions quantitatively and find widespread support for the arguments. This research provides the first global quantitative evidence of the conditional importance of HRO shaming in transnational advocacy efforts.

357 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the assumption of a global-to-local flow of norms inherent in most of the global norm diffusion literature is simplistic and propose three main constellations of traveling global norms: global discourse translation, impact translation and distorted translation.
Abstract: If women's rights norms have become internationally acknowledged, is it reasonable to assume that the status of women worldwide has improved because of international norms? It is argued here that the assumption of a global-to-local flow of norms inherent in most of the global norm diffusion literature is simplistic. To provide a more adequate theoretical framework, the paper juxtaposes the debate on the impact of international regimes and the power of global norms with an interdisciplinary mix of transnational approaches that identify multidirectional processes of appropriation and contestation of global norms. Departing from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as the most authoritative and steady piece of the international women's rights discourse, the transnational perspective developed here proposes three main constellations of traveling global norms: global discourse translation, impact translation, and distorted translation.

273 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argues that the Aunipolar moment is over, and the Pax Americana, the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945, is fast winding down, arguing that contrary to the claims of unipolar stability theorists, the distribution of power in the international system no longer is unipolar.
Abstract: Before the Great Recession’s foreshocks in fall 2007, most American security studies scholars believed that unipolarity—and perforce American hegemony—would be enduring features of international politics far into the future. However, in the Great Recession’s aftermath, it is apparent that much has changed since 2007. Predictions of continuing unipolarity have been superseded by premonitions of American decline and geopolitical transformation. The Great Recession has had a two-fold impact. First, it highlighted the shift of global wealth—and power—from West to East, a trend illustrated by China’s breathtakingly rapid rise to great power status. Second, it has raised doubts about the robustness of US primacy’s economic and financial underpinnings. This article argues that the Aunipolar moment is over, and the Pax Americana—the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945—is fast winding down. This article challenges the conventional wisdom among International Relations ⁄ Security Studies scholars on three counts. First, it shows that contrary to the claims of unipolar stability theorists, the distribution of power in the international system no longer is unipolar. Second, this article revisits the 1980s’ debate about American decline and demonstrates that the Great Recession has vindicated the so-called declinists of that decade. Finally, this article takes on the Ainstitutional lock-in argument, which holds that by strengthening the Pax Americana’s legacy institutions, the United States can perpetuate the essential elements of the international order it constructed following World War II even as the material foundations of American primacy erode. Before the Great Recession’s foreshocks in the fall of 2007, most American security studies scholars believed that unipolarity—and perforce American hegemony—would be enduring features of international politics far into the future. Judging from some important recently published books and articles, many of them still do, the Great Recession notwith

250 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Matthew Krain1
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test the effectiveness of naming and shaming by transnational advocacy networks in reducing the severity of ongoing instances of genocide or politicide, and find that such campaigns can have significant ameliorative effects on the most extreme atrocities.
Abstract: This study tests the effectiveness of naming and shaming by transnational advocacy networks in reducing the severity of ongoing instances of genocide or politicide. I argue that naming and shaming should force perpetrators to reduce the severity of these ongoing atrocities in order to shift the spotlight, save their reputation, reframe their identity, maintain international legitimacy and domestic viability, and ease pressure placed on them by states or IOs. I test whether naming and shaming by NGOs, the media, and IOs significantly reduces the severity of the killing. Ordered logit analyses of ongoing genocides and politicides from 1976 to 2008 reveal that naming and shaming by Amnesty International, the Northern media, and the UNCHR have significant ameliorative effects on the severity of the most extreme atrocities. Transnational advocacy networks have the potential, through naming and shaming, to lead to life-saving changes in these murderous policies.

177 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Margalit et al. as mentioned in this paper argue that many individuals fear not only the oft-cited material consequences of trade openness, but also what they perceive to be its social and cultural consequences.
Abstract: Margalit, Yotam. (2012) Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00747.x © 2012 International Studies Association What are the sources of popular opposition to economic globalization? A common answer in the literature is the adverse impact of trade liberalization on some people’s labor market standing and earning prospects. Recent studies also note a correlation between nationalist and ethnocentric sentiments and support for trade protectionism, yet do not test whether these non-economic sentiments are actually a cause of the opposition to freer trade. I argue that many individuals fear not only the oft-cited material consequences of trade openness, but also what they perceive to be its social and cultural consequences. I use cross-national survey data and a survey experiment to test this causal claim. The argument also helps explain why less-educated individuals are consistently more apprehensive about international economic integration than more educated individuals, even in the countries in which economic theory predicts otherwise. The findings have implications for the debate over the policy tools for compensating globalization’s losers and sustaining popular support for further economic integration.

161 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors outline building blocks for a shared conceptualization of diffusion that is attentive to the initial stimulus; the medium through which information about the stimuli may/may not travel to other destinations; the political agents un/affected by the stimulus positive or negative externalities, who aid or block the stimulus' journey to other destination; and outcomes that enable discrimination among grades of diffusion and resulting equilibria.
Abstract: The Great Recession, Euro contagion, Middle East upheavals, nuclear proliferation, and expansion of rights, among others, highlight the centrality of diffusion to international studies. This Presidential Address outlines building blocks for a shared conceptualization of diffusion that is attentive to the initial stimulus ; the medium through which information about the stimuli may/may not travel to other destinations; the political agents un/affected by the stimulus’ positive or negative externalities, who aid or block the stimulus’ journey to other destinations; and outcomes that enable discrimination among grades of diffusion and resulting equilibria. Various issue areas illustrate how initial stimuli may/may not change preferences, transform identities, trigger emotions, alter strategic choices, and affect outcomes. I advance three related considerations. First, to avoid selection bias, understanding what does not diffuse (the “Vegas counterfactual”) should be as central as what does. Concepts such as firewalls and sedimentation are essential for gauging a medium's relative immunity/vulnerability to diffusion. Second, weaving domestic, regional, and global considerations into a single analytical framework reduces omitted variable bias and enables systematic cross-regional comparisons. Third, these building blocks imbue the study of diffusion with political dynamics—entailing strategic interaction, contingency, incomplete information, and unintended effects—that defy determinism, automaticity, or teleology. Similar causal mechanisms may yield different outcomes under different domestic, regional, and global conditions. And different mechanisms may yield similar outcomes under comparable circumstances. I highlight the challenges inherent in assessing the outcomes of diffusion given competing empirical findings, epistemologies, and normative readings of what does/does not and should/should not diffuse, and outline an agenda for future research.

159 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Based on panel data analysis and their own survey of US corporations, this paper found that judicial strength and rule of law elements are important determinants of FDI in Latin America, while little attention has been devoted to unpacking regime type.
Abstract: An extensive literature has emerged recently that investigates the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing regions of the world, including Latin America. Much of this work has focused on whether authoritarian or democratic rule is better for attracting FDI. Curiously, little attention has been devoted to unpacking regime type to see whether specific political institutional variables related to judicial strength and adherence to the rule of law are important FDI determinants. Based on panel data analysis and our own survey of US corporations, we find that judicial strength and rule of law elements are important determinants of FDI in Latin America.

109 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the experiences of Canada, France, and Germany and find that their institutional model does a better job of explaining the observed behavior than do competing explanations focusing on public opinion, threat or strategic culture.
Abstract: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the most robust and deeply institutionalized alliance in the modern world, yet it has faced significant problems in running the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Specifically, the coalition effort has been plagued by caveats: restrictions on what coalition militaries can and cannot do. Caveats have diminished the alliance's overall effectiveness and created resentment within the coalition. In this article, we explain why ISAF countries have employed a variety of caveats in Afghanistan, focusing on the period from 2003 to 2009. Caveats vary predictably according to the political institutions in each contributor to ISAF. Troops from coalition governments are likely to have caveats. Troops from presidential or majoritarian parliamentary governments tend, on average, to have fewer caveats, but specific caveats depend on the background of key decision makers in those countries. To demonstrate these points, we first review key limitations facing military contingents in Afghanistan. We then compare the experiences of Canada, France, and Germany and find that our institutional model does a better job of explaining the observed behavior than do competing explanations focusing on public opinion, threat, or strategic culture. We conclude with implications for both research and North Atlantic Treaty Organization's future.

98 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper argued that structural power theory has given insufficient attention to governmental actors, typically the targets of such power, and argued that ideas and the ideational processes through which government and state leaders construct threat perceptions regarding structural power can be important in mediating such power.
Abstract: It is now widely accepted that the classic arguments regarding the “structural power” of business are too “structuralist.” Subsequent research has focused on a widening array of independent variables that shape the variability of such power. This paper extends this research tradition, arguing that structural power theory has given insufficient attention to governmental actors, typically the targets of such power. The paper argues that ideas and the ideational processes through which government and state leaders construct threat perceptions regarding structural power can be important in mediating such power. The literature on power typically argues that power shapes ideas and disciplines target subjects. This paper revises this logic by arguing that the ideas of target subjects can also shape power. The paper’s arguments then are essentially constructivist, but the paper extends such arguments by insisting on a greater role for agency than is often found in constructivist reasoning.

94 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that real world leaders rely to an important extent on their personal impressions of other leaders, taking these as credible indicators of sincerity, and suggest that personal impressions are an important, but up until now relatively ignored, source of evidence for leaders of their counterparts' sincerity with significant implications for threat assessments and policy choices.
Abstract: What counts as evidence that the other side is sincere? Within mainstream international relations literature, scholars have focused on costly signals. We argue, however, that in the real world leaders do not simply look at costly signals, but they rely to an important extent on their personal impressions of other leaders, taking these as credible indicators of sincerity. Our approach thus builds both upon the literature on interstate communication and perceptions and upon more recent research in the field of neuroscience regarding affective information. To probe the plausibility of our theory, we focus on the indicators British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain used to evaluate Germany sincerity in the late 1930s and Ronald Reagan employed to make sincerity judgments about Soviet intentions in the late 1980s. Additionally, we briefly discuss the 1961 Vienna Summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev as an illustration of how personal impressions can also result in negative assessments of sincerity. Our findings suggest that personal impressions are an important, but up until now relatively ignored, source of evidence for leaders of their counterparts’ sincerity with significant implications for threat assessments and policy choices.

79 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined how the past alliance behavior of nations affects the likelihood that these states will be involved in alliance formation and found support for the hypothesis that a reputation for upholding one's agreements significantly improves the likelihood of membership in future alliances.
Abstract: In this paper, we examine how the past alliance behavior of nations affects the likelihood that these states will be involved in alliance formation. We contend that nations evaluate the reputations of potential allies when searching for alliance partners. Reputation information is processed by governments along with other immediate concerns. By introducing a model and developing subsequent measures of reputational alliance histories, we improve upon our current understanding of the factors that drive alliance formation. Using alliance reputation data derived from the ATOP project (1816–2000), we find support for the hypothesis that a reputation for upholding one's agreements significantly improves the likelihood of membership in future alliances.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors compare the explanatory power of two models of UN intervention behavior: (i) an "organizational mission model" built around the proposition that variations in the amount of resources that the UN devotes to different conflicts primarily reflect the degree to which a conflict poses a challenge to the UN's organizational mandate of promoting international peace and stability and (ii) a "parochial interest model" that revolves around the purely private interests of the five veto-holding members of the UN Security Council (the so-called P-5), i.e., interests that are either unrelated to
Abstract: This paper compares the explanatory power of two models of UN intervention behavior: (i) an “organizational mission model” built around the proposition that variations in the amount of resources that the UN devotes to different conflicts primarily reflect the degree to which a conflict poses a challenge to the UN's organizational mandate of promoting international peace and stability and (ii) a “parochial interest model” that revolves around the purely private interests of the five veto-holding members of the UN Security Council (the so-called P-5), i.e., interests that are either unrelated to or at odds with the UN's organizational mandate. Examining data on UN conflict management efforts in more than 270 international crises between 1945 and 2002, we find that measures of the severity and escalatory potential of a conflict are significantly better predictors of the extent of UN involvement in international crises than variables that measure P-5 interests that do not align with the UN's organizational mission of acting as a global peacemaker. This suggests that the UN adheres more closely to the humanitarian and security mission laid out in its Charter than critics of the organization often suggest.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined the determinants of democratization in the short, medium, and long term after civil wars ending between 1945 and 1999 and found that economic development aids democratization while oil wealth hinders it.
Abstract: Why do some states emerging from civil war take significant strides toward democracy while others do not? The existing literature comes to contradictory and puzzling findings, many of which, we argue, are driven by methodological problems. We examine the determinants of democratization in the short, medium, and long term after civil wars ending between 1945 and 1999. Other than a short-term effect of negotiated settlements, we find little support for the prominent claim that the outcome of the war shapes the prospects for postwar democratization. Neither does peacekeeping foster democratization. Meanwhile, consistent with the more general democratization literature, we find that economic development aids democratization while oil wealth hinders it. In short, we find the determinants of democratization to be much the same for post-civil war societies as for other societies. Why do some states emerging from internal conflict take significant strides toward democracy, while others do not? Why, for example, did Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Peru become more democratic after their civil wars ended, while Angola and Sri Lanka did not? The few extant studies that address this question come to a number of contradictory and puzzling findings. This paper attempts to clear the considerably tangled brush on the subject of democratization after civil war. The aim is empirical: rather than present a novel theory, it improves on existing research methods to examine the determinants of democratization for all countries emerging from civil wars ending between 1945 and 1999. 2 We use the term democratization to refer to moves along a continuum toward democracy, not necessarily to convey the crossing of a threshold to democracy. Our findings are rather striking with respect to existing studies on regime change after intrastate conflict: correcting for several methodological issues that we believe contribute to some of the contradictory findings in the literature, we find little support for the prominent notions that the war’s outcome, its death toll, or the presence of peacekeepers affects the prospects for democracy. Rather, democratization in societies emerging from civil war is shaped by much the same factors thought to affect democratization in other societies. Patterns of democratization after civil war are not so puzzling after all.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Tyburski et al. as mentioned in this paper showed that corruption trended downward in states receiving larger remittance sums, after controlling for political competition, divided government, and market openness.
Abstract: Tyburski, Michael D. (2012) The Resource Curse Reversed? Remittances and Corruption in Mexico. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 0.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00721.x © 2012 International Studies Association Do remittances increase corruption in recipient states? Previous research suggests that remittances allow governments to maintain policies that create corrupt state–society relations. In contrast, this paper argues that remittances mitigate corruption by increasing government accountability and providing other incentives to reform. Using data from Mexico in 2001–2007, this study shows that corruption trended downward in states receiving larger remittance sums, after controlling for political competition, divided government, and market openness. The results are robust to instrumental variable analysis testing for potential endogeneity between corruption and migration. These findings bring attention to remittances as an exogenous resource for reform-minded groups and suggest that they may operate as the converse of the resource curse.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Kim et al. as mentioned in this paper argue that trade partner states are likely to engage in ex ante due diligence and improve the protection of labor rights at home before they sign or even enter into negotiations for a PTA.
Abstract: Kim, Moonhawk. (2012) Ex Ante Due Diligence: Formation of PTAs and Protection of Labor Rights. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00758.x © 2012 International Studies Association Do fair trade PTAs—trade agreements that contain provisions for protection of labor rights—lead to improvements in labor protection in PTA partner states? If so, how do the PTAs bring about such improvements? I argue that trade partner states are likely to engage in ex ante due diligence and improve the protection of labor rights at home before they sign or even enter into negotiations for a PTA. Given that large developed economies have increasingly placed value on strong labor protection, trade partners of these economies act on the belief that, holding other factors constant, having stronger labor protection will increase their attractiveness as a potential or a prospective PTA partner. I test this argument in the context of the United States and its trade partners between 1982 and 2005. The evidence shows that trade partner states indeed are much more likely to improve labor protection (i) prior to the 2002 Trade Act publicizing the importance of labor protection and (ii) prior to signing a PTA with the United States.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper analyzed the travel patterns of top Chinese leaders from 1998 to 2008 and found that they are more consistent with a status quo conceptualization of China, though there are some important exceptions such as willingness to travel to rogue states.
Abstract: China's rising power and increased global activism have attracted increasing attention, with particular focus on whether a stronger China is likely to be a revisionist or status quo state. Power transition theory highlights the potential for a dissatisfied rising power to challenge the existing international order, but it is difficult to evaluate whether a rising power is dissatisfied. Where Chinese leaders choose to travel can offer insights into whether China's behavior is more consistent with that of a revisionist or status quo state and into China's broader diplomatic priorities. We present a series of expectations concerning how the travel patterns of a challenger state are likely to differ from the travel patterns of a status quo state. Using a newly compiled data set, we then analyze the correlates of travel abroad by top Chinese leaders from 1998 to 2008. Our results are more consistent with a status quo conceptualization of China, though there are some important exceptions such as willingness to travel to rogue states. We also use travel data to test other hypotheses about Chinese foreign policy behavior.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine how interests, institutional culture, and legitimacy concerns shape actors' support for ambiguity, and how these preferences combine with broader structural factors to produce a predisposition toward institutional ambiguity.
Abstract: How do international organizations deal with the persistent challenge of uncertainty? The most intuitive answer is through regulation. Yet, rules are not always the best solution in times of uncertainty or in dealing with complex and diverse problems. More ambiguous policies that leave room for interpretation, can often be more functional for an international organization (IO); moreover, ambiguities can also be a source of power—and are therefore often a subject of conflict among institutional actors. Focusing on the case of International Monetary Fund conditionality policy, this article provides several key insights into IO practices. It provides an account of the different forms that ambiguity can take in international organizations and develops an explanation for why institutional ambiguities appear and persist. Looking inside the IO black box, the study examines how interests, institutional culture, and legitimacy concerns shape actors’ support for ambiguity, and how these preferences combine with broader structural factors to produce a predisposition toward institutional ambiguity. Finally, this article points toward certain implications of organizations’ tendency toward ambiguity, suggesting that this may play an important role in enabling institutional expansion.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Kertzer et al. as discussed by the authors investigated the relationship between personality traits, foreign policy orientations, and political knowledge, and found that many of realism's causal mechanisms are conditional on whether subjects already hold realist views, and suggest that emotions like fear may play a larger role in realist theory than many realists have assumed.
Abstract: Kertzer, Joshua D. and Kathleen M. McGraw. (2012) Folk Realism: Testing the Microfoundations of Realism in Ordinary Citizens. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00715.x © 2012 International Studies Association International Relations scholars have long debated whether the American public is allergic to realism, which raises the question of how they would “contract” it in the first place. We argue that realism isn’t just an IR paradigm, but a belief system, whose relationship with other ideological systems in public opinion has rarely been fully examined. Operationalizing this disposition in ordinary citizens as “folk realism,” we investigate its relationship with a variety of personality traits, foreign policy orientations, and political knowledge. We then present the results of a laboratory experiment probing psychological microfoundations for realist theory, manipulating the amount of information subjects have about a foreign policy conflict to determine whether uncertainty leads individuals to adopt more realist views, and whether realists and idealists respond to uncertainty and fear differently. We find that many of realism’s causal mechanisms are conditional on whether subjects already hold realist views, and suggest that emotions like fear may play a larger role in realist theory than many realists have assumed.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Steger et al. as discussed by the authors examined the political ideas of the global justice movement, the key antagonist to market globalism from the political Left, and found that justice globalism displays ideological coherence and should be considered a maturing political alter-ideology of global significance.
Abstract: Steger, Manfred B. and Erin K. Wilson. (2012) Anti-Globalization or Alter-Globalization? Mapping the Political Ideology of the Global Justice Movement. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00740.x?(c) 2012 International Studies Association Globalization has unsettled conventional, nationally based political belief systems, opening the door to emerging new global political ideologies. While much analytic focus has been on ideational transformations related to market globalism (neoliberalism), little attention has been given to its growing number of ideological challengers. Drawing on data collected from 45 organizations connected to the World Social Forum, this article examines the political ideas of the global justice movement, the key antagonist to market globalism from the political Left. Employing morphological discourse analysis and quantitative content analysis, the article assesses the ideological coherence of justice globalism against Michael Freedens (1996) three criteria of distinctiveness, context-bound responsiveness, and effective decontestation. We find that justice globalism displays ideological coherence and should be considered a maturing political alter-ideology of global significance. The evidence presented in this article suggests the ongoing globalization of the twenty-first-century ideological landscape.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined subsidies and found that the protectionist bias in majoritarian systems does in fact extend beyond tariffs, by examining an increasingly important form of trade protection: subsidies.
Abstract: Governments elected by majoritarian rules are, according to conventional wisdom, more protectionist than governments elected by proportional rules. However, existing tests of this claim examine only one possible form of trade protection: tariffs. This leaves open the possibility that governments in majoritarian systems provide no more protection than governments in proportional systems but simply use tariffs more often than other forms of trade protection. Does the protectionist bias in majoritarian politics extend beyond tariffs? The current study addresses this question by examining an increasingly important form of trade protection: subsidies. In a sample of 68 countries from 1990 to 2006, spending on subsidies is found to be higher in majoritarian systems than in proportional systems, holding all else equal. The implication is that the protectionist bias in majoritarian systems does in fact extend beyond tariffs.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Maoz et al. as discussed by the authors examined the conditions under which states engaged in strategic rivalries choose to support non-state armed groups (NAGs) that target their rivals.
Abstract: Maoz, Zeev and Belgin San-Akca. (2012) Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946–2001. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00759.x © 2012 International Studies Association This study examines the conditions under which states engaged in strategic rivalries choose to support Non-state Armed Groups (NAGs) that target their rivals. NAGs include ethnic or religious insurgents, guerilla organizations, and terrorists. We develop a rational choice model of state support for NAGs. We focus on state support of NAGs as cooperation between states and NAGs emerging out of a mutual and purposive decision-making process. The model suggests that decisions of states to support NAGs targeting a rival are affected by dissatisfaction with the status quo and the expected risk of retaliation. Rivalries create opportunities for NAGs that operate against one of the rivals, allowing them to acquire resources to sustain their operations. The presence of rivalry increases the likelihood of state-NAG cooperation. In turn, state-NAG cooperation increases the likelihood of rivalry escalation. We test the propositions of the model using an original data set that includes observations for 175 NAGs and 83 state supporters in the post-WWII period. We find consistent support for our propositions. We discuss the implications of these results for the theory and practice of international relations.2

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Thyne et al. as mentioned in this paper examined the effect of government institutional design, political strength, and stability on the duration of civil conflicts from 1946 to 2004, concluding that powerful and stable executives are well equipped to end civil conflicts.
Abstract: Thyne, Clayton L. (2012) Information, Commitment, and Intra-War Bargaining: The Effect of Governmental Constraints on Civil War Duration. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00719.x © 2012 International Studies Association This article considers how governmental variations affect the duration of civil conflicts. Recent work suggests that war termination is likely when competing actors gain information about the power balance and are able to credibly commit to war-ending agreements. I focus on how the strength and stability of executives impact these factors. Regarding information, power consolidation within the government reduces the number of people who must agree on a settlement, which should shorten civil conflicts. Stable leadership should likewise shorten conflicts by making it harder for potential spoilers to derail war-ending agreements, helping minimize credibility problems. This argument is tested by examining how variations in institutional design (executive constitutional and legislative power), political strength (ideological fragmentation and polarization), and stability (leadership tenure) affect the duration of civil conflicts from 1946 to 2004. The results suggest that powerful and stable executives are indeed well equipped to end civil conflicts.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article conducted a thorough test of international boundary agreements during the period 1816-2001 and found that neighbors are less likely to go to war or experience militarized interstate disputes with one another.
Abstract: Can states usher in more peaceful relations with their neighbors by signing agreements that delineate their territorial boundaries? Theory suggests such a possibility, but the empirical evidence to date remains limited by research design and variable measurement decisions. After assembling a new data set on international boundary agreements, the current study conducts the first thorough test of this question during the period 1816–2001. The findings indicate that once neighboring states settle their borders, they are less likely to go to war or experience militarized interstate disputes with one another. These pacific effects persist across numerous time periods even after controlling for joint democracy, a characteristic that both theory and this analysis show to be positively related to settled borders. Through these findings, the study suggests that signing international boundary agreements can bring neighbors a more peaceful relationship with one another, regardless of the characteristics of their respective governmental regimes.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Saull et al. as mentioned in this paper argue that the 2008-2009 global economic crisis is not an indicator of American decline, but rather an organic feature of uneven development with more open political consequences.
Abstract: Saull, Richard. (2012) Rethinking Hegemony: Uneven Development, Historical Blocs, and the World Economic Crisis. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00720.x © 2012 International Studies Association The 2008–2009 global economic crisis has revived debates concerning the decline of American hegemony and the rise of China. This article engages with these debates on two levels. First, through situating the 2008–2009 crisis in longer-term development trends in the world economy, I suggest that the empirical evidence of American decline is more ambiguous and that the crisis itself is not, necessarily, an indicator of decline, but rather an organic feature of uneven development with more open political consequences. Secondly, I offer a revised neo-Gramscian perspective on American hegemony by highlighting the contradictions between the structural logic of uneven development and the neoliberal historical bloc. Through this I provide an alternative overview of the evolution of American hegemony over the last 30 years pointing to the likely continuation of American/neoliberal global hegemony.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors use subnational level data to investigate circumstances that affect people's decisions of whether or not to flee their homes during civilian conflicts and demonstrate the importance of a rationalist framework in understanding the choice of flight.
Abstract: Adding value to existing aggregate cross-national analyses on forced migration, I use subnational-level data to investigate circumstances that affect people's decisions of whether or not to flee their homes during civilian conflicts. Building on existing literature, I argue that conflict by itself is not the sole factor affecting people's decisions to flee or stay. Apart from a direct physical impact, civil war can destroy economic infrastructure and expose people to economic hardships, which can contribute to displacement. In addition, flight may be impeded or facilitated by such factors as geographical features, physical infrastructure, and social conditions under which people live. Using count data from the Maoists “people's war” in Nepal, a subnational analysis of displacement is conducted to provide a more refined test of existing large- n studies on the causes of forced migration. The empirical results are consistent with the major hypotheses developed in the field. With more precise measures of conflict, economic and physical conditions, and presence of social networks, I demonstrate the importance of a rationalist framework in understanding the choice of flight.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Green et al. as discussed by the authors examined the origins of African state size and shape and found that state size has a strong negative relationship with pre-colonial trade and that trade and population density alone explain the majority of the variation in state size.
Abstract: Green, Elliott. (2012) On the Size and Shape of African States. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00723.x © 2012 International Studies Association African states are both unusually large and well known for having artificial borders created during the colonial period. While African state size and shape have been previously shown to be correlated with negative development outcomes, no one has heretofore examined the origins of either phenomenon. Here, I show that African state size and shape are not arbitrary but are rather a consequence of Africa’s low pre-colonial population density, whereby low-density areas were consolidated into unusually large colonial states with artificial borders. I also show that state size has a strong negative relationship with pre-colonial trade and that trade and population density alone explain the majority of the variation in African state size. Finally, I do not find a relationship between population density and state size or shape among non-African former colonies, thereby emphasizing the distinctiveness of modern African state formation.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article showed that investment stock, rather than inflow, is the superior operationalization of structural dependence theory and showed that the political gains from government repression frequently dwarf any economic costs for governments.
Abstract: Cross-national empirical studies have found that foreign investment has beneficial effects on human rights. We argue that these studies poorly operationalize foreign investment to test theoretical predictions and suffer from sampling bias. We demonstrate that investment stock, rather than inflow, is the superior operationalization of structural dependence theory. We construct regression models of government repression of physical integrity rights, include much more data than previous studies, and use a new multiple imputation algorithm for time-series cross-section data to resolve sampling bias. We find no evidence that foreign investment affects repression, contradicting conventional wisdom and suggesting that the political gains from repression frequently dwarf any economic costs for governments.

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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore why governments commit to human rights enforcement by joining the International Criminal Court (ICC) and identify a new causal factor: a country's dependence network, which consists of the set of other states that control resources the country values.
Abstract: This article explores why governments commit to human rights enforcement by joining the International Criminal Court (ICC). Compared with other international institutions, the ICC has substantial authority and autonomy. Since governments traditionally guard their sovereignty carefully, it is puzzling that the ICC was not only established, but established so rapidly. Looking beyond traditional explanations for joining international institutions, this study identifies a new causal factor: a country's dependence network, which consists of the set of other states that control resources the country values. This study captures different dimensions of what states value through trade relations, security alliances, and shared memberships in international organizations. Using event history analysis on monthly data from 1998 to 2004, we find that dependence networks strongly affect whether and when a state signs and ratifies the ICC. Some types of ratification costs also influence state commitment, but many conventional explanations of state commitment receive little empirical support.

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TL;DR: This paper found that realists are the most conservative and right-leaning of international relations scholars, while Liberals are more liberal and left-leaning, and that post-positivist epistemological commitments are associated with the political left.
Abstract: Are international relations scholars objective observers of political events, or do our political preferences influence the way in which we see the world? This article explores that question using data from a survey of international relations scholars. It develops and tests hypotheses about how we might expect adherents of particular paradigms to identify themselves politically on a left-right scale based on the resonance between the content of ideology and the key propositions of different schools of thought in IR. Although they are relatively centrist, I find that realists are the most conservative and right-leaning of international relations scholars, while Liberals are more liberal and left-leaning. Although neither approach has any intrinsic ontological content, rationalism and constructivism also have a distinct ideological profile, the former being more conservative than the latter. Post-positivist epistemological commitments are associated with the political left. More importantly, there is an interaction between ontology and epistemology. Positivism plays a role in breaking the link between political values and paradigm choice. Nonpositivists demonstrate the strongest connection between ideology and international relations approach. I consider the implications of these findings for the use of paradigms in international relations theorizing, arguing that they should make us more circumspect about the use of paradigms in our discipline. Do the political beliefs of those who study international relations affect their beliefs about international relations and the way they study them? Is there an association between the values that guide us in the voting booth and the approaches we adopt in our professional lives? Are we drawn to particular paradigms and epistemologies based on our underlying political opinions? In other words, is our research orientation to some degree ideological, part of an underlying structure of attitudes? Does our prescriptive and normative sense of politics at home influence our positive and empirical understandings about politics abroad? Survey data have indicated that the domestic and foreign policy beliefs at both the mass and elite levels are indeed related (Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Wittkopf 1990; Murray 1996). Is this true of international relations scholars as well? Many in the field would not be surprised to learn that our politics are connected to our political science. Critical theorists and postmodernists reject the notion of the ‘‘subject‐object distinction,’’ that is that international relations scholars can objectively observe and theorize about international politics independent of their values. Political orientation is likely one of those influences. These scholars typically employ post-positivist epistemologies in keeping with this belief. There is some evidence for the contention. In a remarkable book, Oren (2003) traces how the trends in political science and international relations scholarship in the United States are informed and affected by the historical context. Positivistically inclined scholars of international relations, however, would most likely object to this accusation. Although a contentious term, all notions of positivism imply a detached and objective analysis of our phenomena of interest. If there were such an influence, what would it be?

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TL;DR: The authors showed that ratification constraints did not affect bargaining over the Kyoto Protocol, nor did bargaining outcomes affect ratification, and that European countries ratified the Protocol in lock step and offered selective incentives to most of the participants.
Abstract: The politics of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol may suggest a two-level game; yet, our quantitative analysis shows that ratification constraints did not affect bargaining over the Protocol, nor did bargaining outcomes affect ratification. The politics of the Kyoto Protocol are best understood as an example of the ‘Europeanization’ of international politics: European countries subordinate their domestic politics to international cooperation, and the European Union emerges as a key agenda setter. We find that European countries ratified the Protocol in lock step and offered selective incentives—such as EU accession—to most of the participants. Case studies of Russia and Poland confirm our interpretation of the empirical findings.