Journal•ISSN: 0167-2681
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Elsevier BV
About: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is an academic journal published by Elsevier BV. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Population & Incentive. It has an ISSN identifier of 0167-2681. Over the lifetime, 5652 publications have been published receiving 251818 citations. The journal is also known as: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Topics: Population, Incentive, Economics, Competition (economics), Public good
Papers published on a yearly basis
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TL;DR: The economic theory of the consumer is a combination of positive and normative theories as discussed by the authors, which describes how consumers should choose, but it is also described how they do choose, and in certain well-defined situations many consumers act in a manner that is inconsistent with economic theory.
Abstract: The economic theory of the consumer is a combination of positive and normative theories. Since it is based on a rational maximizing model it describes how consumers should choose, but it is alleged to also describe how they do choose. This paper argues that in certain well-defined situations many consumers act in a manner that is inconsistent with economic theory. In these situations economic theory will make systematic errors in predicting behavior. Kanneman and Tversey's prospect theory is proposed as the basis for an alternative descriptive theory. Topics discussed are: undeweighting of opportunity costs, failure to ignore sunk costs, scarch behavior choosing not to choose and regret, and precommitment and self-control.
5,099 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the ultimatum bargaining games with two players and two stages were investigated. But the authors focused on situations with two agents and two stage bargaining games and only one agent has to decide and the set of outcomes is restricted to two results.
Abstract: There are many experimental studies of bargaining behavior, but suprisingly enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on every stage of the bargaining process only one player has to decide and that before the last stage the set of outcomes is already restricted to only two results. To make the ultimatum aspect obvious we concentrated on situations with two players and two stages. In the ‘easy games’ a given amount c has to be distributed among the two players, whereas in the ‘complicated games’ the players have to allocate a bundle of black and white chips with different values for both players. We performed two main experiments for easy games as well as for complicated games. By a special experiment it was investigated how the demands of subjects as player 1 are related to their acceptance decisions as player 2.
4,332 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that political competition fails to inform constituents of the costs of forgone political alternatives, which prevents the adoption of welfare enhancing reforms of public institutions and policies.
Abstract: Selection of efficient institutions or policies in politics requires constituents to estimate the net benefits of political reforms. Political competition fails to inform constituents of the costs of forgone political alternatives. Ignorance of ‘political opportunity costs’ prevents the adoption of welfare enhancing reforms of public institutions and policies. The empirical record supports this contention.
3,134 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a cardinal utility theory with an associated set of axioms is presented, which is a generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory, which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability.
Abstract: A new theory of cardinal utility, with an associated set of axioms, is presented. It is a generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory, which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability.
2,962 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors suggest that the material norms on which judgments of well-being are based increase in the same proportion as the actual income of the society, and that raising the incomes of all does not increase the happiness of all.
Abstract: Today, as in the past, within a country at a given time those with higher incomes are, on average, happier. However, raising the incomes of all does not increase the happiness of all. This is because the material norms on which judgments of well-being are based increase in the same proportion as the actual income of the society. These conclusions are suggested by data on reported happiness, material norms, and income collected in surveys in a number of countries over the past half century.
2,883 citations