Showing papers in "Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology in 1980"

Violence in America : historical and comparative perspectives

Abstract: A total reworking of this 1968 bestseller, with nine entirely new chapters, taking into account the radical changes in American society and American violence over the last decade. Of interest to anyone concerned with the interpretation of America's turbulent past and the assessment of its future.

The 75% Solution: An Analysis of the Structure of Attitudes on Gun Control, 1959-1977

Abstract: One of the few constants in American public opinion over the last two decades has been that three-fourths of the population supports gun control. Sixteen surveys were conducted from 1959 to 1977 which asked the question, "Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?" The public response has split consistently about three-to-one in favor of gun control (see table 1).' The low point of opposition occurred in December, 1963, during the traumatic aftermath of President Kennedy's assassination, and the high point appeared in August, 1966. In the remaining fourteen surveys the opposition to gun control moved within a narrow band of from 22 to 28%.

Is Mens Rea a Component of Perceived Offense Seriousness

Abstract: Since the publication in 1964 of Sellin and Wolfgang's The Measurement of Delinquency, much scholarship has been devoted to the topic of seriousness scales Some of the studies have emphasized the validity and reliability of the scales while others have raised doubts about their methodology and usefulness' The present article will address a question that has received only sporadic attention in the related literature; namely, the extent to which offense descriptions used in evolving a seriousness scale should take into consideration the mental

The Process is the Punishment

Abstract: This chapter develops the argument that in the lower criminal courts the process itself is the primary punishment. It identify the costs involved in the pretrial process, and examines the ways they affect organization, as well as the way a defendant will proceed on his journeys through the court. There is an elaborate multi-layered system for decision and review, there are a variety of pretrial release alternatives, and assurance of appearance at trial is the sole criterion for establishing release conditions. Although most students of the pretrial process focuses on judicial bail setting at arraignment, their observations may often miss the mark, since in many jurisdictions—including New Haven—the bulk of the pretrial release decisions is made by other people before the accused is ever presented in court. The prosecutor proposes the bail established by the police and reiterated by the bail commissioner.

Criminal Statistics in the United States

Abstract: Congress enacted legislation during the Ninetysixth Congress authorizing the creation of a Bureau ofJustice Statistics within the Justice Department.' Although the idea of a separate bureau is not new, having been suggested by presidential crime commissions in 1931 and 1967, the initial configuration of the Bureau probably will reflect work started in the Department of Justice in 1975.2 That effort resulted in Deputy Attorney General Harold Tyler's recommending the establishment of a bureau of criminal statistics within the Department.3 In the fall of 1976 the Department formed a Statistical Systems Policy Development Group to prepare a plan for a bureau of criminal statistics.4 The plan, completed on January 6, 1977, was sent to Attorney General Griffin Bell on May 4, 1977. Almost a year later, following wide distribution of the plan for review and comment by experts, by us rs of-criminal justice statistics, and by persons working within the federal or state systems ofjusti e, S nator Kennedy and Representative Rodino introd ced the administration's proposal for a bureau as part of legislation to restructure the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.6 The Kennedy-Rodino bill was reintroduced in the Ninety-sixth Congress together with a bill introduced by Representative Conyers.7 The most important differences among the bills were thei approach to the Bureau's administrative organizatio and the responsibilities assigned to its advisory boards. In the Conyers bill, a twelvemember policy board was to guide the Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics rather than a twenty-one-member advisory board. In addition, in the original House and Senate versions of the administration's bill, the Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported to the Director of the Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics under the general authority of the Attorney General. In the Conyers bill, and in the bill which the House ultimately passed, there was no Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics (OJARS). A conference committee retained the OJARS but decided that it did not need an advisory board since the board was to provide coordination and support functions for the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice and a bureau of justice assistance to be called the LEAA.8 * Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; Ph.D. Indiana University, 1962. Two bills to amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (current version at 42 U.S.C. ?? 3701-3796c (1976)), and to restructure the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration were introduced in the House of Representatives during the 96th Congress. See H.R. 2108, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2061, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Both bills and a version introduced in the Senate, S. 241, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), included sections creating a Bureau of Justice Statistics. The House passed S. 241 after amending its language to contain the text of H.R. 2061. See [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4675. A conference report resolving differences created by the disagreeing votes was issued November 16, 1979. See H.R. REP. NO. 655, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4675, 4744). 2 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND

Measuring the Severity of Self-Reported Delinquency: The Development of a Seriousness Scale

Abstract: popular of these is the self-report technique.2 The reliability and validity of self-reports in measuring deviancy remains an open issue with considerable contradictory findings.3 Although utilization of the method has increased dramatically, it has enjoyed little technical development.4 A review of the delinquency indices" using information gathered from self-reports reveals a predominance of simplistic and primitive measures of deviant behavior. Many of these indices, although rectifying some of the deficiencies of official statistics, focus primarily upon the variety and frequency of delinquent activity and ignore important qualitative characteristics of deviant acts." Quantitative measures are quite useful in judging initial distinctions between individuals, but they are incapable of finely discriminating between individuals who are essentially different in the attribute under scrutiny. Thus, in order to arrive at more accurate measurement discriminations in deviant behavior researchers must address the

Problems with Existing Prediction Studies and Future Research Needs

Abstract: Most decisions involve risk and are thus subject to two kinds of error. Prognoses, estimates of future conditions, and all probability statements are subject to the same two kinds of error. In criminological prognoses, the decisionmaker can be in error in that: (1) the individual who is predicted to fail may succeed, or (2) the individual who is predicted to succeed may fail. These two kinds of error apply to all decisions or estimates irrespective of the means by which such decisions or estimates are derived. In criminology, neither clinical nor statistical methods of prognosis and prediction can avoid the two classes of error.' In addition, these two kinds of error will be present no matter how success or failure are defined. The first kind of error is

The Measurement of Inmate Social Role Types: An Assessment

Abstract: stitutions, they become participants in the informal inmate organization. As is true when individuals become participants in more conventional organizations, inmates typically move into one of a number of the positions making up the structure of the prison society. Thus, if it were possible to develop a reliable means of acquiring information on the type of position that an inmate had assumed, we would be better able to understand and predict attitudinal and behavioral changes that might occur from confinement.

Planning of Crime and the Criminal Career: Official and Hidden Offenses

Abstract: Despite recent increased interest in the criminal career-its development and demise and its content in terms of frequency, patterns and seriousness-only scant attention has been paid to a crucial issue concerning such careers; namely, the presence or absence of planning and its consequences. This issue is relevant for both theoretical and practical concerns. The explanation of crime may take different paths when criminality is planned instead of impulsive. It may be that the well-planned offender closely resembles some of the early images of offenders, which assumed differences between criminals and their law-abiding counterparts.' The behavior of the individual who carefully plans his illegal actions, who approaches criminal endeavors in a methodic and rational

Career Criminal Prosecution: Potential Objectives

Abstract: The concept of career criminal programs, which involves concentrating prosecutors' resources on repeat offenders with serious criminal records, is more than five years old. Federal, state, and local officials have instituted more than fifty projects utilizing federal or state Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grants. These programs have been immensely popular among practitioners and the press. They are routinely praised as being one of the most significant innovations that the LEAA has produced to date. Nevertheless, when practitioners take a hardheaded look at what these programs accomplish, they are uncertain about the ultimate impact of the programs. There is no confusion about career criminal

Fighting Crime: The Problem of Adolescents

Abstract: Crime rates are high not because large numbers of people commit one or two crimes in a lifetime but because a relatively small number of people are habitual offenders. This commonly recognized fact about crime is beginning to provide a major impetus for devoting extra police and prosecutorial resources to apprehending, prosecuting, and incarcerating the "worst" recidivist offenders. In the past five years, one hundred district attorneys have initiated formal programs to deal with adult habitual offenders. Many rely heavily on prior criminal records to designate individuals as career offenders. There is little doubt that in the end such

Jury Simulation: The Impact of Judge's Instructions and Attorney Tactics on Decisionmaking

Abstract: gate the methodology of the jury simulation paradigm. Each of these studies isolated some of the pitfalls involved in generalizing from experiments to the real world. These studies suggested that the method of presenting the stimulus,' with whom the decision rests2 and the consequences of the decision3 may all have a significant effect on the outcome of the laboratory experiment. One possible criticism of most laboratory studies is the failure to include judicial instructions. After jury selection has taken place, jurors take an oath. In this oath they promise to do two things: 1) to decide the case solely on the facts as developed from the evidence and 2) to uphold the law as it is given to them by the court. The stimulus for most laboratory experiments, however, has been some sort of presentation of the facts with judicial instructions omitted. In a real trial the judicial instructions are never optional. Judicial instructions often provide specific guidelines as to how jurors are supposed to respond to some of the typical independent variable manipulations that are found in laboratory simulations. For instance, in regard to the extraevidential factor of the judge's personality or demeanor, the following judicial caution is often given:

Toward an Interdisciplinary Approach to Criminal Violence

Abstract: In explaining the title of this paper, I must qualify its ecumenical theme by noting that my perspective is conditioned by membership in the Subculture of the Clinician, though I am not a core member. I agree with Sholom Aleichem, who compared the mission of psychology to that of parsley. "To look at it's not bad," he said, "it smells nice, tastes good when you flavor food with it. But you try chewing parsley by itself "' In Aleichem's terms, the goal of this paper is to discuss violence menus that are flavored with parsley; to discuss the impact of clinical thinking on the study of violence. The assets of this approach, and its liabilities, are relative (just as some spices can make unusual chicken soup). Problems arise where disciplines are stretched to apply to the domains of other disciplines. We must start by recognizing that disciplinary parochialism in our perspectives on crime and violence is inevitable. Linkages between our perspectives are made more difficult by a tendency to gravitate toward core assumptions in our own fields, as opposed to areas of potential interface between fields. This point was well put by Robert Merton in a conference on delinquency in 1955. Merton said:

Selection Criteria for Career Criminal Programs

Abstract: reduce crime through incapacitation; offenders in jail or prison cannot commit crimes. A second method would be to increase either the probability of prison sentences or their length. This method is also an incapacitation strategy, but one that is not completely within the control of the prosecutor. A third method by which a career criminal program might influence crime is by deterring other offenders. When career criminals learn that there is a

The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration

Abstract: In Bell v. Wolfish, the United States Supreme Court held that, with respect to conditions or restrictions having no specific constitutional source for protection, a pretrial detainee in a federal correctional center has a right under the due process clause of the fifth amendment to be free from any punitive conditions or restrictions during detention. The Court further held that all of the challenged practices and conditions were valid because they were rationally related to the legitimate nonpunitive purposes of the detention center. Thus, the correctional facility could place two detainees in a cell built for one, prohibit receipt of books and magazines except directly from publishers ("publisher-only" rule), limit gift packages to one package of food at Christmas, conduct unannounced searches of the living areas outside of the inmates' presence, and conduct visual anal and genital searches for contraband after every contact visit, without probable cause. Apart from its impact on the rights of detainees, Wolfish has virtually blocked any potential expansion of prisoners' rights by the Supreme Court for the near future. The purpose of this Article is to examine the lower federal court decisions rendered in the period since Wolfish to determine whether judicial relief remains available in the federal system for prisoners' claims. To do so, it will be necessary first to explore the evolution of judicial intervention in correctional reform during the 1970s and the relationship of Wolfish to earlier Supreme Court decisions influential in defining the scope of judicial intervention in prison administration.

The California Career Criminal Prosecution Program One Year Later

Abstract: several important areas. Concurrent with these efforts, the state legislature enacted the Career Criminal Act' in 1977. This legislation appropriated approximately $6 million of general state funds to establish special career criminal prosecution units (CCP units) to prosecute these individuals who qualify as career criminals. This program continues to receive strong state support.2 More recently, in its continued effort to assist prosecutors and law enforcement agencies, the state legislature passed legislation establishing the California Career Apprehension program in eight jurisdictions.3 Modeled after LEAA's successful Integrated Career Apprehension program, this program provides approximately $2 million to local law enforcement agencies to help structure their decisionmaking and service-delivery activities in order to apprehend serious career offenders. Although this paper will focus on the results achieved by the CCP program, it is important to view this program in the context of the changing attitudes and policies occurring in California's criminal justice system. The State Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP) is responsible for establishing and monitoring the CCP program. During the first year, twelve of the largest counties in the state developed CCP units. These twelve units are the subject of this article. Later, in 1978 and in 1979, another nine counties received LEAA funds to operate CCP units within their district attorney's offices. Together, approximately $4 million in state and federal funds were committed to the twenty-one project sites. These units are located in the following counties: Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Ventura, Stanislaus, San Joaquin, Yolo, Santa Barbara, Marin, Solano, Imperial, and Pla-

Investment of Prosecution Resources in Career Criminal Cases

Abstract: Justification for a career criminal program rests on several basic assumptions: (1) that a small number of offenders (habitual criminals) account for a disproportionate amount of crime; if these& offenders were imprisoned, crime would be reduced significantly;'I (2) that habitual criminals are distinguishable from "routine" offenders who commit fewer and less serious offenses;2 (3) that once an habitual offender is identified, his case can be singled out for increased prosecutorial effort; and (4) that this special handling will enhance the probability of conviction and, perhaps also, the length of prison time received by the convicted offender. The research reported in this paper initially concentrates on the third premise that career criminal units increase attorney time devoted to the handling of habitual offenders. The findings were drawn from a larger study deriving case weights for the prosecution of adult felony cases in Los Angeles County, California.4 In that study, case weights were defined as the average amount of attorney time spent on a criminal case, holding constant the type of offense and disposition. Weights were calculated independently for both the career criminal unit and the routine caseload. A summary of the methodology used in the Los Angeles study is provided in the second section of this paper. The third section of the paper presents (1) case weights for the prosecution of career criminal and noncareer criminal cases; (2) the distribution of attorney time, broken down by the activity with which the attorneys were engaged, for career criminal and noncareer criminal cases; and