Showing papers in "Journal of Economic Theory in 1996"

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self-interested individuals can form or sever links, and show that there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the relationship between R. W. Shephard's input distance function and D. G. Luenberger's benefit function and point out that the latter can be recognized in a production context as a directional input distance functions which can exhaustively characterize technologies in both price and input space.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that every ANN-person game has the fictitious play property and has identical interests if it is best response equivalent in mixed strategies to a game with identical payoff functions.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a general model which encompasses virtually all models of the existing literature on information sharing as special cases, and show that in contrast to the apparent inconclusiveness of previous results some simple principles determining the incentives to share information can be obtained.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose several sensible properties defining the concept of income mobility and show that an easily applicable measure of mobility is uniquely implied by these properties, and they also show that the resulting measure is additively decomposable into the two sources listed above, namely, mobility due to the transfer of income within a given structure and mobility to economic growth or contraction.

TL;DR: In this article, the sensitivity of evolutionary models of learning to the specification of the matching mechanism was investigated, and it was shown that in symmetric 2×2 coordination games, the Pareto-efficient equilibrium, per se, is selected, rather than the risk-dominant equilibrium, as the probability of experimentation goes to zero.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined a two-sector endogenous growth model with general constant return-to-scale production technologies governing the evolution of human and physical capital and proved the existence, uniqueness, and saddle-path stability of the balanced growth equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this paper, a biological model is developed to determine the fittest attitude to risk with a fixed environment, the type maximizing expected offspring is selected This yields the expected utility theorem when translated into a criterion for evaluating gambles over commodities.

TL;DR: The authors generalizes equilibrium concepts for normal form games to allow for the beliefs of each player to be representable by a closed and convex set of probability measures, and the implications of this generalization for strategy choices and welfare of players are studied.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the class of increasing utility functions exhibiting all derivatives of alternating sign and found conditions for both mutual aggravation and mutual amelioration of risks when agents are mixed risk averse.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors axiomatically characterised a notion of freedom of choice and established a link between the notion of "preference for freedom" and Kreps' concept of preference for flexibility.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid, and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem.

TL;DR: In this article, a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities is developed and a new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the second-price auction has an equilibrium that is classically ex anteefficient, given general opportunities to invest in information about or enhancements of own valuations.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied indeterminacy and endogenous growth in a simple one-sector model of capital accumulation, endowed with inelastic labor supply, in which the presence of public goods creates positive externalities both in the production and the consumption sectors.

TL;DR: In this paper, a class of evolutionary selection dynamics is defined, and the defining property, convex monotonicity, is shown to be sufficient and essentially necessary for the elimination of strictly dominated pure strategies.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors considered repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players, and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the possibility of implementing two sets of stable allocations, by employing two types of mechanisms: a now-or-never choice process and a Gale-Shapley mechanism.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors extend Cho and Sobel's existence and uniqueness results for D1 equilibria of signaling games with multiple signals by specifying that types are drawn from a compact interval, and invoking a more general incentive monotonicity condition, due to Engers (Econometrica55(1987), 663-674) which extends the usual single-crossing property of one-signal models.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a model in which two agents share access to the same stock of a productive asset and study the implications of non-cooperative consumption behavior over time.

TL;DR: In this article, a one-shot, simultaneous-move bargaining game with partial commitments is studied, and it is shown that a player's equilibrium share of the cake is strictly increasing in her marginal cost of revoking a partial commitment.

TL;DR: In this article, an axiomatic approach to ranking lists of opportunity sets of the formO=(O1, …, On) on the basis of fairness is proposed. But the approach is restricted to two agents each of whom faces a finite set of opportunities.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate different refinements of subgame perfection, which rely on different restrictions on players' assessments, using a simple and intuitive independence property for conditional probability systems on the space of strategy profiles.

TL;DR: In this article, a sequential trading economy with incomplete financial markets and a finite number of infinitely lived agents is considered, and a specification of agents' budget sets is proposed, and the existence of an equilibrium for a regular class of economies is established.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a model of stochastic oligopoly with demand uncertainty where firms endogenously choose entry timing and conclude that the behavior of a dominant firm with a finite fringe can be approximated by Stackelberg equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the global behavior of the output equilibrium time paths in a two-dimensional overlapping generations model with productive investment and capital accumulation, where agents behave rationally and markets are competitive.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a cooperation-formation game in which players choose independently with whom they wish to cooperate in a given coalitional game, and players' payoffs follow a solution imposed on the game.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the Nash implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational solutions in the context of matching problems and show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors derived the least upper bound of discount factors of future utilities for which a cyclical optimal path of period 3 may emerge in the standard class of optimal growth models.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors prove a general existence theorem for equilibrium in a local public good economy with free mobility by extending Greenberg and Shitovitz's (J Econ Theory46, 1988, 223-236) approach Each jurisdiction's collective choice rule is the d-majority voting rule proposed by Greenberg (Econometrica47, 1979, 627-636) Spillover effects of local public goods, externalities due to the population distribution, and snob effects are all allowed.