Showing papers in "Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1963"
12,798 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a typology of interpersonal conflicts is developed based on the sources of conflicts and the modes of their settlement, and some systematic relationships between sources of conflict and their settlements are suggested.
Abstract: The present paper sets out to develop a simple typology of interpersonal conflicts. The evolving scheme of classification is based upon sources of conflicts as well as upon the modes of their settlement. Some systematic relationships between sources of conflicts and their settlements are suggested. Certain sources of conflict may tend to call forth a certain type of mechanism for conflict resolution, but the form of the conflict may also frequently be determined by the available means of solution. On the basis of such considerations an at-
193 citations
TL;DR: The problem of how to defend third areas has been a persistent problem for American political and military planners and has been the question of "third areas" as discussed by the authors, where a major power makes credible an intent to defend a smaller ally from attack by another major power.
Abstract: A persistent problem for American political and military planners has been the question of how to defend “third areas.” How can a major power make credible an intent to defend a smaller ally from attack by another major power? Simply making an explicit promise to defend an ally, whether that promise is embodied in a formal treaty or merely in a unilateral declaration, is not sufficient. There have been too many instances when “solemn oaths” were forgotten in the moment of crisis. On the other hand, more than once a major power has taken up arms to defend a nation with whom it had ties appreciably less binding than a formal commitment. If a deterrer is to be firm, the prospective gains from a successful policy of firmness must be greater, when weighted by the probability of success and discounted by the cost and probability of war, than the losses from retreat.
113 citations
78 citations
TL;DR: In this article, Mouton studied the effect of overappraisal or underappraisement on the evaluation of nations depending on whether they are and losing the competition.
Abstract: Unrealistic overappraisal or underappraisthe evaluations were affected by winning al of nations depending on whether they are and losing the competition. allies or enemies are common occurrences Methods and Subjects historically. The Japanese were seriously underrated by their American opponents in As part of a ten-day management training World War II. As opponents in 1939-41, laboratory, 33 supervisors and engineers the Russians were judged totally inferior; from the same petrochemical refinery met as allies to America in 1941-45, as superior. the first three days in four sensitivity trainIn 1939, England and France continuously ing groups of 8 or 9 men each. The four overvalued each other as allies and undergroups, Red, Black, Yellow, and Green, had estimated the power of their common enemy, been assembled so that no man was with his Germany. None of the first class powers own boss. Each group contained equal produring this era, including Germany, was portions of supervisors and engineers and realistic in appraising its own national poequal proportions of men from different tential in comparison to the others. levels in the refinery. Using small competing groups, Blake and The third night, the 33 men were handed Mouton (1961) were able to reproduce conthe following instructions: sistently in the laboratory the common error "A Red-Black Plan is to be developed in international perceptions of undervaluing by the Red and Black groups. This Redthe opposition and overvaluing oneself. Black Plan should be a collaborative effort, The present study was concerned with representing the joint opinion of both groups how we value our allies, by attempting to reand all the members of the two groups. In produce in the laboratory conditions of conthe same way, a Yellow-Green Plan is to be flict between allied and competing groups. developed by the Yellow and Green groups The worth we attach to competitors, to which likewise should be a collaborative allies, and to our own group was compared effort, representing the joint opinion of both when two groups collaborate in order to groups and all the members of the two compete against two other groups now allied groups. against us. Also examined was the extent "Each of the two Plans should be a oneiases in th evaluati n f one's own group, its lies and o po ents
48 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that modern medical technology derives from physical and biological sciences, from certain organizational techniques (e.g., management of hospitals), from the same forms of social organization, and from an ethos which declares that human life is to be prolonged under almost any circumstances.
Abstract: preferable to poverty and that man is privileged to modify nature to suit himself. Modern medical technology derives from physical and biological sciences, from certain organizational techniques (e.g., management of hospitals), from the same forms of social organization, and from an ethos which declares that human life is to be prolonged under almost any circumstances. Military technology derives from similar scientific and social sources and from an
26 citations
21 citations
TL;DR: The contribution made to International Relations, and to the study of alliances in particular, by three works, symptomatic of the recent flurry of interest in politico-military cooperation, are Liska's Nations in Alliance, Osgood's NATO: The Entangling Alliance, and Zagoria's Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61 (1962), an account of strains within the principal alliance of the Communist system as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: rightly points out (Liska, 1962, p. 3) &dquo;it has always been difficult to say much that is peculiar to alliances on the plane of general analysis.&dquo; With this sobering thought in mind, we can attempt an assessment of the contribution made to International Relations, and to the study of alliances in particular, by three works, symptomatic of the recent flurry of interest in politico-military cooperation: Liska’s Nations in Alliance which looks at alliances from a general perspective; Osgood’s NATO: The Entangling Alliance (1962), a review of the progress and prospects of the main defence association of the West, and Zagoria’s Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61 (1962), an account of strains within the principal alliance of the Communist system.
20 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors begin an analysis of the meandering course of the postwar disarmament negotiations with a bargaining model, which is perhaps the height of optimism because they regard the negotiations primarily as parallel monologues in which the basic appeals are made to the galleries of world public opinion rather than across the table to the opposition.
Abstract: To begin an analysis of the meandering course of the postwar disarmament negotiations with a bargaining model is perhaps the height of optimism. Some would doubt the utility of such a model because they regard the negotiations primarily as parallel monologues in which the basic appeals are made to the galleries of world public opinion rather than across the table to the opposition. It further has been asserted that the
20 citations
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TL;DR: The threat of violence and the occasional outbreak of real violence (which gives the threat credibility) are essential elements in conflict resolution not only in international, but also in national communities as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The threat of violence, and the occasional outbreak of real violence (which gives the threat credibility), are essential elements in conflict resolution not only in international, but also in national communities.1 Individuals and groups, no less than nations, exploit the threat as an everyday matter. This fact induces flexibility and stability in democratic institutions and facilitates peaceful social change. I refer not only to the police power of the state and the recognized right of self-defense, but also to private individual or group violence, whether purposive or futile, deliberate or desperate. Violence and the threat of violence, far from being meaningful only in international politics, is an underlying, tacit, recognized, and omnipresent fact of domestic life, of which democratic politics is sometimes only the shadow-play. It is the fact that instills dynamism to the structure and growth of the law, the settlement of disputes, the processes of accommodating interests, and that induces general respect for the verdict of the polls. An effort by the state to obtain an absolute monopoly over violence, threatened or used on the behalf of private interests, leads inexorably to complete totalitarian repression of all activities and associations which may, however remotely, create a basis of antistate action. A democratic system preserves he threat of violence, and the occasional utbreak of real violence (which gives the reat credibility), are essential lements conflict resolution n t o ly in interna-
19 citations
TL;DR: Richardson's basic system for a two-nation armaments race is given by a pair of equations in the time rates of change of the total warlike preparations, x and y, of the respective nations.
Abstract: Lewis F. Richardson in a classic monograph (Richardson, 1939) devised a compelling mathematical representation of armaments races between nations. This work has lately received a great deal of attention, largely creditable to Rapoport's (1957,1960) discussions and to the reissue (Richardson, 1960) of earlier out-of-print treatments. Richardson's basic system for a two-nation armaments race is given by a pair of equations in the time rates of change of the total warlike preparations, x and y, of the respective nations:
TL;DR: In this article, the authors start with an inquiry into the nature of legitimacy, and into the basic processes by which it is produced, maintained, or possibly destroyed, and which permit the pledging of legitimacy symbols and sources to the fulfillment of political obligations.
Abstract: The paper will have to extend its scope, however, into the background of the commitment of legitimacy symbols. In order to appraise the possibilities and limits of this technique, it may be useful to begin with an inquiry into the nature of legitimacy, and into the basic processes by which it is produced, maintained, or possibly destroyed, and which permit the pledging of legitimacy symbols and sources to the fulfillment of political obligations. After this inquiry into the theoretical national and domestic aspects
TL;DR: The application of the methods of measurement and analysis of the physical scientist to the statistics of wars was unique as discussed by the authors, and the widening interest in the use of mathematical models in the social and psychological sciences suggests that Richardson's work should be viewed in the broader context of the mathematical revolution in social sciences.
Abstract: Lewis F. Richardson, the British physicist and meteorologist, devoted much of his life and scientific work to the study of the quantitative aspects of warfare. It was his firm belief that wars arise from measurable relations between nations and groups and that an understanding of these relationships would contribute more to the furtherance of peaceful coexistence than would conventional diplomacy. In a sense, his work was pioneering. The application of the methods of measurement and analysis of the physical scientist to the statistics of wars was unique. However, wars represent only a particular type of social phenomenon and the widening interest in the use of mathematical models in the social and psychological sciences suggests that Richardson's work should be viewed in the broader context of the mathematical revolution in social
TL;DR: The task taken for this presentation is to describe the INS in sufficient detail so that the concepts and procedures used in running it will be understood and to describe briefly pilot study results in using the INS to study Osgood's GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiative in Tension-reduction) strategy.
Abstract: During the summer of 1962, Dr. Lawrence N. Solomon and I undertook a study of the feasibility of using the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) to study strategic doctrines.2 Our purpose was to see if certain phenomena could be produced in the INS system through experimental intervention. The reasoning was that, if these phenomena could be produced, it would then be possible to subject them to controlled investigation in later studies. The task taken for this presentation is to describe the INS in sufficient detail so that the concepts and procedures used in running it will be understood and following this, to describe briefly pilot study results in using the INS to study Osgood's GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiative in Tension-reduction) strategy.
IBM1
TL;DR: The problem of misunderstanding in the social sciences is the inability of many political scientists, sociologists, generalists, and a great many economists and psychologists, to understand what is meant by a formal model, and to comprehend what constitutes a legitimate or an unsound use of that model as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: One of the greatest sources of misunderstanding in the social sciences is the inability of many political scientists, sociologists, generalists, and a great many economists and psychologists, to understand what is meant by a formal model, and to comprehend what constitutes a legitimate or an unsound use of that model On certain occasions, more mathematically inclined social scientists may use simple examples to illustrate methodology Unfortunately, these examples can easily be misconstrued and given significance and content matter far beyond the initial intent of the expositor Thus, in the past few years, there has been a rash of writing using two by two game matrices as a basis for discussions of threat and deterrence policies It is unlikely that any international power situation can be adequately modelled for any purpose other than very simplified teaching by a two by two matrix
TL;DR: The concept differs from the &dquo;no-cities&dqo; doctrine as sometimes conceived-the attempt to destroy as much as possible of the opponent's strategic forces-though a counterforce policy would be a form of limited strategic war if the purpose was primarily to weaken the opponent’s will, rather than his capacity as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: amount of damage threatened, planned and done, as well as in the kinds of targets attacked,&dquo; the primary aim being to influence the will of the opponent, not to destroy his military capability (p. 3). Thus the concept differs from the &dquo;no-cities&dquo; doctrine as sometimes conceived-the attempt to destroy as much as possible of the opponent’s strategic forces-though a counterforce policy would be a form of limited strategic war if the purpose was primarily to weaken the opponent’s will, rather than his capacity
TL;DR: In the past 100 years, we have not only devised ways and means of applying the discoveries of science to the improvement of weapons hardware, but also applied with great success the scientific method to more abstract ways of improving the performance and efficiency of military weapons systems, including, for example, economic analyses, operations research, simulated military operational training exercises, and computerized war games as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Since the earliest times science has served in the cause of war; the discoveries of science have been forged into the most ingenious weapons and their nonmilitary potential sometimes neglected or entirely overlooked. During the past 100 years, we have not only devised ways and means of applying the discoveries of science to the improvement of weapons hardware-the issue that troubles so many of us today-but we have also applied with great success the scientific method to more abstract ways of improving the performance and efficiency of military weapons systems, including, for example, economic analyses, operations research, simulated military operational training exercises, and computerized war games. While many of these nonphysical scientific techniques are probably applicable to the problems of world peace, particularly arms control, little has been done to rework the technology and apply it to areas serving the cause of peace. At the same time, no physical or social scientist who has waded through the arms control literature of the past three years can fail to note the lack of controlled research
TL;DR: There may well be more than one dimension to the arms control picture which will remain unexplored as mentioned in this paper, and at the very least ther is on dime sion which p esen l is o ly dimly p rce v d, nd t s di nsion ed not l g out f focus.
Abstract: Institute of International Studies, University There may well be more than one dimension to the arms control picture which will remain unexplored. Perhaps there are oth rs which could be invented, designed, scov ered, or sup i d. At the very least ther is on dime sion which p esen l is o ly dimly p rce v d, nd t s di nsion ed not l g out f focus. It s the onconv ti nal, the unc nv tional, and the "counter" efforts with which this paper is concer ed. I recog ition a fundame al co flict of d ol y, b jectiv , a d li y will remai i world p i i s, a d with th furth r understa ding hat
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors distinguish between proposals, statements, and negotiating postures that are primarily propagandistic in nature and those designed to reach an agreement, and make distinctions between propaganda and non-propagation.
Abstract: One of the requisites for assessing the meaning and direction of disarmament negotiations is to distinguish between proposals, statements, and negotiating postures that are primarily propagandistic in nature and those designed to reach an agreement. It is hardly deniable today that propaganda has been an integral feature of much of the disarmament negotiations since 1946. Elements of propaganda have probably been a constantthough not exclusive-feature of all postwar disarmament negotiations, but it is by no means clear exactly what role propaganda has played in all of these negotiations.' There are considerable differences of opinion as to whether propaganda has been a primary or secondary factor in the timing and content of Soviet and American proposals. Then there are distinctions made between
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the application of the bargaining technique of "divide and choose" to disamament negotiations, without considering the important problem of inspection or the political wisdom of disarming.
Abstract: Present political strategy has failed at all attempts to reach a solution to the disarmament problem. Time limits are placed on negotiations as representatives threaten to walk out of conferences to uphold their national prestige; heads of State agree to meet only a single day to discuss unfathomable issues; and deadlines are set for the resumption of nuclear testing just before disarmament talks are scheduled to begin. These pressure tactics and a myriad of strategies and counterstrategies may have transformed international politics into a grand befuddling game. Could the diplomatic foxes be outguessing and outwitting each other in vain? For it is not certain that a solution to partial disarmament exists; and even if it were to exist, whether it could, in any realistic sense, be attained. Conventional types of verbal bargaining have, at least until now, proved woefully inadequate to deal with the immense difficulties involved in negotiating thousands of different classes of weapons. If countries ever seriously decide to disarm themselves of weapons, new methods of bargaining will certainly be needed. Without considering the important problem of inspection or the political wisdom of disarmament, this paper explores the application of the bargaining technique of "divide and choose" to disamament negotiations.
TL;DR: The main idea of as discussed by the authors is to raise the question of what the arrays of political and scientific roles in the working of the international system may be like after the world has passed beyond its present phase, with its particular preoccupations with bipolar conflicts, tensions and crises, deterrence, arms control, and prescriptions for world government, general and complete disarmament, and world peace.
Abstract: The main idea of this essay is to raise the question of what the arrays of political and scientific roles in the working of the international system may be like after the world has passed beyond its present phase, with its particular preoccupations with bipolar conflicts, tensions and crises, deterrence, arms control, and prescriptions for world government, general and complete disarmament, and world peace. The reason for raising the question is fairly obvious: there is always the likely possibility that present efforts to understand and control are on the wrong track. Perhaps our continuous scannings of the future are covering the wrong sectors or are overlooking the important phenomena. Perhaps the assumptions and the affirmations that guide both policy and research on the international system-and that have high face validity-are correct more for the past than for the future.
TL;DR: The authors argued that while disarmament is no panacea for the problems of international conflict and as a dangerous distraction from the hard problems of assuring national military security, neither does it necessarily reduce national security.
Abstract: a panacea for the problems of international conflict and as a dangerous distraction from the hard problems of assuring national military security. It is the intention of this essay to argue that while disarmament is no panacea, neither does it necessarily reduce national security. Some forms of disarmament may enhance military security for all, other forms may enhance the security of one nation at the expense of others, and yet other forms may threaten the security of all. It is necessary to distinguish among forms and strategic contexts of disarmament to achieve a rational appraisal of the favorable possibilities, dangers, and uncertainties. Disarmament embodies the unfortunate
TL;DR: The threshold of perceived provocation at which the deterrence of all-out war may fail depends not only on the workings of individual minds but also on collective social phenomena (mob psychology).
Abstract: The threshold of perceived provocation at which the deterrence of all-out war may fail depends not only on the workings of individual minds but also on collective social phenomena (mob psychology). Fears and irritations can be exacerbated to a degree productive of mass hysteria: a crowd may be induced to jump off a cliff where an individual would refrain. Leadership can play an initiatory role, but may find itself powerless to control a social phenomenon it has catalyzed. It seems hardly credible that a mania for war could ever seize the people of the United States or Russia (or even China) in times of peace. But the fact that some people in the West express the honest opinion that we should go "all the way" for secondary causes (e.g., for Berlin) is evidence that even the most minor degrees of conflict can in some individuals narrow the range of perceived alternatives to the point where war is the most attractive one remaining. It is credible, then, that under the
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the ways and means of securing a stable and reliable peace throughout the world and it is impossible not to touch what is the core of this problem-general and complete disarmament.
Abstract: Nowadays when one discusses the ways and means of securing a stable and reliable peace throughout the world it is impossible not to touch what is the core of this problem-general and complete disarmament. It is becoming more and more evident now that the shortest and the most secure road to peace goes through the solution of this very problem-disarmament. In the Soviet Union we draw a clear-cut distinction between the two notions: disarmament and arms control. As we under-