Showing papers in "Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2011"
TL;DR: In this article, the impacts of war on both genders and assess how war experiences affect reintegration success were investigated. But the authors focused on males and found that women returning from armed groups reintegrate socially and are resilient.
Abstract: What are the impacts of war on the participants, and do they vary by gender? Are ex-combatants damaged pariahs who threaten social stability, as some fear? Existing theory and evidence are both inconclusive and focused on males. New data and a tragic natural quasi-experiment in Uganda allow us to estimate the impacts of war on both genders, and assess how war experiences affect reintegration success. As expected, violence drives social and psychological problems, especially among females. Unexpectedly, however, most women returning from armed groups reintegrate socially and are resilient. Partly for this reason, postconflict hostility is low. Theories that war conditions youth into violence find little support. Finally, the findings confirm a human capital view of recruitment: economic gaps are driven by time away from civilian education and labor markets. Unlike males, however, females have few civilian opportunities and so they see little adverse economic impact of recruitment.
220 citations
TL;DR: This article found that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence in locations with active insurgencies, which is contrary to the opportunity-cost theory.
Abstract: Most aid spending by governments seeking to rebuild social and political order is based on an opportunity-cost theory of distracting potential recruits. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence in locations with active insurgencies. The authors test that prediction in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, using survey data on unemployment and two newly available measures of insurgency: (1) attacks against government and allied forces and (2) violence that kill civilians. Contrary to the opportunity-cost theory, the data emphatically reject a positive correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces (p
215 citations
TL;DR: Income varies considerably within countries and the locations where conflicts emerge are rarely typical or representative for states at large as discussed by the authors. Yet, most research on conflict has only examined natio...
Abstract: Income varies considerably within countries and the locations where conflicts emerge are rarely typical or representative for states at large. Yet, most research on conflict has only examined natio...
171 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between fighting and voting, and argue that the distribution of popular support for contending parties can shape not only the incidence but also the type of armed conflict, and it can also influence the incentives of parties to invest in institutional mechanisms that mitigate commitment problems and help to bring violent conflicts to an end.
Abstract: Two recent research programs--one on the sources of democratic consolidation and another on the causes and consequences of violent conflict--have tended to evolve in relative isolation. The contributions to this special issue of Journal of Conflict Resolution help to bridge this gap, through explicit theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between fighting and voting. Armed conflict and electoral politics may be strategic substitutes, in that political actors may optimally choose to submit to the ballot box or instead attempt to impose their will by force; or they may be strategic complements, in that actors use violence to bolster their electoral aims, or use electoral returns as sources of information on underlying preferences that they exploit in armed campaigns. In either case, the distribution of popular support for contending parties can shape not only the incidence but also the type of armed conflict, and it can also influence the incentives of parties to invest in institutional mechanisms that mitigate commitment problems and help to bring violent conflicts to an end. The contributions to this issue illuminate these themes and demonstrate the value of bringing these separate research programs into closer dialogue.
167 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of human rights international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) on domestic antigovernment protest were studied. And they found that increases in human rights INGO activities reflecting a greater commitment to the domestic population are associated with higher levels of both violent and nonviolent protest.
Abstract: This article studies the effects of human rights international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) on domestic antigovernment protest. Unlike mainstream scholarship, the authors argue that human rights INGOs are not simply the magic bullet in orchestrating nonviolent protests; different types of human rights INGO activity have varying effects on protest. Moreover, some human rights INGO activities may lead to higher levels of violent protest. The empirical tests use new data on the activities of over 400 human rights INGOs and domestic nonviolent and violent protest globally from 1991 to 2004. The authors find that increases in human rights INGO activities reflecting a greater commitment to the domestic population are associated with higher levels of both violent and nonviolent protest.
157 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of terrorism on the electoral choices of the Turkish voters in the 1991 and 1995 general elections were analyzed using a unique data set that includes the date and the place of burial of Turkish soldiers and police officers who died in the fight against the terrorist organization PKK.
Abstract: This article empirically analyzes the effects of terrorism on the electoral choices of the Turkish voters in the 1991 and 1995 general elections. It relies on a unique data set that includes the date and the place of burial of Turkish soldiers and police officers who died in the fight against the terrorist organization PKK. The author uses the number of these security force terror casualties at the district level as a measure of the level of terrorism that the people of that district have been exposed to and analyzes whether and how exposure to terrorism affects people’s electoral choices. The results indicate that Turkish voters are highly sensitive to terrorism and that they blame the government for their losses. Moreover, exposure to terrorism leads to an increase in the vote share of the right-wing parties who are less concessionist toward the terrorist organization’s cause compared to their left-wing counterparts.
144 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors highlight a nefarious effect of elections during civil wars by demonstrating that they can facilitate the displacement of civilians, in contrast to the perception of displacement as h...
Abstract: This article highlights a nefarious effect of elections during civil wars by demonstrating that they can facilitate the displacement of civilians. In contrast to the perception of displacement as h...
142 citations
TL;DR: For instance, the authors found that inducing anger toward Palestinians several weeks before the Annapolis summit increased support for making compromises in upcoming negotiations among those with low levels of hatred but decreased support for compromise among those having high levels of hate.
Abstract: Anger is often viewed as a destructive force in intergroup conflicts because of its links to aggressive behavior. The authors hypothesized, however, that anger should have constructive effects in those with low levels of hatred toward the out-group. Using experimental designs with subsamples of nationwide representative surveys, the authors conducted two studies within the context of the Israeli—Palestinian conflict. Study 1 showed that inducing anger toward Palestinians several weeks before the Annapolis summit increased support for making compromises in upcoming negotiations among those with low levels of hatred but decreased support for compromise among those with high levels of hatred. Study 2 showed that, even when a strong anger induction was used just days before the summit, the anger induction led to increased support for compromise among those low in hatred, but not among those high in hatred. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for informing a psychological understanding of co...
122 citations
TL;DR: Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), agreements that provide extensive rights and protection to foreign investors, were first adopted in the 1960s, proliferated in the late 1980s and 1990s, and were adopted again in the 2000s.
Abstract: Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), agreements that provide extensive rights and protection to foreign investors, were first adopted in the 1960s, proliferated in the late 1980s and 1990s, especi...
106 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that where institutions are strong, actors are more likely to participate in the political process through institutionalized arenas, while where they are weak, protests and other unconventional means of participation become more appealing.
Abstract: In this article, the authors argue that where institutions are strong, actors are more likely to participate in the political process through institutionalized arenas, while where they are weak, protests and other unconventional means of participation become more appealing. The authors explore this relationship empirically by combining country-level measures of institutional strength with individual-level information on protest participation in seventeen Latin American countries. The authors find evidence that weaker political institutions are associated with a higher propensity to use alternative means for expressing preferences, that is, to protest.
105 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a bargaining model of war that incorporates both commitment problems due to shifting power and asymmetric information is analyzed, and four results emerge when both bargaining problems are pres...
Abstract: The authors analyze a bargaining model of war that incorporates both commitment problems due to shifting power and asymmetric information. Four results emerge when both bargaining problems are pres...
TL;DR: The authors found that local convergence can actually preserve global diversity if minority cultures resist assimilation into a global monolith in an increasingly "small world" in the 1990s and 2000s.
Abstract: How can minority cultures resist assimilation into a global monolith in an increasingly “small world”? Paradoxically, Axelrod found that local convergence can actually preserve global diversity if ...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop and test quantitatively a model of the causes of early elections as a building block in evaluating the larger effect of election timing on the return to war.
Abstract: In the post--cold war period, civil wars are increasingly likely to end with peace settlements brokered by international actors who press for early elections. However, elections held soon after wars end, when political institutions remain weak, are associated with an increased likelihood of a return to violence. International actors have a double-edged influence over election timing and the risk of war, often promoting precarious military stalemates and early elections but sometimes also working to prevent a return to war through peacekeeping, institution building, and powersharing. In this article, we develop and test quantitatively a model of the causes of early elections as a building block in evaluating the larger effect of election timing on the return to war.
TL;DR: The authors consider the regional destabilization consequences of civil wars when deciding to intervene, but do not assume that potential interveners base their inter-interference decisions on the inter-state relations.
Abstract: Third-party states consider the regional destabilization consequences of civil wars when deciding to intervene. However, previous work implicitly assumes that potential interveners base their inter...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined how Nepal's 1996-2006 civil conflict affected women's decisions to engage in employment using three waves of the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey, and employed a difference-in-difference approach to identify the impact of war on women's employment decisions.
Abstract: This paper examines how Nepal's 1996-2006 civil conflict affected women's decisions to engage in employment Using three waves of the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey, the authors employ a difference-in-difference approach to identify the impact of war on women's employment decisions The results indicate that as a result of the Maoist-led insurgency, women's employment probabilities were substantially higher in 2001 and 2006 relative to the outbreak of war in 1996 These employment results also hold for self-employment decisions, and they hold for smaller sub-samples that condition on husband's migration status and women's status as widows or household heads Numerous robustness checks of the difference-in-difference estimates based on alternative empirical methods provide compelling evidence that women's likelihood of employment increased as a consequence of the conflict
TL;DR: The authors examined how different components of globalization affect the death toll from internal armed conflict and found that economic globalization and cultural globalization significantly increase fatalities from ethnic conflicts, supporting arguments from ethnic competition and world-polity perspectives, and sociotechnical aspects of globalization increase deaths from ethnic conflict but decrease deaths from non-ethnic conflict.
Abstract: This article examines how different components of globalization affect the death toll from internal armed conflict. Conventional wisdom once held that the severity of internal conflict would gradually decline with the spread of globalization, but fatalities still remain high. Moreover, leading theories of civil war sharply disagree about how different aspects of globalization might affect the severity of ethnic and nonethnic armed conflicts. Using arguments from a variety of social science perspectives on globalization, civil war, and ethnic conflict to guide the analysis, this article finds that (1) economic globalization and cultural globalization significantly increase fatalities from ethnic conflicts, supporting arguments from ethnic competition and world-polity perspectives, (2) sociotechnical aspects of globalization increase deaths from ethnic conflict but decrease deaths from nonethnic conflict, and (3) regime corruption increases fatalities from nonethnic conflict, which supports explanations suggesting that the severity of civil war is greater in weak and corrupt states.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the role of external actors in encouraging or discouraging commitment and in developing good governance institutions in the presence of commitment problems and found that income levels unambiguously increase the chance of peace.
Abstract: We explore how peace or war can occur in the presence of commitment problems. These problems can be reduced by institutions of good governance or, alternatively, state capacity which (a) can be considered a collective good and (b) can be improved through investments. We show how the likelihood of a peace agreement depends on the level of state capacity and on investments in state capacity made by adversaries. In accordance with existing evidence but contrary to various theories of conflict, we find that income levels unambiguously increase the chance of peace. Among other issues, we discuss the critical role of external actors in encouraging or discouraging commitment and in developing good governance institutions.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors theorize that episodes of mass killing are the consequence of two factors: (1) the threat perceptions of the perperson, and (2) third-party interventions affect the severity of mass killings.
Abstract: How do third-party interventions affect the severity of mass killings? The authors theorize that episodes of mass killing are the consequence of two factors: (1) the threat perceptions of the perpe...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors distinguish between direct and indirect violence during civil wars, and show that indirect violence is positively associated with levels of prewar support for the enemy group; in contrast, direct violence is hypothesized to increase with the level of political parity between factions in a locality.
Abstract: This article distinguishes between ''direct'' and ''indirect'' violence during civil wars. These two types differ in their forms of production: while indirect violence is unilaterally perpetrated by an armed group, direct violence is jointly produced by an armed group and civilians, and it hinges on local collaboration. These differences have consequences for the spatial variation of each of these types: in conventional civil wars, indirect violence is hypothesized to be positively associated with levels of prewar support for the enemy group; in contrast, direct violence is hypothesized to increase with the level of political parity between factions in a locality. The predictions are tested with a novel dataset of 1,710 municipalities in Catalonia and Aragon during the Spanish civil war (1936--1939).
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors employed a vector autoregression (VAR) to measure changes in Israel's and Hamas's military response dynamics immediately following two important junctures in the conflict: the introduction of Israeli ground troops and the UN Security Council vote.
Abstract: The lack of temporal disaggregation in conflict data has so far presented a strong obstacle to analyzing the short-term dynamics of military conflict. Using a novel data set of hourly dyadic conflict intensity scores drawn from Twitter and other social media sources during the Gaza Conflict (2008–2009), the author attempts to fill a gap in existing studies. The author employs a vector autoregression (VAR) to measure changes in Israel’s and Hamas’s military response dynamics immediately following two important junctures in the conflict: the introduction of Israeli ground troops and the UN Security Council vote. The author finds that both Hamas’s and Israel’s response to provocations by the other side increase (both by about twofold) immediately after the ground invasion, but following the UN Security Council vote, Israel’s response is cut in half, while Hamas’s slightly increases. In addition, the author provides a template for researchers to harness social media to capture the micro-dynamics of conflict.
TL;DR: Empirical analysis of six evolving attack networks produces results contradicting two arguments about terror network structure using a newly released attack network data set, and investigates whether there are any causal relationships between network characteristics and output, specifically attack casualties.
Abstract: The concept of networks has become synonymous with terrorism in recent years. Despite the abundance of material engaging the concept of terrorist networks, there is a paucity of research that applies analytic network methods to the empirical study of observed data. This article fills that void by comparing two arguments about terror network structure using a newly released attack network data set. One account suggests that terrorists purposefully structure their networks to maximize operational security (OPSEC) by minimizing connections, while an alternate proposition relies on findings in network sciences showing that many networks have a few well-connected individuals (referred to as scale-free structure). Empirical analysis of six evolving attack networks produces results contradicting both assertions. This article then looks beyond structure to examine whether there are any causal relationships between network characteristics and output, specifically attack casualties. The article concludes by examini...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify three factors that influence the willingness of states to give up decision control: issue salience, availability of outside options, and history of negotiations, and conclude that disputants are less likely to use binding conflict management when they have a greater need to maintain decision control.
Abstract: International relations scholars have garnered a good deal of evidence indicating that binding arbitration and adjudication are highly effective means for brokering agree- ments and ending conflict However, binding third-party conflict management is rarely pursued to resolve interstate disputes over contentious issues like territorial or maritime control While states value the effectiveness of binding procedures, they are reluctant to give up the decision control necessary to submit to arbitration or adjudication The authors identify three factors that influence the willingness of states to give up decision control: issue salience, availability of outside options, and history of negotiations An analysis of attempts to settle territorial, maritime, and river claims reveals that disputants are less likely to use binding conflict management when they have a greater need to maintain decision control
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extended the formal logic of Stathis Kalyvas' theory of selective violence to account for three political actors with asymmetric capabilities and found that selective violence by the stronger actor will be concentrated in areas where weaker actors exercise control.
Abstract: This article extends the formal logic of Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence to account for three political actors with asymmetric capabilities. In contrast to Kalyvas’ theory, the authors’ computer simulation suggests that (1) selective violence by the stronger actor will be concentrated in areas where weaker actors exercise control; (2) the relative level of selective violence used by weaker actors will be lower because of a reduced capacity to induce civilian collaboration; and (3) areas of parity among the three actors will exhibit low levels of selective violence perpetrated primarily by the strongest actor. Results from a logistic regression, using empirical data on Israel and two rival Palestinian factions from 2006 to 2008, are consistent with these predictions: Israel was more likely to use selective violence in areas largely controlled by Palestinian factions; zones of incomplete Israeli control were not prone to selective violence; and zones of mixed control witnessed moderate levels ...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that poverty should increase terrorist group participation only for individuals with high education, as a result of terrorist group selection preferences and the lower opportunity costs for militant group membership in economically depressed environments.
Abstract: Poverty is often identified as a determinant of terrorist group participation, but existing research reveals mixed support for this relationship. Some studies find that macroeconomic decline is associated with increased production of terrorists, but micro-level research suggests terrorists have above average socioeconomic status and educational attainment. In this article, the author argues that poverty should increase terrorist group participation only for individuals with high education. The author suggests that as a result of terrorist group selection preferences and the lower opportunity costs for militant group membership in economically depressed environments, the likelihood of terrorist group participation should be highest for the highly educated, poor members of any population. The author tests the hypotheses using data from Krueger and Maleckova (2003) on participation in Hezbollah, adding an interaction term to their model. The results support the hypotheses. Poverty increases the likelihood of participation in Hezbollah only for those with at least high school education.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a theory that portrays attempts at peaceful resolution as a strategic process, by which states search for the most favorable forum, during the process of decision making, a state strategically chooses between several methods of peaceful resolution; its final choice is based on the state's past experience with this particular method.
Abstract: Does a state’s past win/loss record affect its subsequent choices of peaceful dispute resolution methods in territorial disputes? We present a theory that portrays attempts at peaceful resolution as a strategic process, by which states search for the most favorable forum. During the process of decision making, a state strategically chooses between several methods of peaceful resolution; its final choice is based on the state’s past experience with this particular method. Empirical analysis of all attempts at peaceful resolution of territorial disputes from 1945 to 2003 shows that challenger states use their own record of victories and failures, as well as the win/ loss record of the target as indicators of the probability of winning in a subsequent dispute. This pattern is especially strong for the binding third-party methods, arbitration, and adjudication.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that cheap talk can have a substantial impact on the behavior of both the target and the speaker in an entry-deterrence game, and that after issuing threats, defenders become more eager to fight.
Abstract: What effect does cheap talk have on behavior in an entry-deterrence game? We shed light on this question using incentivized laboratory experiments of the strategic interaction between defenders and potential entrants. Our results suggest that cheap talk can have a substantial impact on the behavior of both the target and the speaker. By sending costless threats to potential entrants, defenders are able to deter opponents in early periods of play. Moreover, after issuing threats, defenders become more eager to fight. We offer a number of different explanations for this behavior. These results bring fresh evidence about the potential importance of costless verbal communication to the field of international relations.
TL;DR: This article examined the impact of international relations and its effects on patterns of terrorism and found that states involved in ongoing rivalries with other states are the victims of more terrorist attacks than states that are not involved in such hostile interstate relationships.
Abstract: Existing scholarly research on terrorism has largely ignored the role of international relations and its effects on patterns of terrorism. This study argues that strategic interstate relationships can affect the amount of terrorism that a state experiences and should be considered along with “traditional” determinants of terrorism, such as domestic institutional and macroeconomic variables. The study specifically looks at state sponsorship of terrorism, arguing that while we cannot reliably identify state sponsors of terror, we can indirectly observe relevant evidence of state sponsorship. To support this claim, the study examines the annual number of transnational terrorist attacks that occurred in all countries during the period 1975–2003. The results demonstrate that states involved in ongoing rivalries with other states are the victims of more terrorist attacks than states that are not involved in such hostile interstate relationships.
TL;DR: In this paper, a real-time, intercultural common pool resource experiment using participants from cultures that derive different benefits from a global public good (extraction vs. conservation of biodiversity resources) was designed to analyze the effect of group affiliation on cooperative behavior.
Abstract: We design a real-time, intercultural common pool resource experiment using participants from cultures that derive different benefits from a global public good (extraction vs. conservation of biodiversity resources) to analyze the effect of group affiliation on cooperative behavior. We also collect survey attitudes toward conservation to augment our experimental results. We find that when participants interact interculturally, extraction choices change significantly and that these changes can be attributed to an amplification of the relationship between attitudes and choices cued by the intercultural treatment.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that although the probability of winning an election increases with the size of a group, so does the likelihood of winning a fight, and that in a situation where all groups have a high chance of winning elections, they may also have high chance to win a fight.
Abstract: The conventional wisdom in political science is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups must have a chance to attain power. If they do not then they will subvert democracy and choose to fight for power. In this paper we show that this wisdom is, if not totally incorrect, seriously incomplete. This is so because although the probability of winning an election increases with the size of a group, so does the probability of winning a fight. Thus in a situation where all groups have a high chance of winning an election, they may also have a high chance of winning a fight. Indeed, in a natural model, we show that democracy may never be consolidated in such a situation. Rather, democracy may only be stable when one group is dominant. We provide a test of a key aspect of our model using data from La Violencia, a political conflict in Colombia during the years 1946-1950 between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Consistent with our results, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that fighting between the parties was more intense in municipalities where the support of the parties was more evenly balanced.
TL;DR: The international agreements governing rivers vary considerably in whether they contain institutional provisions for joint monitoring, conflict resolution, enforcement, and/or the delegation of authori... as discussed by the authors, and the authors in this paper
Abstract: International agreements governing rivers vary considerably in whether they contain institutional provisions for joint monitoring, conflict resolution, enforcement, and/or the delegation of authori...