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Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 2020"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset as mentioned in this paper provides information on the parent organizations and the founding processes that gave rise to rebel groups active between 1946 and 2011 in intrastate conflicts included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Database.
Abstract: Scholars have spent decades investigating various sources of rebellion, from societal and institutional explanations to individual motivations to take up arms against one's government. One element of the civil war process that has gone largely unstudied from a cross-national perspective is the role preexisting organizations in society play in the formation of rebel groups, principally due to a lack of comparable data on the origins of these armed actors across conflicts. In an effort to fill this gap, we present the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset, which offers information on the “parent” organizations and the founding processes that gave rise to rebel groups active between 1946 and 2011 in intrastate conflicts included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Database. The new information on rebel foundations introduced in this research note should help scholars to reconsider and newly explore a variety of conditions before, during, and after civil wars including rebel-civilian interactions, structures of rebel organizations, bargaining processes with the government, participation in postwar governance, and more.

56 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In a recent article, Gibler, Miller, and Little as mentioned in this paper reviewed GML's drop and merge recommendations and reevaluated the substantive impact of their changes and concluded that the remaining differences in inference stemming from the variations in the MID data are rare and modest in scope.
Abstract: In a recent article, Gibler, Miller, and Little (2016) (GML) conduct an extensive review of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data between the years 1816 and 2001, highlighting possible inaccuracies and recommending a substantial number of changes to the data. They contend that, in several instances, analyses with their revised data lead to substantively different inferences. Here, we review GML's MID drop and merge recommendations and reevaluate the substantive impact of their changes. We are in agreement with about 76 percent of the recommended drops and merges. However, we find that some of the purported overturned findings in GML's replications are not due to their data, but rather to the strategies they employ for replication. We reexamine these findings and conclude that the remaining differences in inference stemming from the variations in the MID data are rare and modest in scope.

35 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop and test two hypotheses: (1) states adopt NGO restrictions in response to nonarmed bottom-up threats in their regional environment (learning from threats) and (2) states adopted NGO restrictions through imitation of the legislative behavior of other states in their region.
Abstract: Recent decades have witnessed a global cascade of restrictive and repressive measures against nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). We theorize that state learning from observing the regional environment, rather than NGO growth per se or domestic unrest, explains this rapid diffusion of restrictions. We develop and test two hypotheses: (1) states adopt NGO restrictions in response to nonarmed bottom-up threats in their regional environment (“learning from threats”); (2) states adopt NGO restrictions through imitation of the legislative behavior of other states in their regional environment (“learning from examples”). Using an original dataset on NGO restrictions in ninety-six countries over a period of twenty-five years (1992–2016), we test these hypotheses by means of negative binomial regression and survival analyses, using spatially weighted techniques. We find very limited evidence for learning from threats, but consistent evidence for learning from examples. We corroborate this finding through close textual comparison of laws adopted in the Middle East and Africa, showing legal provisions being taken over almost verbatim from one law into another. In our conclusion, we spell out the implications for the quality of democracy and for theories of transition to a postliberal order, as well as for policy-makers, lawyers, and civil-society practitioners.

34 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of self-legitimation in international organizations is proposed, which argues that the need for self- legitimation depends on the degree of identity cohesion and identity hierarchy of the organization.
Abstract: Most analyses of legitimacy and legitimation in international organizations (IOs) focus on the perceptions of external audiences. In so doing, they fail to consider self-legitimation, where an IO undertakes legitimation internally, as a way of developing and reinforcing its identity. Moreover, most studies of IO legitimacy neglect the fact that IO identities are rarely uniform and instead are multiple and conflicting. I address these omissions by examining self-legitimation in three IOs—the UN, NATO, and the World Bank. These organizations are both operational and normative actors, and both institutions dependent on member states and autonomous bodies with independent expertise and capacities. These identities sometimes dictate contradictory goals and practices, forcing the organizations to violate the principles and activities considered appropriate to one of their identities, thus complicating legitimation. Based upon extensive fieldwork and drawing on a range of disciplines, this paper proposes a novel theory of IO self-legitimation: I argue that the need for self-legitimation depends on the degree of identity cohesion and identity hierarchy of the organization. I identify two temporal dimensions of self-legitimation, three categories of self-legitimation practices, and three broader repercussions of self-legitimation, ultimately showing that self-legitimation is a necessary and constitutive activity for IOs.

27 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop a detailed conceptualization of trust in chairs of global negotiations and demonstrate its impact in two cases of United Nations negotiations that aimed to deliver a universal deal on climate change: the failed 2009 round in Copenhagen, and the 2015 round that culminated in the adoption of the Paris Agreement.
Abstract: Trust in the chairs of global negotiations is a decisive factor facilitating successful outcomes. When negotiators trust the chair, they allow her to go beyond her formal procedural role by acting as a mediator, fostering the reaching of agreement. Negotiating parties must consent to a chair assuming substantive mediation functions. They cede parts of their control over the process to the chair when they are confident that the chair is competent and acts in good faith and everyone's interest. In this article, we develop a detailed conceptualization of trust in chairs of global negotiations and demonstrate its impact in two cases of United Nations negotiations that aimed to deliver a universal deal on climate change: the failed 2009 round in Copenhagen, and the 2015 round that culminated in the adoption of the Paris Agreement.

24 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a new global database of government-sponsored restrictions on civil society organizations is presented, showing that when governments have committed to human rights treaties and, at the same time, continue to commit severe human rights abuses, they impose restrictions on groups to avoid monitoring and mitigate the international costs of abuses.
Abstract: Research suggests that civil society mobilization together with the ratification of human rights treaties put pressure on governments to improve their human rights practices. An unexplored theoretical implication is that pressure provokes counterpressure. Instead of improving treaty compliance, some governments will have an interest in demobilizing civil society to silence their critics. Yet we do not know how and to what extent this incentive shapes governments’ policies and practices regarding civil society organizations. In this article we argue and show—using a new global database of government-sponsored restrictions on civil society organizations—that when governments have committed to human rights treaties and, at the same time, continue to commit severe human rights abuses, they impose restrictions on civil society groups to avoid monitoring and mitigate the international costs of abuses.

22 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory note develops a theoretical approach which integrates the negative spillovers that international institutions often impose on each other into our thinking about their normative legitimacy, drawing on the political philosophy of Rainer Forst which revolves around the right to justification.
Abstract: This theory note develops a theoretical approach which integrates the negative spillovers that international institutions often impose on each other into our thinking about their normative legitimacy. Our approach draws on the political philosophy of Rainer Forst which revolves around the right to justification. It suggests that regime complexes facilitate the breakup of institution-specific orders of justification by prompting invested actors to justify negative spillovers vis-a-vis each other. Thus, regime complexes enable more encompassing justifications of negative spillovers than stand-alone international institutions. Against this backdrop, we submit that the proliferation of regime complexes represents normative progress in global governance.

21 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the question of whether international courts become more restrained in their rulings in order to keep their traditional liberal democ- racies on board, and evaluate two mechanisms: gov- ernments that are critical of the Court may nominate more deferential judges.
Abstract: International courts are increasingly facing backlash from consolidated liberal democ- racies. Do international courts become more restrained in their rulings in order to keep their traditional allies on board? We examine this question in the context of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). We evaluate two mechanisms. First, gov- ernments that are critical of the Court may nominate more deferential judges. Second, judges may behave in a more deferential way towards consolidated democracies in order to prevent future backlash. We evaluate these ideas with a new dataset of all ECtHR judgments. We estimate ideal-point models based on dissenting opinions and nd that governments have indeed started to appoint more restrained judges. Five of the Court's six most restrained judges were appointed after the 2012 Brighton conference, which strongly signaled a preference for restraint. We then use matching and a di erence-in- di erences design to estimate changes in the Court's restraint versus the United Kingdom and other consolidated democracies. We nd strong evidence of a new variable geometry, in which consolidated democracies are increasingly given more deference compared to non-consolidated democracies. The United Kingdom is an especially large bene ciary. However, we do not nd that applicants belonging to vulnerable minorities, such as prisoners and refugees, have been disproportionally a ected by the ECtHR's increased restraint towards consolidated democracies.

21 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a comparative large-N analysis of international organizations' commitments to liberal norms is presented, based on a unique dataset on IO policy decisions over the time period 1980-2015.
Abstract: Recent decades have witnessed the emergence and spread of a broad range of liberal norms in global governance, among them sustainable development, gender equality, and human security While existing scholarship tells us a lot about the trajectories of particular norms, we know much less about the broader patterns and sources of commitments to liberal norms by international organizations (IOs) This article offers the first comparative large-N analysis of such commitments, building on a unique dataset on IO policy decisions over the time period 1980-2015 Distinguishing between deep norm commitment and shallow norm recognition, the analysis produces several novel findings We establish that IOs' deeper commitments to liberal norms primarily are driven by internal conditions: democratic memberships and institutional designs more conducive to norm entrepreneurship In contrast, legitimacy standards in the external environment of IOs, often invoked in existing research, mainly account for shallower recognition or "talk" of norms

21 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the effect of mining on local economic well-being is largely driven by different control rights regimes, since national mining companies promote more backward economic linkages and have higher incentives to engage in local capacity building.
Abstract: The quantitative evidence on whether extractive industries generate economic wealth at the local level is far from conclusive. In line with recent studies highlighting the moderating role of institutions and governance structures in the resource–development nexus, we argue that the effect of mining on local economic well-being is largely driven by different control rights regimes. We claim that domestic mineral production stimulates local income more than internationally controlled extraction, since national mining companies promote more backward economic linkages and have higher incentives to engage in local capacity building. To test our micro-level arguments, we combine information on districts’ economic well-being as well as individual's assessments of their personal economic situation with our own dataset on the control rights of copper, gold, and diamond mines. Relying on these data, we perform district- and individual-level analyses of sub-Saharan Africa covering the period from 1997 to 2015. Our instrumental variable estimations and fixed effects models show that the presence of domestic mining companies is associated with increased local wealth. Multinational firms, by contrast, are linked to increased regional unemployment. They largely fail to promote subnational economic well-being.

20 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a theory of emotional labor is proposed to explain the power of international bureaucrats and bureaucracies in world politics. But it is only applied to the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Abstract: This article advances a theory on the power of international bureaucrats and bureaucracies in world politics. It argues that bureaucrats become powerful when they stage emotionally calibrated performances as “servants” before state principals and carve out space for action through “whispering,” “propagating,” cultivating patrons, and building coalitions in the backstage of official interaction. These “servant” performances involve what sociologist Arlie Hochschild calls “emotional labor”—the management of feelings in work performances. I develop a theory of emotional labor that suggests why international bureaucrats manage emotions as they perform as servants and why some bureaucrats with prized sociological profiles are empowered on the back of “confident” servant performances. In contrast to principal–agent, constructivist, and psychological accounts, this is a micro-sociological explanation for bureaucratic power. I evaluate this theory with an ethnography of the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—a “least likely” case for bureaucratic power under prevailing theorizations. I also demonstrate how the ASEAN case is a sharper instance of a more general phenomenon. This article advances the study of emotions and emotional labor, the role of social class in shaping competent practice, and the debate on the power of bureaucrats and international organizations in international relations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors analyzed the patterns of the International Department of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC) external relations since the early 2000s and found that party relations not only serve as an additional channel to advance China's foreign policy interests, but also emerged as a key instrument to promote China's vision for reforming the global order.
Abstract: This paper addresses a largely overlooked actor in China's foreign relations, the International Department of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC). Using publicly available documentation, we systematically analyze the patterns of the CPC's external relations since the early 2000s. Building on an intense travel diplomacy, the ID-CPC maintains a widely stretched network to political elites across the globe. The ID-CPC's engagement is not new; but since Xi Jinping took office, the CPC has bolstered its efforts to reach out to other parties. We find that party relations not only serve as an additional channel to advance China's foreign policy interests. Since President Xi has come to power, party relations also emerged as a key instrument to promote China's vision for reforming the global order. Moreover, China increasingly uses the party channel as a vehicle of authoritarian learning by sharing experiences of its economic modernization and authoritarian one-party regime. The cross-regional analysis of the CPC's engagement with other parties helps us to better understand the role of the CPC in Chinese foreign policy-making, pointing to a new research agenda at the intersection of China's foreign relations, authoritarian diffusion, and transnational relations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a measure of surplus domestic product (SDP) is proposed to correct the measurement error by decomposing subsistence income and surplus income from total GDP, which is used to measure the distribution of power resources.
Abstract: Scholars systematically mismeasure power resources and military burdens by using gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy for the income states can devote to arming. The core problem is that GDP confounds two conceptually distinct forms of income into one additive indicator. Subsistence income represents resources needed to provide the “bread” necessary to cover the basic subsistence needs of the population. Surplus income represents the remaining resources that could be allocated to “guns” or “butter.” Our new measure of surplus domestic product (SDP) corrects for this measurement error by decomposing subsistence income and surplus income from total GDP. Validation exercises demonstrate that SDP outperforms GDP at measuring the distribution of power resources. Though theoretically we expect states’ decisions to arm are influenced by the distribution of power; empirical models using GDP find mixed support for this expectation. Strikingly, using SDP reveals strong support for this proposition.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that the United States uses reassurance to discourage its allies from seeking outside options and reducing their dependence on the alliance, and test the theory using a new cross-national dataset of US. statements of reassurance from 1950 to 2010.
Abstract: The United States frequently reassures allies of its protection by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, and making public statements. Yet the causes of reassurance in asymmetric alliances—those between a great power patron and its weaker allies—are understudied in the academic literature. Indeed, many scholars argue that reassurance can be counterproductive as it invites allies to free ride or provoke their adversaries, knowing that they have their patron's support. Despite the drawbacks, I argue that the United States use reassurance to discourage their allies from seeking outside options and reducing their dependence on the alliance. Patrons such as the United States thus face a dilemma wherein they trade-off between withholding reassurance for short-term leverage and using reassurance to preserve their long-term influence. I test the theory using a new cross-national dataset of US. statements of reassurance from 1950 to 2010, and the results provide stronger support for my hypotheses than for the competing explanations of deterrence, strength from desperation, and shared preferences. The findings have implications for understanding how great powers manage their alliances, and suggest a pathway through which weaker states can shape great powers’ foreign commitments.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that despite the common reference to international humanitarian law (IHL) in the discourse and practice of international politics, international relations (IR) scholarship has yet to consistently engage in an analysis of IHL that extends beyond the relatively narrow specifications of its regulative and strategic effects.
Abstract: Despite the common reference to international humanitarian law (IHL) in the discourse and practice of international politics, international relations (IR) scholarship has yet to consistently engage in an analysis of IHL that extends beyond the relatively narrow specifications of its regulative and strategic effects. In this theory note, we argue that this prevailing focus leaves the discipline with an impoverished understanding of IHL and its operation in international politics. We propose that the study of IHL should be expanded through a deeper engagement with the law's historical development, the politics informing its codification and interpretation, and its multiple potential effects beyond compliance. This accomplishes three things. First, it corrects for IR's predominantly ahistorical approach to evaluating both IHL and compliance, revealing the complicated, contested, and productive construction of some of IHL's core legal concepts and rules. Second, our approach illuminates how IR's privileging of civilian targeting requires analytical connection to other rules such as proportionality and military necessity, none of which can be individually assessed and each of which remain open to debate. Third, we provide new resources for analyzing and understanding IHL and its contribution to “world making and world ordering.”

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a causal mediation model was used to examine whether information campaigns of nongovernmental human rights organizations (HROs) to name and shame human rights violators improve human rights conditions.
Abstract: How can information campaigns of nongovernmental human rights organizations (HROs) to “name and shame” human rights violators improve human rights conditions? Is the effect direct—does HRO targeting induce violating states to change their behavior? Or is the effect indirect—does pressure by third parties mediate the relationship between HRO actions and changes in human rights practices? The boomerang and spiral models suggest HRO activity provokes third parties, such as other states and international organizations, to pressure violating states. This pressure, in turn, drives violating states to improve human rights conditions. On the other hand, recent empirical work finds third-party pressure can further degrade human rights conditions. In this paper we provide a comprehensive analysis of how these individual factors—HRO activities and pressure from third parties—work together in the larger chain of causal events influencing human rights conditions. Using a causal mediation model, we examine whether HRO campaigning improves human rights directly or if the effect is mediated by costs imposed by powerful actors through sanctions and military interventions. We find that, although HRO activities have an overall positive effect on human rights conditions, the negative effects of third-party pressure somewhat diminish the positive effects.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the answer lies with domestic and international civil society actors, who are connected by a global transitional justice network and who share the burden of guiding commission adoption and design.
Abstract: Since 1970, scores of states have established truth commissions to document political violence. Despite their prevalence and potential consequence, the question of why commissions are adopted in some contexts, but not in others, is not well understood. Relatedly, little is known about why some commissions possess strong investigative powers while others do not. I argue that the answer to both questions lies with domestic and international civil society actors, who are connected by a global transitional justice (TJ) network and who share the burden of guiding commission adoption and design. I propose that commissions are more likely to be adopted where network members can leverage information and moral authority over governments. I also suggest that commissions are more likely to possess strong powers where international experts, who steward TJ best practices, advise governments. I evaluate these expectations by analyzing two datasets in the novel Varieties of Truth Commissions Project, interviews with representatives from international non-governmental organizations, interviews with Guatemalan non-governmental organization leaders, a focus group with Argentinian human rights advocates, and a focus group at the International Center for Transitional Justice. My results indicate that network members share the burden—domestic members are essential to commission adoption, while international members are important for strong commission design.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper investigated whether female political empowerment is conducive to civil peace, drawing on global data on female empowerment over a 200-year period, from the Varieties of Democracy database, and found a strong link between women political empowerment and civil peace.
Abstract: This paper investigates whether female political empowerment is conducive to civil peace, drawing on global data on female political empowerment over a 200 year period, from the Varieties of Democracy database. We augment previous research by expanding the temporal scope, looking at a novel inventory of female empowerment measures, attending to reverse-causality and omitted variable issues, and separating between relevant causal mechanisms. We find a strong link between female political empowerment and civil peace, which is particularly pronounced in the 20th century. When studying mechanisms, we find that this relationship is driven both by women’s political participation and the culture that conduces it. To draw causal inferences, we estimate instrumental variable models and perform causal sensitivity tests. This is the strongest evidence to date that there is a robust link between female political empowerment and civil peace, stemming from both institutional and cultural mechanisms.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The emergent flexibility as discussed by the authors is a property of international institutions that is not intentionally crafted by rule-makers when a rule is formally established, but is subsequently discovered, activated, and accessed by creative rule-users in ways unintended by designers.
Abstract: How do formal international institutions change and adjust to new circumstances? The conventional wisdom in International Relations (IR), outlined by rational design, is that the answer lies in designed flexibility, which allows states to adjust agreements. Drawing on rich but disparate literatures across subfields of political science — especially constructivism and historical institutionalism — we propose an alternative, which we call “emergent flexibility.” Emergent flexibility is a property of international institutions that is not intentionally crafted by rule-makers when a rule is formally established, but is subsequently discovered, activated, and accessed by creative rule-users in ways unintended by designers. Rich case studies trace how rule-users have accessed emergent flexibility through the legal interpretive strategy of subsequent practice to change rigid rules of the UN Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights. A key implication of emergent flexibility is that, contrary to rational design expectations, international institutions designed to be rigid can adjust to unforeseen circumstances even in the absence of formal redesign, allowing cooperation to continue. The broadening of flexibility from designed to emergent reveals the politics of flexibility between formal design moments, provides a more nuanced notion of intentionality, and equips us to better address fundamental positive and normative questions of institutional development.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Aspiration is an essential component of politics and articulates goals, affirms identities and values, and structures action at all levels of social life as mentioned in this paper. But aspiration also has a dark side and can be manipulated to dodge accountability, postpone action, and to serve private, rather than public, goals.
Abstract: Aspiration is an essential component of politics. It articulates goals, affirms identities and values, and structures action at all levels of social life. Yet political scientists have spent little time theorizing aspiration - what it is, how it relates to other concepts, and the kinds of effects it creates. In this paper, we develop the concept theoretically and argue that aspiration creates a distinct “aspirational politics” that differs from our international relations (IR) models of both norm-driven social activism and interest-driven rational choice. We identify three core features of aspiration that undergird its theoretical utility: lofty goals, change over time, and transformation through imagination. In the hands of skilled political actors, aspiration does essential work in both facilitating agreement and mobilizing social action that create change in the world. But aspiration also has a dark side and can be manipulated to dodge accountability, postpone action, and to serve private, rather than public, goals.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined how transnational ties increase support for foreign aid via two mechanisms: group interests and cosmopolitanism, and found that Latinos with transnational connections equally support aid to Africa and Latin America.
Abstract: Although globalization and international migration have increased personal connections across national borders, we know little about how these connections a↵ect attitudes towards foreign policy. This study examines how transnational ties a↵ect support for foreign aid in donor countries. It argues that transnational ties increase support for foreign aid via two mechanisms: group interests and cosmopolitanism. An original survey experiment embedded in a national survey of 1,000 Latino Americans shows that Latinos vary significantly in the strength of their transnational ties, which is strongly correlated with support for foreign aid. The findings from the experiment, which varies the location of an American foreign aid program, demonstrate that although group interests explain some of this e↵ect, cosmopolitanism is also an important mechanism. Indeed, Latinos with transnational ties equally support aid to Africa and Latin America. A test of the generalizability of the findings to other racial and ethnic groups in the United States and United Kingdom reveal that group interests may be a more powerful mechanism outside of the Latino American community. This study encourages further work on the relationship between transnational ties and foreign policy attitudes and provides insight into the emerging link between international migration and foreign aid.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper developed a theory of hegemonic components of national identity that links institutionalized white supremacy to the differential treatment of non-white perpetrators, even when they are deemed terrorists, through a process of institutional reproduction.
Abstract: Despite the recent global uptick in white supremacist terrorism, governments continue to face accusations of not taking the threat seriously, either discursively or in terms of policy responses. Why do acts of white supremacist violence consistently fail to constitute turning points for policy change? Rather than considering acts of political violence as critical junctures for change, I argue that such acts instead reveal how persistent institutions of power actually are. I develop a theory of hegemonic components of national identity that links institutionalized white supremacy to the differential treatment of non-white perpetrators, even when they are deemed terrorists, through a process of institutional reproduction. Drawing on interviews with German national security elites, I show that even when white supremacist violence is treated as terrorism, both legally and discursively, it does not engender policy responses and attitudinal changes on par with those following other terrorist threats.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a dynamic theory of civilian control over the military is proposed, arguing that control of the military can be achieved once civilianized institutions are adopted and sufficient time has passed to permit the development of a shared norm for civilian control within the military and learning among military elites that fosters a belief that civilian rule is robust to military challenges.
Abstract: How do civilians prevent their militaries from engaging in politics? Scholars are divided in their answer to this question, with some highlighting the constraining effects of political institutions and others emphasizing the importance of norms of civilian control. We integrate these two approaches and develop a dynamic theory of civilian control, arguing that control over the military is achieved once civilianized institutions are adopted and sufficient time has passed to permit: (1) the development of a shared norm of civilian control within the military; and (2) learning among military elites that fosters a belief that civilian rule is robust to military challenges. As a result, civilian control is self-reinforcing. We evaluate these claims by developing a latent variable model that tests for the presence of self-reinforcing institutional dynamics. We generate estimates of civilian control for all countries, 1945-2010 and find strong support for our expectations. In the summer of 2016, Turkish military personnel seized control of the Bosphorus bridges as jets flew overhead in Ankara. Members of the armed forces were attempting to oust President Recep Tayyip Erdŏgan from office. Although it quickly failed, the coup attempt took many by surprise. The years of rampant military intervention in politics appeared to have been over in Turkey. The previous two decades were characterized by stable civilian rule, enough time to suggest that the democratic regime should have consolidated itself from such challenges (Huntington, 1993; Svolik, 2015). The conventional wisdom was that Erdŏgan successfully defanged the military as a source of political opposition (Hannah, 2016; The Economist, 2016). Yet, as these events demonstrate, the military is seldom tamed easily. Why were observers so surprised by the Turkish coup attempt and why does control of the military remain tenuous in regimes where seemingly strong civilian institutions have been established? These questions are central to our understanding of civilian control, defined here in terms of the extent to which civilians dominate political decision-making within a polity, and the robustness of this dominance to military involvement in politics.1 Existing answers to this question broadly originate from two theoretical frameworks. The first is institutionalist and understands civilian control as an outcome behavior emerging from civilian and military elites pursuing unique interests within a fixed institutional setting. Civilian control is achieved when the structure of political institutions is such that the preferences of civilian elites dominate those of the military. This approach links civilian control with political regimes where civilians enjoy a monopoly on de facto, if not de jure authority over members of the armed forces.2 While this provides a robust and generalizable means of understanding civilian control across polities, it ignores the fact that 1For definitions of civilian control relating to civil-military preference divergence and policy implementation and compliance see Feaver (1999, 2003), and Desch (1999). 2 For qualitative examples of institutional typologies of civilian control see Nordlinger (1977); Stepan (1988); Welch (1976); and Colton (1979). The quantitative literature has employed a variety of regime type indicators and indexes to capture this construct (Poe and Tate, 1994; Lai and Slater, 2006; Sechser, 2004; Weeks, 2008, 2012; Talmadge, 2015). Game theoretic treatments of civil-military interactions as a single-iteration game also assume a fixed institutional setting, though recent work has begun to incorporate temporal dynamics into formal models of military coups (Little, 2016).

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a novel theoretical framework that combines insights from realist and constructivist theory with lessons from institutionalist theory and bargaining theory is proposed to examine the UN Security Council's agenda-setting speed.
Abstract: The UN Security Council (UNSC) can respond to a civil conflict only if that conflict first enters the Council’s agenda. Some conflicts reach the Council’s agenda within days after they start, others after years (or even decades), and some never make it. So far, only a few studies have looked at the crucial UNSC agenda-setting stage, and none have examined agenda-setting speed. To fill this important gap, we develop and test a novel theoretical framework that combines insights from realist and constructivist theory with lessons from institutionalist theory and bargaining theory. Applying survival analysis to an original dataset, we show that the parochial interests of the permanent (P-5) members matter, but they do not determine the Council’s agenda-setting speed. Rather, P-5 interests are constrained by normative considerations and concerns for the Council’s organizational mission arising from the severity of a conflict (in terms of spillover effects and civilian casualties); by the interests of the widely ignored elected members (E-10); and by the degree of preference heterogeneity both among the P-5 and the E-10. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of how the UN works, and they have implications for the UN’s legitimacy.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore whether border fortifications provide security against the international spread of violent militancy, and they find that although barriers can reduce the likelihood that militant activity diffuses across international borders, their effectiveness is conditional upon the roughness of the terrain on which they are built and the level of infrastructure development in their proximity.
Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, walls, fences, and fortifications have been constructed on interstate borders at a rapid rate. It remains unclear, however, whether these fortifications provide effective security. We explore whether border fortifications provide security against the international spread of violent militancy. Although barriers can reduce the likelihood that militant activity diffuses across international borders, their effectiveness is conditional upon the roughness of the terrain on which they are built and the level of infrastructure development in their proximity. Barriers require intensive manpower to monitor and patrol, and so conditions like rough terrain and poor infrastructure render security activity more difficult. However, rebels and other militants prefer to operate in such difficult areas, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of barriers in containing the international spread of violent militancy. Analyses on newly collated data on interstate border fortifications within a global sample of contiguous-state directed-dyad-years show that border fortifications are only effective in limiting the diffusion of militancy in contexts in which states can plausibly monitor and police their borders. This paper has significant implications for the academic literatures on national security and intrastate conflict, and it also speaks to the broader policy debate over border walls and fences.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article argued that the Central Asian elites have developed the institution of authoritarianism in their region through the mechanisms of mimicry/emulation and praise/blame, and they have been using the new elements of the "democratic transition" in combination with the traditional legitimation offered by diplomatic recognition to secure authoritarian regimes in the democratic age, to create authoritarian state-centric solidarity in the region, and to make "avtoritet" and "stabil'nost' fundamental pillars of Central Asian regional order.
Abstract: While much of the English School has focused on liberal aspects of solidarism, forms of “illiberal solidarism” in contemporary international society remain underexplored. Drawing on archival material and elite interviews conducted in Central Asia in the period 2013–2019, this paper advances the claim that the Central Asian elites have developed the institution of authoritarianism in their region through the mechanisms of mimicry/emulation and praise/blame. By looking at specific discourses and practices over the last two decades, the paper discusses how the Central Asian governments have been using the new elements of the “democratic transition” in combination with the traditional legitimation offered by diplomatic recognition to secure authoritarian regimes in the democratic age, to create authoritarian state-centric solidarity in the region, and to make “avtoritet” and “stabil'nost'” fundamental pillars of the Central Asian regional order. The paper contributes to the English School literature by providing an initial account of illiberal solidarism and by showing how authoritarianism can potentially be an institution of specific regional international societies; to the authoritarian diffusion literature by demonstrating that authoritarianism can have a deontic component alongside considerations of domestic survival; and to the broader norm diffusion literature by focusing on the spread of illiberal values.

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TL;DR: This article showed that a belief in lost jobs is more strongly associated with trade preferences than with lower prices, and that consumers tend to discount these benefits due to media coverage of the employment costs and loss aversion, thus it appears more effective to prime pro-trade attitudes by appealing to jobs than to prices.
Abstract: This article explores why citizens favor protection despite the economic case for free trade. It argues that due to a lack of training and in an environment of stable prices, many individuals are not aware of the consumption benefits. Even when they are aware, citizens tend to discount these benefits due to media coverage of the employment costs and loss aversion. The article presents survey evidence from an American sample, showing that a belief in lost jobs is more strongly associated with trade preferences than a belief in lower prices. Given that the former pushes citizens toward less favorable trade attitudes, it also presents evidence from a priming experiment, testing if attitudes can be moved in a more favorable direction with positive information. Factual information about the consumer benefits has no effect, but information about the employment effects shifts attitudes positively. In the present environment, it thus appears more effective to prime pro-trade attitudes by appealing to jobs than to prices.

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TL;DR: The authors argue that the global health and security literatures are better served by an explicit consideration of risk and security logics in interplay, or never entirely encompassed by the other, nor in complete alignment, yet never truly separate.
Abstract: The logic of “risk” is increasingly important in the study of global health politics. One recent contribution has even argued that risk is beginning to replace security as the defining logic of health governance and policy. Others dispute this on the basis that risk and security have always operated together in the “securitization” of disease. This article constitutes a theoretical intervention into this burgeoning debate. Does a stronger appreciation of risk warrant the diminishment of security? Are we looking at the “riskification” of health rather than “securitization”? Or would this miss the way these two logics might be complimentary or intertwined in ways that we are yet to theorize? I argue that the global health and securitization literatures are better served by an explicit consideration of risk and security logics in interplay, or never entirely encompassed by the other, nor in complete alignment, yet never truly separate. To do this, I propose a reconceptualization of the central problem—exceptionalism—that allows for risk to be understood as a form of exceptionalist politics. I demonstrate the validity of this approach through an otherwise “easy case” of securitization: the US response to the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa.

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TL;DR: This paper argued that the politics and governance of sexuality have maintained a "divided world" from the nineteenth century to the twenty-first century, transforming from a hetero-to a homocolonial standard of civilization.
Abstract: In recent years, acceptance and tolerance of homosexuality has become symbolic of Western liberal, social, and political progress. This has been noted in discussions on homonormativity, homonationalism, and homocolonialism. While some of these discussions have touched on the intersections between sexuality, race, gender, and class, this article argues that this relationship has been historically produced as a standard of civilization. It notes that the politics and governance of sexuality, and its intersections with race, gender, and class, have historical relevance in producing social and political exclusions. In building this argument, the article considers how the politics and governance of sexuality have maintained a “divided world,” from the nineteenth century to the twenty-first century, transforming from a hetero- to a homocolonial standard of civilization. It draws from a number of examples, from the nineteenth century to the contemporary period, using a diverse set of materials, including ethnographic research, fieldwork, and historical documents to explain temporal and geographic connections regarding the politics of sexuality.

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TL;DR: Kotsadam et al. as mentioned in this paper used spatial-temporal techniques to assess how FDI impacts individual corruption experiences and found evidence that FDI flows reduce individual bribery experiences, but only when existing levels of corruption are high.
Abstract: It remains unclear if foreign direct investment (FDI) benefits local citizens in host countries. Combining geo-referenced FDI data and household level surveys, this paper uses spatialtemporal techniques to assess how FDI impacts individual corruption experiences. We investigate if this relationship is conditional on the corruption levels, or engagement with the OECD’s anti-bribery convention (ABC), of the FDI’s source country. We find evidence that FDI flows reduce individual bribery experiences, but only when existing levels of corruption are high. We find it is FDI from comparatively more corrupt, and non-ABC engaging, countries that locates to areas of high corruption. Further, FDI appears to improve both the employment prospects and financial positions of local households. Collectively, we argue that these results suggest that individual empowerment via a wealth effect, rather than spillovers from firm professionalization or regulatory pressure mechanisms, is what stems individual corruption experiences. Samuel Brazys (samuel.brazys@ucd.ie) is Associate Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin. Andreas Kotsadam (andreas.kotsadam@frisch.uio.no ) is Senior Research Fellow at the Ragnar Firsch Centre for Economic Research. The authors thank the University College Dublin College of Social Sciences and Law and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 693609 (GLOBUS) for generous funding support for this project.