Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 2015"
TL;DR: The core claims of the practice turn in International Relations (IR) remain ambiguous as discussed by the authors, and it is worth noting that practice approaches entail a distinctive view on the drivers of social relations, arguing against individualistic-interest and norm-based actor models.
Abstract: The core claims of the practice turn in International Relations (IR) remain ambiguous. What promises does international practice theory hold for the field? How does the kind of theorizing it produces differ from existing perspectives? What kind of research agenda does it produce? This article addresses these questions. Drawing on the work of Andreas Reckwitz, we show that practice approaches entail a distinctive view on the drivers of social relations. Practice theories argue against individualistic-interest and norm-based actor models. They situate knowledge in practice rather than “mental frames” or “discourse.” Practice approaches focus on how groups perform their practical activities in world politics to renew and reproduce social order. They therefore overcome familiar dualisms—agents and structures, subjects and objects, and ideational and material—that plague IR theory. Practice theories are a heterogeneous family, but, as we argue, share a range of core commitments. Realizing the promise of the practice turn requires considering the full spectrum of its approaches. However, the field primarily draws on trajectories in international practice theory that emphasize reproduction and hierarchies. It should pay greater attention to practice approaches rooted in pragmatism and that emphasize contingency and change. We conclude with an outline of core challenges that the future agenda of international practice theory must tackle.
178 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine global, transnational, and national influences on quota adoption in 149 countries between 1989 and 2008 and find a crucial role for women's activism, but uncover a negative interaction between increased global pressures and domestic ties to women's transnational organizing.
Abstract: The rapid global spread of quotas for women constitutes one of the most significant political developments of the last thirty years. It transformed the composition of legislatures worldwide. Yet we lack a solid understanding of the forces driving quota diffusion. In this article, we consider how global pressure from the international women's movement affects national gender quota adoption. In the first quantitative analysis of this question on a global scale, we use event history techniques to examine global, transnational, and national influences on quota adoption in 149 countries between 1989 and 2008. Contributing to work on international norm diffusion, we find a crucial role for women's activism, but uncover a negative interaction between increased global pressures and domestic ties to women's transnational organizing. We suggest global pressure to adopt quotas may be weakened by the diverse agendas of women's activist organizations, by perceived threats to male elites posed by women's agitation, or both.
119 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed that trade and direct investment interdependence relate to dyadic BSA cooperation via two mechanisms: financing insulation from international liquidity shocks and reduced transaction costs of cross-border exchange for local firms.
Abstract: For several years now, China has implemented policies to promote the international use of its national currency, the Renminbi (RMB). As part of these efforts, the People's Bank of China (PBC) has negotiated 25 bilateral currency swap agreements (BSAs) with foreign central banks. These make it easier for firms in both China and its partner countries to settle cross-border trade and direct investment in RMB. We seek to explain why China and these countries cooperate via BSAs. We theorize that trade and direct investment interdependence relate to dyadic BSA cooperation via two mechanisms: financing insulation from international liquidity shocks and reduced transaction costs of cross-border exchange for local firms. Additionally, we expect the presence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) will increase the probability of dyadic BSA cooperation. BSAs are natural extensions of these existing agreements. They represent an additional layer of state-level formal cooperation that further reduces barriers to cross-border trade and direct investment. Our empirical analysis finds that both de facto trade interdependence and de jure economic integration via PTAs and BITs increase the probability of BSA cooperation between China and partners.
105 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party-based regimes and therefore make voters less dependent on state transfers.
Abstract: Do remittances stabilize autocracies? Remittances—money sent by foreign workers to individuals in their home country—differ from other sources of external non-tax revenue, such as foreign aid, because they accrue directly to individuals and thus raise the incomes of households. We argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party-based regimes. Remittances therefore make voters less dependent on state transfers. As a result, autocracies that rely heavily on the broad-based distribution of spoils for their survival, namely party-based regimes, should prove especially vulnerable to increases in remittances. Evidence consistent with this argument suggests that remittances promote democratization in some dictatorships.
99 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors assess how investors evaluate sovereign borrowers, arguing that sovereign risk is less "sovereign" than previous research assumes, and that peer country effects, as well as country-specific and global factors (booms, crises, or shocks), should explain sovereign interest rates.
Abstract: We assess how investors evaluate sovereign borrowers, arguing that sovereign risk is less “sovereign” than previous research assumes. Investors evaluate governments based not only on what they do, but also on investors' views of similar, “peer” countries. Professional investors use investment categorizations (geography, sovereign credit rating, or level of market development) as a heuristic device. As a result, peer country effects, as well as country-specific and global factors (booms, crises, or shocks), should explain sovereign interest rates. The peer effects we expect are regular features of international capital markets, rather than phenomena that occur in periods of market turmoil. We assess our expectations using error correction models of monthly sovereign risk premiums, which reveal significant interdependencies in sovereign risk assessments among countries, net of global and domestic predictors. Such contagion emerges principally in the short term, although we also find robust, long-term ties in sovereign risk assessments among countries sharing common regional classifications. Hence, our evidence suggests that professional investors' reliance on country categorizations facilitates the transmission of market sentiments—which include lower as well as higher risk premiums charged—across groups of countries, even when countries differ in key measures of creditworthiness. Our analyses highlight the importance of investors' ideas regarding country categorizations; they call into question the efficiency of sovereign debt markets.
97 citations
TL;DR: The authors analyzes evaluative statements made by states in UN General Assembly debates on the Security Council, for the period 1991-2009, and concludes that the Council suffers from a legitimacy deficit because negative evaluations of the Council by UN member states far outweigh positive ones.
Abstract: Existing research on the legitimacy of the UN Security Council is conceptual or theoretical, for the most part, as scholars tend to make legitimacy assessments with reference to objective standards. Whether UN member states perceive the Security Council as legitimate or illegitimate has yet to be investigated systematically; nor do we know whether states care primarily about the Council's compliance with its legal mandate, its procedures, or its effectiveness. To address this gap, our article analyzes evaluative statements made by states in UN General Assembly debates on the Security Council, for the period 1991–2009. In making such statements, states confer legitimacy on the Council or withhold legitimacy from it. We conclude the following: First, the Security Council suffers from a legitimacy deficit because negative evaluations of the Council by UN member states far outweigh positive ones. Nevertheless, the Council does not find itself in an intractable legitimacy crisis because it still enjoys a rudimentary degree of legitimacy. Second, the Council's legitimacy deficit results primarily from states' concerns regarding the body's procedural shortcomings. Misgivings as regards shortcomings in performance rank second. Whether or not the Council complies with its legal mandate has failed to attract much attention at all.
94 citations
TL;DR: The authors examined the effect of domestic political change on United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting and found that change in the societal support base of leaders leads to change in UN voting, especially in nondemocracies.
Abstract: This study examines the effect of domestic political change on United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting. We argue that foreign policy change is most likely when a new leader—one who relies on different societal groups for support than her predecessor—comes to power. We then examine the extent that domestic institutional context—in particular, democracy—shapes this process. We test our hypotheses using a new measure of UNGA voting patterns and new data on changes in leaders' supporting coalitions. We find that change in the societal support base of leaders leads to change in UN voting, especially in nondemocracies. This study lends credence to the perspective that foreign policy, like domestic policy, can vary with the particular interests that leaders represent; it encourages scholars to focus less on leadership change per se and more on changes in the societal groups to which leaders are most accountable. This study also suggests that democratic institutions inspire policy consistency not only in areas governed by treaties and international law, but also in areas of foreign policy that are easier to alter in the short term.
83 citations
TL;DR: This paper showed that Chinese bilateral interactions have little effect on the longevity of autocratic regimes and that only export dependence on China may increase the likelihood of survival for autocratic regime while doing little to stabilize their democratic counterparts.
Abstract: Critics frequently accuse China of acting as a patron for autocratic states. But does Chinese engagement actually increase the stability of authoritarian clients? This article demonstrates that Chinese bilateral interactions have little effect on the longevity of autocratic regimes. Analyses of different forms of Chinese bilateral engagement between 1993 and 2008—including state visits, arms trading, aid projects, economic cooperation, and trade dependence—show that only export dependence on China may increase the likelihood of survival for autocratic regimes while doing little to stabilize their democratic counterparts.
81 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that domestic patterns of support and opposition to autocrats determine citizens' receptivity to policy endorsements, with policy endorsements of foreign-supported reforms polarizing public opinion in Jordan.
Abstract: A pillar of American foreign policy in the Middle East since September 11, 2001, has been promoting democracy, with particular emphasis on support for women's representation. Given high levels of anti-Americanism in the region, does foreign pressure for policy reform undermine this project? Evidence from a nationally representative survey experiment in Jordan shows that an American endorsement of women in politics has no average effect on popular support for women's representation. Instead, domestic patterns of support and opposition to autocrats determine citizens' receptivity to policy endorsements, with policy endorsements of foreign-supported reforms polarizing public opinion. Both foreign and domestic endorsements of women in politics depress support among Jordanians who oppose their regime significantly more than among Jordanians who support it.
75 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors use a bargaining framework to argue that aid can inadvertently increase each combatant's uncertainty about the other side's relative strength, thereby prolonging civil war.
Abstract: Humanitarian aid has rapidly emerged as a core component of modern peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. However, some practitioners and policymakers claim that humanitarian assistance may actually prolong conflict. The current debate about the effect of humanitarian aid on conflict underspecifies causal mechanisms and takes place largely through case studies. I use a bargaining framework to argue that aid can inadvertently increase each combatant's uncertainty about the other side's relative strength, thereby prolonging civil war. I test my argument using panel data on cross-national humanitarian aid expenditures. From 1989 to 2008, increased levels of humanitarian assistance lengthen civil wars, particularly those involving rebels on the outskirts of a state. This result suggests that policymakers need to carefully consider whether the specific benefits provided by humanitarian aid outweigh the risk of prolonging civil conflicts, and to look for methods of disbursement that reduce that risk.
73 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that the gender difference in trade preferences and attitudes about open markets is due to less favorable attitudes toward competition among women, less willingness to relocate for jobs among women and more isolationist noneconomic foreign policy attitudes among women.
Abstract: In this paper, we provide one of the first systematic analyses of gender's effect on trade attitudes. We draw on a unique representative national survey of American workers that allows us to evaluate a variety of potential explanations for gender differences in attitudes toward free trade and open markets more generally. We find that existing explanations for the gender gap, most notably differences between men and women in economic knowledge and differing material self-interests, do not explain the gap. Rather, the gender difference in trade preferences and attitudes about open markets is due to less favorable attitudes toward competition among women, less willingness to relocate for jobs among women, and more isolationist non-economic foreign policy attitudes among women.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that growth data submitted to international agencies are overstated by authoritarian regimes compared to democracies, and they call into question the estimated relationship between government type and economic growth found in the literature.
Abstract: Some recent papers have concluded that authoritarian regimes have faster economic growth than democracies. These supposed growth benefits of autocracies are estimated using data sets in which growth rates rely heavily on data reported by each government. Governments have incentives to exaggerate their economic growth figures, however, and authoritarian regimes may have fewer limitations than democracies on their ability to do so. This paper argues that growth data submitted to international agencies are overstated by authoritarian regimes compared to democracies. If true, it calls into question the estimated relationship between government type and economic growth found in the literature. To measure the degree to which each government's official growth statistics are overstated, the economic growth rates reported in the World Bank's World Development Indicators are compared to a new measure of economic growth based on satellite imaging of nighttime lights. This comparison reveals whether or not dictators exaggerate their true growth rates and by how much. Annual GDP growth rates are estimated to be overstated by 0.5–1.5 percentage points in the statistics that dictatorships report to the World Bank.
TL;DR: This article summarized and clarified the theoretical underpinnings of "reward-for-ratification" theories and test these propositions empirically by looking for increased international aid, economic agreements, and public praise and recognition following ratification of four prominent human rights treaties.
Abstract: Among the explanations for state ratification of human rights treaties, few are more common and widely accepted than the conjecture that states are rewarded for ratification by other states. These rewards are expected to come in the form of tangible benefits—foreign aid, trade, and investment—and intangible benefits such as praise, acceptance, and legitimacy. Surprisingly, these explanations for ratification have never been tested empirically. We summarize and clarify the theoretical underpinnings of “reward-for-ratification” theories and test these propositions empirically by looking for increased international aid, economic agreements, and public praise and recognition following ratification of four prominent human rights treaties. We find almost no evidence that states can expect increased tangible or intangible rewards after ratification. Given the lack of empirical support, alternative explanations seem more appealing for understanding human rights treaty ratification.
TL;DR: In this article, an interactive theory of relations between governments and electoral armed groups is developed, where the interaction of regime political interests and armed group autonomy leads to five distinct government-armed group trajectories, ranging from incorporation to violent conflict.
Abstract: Nonstate armed groups are often involved in electoral violence, but we know little about the origins or fates of these groups. This article develops an interactive theory of relations between governments and electoral armed groups. Governments assign different political roles to armed groups that reflect their ideological position and electoral value. State strategies flow from these political roles, but groups’ organizational capacity can allow them to resist government efforts to control, destroy, or incorporate them. The interaction of regime political interests and armed group autonomy leads to five distinct government-armed group trajectories, ranging from incorporation to violent conflict. I use comparative evidence from militarized elections in Karachi to illustrate the validity of the concepts and assess the power of the theory, while also exploring its limits and the need for future research. My argument and findings matter for our understanding of the linkages between democracy, civil conflict, and state power.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the democratic advantage literature (i) exaggerates the potential political backlash from credit downgrades in democracies; and (ii) overlooks the importance of sovereign credit to non-democratic leaders.
Abstract: In this article, we contend that the “democratic advantage” literature (i) exaggerates the potential political backlash from credit downgrades in democracies; and (ii) overlooks the importance of sovereign credit to nondemocratic leaders. We argue that nondemocratic regimes receive a higher marginal political benefit from credit compared to democratic regimes. Consequently, changes in credit prices or credit access affect nondemocratic leaders' tenure more than democratic leaders' tenure. To test this argument, we provide the first statistical examination of the electoral punishment mechanism of the “democratic advantage.” Our duration analysis shows that credit downgrades increase nondemocratic leaders' vulnerability more than that of their democratic peers. Our research reinforces the growing concerns about the conventional views about regime type, domestic constraints, and leaders' preferences toward sovereign credit and other political processes.
TL;DR: The early modern Indian Ocean international system hosted a variety of statist, corporate, and imperial polities as discussed by the authors, which created the potential for coexistence between unlike polities by congruent European and Asian ideas of heteronomy facilitated durable polity diversity.
Abstract: International Relations theories generally hold that increased interaction between units in an international system produces convergence in their forms through military competition, institutional emulation, or normative socialization. In contrast, we argue that diverse international systems can endure despite increasing interaction. The early modern Indian Ocean international system hosted a variety of statist, corporate, and imperial polities. Diversity endured for three reasons. First, powerful foreign and local actors held differing maritime and land-oriented preferences for conquest, which created the potential for coexistence between unlike polities. Second, congruent European and Asian ideas of heteronomy facilitated durable polity diversity. Third, strategies of localization enhanced enmeshment. Convergence on common polity forms failed to occur despite the presence of a statist model during this period. Subsequently, a reconfigured form of diversity under colonial empires succeeded this order. Greater attention to past diverse systems coheres with recent calls to study history to better understand not only contemporary instances of international hierarchy, but also unbundled and shared sovereignty regimes
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the relationship between depth and flexibility proves weaker for democracies than for nondemocracies, and when making deep agreements more flexible, countries also add strings to the use of additional flexibility provisions.
Abstract: Existing research indicates the interrelated nature of different dimensions of the design of international institutions. In particular, it shows the greater flexibility of deep agreements. We argue—and demonstrate empirically—that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility holds for preferential trade agreements (PTAs). But we add two qualifications to the conventional wisdom that depth and flexibility go hand in hand. First, we argue that the positive relationship between depth and flexibility proves weaker for democracies than for nondemocracies. Second, when making deep agreements more flexible, countries also add strings to the use of the additional flexibility provisions. An original data set on the design of 587 PTAs allows us to test our arguments. Both descriptive evidence and multivariate statistics support the theoretical expectations. The findings contribute to the literatures on the design of international institutions and the causes and consequences of PTAs.
TL;DR: The authors analyzed how independence affects foreign aid allocation patterns over the 1999-2010 period and found that in dependent and independent agencies, aid flows appear less responsive to presidential priorities and more responsive to indicators of need in the recipient country.
Abstract: How does the institutional design of a state's bureaucracy affect foreign policy? We argue that institutions can moderate bureaucrats' incentives to act in accordance with an Executive's diplomatic preferences. Where the Executive can influence budgets or career paths, bureaucrats face incentives to adopt her diplomatic goals as their own. Where agencies are shielded from Executive influence, bureaucrats are free to act independently in a bid to enhance their autonomy and their reputation for competence. To test these expectations, we develop a new measure of bureaucratic independence for the 15 aid-giving agencies in the US government. We analyze how independence affects foreign aid allocation patterns over the 1999–2010 period. We find that in “dependent” agencies, foreign aid flows track the diplomatic objectives of the president. In “independent” agencies, aid flows appear less responsive to presidential priorities and more responsive to indicators of need in the recipient country. Our results highlight limits on the diplomatic use of foreign aid and emphasize the importance of domestic institutional design. Our findings yield insight into a broad range of policy domains—including international finance, immigration, and the application of economic sanctions—where multiple government agencies are in charge of implementing foreign policy.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that language can influence investors' decision to allocate capital and demonstrate a significant and robust relationship between language and foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries.
Abstract: Does language choice attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and if so, how? We argue that language—a dynamic instrument for reducing transaction costs—can influence investors' decision to allocate capital. Potential host countries attract investments by coordinating their domestic language policies—especially those in education—to match the language of the potential FDI investor. We subject our argument to three different tests: (i) a cross-sectional sample of all global Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development investments that employs a newly constructed language-in-education measurement; (ii) a newly assembled time-series cross-sectional data set of all Chinese FDI abroad; and (iii) a detailed case study that uses process tracing to explain Chinese FDI in Indonesia. The results from these tests demonstrate a significant and robust relationship between language and FDI.
TL;DR: In this paper, the role of commitment institutions by which host countries can commit their protection of foreign assets is discussed, and it is argued that autocrats with long time horizons can provide stronger institutions to protect property rights, which allows them to attract more FDI.
Abstract: Why do some autocratic governments do better than others in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI)? The received wisdom holds that democracies enjoy advantages over autocracies when it comes to attracting FDI. But there exist autocratic countries that attract substantial amounts of FDI. For example, during the last two decades, about half of the top 20 non-OECD host countries are nondemocratic. Focusing on the role of commitment institutions by which host countries can commit their protection of foreign assets, I argue that autocrats with long time horizons can provide stronger institutions to protect property rights. This allows them to attract more FDI. Using an error correction model (EDM) covering autocratic countries from 1970 to 2008, I find evidence that strongly supports my argument. These findings suggest that what matters to foreign investors is not regime type per se but specific institutional features of the host country. Insofar as host countries provide sound institutions to protect foreign assets, they would be able to attract more foreign investment.
TL;DR: The authors found that rebel groups that do not primarily fight for a specific ethnic group, that receive outside military assistance, or that have relatively weak fighting capacity tend to fight in inconsistent locations.
Abstract: The fighting in some civil wars primarily takes place in a few stable locations, while the fighting in others moves substantially. We posit that rebel groups that do not primarily fight for a specific ethnic group, that receive outside military assistance, or that have relatively weak fighting capacity tend to fight in inconsistent locations. We develop new measures of conflict zone movement to test our hypotheses, based on shifts in the conflict polygons derived from the new Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Our empirical results provide support for the suggested mechanisms. We find that groups which lack strong ethnic ties and sufficient military strength to compete with government forces in conventional warfare fight in more varied locations. These findings improve our understandings of and expectations for variations in the humanitarian footprint of armed conflicts, the interdependencies between rebel groups and local populations, and the dilemmas faced by government counterinsurgency efforts.
TL;DR: In this article, a modified selectorate theory is proposed for air pollution control in core democracies and core democracies with large winning coalitions, considerable state capacity, and high regime stability.
Abstract: Selectorate theory proposes that authoritarian regimes supply fewer public goods than democracies. Smaller winning coalitions make it less costly for autocracies to maintain support among critical groups by providing private goods. Democracies, with large winning coalitions, find it cheaper to provide public goods. In contrast, we argue for a conditional effect of winning coalition size on public good provisions: Many public goods require considerable state capacity to plan, legislate, and implement. Moreover, leaders with short-term horizons are unlikely to invest in public goods that take considerable time to provide. Therefore, our modified selectorate theory suggests that governments will provide public goods if the size of the winning coalition is large enough, state capacity is great enough, and a priori regime durability is long enough. We test our theory on air pollution. While selectorate theory receives little empirical support, our findings cohere with modified selectorate theory. In particular, core democracies—defined as those with large winning coalitions, considerable state capacity, and high regime stability—perform better than autocracies in controlling air pollution.
TL;DR: This article examined what type of cross-national activities can socialize Moroccan state officials into democratic governance and found that, in authoritarian contexts, transnational linkage manifests the potential to democratize only if it involves practical experience, a condition fulfilled by cooperative exchange within transgovernmental networks, but not by more diffuse types of linkage such as international education and foreign media broadcasting.
Abstract: Does contact with democratic governance make state officials in authoritarian regimes more democratic? While studies of democratic diffusion are built on the inherent assumption that exposure to democratic practices shapes the attitudes of domestic actors toward democracy, scholars of international socialization are more skeptical about such micro-effects. Drawing on insights from sociology and social psychology, I examine what type of cross-national activities can socialize Moroccan state officials into democratic governance. The results of cross-sectional, multivariate regression analyses based on original survey data emphasize that, in authoritarian contexts, transnational linkage manifests the potential to democratize only if it involves practical experience, a condition fulfilled by cooperative exchange within transgovernmental networks, but not by more diffuse types of linkage such as international education and foreign media broadcasting.
TL;DR: The authors developed a historical-institutionalist theory of normative change centered on the notion of "prosecutorial momentum" and argued that the rise in domestic trials against rights-abusing state agents in Europe and Latin America results in large part from the cumulative efforts of victims and human rights lawyers utilizing their rights to private criminal prosecution.
Abstract: Over the last three decades, thousands of prosecutions for human rights abuses have progressed through domestic courts, a puzzling fact considering that state leaders have little incentive to punish their own agents. Previous studies have advanced rational-choice or sociological-institutionalist accounts of this phenomenon, emphasizing the role of political coalitions or regional cultures. Few, though, have recognized the local, private struggles that lie at the root of the trend toward domestic human rights enforcement. In this article, we develop a historical-institutionalist theory of normative change centered on the notion of “prosecutorial momentum.” We contend that the rise in domestic trials against rights-abusing state agents in Europe and Latin America results in large part from the cumulative efforts of victims and human rights lawyers utilizing their rights to private criminal prosecution. Using a new data set and mixed methods, we offer a systematic analysis of how rights to private criminal prosecution, when activated in response to a legacy of repression, helps set in motion sustained efforts to pursue domestic enforcement and compliance with international law.
TL;DR: In this article, a game-theoretic model of bargaining between a government and a rebel group is proposed, where decisions over war and peace occur in the shadow of increasing oil wealth that both increases national wealth and shifts relative power in the government's favor.
Abstract: Can the discovery of petroleum resources increase the risk of civil conflict even before their exploitation? We argue that it can, but only in poorer states where oil revenues threaten to alter the balance of power between regimes and their opponents, rendering bargains in the present obsolete in the future. We develop our claims via a game-theoretic model of bargaining between a government and a rebel group, where decisions over war and peace occur in the shadow of increasing oil wealth that both increases national wealth and shifts relative power in the government's favor. To test the model's main hypothesis, we leverage data on newly discovered oil deposits as an indicator of the state's expected future power resources. Our argument has important implications for the literature on credible commitments, power shifts, and violent conflict.
TL;DR: The authors argue that the advice and consent process sometimes slows or stalls because it imposes costs in terms of legislative time and political capital, and that these costs alter the calculus of key players and may obstruct the process.
Abstract: The United States often leads in the creation of treaties, but it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so only after considerable delay. This presents an interesting puzzle. Most international relations theory expects states to join treaties as long as the benefits outweigh the costs. Domestic theories modify this with the constraints of institutional veto players. Yet, sometimes neither of these arguments explains the delay or absence of US participation. We supplement these explanations with an opportunity cost theory. We argue that the advice and consent process sometimes slows or stalls because it imposes costs in terms of legislative time and political capital. These costs alter the calculus of key players and may obstruct the process. Statistical analysis supports the argument. The priority the Senate and President give to treaties depends not only on the value they assign to the treaty, but also on the value of the time needed to process the treaty. Presidents are less, not more, likely to transmit treaties to the Senate the more support they have in Congress. Furthermore, the more support the President has in Congress, the more the cost of Senate floor time matters for advice and consent.
TL;DR: This article argued that the pursuit of "ethnocratic" solutions not only runs contrary to American ideals, but it is also not pragmatic, in that it enables the creation of regimes that are fragile, divided, and often dependent on outside assistance to maintain peace.
Abstract: Individual political rights and civic national identity lie at the core of American democracy, and spreading democracy is a crucial component of American grand strategy. However, American policymakers have often supported the construction of rigid, group-rights-based institutions in ethno-religious conflicts even when the parties were not demanding such institutions. The pursuit of “ethnocratic” solutions not only runs contrary to American ideals, but it is also not pragmatic, in that it enables the creation of regimes that are fragile, divided, and often dependent on outside assistance to maintain peace. This article weighs hypotheses about the sources of foreign policy decision making stemming from three contending Weberian logics of social action: instrumental rationality, normative appropriateness, and habit. Drawing on causal-process observations during crucial decision moments in Bosnia and Iraq, I argue in favor of the plausibility of habit as a driver of U.S. foreign policy. This work furthers the theoretical development of the concept of habit, offers a means of studying social habits empirically, and suggests improvements for American foreign policy in ethnic conflict.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate whether the property rights of foreign direct investors matter to sovereign bondholders and find that when bondholders' and direct investors' preferences conflict, governments gain space to prioritize other goals over the protection of private property.
Abstract: We often presume that international financial actors have the same preferences, but this paper asks whether the property rights of foreign direct investors matter to sovereign bondholders. When governments expropriate direct investors, different investors' preferences could align over property rights issues. However, bondholders likely take positive signals if expropriation generates revenue for the state. Using a novel data set (1995–2011), I find that governments that earn revenue from expropriation can enjoy lower long-term spreads on sovereign bonds. Although governments that expropriate lose out on FDI, they can benefit by generating revenue and enjoying rewards in sovereign debt markets. Unpacking investor preferences thus reveals gaps in market-based informal property rights enforcement. When bondholders' and direct investors' preferences conflict, governments gain space to prioritize other goals over the protection of private property.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the impact of military unit composition on desertion in civil wars and argue that military units face an increased risk of desertion if they cannot develop norms of cooperation.
Abstract: This article examines the impact of military unit composition on desertion in civil wars. I argue that military units face an increased risk of desertion if they cannot develop norms of cooperation. This is a challenging task in the context of divided and ambiguous individual loyalties found in civil wars. Norms of cooperation emerge, above all, from soldiers sending each other costly signals of their commitment. Social and factional ties also shape these norms, albeit in a more limited fashion. Hence, unit composition can serve as an intervening variable explaining how collective aims can sometimes induce individual soldiers to keep fighting. Analyzing original data from the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), I demonstrate that three characteristics of a military unit's composition—the presence of conscripts rather than volunteers, social heterogeneity (whose effect is found to be limited to volunteer units), and polarization among factions—increase the individual soldier's propensity to desert. Unit composition proves at least as important as individual characteristics when explaining desertion. This analysis indicates the usefulness of moving beyond commonly used atomistic understandings of combatant behavior. Instead, it suggests the importance of theoretical microfoundations that emphasize norms of cooperation among groups of combatants.
TL;DR: This article found that ex-combatants are more satisfied with DDR when their income-generating activity is based on DDR job training and when the UN has a large presence in their area.
Abstract: Successful management of combatants through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) remains one of the main challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding. While DDR is meant to contribute to a secure post-conflict environment conducive to economic and political development, the success of DDR efforts remains mixed. Unlike previous work focusing on procedural aspects or post-conflict reconstruction and development, we shift the focus to understand microlevel conditions—economic, security, and ethnic concerns—that influence ex-combatants' satisfaction with DDR. We argue that ex-combatant satisfaction with DDR should increase as individual-level economic conditions increase, as security situations improve, and as ethnic tensions decrease. We test our expectations using an original data set collected with field interviews and surveys from 122 ex-combatants in South Sudan in 2011–2012. We find that participants are more satisfied when their income-generating activity is based on DDR job training and when the UN has a large presence in their area. Concerns about political instability and an abundance of firearms make ex-combatants less satisfied with DDR.