Showing papers in "Journal of Chinese Political Science in 2013"
TL;DR: Zhang et al. as discussed by the authors explored the micro-foundation of China's urban social welfare reform by examining the diverse social welfare preferences and the cleavages among societal groups, arguing that the diversity of the societal groups' preferences for social welfare has given rise to two lines of cleavage in urban China with respect to social welfare.
Abstract: China’s social welfare reform since the mid-1980s has been characterized as incremental and fragmented in three dimensions—social insurance, privatization, and targeting. This paper attempts to explore the micro-foundation of China’s urban social welfare reform by examining the diverse social welfare preferences and the cleavages among societal groups. It argues that the diversity of the societal groups’ preferences for social welfare has given rise to two lines of cleavage in urban China with respect to social welfare—between state sector and non-state sector employees and between labor market insiders and outsiders. The Chinese authoritarian regime’s political priority—economic growth with social stability—has induced the government to accommodate public social welfare preferences in social welfare policies. Therefore, the three dimensions of Chinese social welfare reform policies since the mid-1980s reflect and respond to the social cleavages derived from societal groups’ different preferences for social welfare.
33 citations
TL;DR: Based on the analysis of bills submitted to Yangzhou Municipal People's Congresses, the authors found that congress delegates have increasingly represented the interests and demands of the geographic areas from which they are elected, and that the local people's congress has become a place to present and coordinate various competing interests, which are often contradictory to the interests of the local Party committee that represents the higher authority of the state.
Abstract: Local people’s congresses have become increasingly active, carrying out legislative activities and (supposedly) supervising state organizations. Based on the analysis of bills submitted to Yangzhou Municipal People’s Congresses, we find that congress delegates have increasingly represented the interests and demands of the geographic areas from which they are elected, and that the local people’s congress has become a place to present and coordinate various competing interests, which are often contradictory to the interests of the local Party committee that represents the higher authority of the state. In other words, the local people’s congress has become a place where two interests intersect: the “central” interests represented by the local Party committee and the “local” interests represented by the local people’s congress delegates.
30 citations
TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper analyzed the selection criterion of China's most powerful leading body, the Politburo Standing Committee, by using Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the latest data of the 18th Party Congress in 2012.
Abstract: This article analyses the selection criterion of China’s most powerful leading body—the Politburo Standing Committee—by using Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the latest data of the 18th Party Congress in 2012. It finds that age, combined with institutional rules, is one of the dominant factors in deciding the appointment of leaders in 2012, suggesting the significance of institutional rules in today’s elite politics in China. It also finds that candidates’ patron-client ties with senior leaders did play a role but they are not always positive in terms of the career advancement of candidates. Moreover, and perhaps surprisingly, this study finds that powerful family backgrounds do not have positive impacts on promotion at the highest level.
23 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare Chinese state-owned enterprises and hybrid (mixed owned) enterprises with private enterprises in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, and conclude that Chinese SOEs and mixed ownership companies in Uganda are involved in a small range of sectors, often capital-intensive sectors such as oil and construction, and are therefore also larger than the majority of the Chinese private enterprises.
Abstract: Within the large body of China-Africa literature, there is a growing body of literature that differentiates between China’s various economic actors, more specifically between its state-owned and private enterprises. This paper intends to contribute to this literature by comparing Chinese state-owned enterprises and hybrid (mixed owned) enterprises with private enterprises in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. An air of mystery often surrounds Chinese companies in Africa, this paper will provide some clarity concerning companies in Kampala. To do this we first look at the governmental assistance given to these companies, then the kind of assistance they potentially receive. Next we investigate what motivated these companies to come to Uganda, and how they established themselves, whether it is after a Chinese aid project or construction job, or some other route. We further investigate the size, employment policy and markets of these Chinese state-owned enterprises in Kampala. Finally we look at the employment of Ugandan labour and management, the problems faced by the enterprises and the environmental challenges, as well as how these are dealt with. We conclude that Chinese SOEs and mixed ownership companies in Uganda are involved in a small range of sectors, often capital-intensive sectors such as oil and construction, and are therefore also larger than the majority of the Chinese private enterprises. SOEs and mixed ownership enterprises tend to have arrived in Uganda earlier than most private enterprises, face slightly different problems, and are more interested in the Ugandan market as whole than their privately owned counterparts. More importantly, they have greater proportions of local employees and are more interested in indigenizing their workforces.
23 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the ruling elites in authoritarian regimes propagate official frames in a continuous effort to reproduce the belief of the populace in the elites' leadership qualities and their determination to serve the common interest.
Abstract: In the debate on authoritarian resilience, the importance of persuasion to regime legitimacy has been widely acknowledged, yet a conceptual framework explaining the role of persuasion is still lacking. Against this backdrop, we argue that the framing perspective (Benford and Snow 1988) provides a useful basis for such a framework. Drawing on Beetham’s (1991) legitimacy model, we contend that the ruling elites in authoritarian regimes propagate official frames in a continuous effort to reproduce the belief of the populace in the elites’ leadership qualities and their determination to serve the common interest. In the empirical part of our paper we look at the case of China, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has in recent years reemphasized persuasion as a means of reproducing legitimacy. We then apply our theory in an analysis of the conceptual shifts in the CCP’s frames and ideology, as propagated under its secretary general, Hu Jintao.
20 citations
TL;DR: This paper studied the content and dynamics of Price Public Hearing Meeting (PPHM) in China by analyzing 711 talking points delivered by 140 participants in six deliberative meetings on price adjustments.
Abstract: I study the content and dynamics of Price Public Hearing Meeting (PPHM) in China by analyzing 711 talking points delivered by 140 participants in six deliberative meetings on price adjustments. By examining the “modes of action” and the content of these speeches, this study demonstrates that the participants at these six PPHM’s collectively employed a set of discursive strategies to show deference to the state’s authority and, simultaneously, to expand the discursive space at the PPHM’s beyond the parameters set by the state’s hegemonic discourses. Discussion of government responsibilities and criticism of the state-sanctioned price hikes took place in this new space. The Confucian political value of “people’s livelihood” (minsheng) was widely drawn upon by grassroots representatives to stress the government’s role as the guardian of people’s welfare.
18 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a comparative analysis of competing discourses surrounding the case of Wang Yue, a toddler who was ran over by two motor vehicles in Foshan, following which 18 people passed by and ignored her plight.
Abstract: This study uses frames analysis to investigate online discourses and processes of political deliberation on China’s weibo (microblog) service. It offers a comparative analysis of competing discourses surrounding the case of Wang Yue, a toddler who was ran over by two motor vehicles in Foshan, following which 18 people passed by and ignored her plight. The study aims to understand how weibo facilitate its users to express their differences and deliberate disagreements with each other. The study found that Internet users are rational in the sense that they do not simply lean towards a dichotomised choice of ‘pro-’ or ‘anti-’ official discourse, but they are able to negotiate their moral choices by considering a wide range of social and political factors in such an emotional and morally controversial incident.
18 citations
TL;DR: Zhang et al. as discussed by the authors argued that ideology is pervasive in China's political economy of reform and that a common assessment is both necessary and feasible, and presented case studies (loyalty signaling, message control, policy learning and anti-corruption) underline the highly ambiguous role of ideology oscillating between alignment and adaptation.
Abstract: Political scientists and economists fundamentally disagree in their assessment of ideology in contemporary Chinese reform. Whereas the former emphasize its functional value legitimizing the overall course of reform, the latter warn of indoctrination and negative welfare effects. We argue that ideology is pervasive in China’s political economy of reform—past, present, and future. Moreover, a common assessment is both necessary and feasible. The presented case studies (loyalty signaling, message control, policy learning, and anti-corruption) underline the highly ambiguous role of ideology oscillating between alignment and adaptation. In the end, ideology can unite or divide Chinese society as well as increase or diminish economic efficiency.
14 citations
TL;DR: The authors suggests that it will be difficult for the two sides to sustain the momentum in cross-strait relations unless Beijing and Taipei begin to recalibrate their relationship in a more pragmatic way and adopt some new thinking on the concepts of sovereignty and the political status of the ROC.
Abstract: Relations between the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or Chinese mainland) have improved significantly since 2008. However, this study suggests that it will be difficult for the two sides to sustain the momentum in cross-strait relations unless Beijing—and to some extent Taipei—begin to recalibrate their relationship in a more pragmatic way and adopt some new thinking on the concepts of sovereignty and the political status of the ROC. In short, they need to figure out a way to acknowledge the fact that both the ROC and PRC exist.
8 citations
TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors examined village officials who are embedded in such social groups as lineage groups and explored their role in shaping public goods provision in rural China based on a unique set of nationwide-survey data.
Abstract: In recent studies, analysts have found that so-called “informal accountability” exerts significant influence on public goods provision in rural China. According to these studies, such informal accountability may be formed through the embedment of local officials in social groups. However, there seems to be no agreement on the identification of such embedment and the conditions under which this embedment can influence public goods provision. To advance the literature of this debate, this study examines village officials who are embedded in such social groups as lineage groups and explores their role in shaping public goods provision in rural China based on a unique set of nationwide-survey data. Using a direct measure of social embeddedness of village officials, we have found that the embedment of village officials in a social group can be identified through a direct measure designed in this study and that the embedment has a positive effect on public goods provision in rural China. Finally, we draw some important policy implications from our findings.
8 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used the theory of social construction of reality deriving from the writings of Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger to explain the origin of national identity and hence the emergence of a nation.
Abstract: This paper uses the theory of social construction of reality deriving from the writings of Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger to explain the origin of national identity and hence the emergence of a nation. It argues that social construction of national reality originates from everyday life experience taken for granted during the process of socialization. Individuals make sense out of the external world. Experiences taken for granted become actor’s stock of knowledge. A common scheme of knowledge shared by the community serves to differentiate in-group (nationals) and out-group (foreigners). Collective consciousness thus defines national identity and hence a nation. Unless people (both in-group and out-group) interact with and learn from each other, different stocks of knowledge taken for granted will create political tension. This theory will be applied to understand the tensions in Tibet and along the Taiwan Strait. The paper further argues that Taiwan can hardly separate from mainland China in the future, while strong Tibetan consciousness continues to defy against powerful Chineseness, resulting in endless upheavals in the region.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors adopt a network perspective to explore the ways digitally-mediated relationships prompt social and/or political participation in China, and find that collective actions are facilitated by both weak and strong ties, which generate a fairly unified collective identity that is conductive to high-risk mobilization.
Abstract: This paper adopts a network perspective to explore the ways digitally-mediated relationships prompt social and/or political participation in China. In the “chicken game scenario”, my analysis suggests that collective actions are facilitated by both weak and strong ties, which generate a fairly unified collective identity that is conductive to high-risk mobilization. In the “public crisis scenario”, it is generally weak ties that facilitate relatively lower-risk mobilization. In the “compromise scenario”, if collective actions do occur, they are generally low-risk and non-political. This appears to be largely due to the dominance of weak ties in the compromise scenario. The “banal scenario” is a black box that has yet to be sufficiently investigated in the future.
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors argue that unequal power distribution between the central ministries and the promotion competition among officials is the mechanism that motivates senior officials to enter the spotlight on television talk shows, and they use media interviews to enhance policy adherence, signal administrative needs, and display achievements to the central government.
Abstract: Many high-ranking Chinese officials have recently changed their low-key persona and have discussed sensitive issues on television talk shows. Using complete participant observations of a CCTV talk show, we argue, besides officials’ personal factors, that the unequal power distribution between the central ministries and the promotion competition among officials is the mechanism that motivates senior officials to enter the spotlight. State ministries with less political clout and local officials are more active talk show guests. They take advantage of media interviews to enhance policy adherence, signal administrative needs, and display achievements to the central government. The media political platform also brings more personal interaction between Chinese media and political elite, which may increase personalization of politics and autonomy for the media.
TL;DR: This article conducted an experimental study in rural China and found that rural residents place equal importance on their political rights and economic development when assessing their support for government, while rural residents also consider their economic rights when evaluating government.
Abstract: All governments are dependent upon a degree of political support and legitimacy. Some authoritarian countries, like Singapore and China, have staked this legitimacy on an “authoritarian bargain” in which residents exchange their political rights for economic growth and development. However, this bargain is complicated in the Chinese countryside, where rural residents have been granted a key political right – the right to participate in the election of their local leadership. In this paper, we ask whether rural residents have accepted the authoritarian bargain, and base their political support solely on economic development, or whether rural residents also consider their political rights when evaluating government. Based on an experimental study conducted in rural China, we find that rural residents place equal importance on their political rights and economic development when assessing their support for government.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors combine the government's commitment to openness and its strategic policy adjustment that, working together, induce the vested interests from the public sector to accept the new institutions in a timely manner so that the welfare programs assist the economy in exploring the opportunities offered by the international market.
Abstract: China’s social welfare system in the past three decades has undergone a fundamental transformation. This process is part of a general movement occurring in the developing world in the new context of globalization. Globalization has produced a structural change of preferences among major social actors with regards to social protection, which in turn induces the governments to adopt a balanced and inclusive approach of social protection that is compatible to market competition and continuous development. What distinguishes China in achieving this objective is the combination of the government’s commitment to openness and its strategic policy adjustment that, working together, induce the vested interests from the public sector to accept the new institutions in a timely manner so that the welfare programs assist the economy in exploring the opportunities offered by the international market.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors classify the evolution of the government's policy on administering social organisation into three phases, from laissez-faire to control, from a non-formal style of administration to using legal instruments as the main means, and with administrative focus from the central to the local level.
Abstract: This article, concerning various state strategies in different periods since 1978, classifies the evolution of the government’s policy on administering social organisation into three phases. In particular, the state’s policy has gone through a series of shifts from laissez-faire to control, from a non-formal style of administration to using legal instruments as the main means, and with administrative focus from the central to the local level. The supervision mechanism thus formulated implies a totalitarian logic of exercising a “tutelary” style of monitoring—a logic that has to a certain extent revealed “opportunism” on the part of the state. Through an analysis of the state’s governance strategies on social organisations, this article argues that this “tutelary-style” monitoring system explains the interaction between the state and civil society in contemporary China.
TL;DR: The authors examines the likelihood of China's legitimation as the global hegemon during an era of relative U.S. decline and concludes that recent Chinese legitimation efforts through UN leadership have been stonewalled by an inability to provide an international agenda with globally held values and beliefs.
Abstract: This paper examines the likelihood of China’s legitimation as the global hegemon during an era of relative U.S. decline. Using Rapkin’s (1990) legitimacy deficit framework, the author tests China’s prospects for international legitimacy through the analysis of Chinese leadership at the United Nations (UN). While China’s recent exponential increase in contributions to UN peacekeeping and the UN regular budget signal growing Chinese global leadership, their consistent focus on regional interests, as displayed in UN Security Council and UN General Assembly debate and discussion, indicates the absence of an internationally supported agenda. In concluding, this paper asserts that recent Chinese legitimation efforts through UN leadership have been stonewalled by an inability to provide an international agenda with globally held values and beliefs.
TL;DR: In this paper, the CCP has its preferences in reshuffling China's regional governments: higher-ranked regional leaders receive more protection; lower-ranked leaders of underdeveloped regions have a greater possibility of being downgraded and removed.
Abstract: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) controls its regional leaders by controlling their career movements and political mobility. It is difficult to explain why some regional leaders got promoted but some were dismissed, for they all had similar backgrounds. With empirical analysis, this study shows that in post-Deng Xiaoping Chinese politics (1997–2010), the CCP has its preferences in reshuffling China’s regional governments: higher-ranked regional leaders receive more protection; lower-ranked leaders of underdeveloped regions have a greater possibility of being downgraded and removed. Furthermore, corruption, violations and mishandlings of accidents are very frequent accusations utilized by the center to take down regional leaders.